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4.3 Approaches to New Technology  
Venture Growth 
Venture growth is currently an issue of strategic management or entrepreneurship – 
and of particular interest to policy. For the field of strategy the emphasis was and is on 
existing firms and business growth, but this makes insights to be transferred to firm’s 
foundation and early growth of new (technology) ventures problematic. 
Understanding the origins of new venture growth and why and how startups grow and 
become successful or even very successful firms (“promising startups”) is still one of 
the least understood aspects of entrepreneurship research. 
It is our conviction, in line with Bhidé [2000:11], 
“We cannot expect to derive a fool-proof formula or a ‘complete’ description 
for starting a profitable business.” 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs or the leadership team of young technology-based ven-
tures are being presented with a much larger “menu” or array of choices for decision-
making (opportunities, financing, etc.), at many points in time, than established firms. 
From a choice-taking perspective the critical questions become the following: a) Are 
there identifiable patterns of growth, technology, and financial choices for a particular 
industry or even industry segment? b) What factors shape or determine which choices 
are taken? c) Are these patterns related to venture productivity and performance 
(Equation I.2)? 
Furthermore, are the above questions to be differentiated for the various types of 
NTBF – RBSUs, academic NTBFs, EBSUs (ch. 1.2.6.1)? Do they differ with regard to 
initial (startup) financing, such as financing by bootstrapping, mixed private/loan 
financing, financing by private investors or venture capital investors? What is the role 
of the different types of markets for NTBFs (ch. 1.2.5.3; “economic markets” “policy-
driven markets”, etc. – Table I.15)? 
Under which circumstances do we have a transition of a growing young firm from 
“strategy logics” to formal “strategy-making”? How is the evolvement of strategy bound 
to the change of entrepreneurial leadership to management, if at all? 
Following Drucker’s third pitfall (4.2.3) one can say: Growth creates problems! 
There is evidence that the young firms’ growth dynamics, as a teleological process 
targeted at a given vision, mission and goal, may not be governed by a random 
process and this has stimulated scholars to investigate factors and put forward a large 
number of growth models. 
Each of these theories focus on explaining different aspects. There is no commonly 
agreed framework or theory for growth of startups. The frameworks are not mutually 
compatible or consistent. They do not agree on which (endogenous and/or exoge-
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nous) variables are the essential drivers of startup growth. Bhidé [2000:210] sug-
gested, for instance, that “the transition to a large enterprise requires greater hetero-
geneity of assets and functions and investment in administrative infrastructure.” 
Most of the literature on the theory of the firm assumes a firm to be already in opera-
tion, but “mainstream economics has little to tell us about how and why some firms 
survive and grow and others do not.” [Bhidé 2000:242] 
What is needed is a conceptually grounded explanatory model allowing making sense 
of the extremely broad spectrum of findings in the technology entrepreneurship area. 
Such an approach to tackle the developmental processes found among new techno-
logy firms as they generate and increase revenues and build their employees’ base 
can only be fully illuminated by micro-data from case histories. 
In this line it is important to find out how the overall GST framework for technology en-
trepreneurship as the conceptual basis of this book can make use of gross aspects of 
common venture growth models and add insights on the structural and processual 
levels – and raise further research questions. 
Teleological, future-oriented GST models would imply that it is the purpose or final 
goal of the founder(s) and their views of “success” that guides the development pro-
cess of a new firm. Hence, the developing entity is purposeful and adaptive to internal 
and external forces and events, and the process can be seen as a repetitive sequence 
of goal formulation, implementation, execution, evaluation and modification of interme-
diate goals or milestones or even distinct changes of goals (purposeful enactment). 
For our context, the explicit consideration of economic recession for firms’ growth will 
illustrate important broader conceptual implications for reasoning and exemplify the 
general paths followed to generate statements like hypotheses, proposals, proposi-
tions or explanations. 
Figure I.2 and surrounding text has outlined that for statements with conditionals there 
is a need for care in making clear whether “reason why” or “reason for thinking that” 
relations illustrated in terms of antecedents and consequents are being stated. For in-
stance, “prediction” in chemistry refers often to properties and reactivities of molecular 
classes and exceptions (“single events,” “single data points”) explained a posteriori by 
a particular condition. 
In a related way, our growth models targeting expectations are often statements of 
that kind, for instance: the particular startup configuration let expect strong growth (> 
25 percent) over the next 4-5 years unless an economic recession prevents that. Or, 
the startup can be expected to show good growth (around 10 percent) provided the oil 
price will not fall significantly below $80 per barrel. 
Discussing NTBF growth we shall focus essentially on the time periods surrounding 
firm birth (Figure I.122) and its first eight to ten years of existence. The entrepreneurs’ 
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reasons and motivations to found a firm (ch. 2.1.2.5) and the ideas and opportunities 
they pursue (ch. 3) have been discussed in previous sub-chapters. 
However, growth of a new firm is not only a matter of the drive for achieving the goal, 
but also of the pace of development (Figure I.122) and attitudes toward resources. 
“But founders, not outside investors, should determine the proper pace of growth for a 
company. And a founder who is about to lose his or her life savings is far more likely 
to drive a company towards profitability.” “Landing equity money early on quickly leads 
to bad habits” and “bringing in outside money usually creates expectations of very ra-
pid growth.” In the end, creating a culture that emphasizes long-term profitability over 
rapid growth is critical for success.” [Wadhwa 2009] 
The author encountered the description of the above situation several times with 
founders as guest lecturers for his Technology Entrepreneurship curriculum (Box 
I.20). All the cited firms were LLCs and for the first ten years of existence under full 
control of the founder-owners who had invested much of their private money. 
Box I.20: How founders of NTBF with preferences for financial sources deter-
mine the pace of their firms’ developments. 
As Wadhwa [2009] says “Hungry companies figure out ways to keep eating because 
they don’t know whether there will ever be another meal.” 
We hear the same from WITec GmbH (B.2). WITec was funded with private money, 
which is not necessarily a bad thing, one of the founders (Klaus Weishaupt) said, 
because it creates pressure to make profits as soon as possible. “If the fridge is 
empty, the pressure is greater to make money than when you have millions from an 
investor to spend,” he said, adding that he does not want the company to get listed on 
the stock exchange anytime soon. “We don’t want to sell. It’s better when the profits 
go into your own pocket.” 
Corresponding statements are heard from one of the founders of Nano-X GmbH (B.2), 
Reimund Krechan. “Permanently, I have been addressed by venture capital firms, but 
so far I have rejected their offers,” Krechan said. “Money makes only lazy” (in German 
“Das Geld macht nur bequem”). 
“In hindsight, this scarce funding had also a positive impact as we had to focus on the 
essentials,” said Niels Fertig (founder of German Nanion Technologies GmbH), “we 
have learned how important it is to orient ourselves toward the market and not toward 
the investors.” 
(“Im Nachhinein hatte diese äußerst knappe Finanzierung auch positive Folgen, weil 
wir uns auf das Wesentliche fokussieren mussten,” erläutert Fertig. „Dabei haben wir 
gelernt, wie wichtig es ist, sich am Markt zu orientieren und nicht an den Investoren.”) 
And ChemCon GmbH (B.2) follows a strict strategy that growth (in terms of employees 
and office/laboratory space) follows cash/profit development; positive growth allowed 
expansion. (in German: Das sehr positive Wachstum erlaubte eine Erweiterung des 
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Teams um 10 Mitarbeiter bis zum Ende des Jahres). ChemCon’s principle from the 
beginning: continue to invest only if a new order was caught (“…weil immer erst dann 
investiert wurde, wenn auch ein neuer Auftrag vorlag.) 
A graphical reflection of this attitude is also seen for German Nano-X GmbH (B.2) 
after having bought a building in 2001. After having caught a big order for its products, 
Nano-X additionally bought the adjacent area for a new production hall and office. At 
first Nano-X increased the number of employees to then later execute the request 
(Figure I.137). 
Looking at growth of young firms is associated with perspective (Table I.64). For 
instance, the policy perspective (and expectation) is related to job creation (and 
growth). We shall take primarily a perspective of the firm and its founder(s) (and 
probably stakeholders). 
Indicators of Growth 
Development of a new firm can be tackled along several dimensions which character-
ize “input,” internal structures, events and processes in a (new) firm or relate to per-
formance and output, for instance, growth in terms of revenues or number of employ-
ees over time or interrelate both of these aspects (productivity, Figure I.130). 
Garnsey et al. [2006] have critically discussed the various indicators that can be used 
for observing and measuring growth according to relation to input, value and output. 
The most common ones are absolute figures of revenues and numbers of employees 
(ch. 4.1). Each is subjected to limitations. Employment figures are the most commonly 
used measure because they seem to offer standardized, comparable data on the rate 
and direction in which a firm has been expanding. But, developments of revenues 
(disregarding inflation effects over time) and numbers of employees are not necessar-
ily correlated. 
Absolute figures of revenues and numbers of employees, particularly with regard to 
NTBFs, may have special issues. To a certain degree it has become common practice 
of NTBFs to incorporate money (funds or grants) from public sources for R&D into re-
ported revenues. But, reliance on public grants or funds must be viewed as time-
delimited projects. If this money is used for temporarily hiring personnel and without 
knowing about this may easily lead to misinterpretations of an effect of the decrease in 
the number of employees. 
Depending on the situation the following discussions of NTBF developments will usu-
ally focus on “absolute years” for a time period or a sequence of individual years (for 
instance, 1997-2006 or 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008) rather than years of existence. Fur-
thermore, we shall usually consider 
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 Absolute figures of revenues and numbers of employees and 
 Productivity (revenues per employee), 
 For production-oriented firms also output-oriented indicators, such as pieces 
of items (devices, instruments) sold or produced, volume of material (pounds 
or kg, barrels or liters) or overall performance of items sold, such as produc-
ible power (cf. Figure I.150, Figure I.154). 
Getting data on revenues and numbers of employees is rather difficult, particularly for 
privately held firms. Except for public firms which are required to publish such data by 
law and according to standard accounting rules one has to rely on data collected by 
special for-profit firms, data reported to and published by the media or published by 
firm founders (in interviews). 
Hence, one is plagued with issues of missing data for timelines and reliability and 
quality of the data. And even official data, for instance, in annual reports sometimes 
vary – and it is well known that such data for a year to year may be distorted in the 
framework of accounting rules to fit corporate policy. 
Concerning growth rates we shall sometimes refer to the “Compound Annual Growth 
Rate.” Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) is a widely used mathematical for-
mula that provides a “smoothed” growth rate. CAGR is often used to describe the 
growth over a period of time of some element of the business, for example revenues. 
The compound annual growth rate is calculated by taking the nth root of the total per-
centage growth rate, where n is the number of years in the period being considered 
(Equation I.10). 
Equation I.10: 
 
   V(t0) : start value, V(tn) : finish value, tn − t0 : number of years 
 
In any case, specifically for a GST approach, understanding a new firm’s development 
requires taking firm-internal and external factors into account. Following the axiom that 
at any point in time, metrics of firm size change will show the firm undergoing growth, 
stability or decline and transition points between these expressions of development 
will indicate change of the firm from one state to another one, one may encounter 
problems of interpretation over a time period if economic recession is not taken into 
account. Its effect may show up in one or the other indicator or, worst, it may show up 
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as growth in one (in revenues), but decline in the other (employees) as is observed, 
for instance, for Novaled (Figure I.148). 
Growth discussions are especially critical if a sample of firms is considered using 
growth indicators based on “year of existence” (year = 1, 2, 3, …) of NTBFs. Any 
observation and related comparisons referring to “year of existence” may cut off any 
external effect with a relevant impact for growth a startup may be subjected to and 
compares or group together “apples and pears” and other fruit. 
Referring again to recession this could mean to group together startups with lacking 
necessary (external) financing during foundation, startups in their third year and 
almost no chance to catch customers due to the recessions and struggle for survival 
and “stable” NTBFs in their sixth year which just encounter a manageable reduction of 
revenue due to reduced orders of customer with conviction to overcome the recession 
and will be back to growth. 
Generally, recessions may lead to difficulties in interpreting just growth curves (reve-
nues or employees) which show setbacks (back to growth, plateauing; Figure I.107) in 
terms of firm internal problems or recessions or both. Additionally, revealing firms with 
delayed growth require careful examination of whether this is a reflection of slow firm 
growth in the early development phase or whether the situation reflects structurally 
effects of the firm, a characteristic of good or high growth hindered by recession and a 
rather long time for catching up to structurally appropriate characteristics – or just a 
favorable event that leads from a state with a medium or low growth to an “explosion 
of growth.” 
In addition to recession, there is a further environmental factor for (technology) entre-
preneurship one must be aware of, the situation of industry genesis which may show 
up in waves of segments, such as the chemical industry and particularly the synthetic 
dye industry or automotive industry [Runge 2006:266-269, 274-275]. Currently such 
waves occur in the I&CT industry and here particularly the hard- and software industry 
and the “Internet industry” – and also in CleanTech with the biofuels segment (A.1.1) 
Entrepreneurship in a segment of industry genesis usually has a special constellation 
concerning attracting entrepreneurs and financial backers as well as the government. 
This may induce a “push” for founding and funding affecting the early state of new 
firms compared to startups in other industry segments. 
Finally, to understand growth of new technology venture it is important to be aware of 
factors and their interrelations (Figure I.114, Figure I.115) which led to decline and ul-
timately closure of the firm. 
To proceed selected aspects of common growth models and their key fundamentals 
shall be discussed to reveal how to integrate them or, at least, put them into the con-
text of an embracing GST framework. 
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4.3.1 Life-Cycle Models and Stage-Based Views 
Life-cycle models [Bhidé 2000:244-259; Dorf and Byers 2007:459-465] similar to 
those of technologies and industries (Figure I.32) reflect stage-based views and sug-
gest that organizations evolve in a consistent and “predictable” manner. 
One widely-cited conceptual life-cycle work was published by Larry Greiner in 1972 
and 1998. His emphasis is on five continuous phases of growth (“stages of evolution”) 
interrupted by “stages of revolution.” A growth phase (evolution) is characterized by a 
particular style of management (Figure I.118). Each “revolution” is specified by a man-
agement crisis and the solutions that lead to the next phase of growth. The same or-
ganizational practices are not maintained throughout a long life span (Table I.68). 
The model’s phases cover explicitly the development of firms till maturity. However, in 
the context of entrepreneurship the main emphasis will be only on foundation, early 
and later growth phases which are the “S-part” of a development curve (Figure I.32). 
Greiner tackles key issues that are relevant for entrepreneurship as effects and 
organizational processes. 
Table I.68: Larry Greiner’s Five Phases of Business Growth [Greiner 1998]. 
Size: From Small to Large ↓ Life-Cycle (Age): From Start Up to Maturity 
Growth through  Crisis of 
Creativity  Leadership 
Direction  Autonomy 
Delegation  Control 
Coordination Red Tape 
Revolution: stages of crisis 
Practices become outdated. 
Companies that do not change 
will fold or cease to grow. 
Often solutions for one crisis 
become a major problem in the 
next crisis. 
Collaboration  
Generally, a stage-based view may be viewed as a “stimulus-response” mechanism. 
Stage-based models presume that development is achieved by firm-internal change 
initiated by controllable or even uncontrollable events or processes or intentionally 
initiated change by entrepreneurs/managers or responding to external effects (cf. US 
Osmonics [Runge 2006:91]; German Zweibrüder Optoelectronics (B.2); Google 
(Figure I.160, Figure I.163; Box I.24). 
An internal “event” could be the detection that the productivity of employees has de-
creased or grasping an opportunity and pushing a firm into a new direction. Funda-
mentally, in staged-based models new firm growth will be described in terms of some 
prototypical triggers affecting a stage and responses to initiate a new stage.  
Mostly related to entrepreneurs starting in niche businesses who initially do not face 
obvious growth opportunities an emphasis can be that by intention – and dissatisfac-
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tion with the status quo – entrepreneurs decide consciously to go for larger opportuni-
ties or change development direction and invest in broadening the offering line or be-
come active in another area of the value system [Bhidé 2000:252]. 
Drucker’s pitfall number three – outgrow your production (deliverables) capabilities, 
management capabilities (Figure I.118) – seems to provide a good rule of thumb for 
entrepreneurship for growing private firms and associated effects on the organization 
of the startup. Furthermore, its empirically founded occurrence after four to five years 
shows up when the early period of risk of failure of the startup has passed the 
maximum and decreases (ch. 4.2). 
But the new firm enters a first growth crisis. We look at the period of the new firm’s ca. 
four years of existence simultaneously as the “startup thrust phase” for “lift-off” (ch. 
4.3.2, Figure I.125) into potential growth of the startup. This shifts the focus to special 
organizational life-cycle (OLC) models for NTBFs. 
The “startup thrust phase” coincides temporarily largely with a definition of “early-
stage entrepreneurship activities” (Figure I.15) that covers a time span which begins 
with the initial communication of startup intentions, continues with the transition into 
active business as defined by the actual start of business activities (first sales 
revenues), and includes the ensuing survival or failure of the new venture. Thus the 
period covers the subject of nascent entrepreneurship as well as that of new venture 
survival/failure matching recent work [Keßler et al. 2010]. 
The paper of  Keßler et al. [2010] based on a model (not specifically for NTBFs) con-
sisting of the person, resource/environment and founding process forwards the basic 
assumption that characteristics of nascent entrepreneurship have significant explana-
tory power for founding success and new venture survival. 
Growth of a firm is associated with development of organization. Organization refers 
to structure (order of components/parts) and function (order of processes/activities) 
and coordination for the pursuit of a goal. 
Organization in firms is seen essentially as being determined by lines of communica-
tion and influence, authority or power as well as data and information flows through 
these lines of communication. Lines of influence/authority/power to structural compo-
nents of the entity will be superimposed by coordination among the structural and 
functional components. 
Corporate culture is usually seen as the basement of communication and coordina-
tion. Treating organizational development is often reduced to a special “one-dimen-
sional” aspect in terms of the organizational structure and management complexity. 
Malone [1988] defines coordination operationally “as the additional information pro-
cessing performed when multiple, connected actors pursue goals that a single actor 
pursuing the same goals would not perform.” (Emphases added) Coordination means 
extra organizing activities related to achieving a goal. 
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Boiled down to entrepreneurship and micro- or small firms this definition of coordina-
tion implies the following components: 1) a set of (two or more) actors, 2) who perform 
tasks, 3) in order to achieve goals. 
The common problems that have to do with coordination are [Malone 1988]: 
 How can overall goals be subdivided into tasks? 
 How can tasks be assigned to groups or to individual actors? 
 How can resources be allocated among different actors? 
 How can information be shared among different actors to help achieve the 
overall goals? 
 How can the different knowledge, education and professionalism and profes-
sional (special) languages be overcome and conflicting preferences of dif-
ferent actors be combined to arrive at overall goals? 
 How can we track and measure the level of overall goal achievement referring 
to a system of activities and sub-processes? (added by the author) 
These problems have been tackled partly in the discussion of the single entrepreneur 
(A.1.2) versus team constellations (ch. 2.1.2.5) and specifically entrepreneurial teams 
(Table I.41; Figure I.72, Figure I.73), but shall get more attention for entrepreneurship. 
A paper by Hanks et al. [1993] presents an effort toward an empirical taxonomy of life-
cycle organization-related stages in young high-technology organizations. In GST 
language, however, one would speak about navigation through a series of (system) 
“states” rather than “stages” each of which can be induced by a significant change or 
development challenge. 
Two aspects of particular importance for organizational change (the internal dynamics 
of growth) are “specialization” and “centralization.” Organizational specialization 
means how many functional areas exist in the firm so that at least one full-time em-
ployee fills the function. It should be noted, however, that specialization may be 
present already by functional roles at the start and in the very early phase of a young 
firm (Table I.41, Figure I.72). It may appear as a path from personal operational com-
petencies to corporate functions (and establishing the value chain). 
Formalization has been introduced as a further division of functional areas according 
to particular activities and professionalization, such as finances as financing versus 
controlling versus accounting. 
Organizational centralization was measured by Hanks et al. [1993] referring to a list of 
five decision issues and finding out the level of management that must approve the 
decision (authority/power) before legitimate actions may be taken. 
Cluster analysis has been used by Hanks et al. [1993] to derive empirically a taxon-
omy of growth stage/state architectures (originally called configurations) in a 1988 
sample of high-technology organizations (R&D intensity on average 3.1 percent) 
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reflecting a situation in 1987/1986. The derived architectures were interpreted as a 
sequence of four growth stages. 
The notion architecture in the context of a firm may represent various expressions of 
organizational structures (Table I.69) 79. It was proposed in this study that life-cycle 
stages could be defined and operationalized as unique architectures of organization 
context and strategy. 
However, one has to note that in the sample firms which are seven years in existence 
could be affected by two recessions and those of sixteen years even three recessions 
in the US (Nov 1973–Mar 1975; Jan–July 1980; July 1981–Nov 1982), if sales and 
growth rates are considered. Suffering from a severe recession may require up to two 
years to catch up to the growth level before the recession. 
Our interpretation of State I in Table I.69 is that it represents early growth until the 
“management crunch” after four to five years of existence (Figure I.118) reaching 6-7 
employees with organizational settings probably close to the startup architecture. The 
NTBF is still a “micro enterprise” (Table I.4). State II has emerged after having 
crossed the “management crunch” and having adopted a functional basis of the or-
ganization and further differentiation toward less centralization but more formalization 
(a small enterprise; Table I.4). 
State III having an average age of seven years similar to State II seems to represent a 
quite rapidly growing firm in terms of number of employees and sales with an opera-
tionally functioning manufacturing orientation and related necessary functional spe-
cialization, such as customer/product service, production planning and scheduling and 
quality control. 
State II and State III show comparable original productivity which is on average 
$59,200 sales per employee for State II and $59,000/employee for State III. And the 
proportion of number of employees per special functions is 7.0 (State II) versus 6.2 
(State III). However, the clusters differ markedly by level of centralization.  
Hanks et al. [1993] view their State III as a fast expansion stage of development and 
this may tentatively assumed to be associated with a transition from the stage of 
Direction in State II to Delegation in III in the sense of Greiner (Table I.68). 
The increase of number of employees above “25” would reflect a change of the firm’s 
organization in terms of communication including reporting lines and coordination 
following the “10 - 25 - 150” rule of thumb (Table I.72). 
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Table I.69: Growth states and related organizational features for young technology-
based firms [Hanks et al. 1993]. 
State I – Average growth in sales 
Relatively young, small, highly centralized and informal firm, focusing on the development 
and early commercialization of their technology-based product(s) 
Age 
(Years) 
Average 
Sales ($) 
Number of 
Employees 
Employee 
Growth 
Special 
Functions 
4+x 271,000 
(404,000) 1) 
6.46 29% 1.5 
(mainly R&D) 
 Organization 
Structure 
Organization 
Level 
Centralization Formalization 
 Simple Little (2.2) High Quite informal 
State II – Average to low growth in sales 
Appears to represent an expansion state of development; in addition to research and devel-
opment, specialized functions present in at least 50 percent of firms; include sales and ac-
counting, indicating that these firms are actively involved in the commercialization 
Age 
(Years) 
Average 
Sales ($) 
Number of 
Employees 
Employee 
Growth 
Special 
Function 
7.36 1.4 million 
(2.0 million) 1) 
23.64 94% 2) 3.4 
 Organization 
Structure 
Organization 
Level 
Centralization Formalization 
 Adopted 
generally a 
functional 
basis of 
organization 
Compared to 
State I firms 
an additional 
organization 
level (3.18) 
Still very central-
ized, but less so 
than in State I 
Little more 
formal than in 
State I 
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Table I.69, continued. 
State III – Good-growth in sales 
Firms are still growing quite rapidly. In addition to research and development specialized 
functions are present in at least 50 percent of the firms and include sales and accounting; 
include functionally also shipping and receiving, finance, purchasing, customer and product 
service, production planning and scheduling, quality control and payroll. This appears to in-
dicate expansion and increased professionalization, particularly in the manufacturing arm. 
Age 
(Years) 
Average 
Sales ($) 
Number of 
Employees 
Employee 
Growth 
Specialized 
Function 
6.6 3.7 million 
(5.5 million)1) 
62.76 28% 10.17 
 Organization 
Structure 
Organization 
Level 
Centralization Formalization 
 Employ a 
functional 
organization 
structure 
Average four 
levels of man-
agement 
Have the lowest 
centralization 
mean of all the 
clusters 
The second 
highest level of 
formalization 
State IV 
Specialized functions present in this architecture, over and above those present in the other 
states; include personnel, building maintenance, advertising, market research and inventory 
control. 
Presence of these specialists may suggest greater formalization of human resource programs 
and policies, cost control, and market expansion; a divisional structure has emerged in sev-
eral firms. 
They have overcome obstacles, such as a recession, and via healthy growth have achieved 
the status of a medium-sized firm. They have achieved the characteristics of Drucker’s forth 
pitfall (ca. $60 million with 300-500 employees after 8–14 years of existence (ch. 4.2.3; Table 
I.67; Figure I.143, Figure I.144). 
Age 
(Years) 
Average 
Sales ($) 
Number of 
Employees 
Employee 
Growth 
Specialized 
Function 
16.2 46 millions 
(69 million) 1) 
495 57% 2) 15.3 
 Organization 
Structure 
Organization 
Level 
Centralization Formalization 
   Centralization is 
low 
Formalization is 
the highest of all 
the clusters 
1) To make monetary values from 1986/1987 comparable with those observed for 2006/2007 
we assumed an average inflation rate of 2 percent, which is multiplying the original figures by 
1.49. 2) Not clear; due to the way of measuring growth, our emphasis will be more on absolute 
employee numbers. 
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State IV is characterized by a productivity (sales per employee) of $93,000. Hanks et 
al. [1993] put forward several limitations which hinders clear interpretation of State IV. 
But it may be tentatively associated with a further development of the high growth 
State III. The nearest comparable example to the situation of State IV could be the 
German SAP AG which after fifteen year of growth in 1987 had 468 employees and 
sales of €77.7 million (Table I.67). 
Other clusters revealed by Hanks et al. [1993] are notable characterizing essentially 
non-growth firms: 
While similar in size to Clusters A (State I) and B (State II), respectively, they 
are significantly older than their counterparts. Companies average 18.7 years 
of age, yet employ a mean of only seven employees. Employee growth is 
non-existent, actually declining slightly. These firms have virtually no speciali-
zation, less than two organization levels (1.71) and employ a simple organiza-
tion structure. Centralization is the highest of all the cluster groups and formal-
ization is lowest. These are old small firms. They are presently not growing, 
and appear to have their product(s) fairly well developed. 
This is in line with the discussion of “non-growth” NTBFs (ch. 4, Table I.63). For these 
firms entrepreneurs or owners, respectively, have consciously chosen to keep their 
firms small with a size of five to nine employees. The phenotype growth pattern corre-
sponds to that of the “Growth Setback – Plateauing” phenotype or  “Continuous 
Growth – Asymptotic” (Figure I.107). 
Specialization in terms of developing functions of startups may appear by more or less 
fast hiring of appropriately targeted personnel of an otherwise unsystematic hiring 
process during the startup’s development so far. 
For instance, Cisco System’s founders relied on improvised staffing for its first four 
years, but obviously ran into a “management crunch” (Figure I.118). John Morgridge 
“built the management structure” after he was recruited as President and CEO of 
Cisco in 1988 (Figure I.145, Figure I.158). He concentrated on hiring of “professional 
and experienced people in all the main functional areas – a Chief Financial Officer, a 
Vice President of Engineering, a Vice President of Manufacturing, and a marketing 
person” and recruited a professional sales staff. [Bhidé 2000:285]. 
Organizational development of NTBFs concerning specialization may follow a path 
from personal competencies and roles and activities of founders’ functions outlined in 
Figure I.72 and Table I.41. 
An illustrative development of internal and external organizational structures through 
specialization, leadership structure and networking during ca. nine years is given for 
the German NTBF IoLiTec GmbH (A.1.5; B.2). Furthermore, by the end of 2011 
IoLiTec achieved a status concerning the level of progression from R&D via piloting to 
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commercialization of offerings. One can also see how IoLiTec’s technology strategy is 
implemented in the firm’s state reflecting executing the strategy. 
Disregarding the environment, for instance, that business growth is determined by 
technology and market environment of its industry, as a summary of internal effects 
for the firms’ early growth one finds: 
 Problems tend to change with increased number of employees and sales 
revenue. 
 New functions emerge (specialization). 
 Structural hierarchy increases. 
 Formalized processes are established – for control (formalization). 
 Jobs become more interrelated. 
 Coordination and communication become more difficult. 
 Organizations that do not grow can maintain the same structure for longer 
periods of time. 
 Prior to change being possible the owner-managers need to develop skills 
and competencies in leadership, coaching and management before effective 
delegation and team building could take place. 
A growing firm needs “feeding” (ch. 5.2); it must draw in new resources to support 
growth, but it may face coordination and delivery problems and planning delays as it is 
very difficult to synchronize resources to requirements in a dynamic system.The need 
for internal coordination and resource allocation sets a brake on the rate at which 
business opportunities can be pursued. 
Start-up and early growth of NTBFs encounter several organizational challenges for 
growth. Parallel to increasing the number of hierarchies (organizational levels) rele-
vant changes include 
 The way of communication and the flow of information, 
 Individual working processes and their coordination, 
 The scope of tasks for employees, 
 Employee development (Figure I.121), 
 The felt extent of responsibility of the individual employee for the firm (commit-
ment). 
However, revisiting development of specialization in new firms requires lifting the as-
sumption that the new firm builds functions or functional activities only internally to get 
results of particular activities. In contrast to the notion “outsourcing” meaning transfer 
of existing activities or whole functions of a firm to external service providers we look 
into “outcontracting.” This will be understood here as an NTBF buying in “contract 
services” for functional activities or a “whole function” that are needed for the busi-
ness, but do not exist so far in the NTBF and will not be established in due course. 
Concerning the necessary activities of the startup a decision must be made between 
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“do-it-yourself” or “let others do it.” “Outcontracting functional activities” means addi-
tional and other kinds of coordination efforts. 
Gottschalk et al. [2007] found that ca. 87 percent of young firm of research-intense 
industry sectors “outcontract” functional activities in Germany. They found the fol-
lowing levels of totally or partially utilizing contract services: 
 Accounting (74 percent) 
 Payroll (57 percent)  
 IT Infrastructure (26 percent) 
 Production (24 percent) 
 PR/Marketing (18 percent) 
 R&D (15 percent ) 
 Distribution/Sales (12 percent). 
The vast majority of these contract services are done by domestic firms. The highest 
costs for outcontracting have been observed for outside manufacturing. 
Young German firms have various reasons for outcontracting functional activities 
[Gottschalk et al. 2007]. Only 47 percent of the firms put forward cost as an argument. 
The major line of arguments followed a longer term strategic decision to outcontract 
functional activities to concentrate on core competencies and activities. 
The insufficient endowment with personnel, technology and laboratory or pilot plant fa-
cilities, but also lack of experience in the context of application-oriented R&D projects 
imply that necessary scientific resources and research services, such as chemical or 
technical testing or engineering activities, must be purchased from external firms or 
research institutes to push the own R&D projects or to produce own products. 
For young high-tech firms it is important to gain or complement, respectively, the lack-
ing or insufficient technical and administrative infrastructure by external providers. 
Reasons for outcontracting are as follows [Gottschalk et al. 2007]. 
 Data security (16 percent) 
 Reduce risk (28 percent) 
 Lack of special personnel (33 percent) 
 Lack of personnel (44 percent) 
 Reduce cost (47 percent) 
 Get better quality (55 percent) 
 Gain flexibility (61 percent) 
 Access to technology and know-how (65 percent) 
 Focus on core competencies (97 percent). 
A particular interesting case of outcontracting is the German firm Xing AG (ch. 3.4.2; 
B.2). For starting his Internet company the founder who perceived the opportunity im-
plemented his business idea essentially by outcontracting a very large proportion of 
needed functionality from the beginning, in particular, software development. 
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Effects similar to directions of outcontracting in the US have been observed by 
Ardichvili et al. [1998] who looked into timing and sequence of startup teams’ delega-
tion of business functions in growing entrepreneurial ventures. 
In 1986/87 their  related study surveyed startups founded in the period 1979-84; and 
they repeated the survey in 1992/93. They found that there was no difference in the 
patterns of delegation of functions between manufacturing and service firms. Irrespec-
tive of the sales level and timing top level delegated functions included Accounting, 
Warehousing and Shipping, Production, Computer Systems, Purchasing and Person-
nel. 
Currently, for NTBFs with larger production facilities also “Quality Management” has 
become a very important formalization (cf. IoLiTec (A.1.5, B.2), Nano-X GmbH (Figure 
I.137; B.2), Novaled AG (Figure I.148; B.2), Heppe Medical Chitosan GmbH (B.2)). 
For NTBFs, also other kinds of specialization show up rather early – according to ap-
plications (IoLiTec (A.1.5, B.2), products or product groups and business lines (for 
instance (all described in B.2), WITec GmbH, Novaled AG; Zynga, Inc. (online games 
as products; ch. 3.4.1.1). 
Finally some facts with regard to resources and organizational development of start-
ups and NTBFs are to be noted. 
 Startups, particularly RBSUs, often need internal and also a distinct external 
organization in terms of networking and cooperation with universities and 
public research institutes (as exemplified by the IoLiTec GmbH case (B.2)). 
 VC-based startups and NTBFs usually get organizational structures of me-
dium to large firms imposed by the investors which may occur rather early 
(Novaled AG (Figure I.148),  biofuels NTBFs – A.1.1); 
NTBFs with management and organizational structures closely related to 
those of large firms are characterized by Bhidé [2000:4, 21] as “transitional 
firms” to indicate their way to become large firms. 
 Founders with industry experience in (very) large firms tend to set up early an 
organizational structure for the NTBFs that mirrors business and organiza-
tional processes they encountered with their previous employer (ATMgroup 
AG, Polymaterials AG; B.2). 
To inquire further into the details of NTBF growth complementing the sales and num-
ber of employees figures from Table I.69 one can refer to the study of Gottschalk et al. 
[2007] which provides averages of related indicators for German NTBFs (Table I.70). 
The data differentiate the high-tech area according to Table I.1, but do not differentiate 
initial funding and ownership (Table I.74). The data cover the 2001 dot-com recession. 
According to the study, only ca. 7 percent of the high-tech firms in Germany did not 
achieve any revenues in the first year after foundation. In the first year of business all 
firms of the sample had average revenue of €190,000 which increased to €840,000 
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after ca. six years in 2006. The extents of growth of revenues and employees depend 
on the industry segment of the NTBF. On average the firms started with three to four 
persons. 
Concerning employee growth after ca. seven years the firms had on average nine em-
ployees with five employees having a university degree; after ca. five years the firms 
had seven employees (see next page) roughly comparable with State I in Table I.69. 
Young technology firms’ growth during the first few years is rather strong with the 
growth rate decreasing significantly after four years. However, one must be aware of 
the fact that for startups high growth rates are often due to the low level they have 
started from. More realistic impressions would consider growth rate calculations to 
start with year four of the firm’s existence. This would be after the “startup thrust” 
phase (Figure I.125). 
The data of Cowling et al. [2007] reported for an NTBF sample from Germany and the 
UK collected 1997-2003 fit these findings: in the median firm in its 12th year there 
were 12 persons in Germany and 10 in the UK. 
Furthermore, for the NTBFs growth in sales is consistently larger than growth by em-
ployee numbers. That indicates the productivity (sales per employee) has continuous-
ly increased over the time period under consideration, probably due to learning ef-
fects. 
The data in Table I.70 show that after foundation on average revenues for NTBFs 
from the industrial high-tech areas TVT and HVT are considerably larger than those 
from the software and TBS areas. The yearly averages across the Dot-Com Reces-
sion shed some light on an recession’s impact and the issue of sampling for statistical 
descriptions of NTBFs, such as that of Hanks et al. [1993] 79 (Table I.69). 
Table I.70: Sales, number of employees and average growth rates of German NTBFs 
[Gottschalk et al. 2007]. 
Ave-
rages 
Sales 
Year 1 
1) ; 
1,000 € 
Sales 
2006; 
 
1,000 € 
People 
Year 1 
2) 
People 
2006 
3) 
Growth, 
Emp-
loyees 
Growth, 
Sales 
4) 
All 5) 190 840 3 7 (3) 24% 34% 
TVT 260 1,130 4 8 (3) 25% 34% 
HVT 350 1,530 4 10 (2) 29% 39% 
Software 140 480 3 6 (3) 25% 37% 
Other 
TBS 
160 670 3 7 (4) 22% 32% 
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Table I.70, continued. 
Year 
Started  
 
1998-
2000 
210 1,270 4 9 (5) 13% 28% 
2001 170 740 3 7 (4) 17% 34% 
2002 190 690. 3 6 (4) 18% 40% 
2003 220 760 3 6 (3) 23% 50% 
2004 170 650 3 6 (3) 39% – 
2005-
2006 
150 260 3 5 (2) 60% – 
Growth rates are actually calculated in terms of a CAGR formula (Equation I.10). 
1) Sales in first year of business; 2) Number of full-time employees; 
3) Total employee number and employees with university degree in parentheses; 
4) Foundation years 1998 - 2003; 5). For acronyms cf. Table I.1. 
In addition to the above outline on NTBFs’ growths the following observations were 
made for German NTBFs. With regard to the foundation dynamics NTBFs differ al-
ready during their early years by their development paths [Creditreform - KfW - ZEW 
2009]: 
Most young technology ventures exhibit only little economic activities. Except 
for the founding persons there are rarely additional employees. Except for the 
year of foundation there are no further investments and neither a product nor 
process innovation is launched. 
They probably represent largely RBSUs characterized (for the UK) as a “spin-
out becoming one of the ‘living deads’ with little prospect of success.” They 
have limited growth and hence, become the ‘living deads’ rather than disap-
pear completely [Fyfe and Townsend 2005] – They are “non-growth NTBFs.” 
For a second group of NTBFs’ foundation indicators for development reflect a 
build-up process which, after some time, comes to an end (cf. Clusters A 
(State I) and B (State II) text below Table I.69): Growth in terms of number of 
employees and volume of investments slows down and the NTBF does not 
launch additional new products or processes. 
Technical developments concentrate on updates or improvements (pheno-
type: growth setback – plateauing, back to (low) growth or asymptotic growth 
(Figure I.107) – they are “marginal NTBFs.” 
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The third group of NTBFs comprises firms which in their core domain exhibit 
high activities. Over several subsequent years they show high growth rates in 
terms of number of employees, they launch new products or processes or is-
sue high investments (innovation and investment persistence; ch. 4.2.3, 
Figure I.117) in expansions or renewal of their capacities. The related pheno-
type could be assigned to “continuous growth or growth setback – back to 
growth” or even non-linear exponential growth (Figure I.107) – they are 
“promising NTBFs.” 
This grouping is in line with data in Table I.63 and associated text, which is: most 
NTBFs start small and stay small, having roughly between twelve and fifty employees 
(Table I.69). A general analytical description of the developments is displayed in 
Figure I.155. 
The above grouping is also reflected by a study of German NTBFs founded in incuba-
tors with entrepreneurial teams, the survey’s population being from 2007 [Zolin et al. 
2008]. Accordingly, all firms with an entrepreneurial team are rather small. On average 
they have twelve employees, 80 percent of them achieved less than €2 million in reve-
nues and 82 percent report a balance sheet total of less than €2 million. Since no firm 
in the sample exceeds €50 million in sales or a balance sheet total of €43 million, 
according to Table I.4 the sample can be classified as reflecing a sample of small and 
medium-sized enterprises mainly consisting of micro firms. 
Though not strictly related to technology ventures, a rough “80:20” rule seems to be 
also applicable for mid-sized firms. An investigation of 1,300 German mid-sized, 
usually family-controlled firms [Fröndhoff 2008] and comparisons with the 180 firms 
(14 percent) showing the strongest growth revealed that the top firms have growth 
rates of 10 – 39 percent, far exceeding the others (ch. 4.3.6). 
Concerning the proportion of NTBFs with growth or fast growth characteristics, in line 
with general results from GEM (ch. 4.1), a recent US study [Stangler 2011] found for 
new (technical and non-technical) firms, for instance, that about two-thirds of job crea-
tion came from young firms, many of which were small and never got much bigger. 
Only a small number of firms creates a disproportionate share of such additional jobs; 
these are the top-performing firms. According to the study 
 Measured by employment growth, in any given year, the top-performing 1 per-
cent of firms generates roughly 40 percent of new jobs. 
 The top 5 percent of companies (measured by employment growth) creates 
two-thirds of new jobs in any given year. 
 The fastest-growing young firms (between the ages of three and five years) 
account for less than 1 percent of all companies in the economy, yet generate 
10 percent of new jobs each year. 
The “average” firm in the top 1 percent contributes eighty-eight jobs per year. The 
large majority of these companies end up with somewhere between twenty and 249 
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employees. On average, fast-growing young companies create about twenty-seven 
jobs per year, with most growing to a size of about twenty to ninety-nine employees. 
The average firm in the economy as a whole adds two or three net new jobs per year 
[Stangler 2011]. This has also been described for NTBFs in Germany (ch. 4.3.1). 
Importantly to note, however, many of the jobs created by these fast-growing firms will 
disappear. Most of the companies in the top 5 percent and top 1 percent are young 
and so susceptible to failure even if they have been creating jobs. That means pro-
moting fast developing, high-growth companies will not guarantee the creation of sus-
tainable firms. Three or four years later the business may fail and the jobs disappear. 
Specifically, controlling for industry sector and ranking on the Inc. 500 lists, it was 
found [Markman and Gartner 2002] that extraordinary high growth – in terms of sales 
and number of employees – was not related to firm profitability (cf. also LinkedIn 
Corp., ch. 3.4.2.1, B.2). 
Venture capital and large private investment are viewed in the US to be important for 
the development and growth of certain firms. However, it does not appear to be uni-
versally important for creating high-growth companies. 
Of several hundred fast-growing companies on the Inc. list over the last decade, only 
sixteen percent ever received a venture capital investment (cf. also the German 
situation, Table I.24, Table I.25, Figure I.54, Figure I.55). Venture capital, moreover, is 
highly concentrated in just a few sectors, but high growth companies can be found in 
nearly every sector of the economy [Stangler 2011]. 
We assume that foundations of technology-based firms are roughly a quarter of all 
foundations (Table I.2). But young, high tech firms create a greater percentage in-
crease of net new jobs than do the other categories of young firms [Kirchhoff and 
Spencer 2008]. Hence, we propose that job creation by NTBFs can be approximately 
related to a kind of “80:20” pyramid displayed in Figure I.119. 
From a point of view targeting practice providing rules of thumb, similar to Drucker’s 
pitfall No. 3 (ch. 4.2.3), and in a context of a stage-based view of firms’ growth one is 
led to search for approximate time lines with development-related “markers” for 
NTBFs, keeping Bhidé’s [2000:247] basic approach into account that “does not try to 
force empirical regularities into a recurring temporal sequence.” 
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Figure I.119: The inverted pyramid of growing NTBFs related to employment contribu-
tions according to a rough 80:20 rule. 
For instance, all the previously described observations suggest the following tentative 
time-related markers (Table I.71) concerning revenues for NTBFs with founders 
having full or majority ownership and full control of the venture (Table I.74) – unless 
significant firm-internal or external events interfere strongly with the development. The 
attribution also takes productivity (revenues per employee) into account. 
Table I.71: Approximate time-markers for NTBFs with above average growth (non- 
VC-controlled startups). 
Years of 
Existence 
Revenue Number of 
Employees 
Average Growth 
Rates *) 
4 - 5 $400,000; €300,000 7 - 8 Year 2: 60% 
5 - 6 $1.6 mio.; €1.2 mio. 9 Year 3: 50% 
7 $5.5 mio.; €4.1 mio. 30-60 Year 4: 40 % 
15 - 17 $50 – 70 mio. 
€37 -52 mio. 
500 Year 6: 30% 
*) Estimations using data from Table I.70. 
Other time markers for such kinds of NTBFs can refer to three rules of thumb reflect-
ing organizational issues of young firms (Table I.72). 
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Table I.72: Approximate time-markers for development phases of NTBFs without VC 
participation and control via an implemented management. 
 Drucker’s third pitfall, the management crunch after 4-5 years (Figure I.118) for 
startups without a professional management team – and the NTBF having  9-11 
employees; 
 Fourth pitfall, the “Let go” issue (Figure I.118) after 10-15 years and ca. $60 million 
revenues (Table I.67, Table I.71); 
 The “10 - 25 - 150” rule of thumb relating the number of employees to organizational 
issues, particularly related to leadership/management, specialization, communication, 
coordination and delegation. 
 
The “10 - 25 - 150” rule of thumb, covering essentially the ranges 8-12 or 20-30, re-
lates to the approximate number of employees of a growing firm or an overall range of 
8 to 30 employees without discrimination. It has emerged from various discussions 
with entrepreneurs and confirmed by several of those who contributed to the author’s 
Technology Entrepreneurship curriculum. For instance, in the time table of Attocube 
AG (B.2) one reads: “2005 >10 employees, introducing new organizational structures.” 
The situation inducing new firm structures was characterized by P. Klausmann [2011] 
by relating to communication and coordination issues: “You can gather up to ten 
people at one table to have a productive meeting.” And N. Fertig, founder of Nanion 
Technologies, explained: “Sticking points for organizational problems occur with ten to 
fifteen employees. Then, internal communications becomes the decisive factor for the 
future development.” (in German “Knackpunkte für Organizationsprobleme treten bei 
zehn bis fünfzehn Mitarbeitern auf. Dann wird die interne Kommunikation zum ent-
scheidenden Faktor für die weitere Entwicklung.” [Fertig 2012:Slide 42]. 
The rule relates to typical thresholds associated with necessary adaptation of the or-
ganization and its infrastructure to changed conditions of growth. The “10-threshold” is 
in line with Drucker’s “management crunch” in year four to five of a new firm having on 
average seven to nine employees and Greiner’s “revolutions” (Table I.68). 
Overcoming these thresholds requires time, energy and money (including conflicts 
with employees and partners or stakeholders). According to Weber [2002] the ability 
of large groups or organizations to coordinate 12 people successfully (ch. 4.3.2) 
represents a certain threshold of efficient coordination per se. 
The “10 - 25 - 150” rule of thumb is corroborated also considering growth of a startup 
in terms of the number of employees and associated expansion of building facilities. 
This means relating “communication intensity” (probability of communicating at least 
once per week) of the firm’s employees in relation to separation distance in meters be-
tween the employees. Accordingly, communication intensity is ca. 30 percent, de-
creasing to 15 percent for a distance of 5 meters and converging to 12 – 10 percent if 
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10 meters are exceeded. The last measured distance was 80 meters [Ulrich and 
Eppinger 2000:Exhibit 14-12]. 
Concerning the “25 threshold” we hear from Niels Fertig (Nanion Technologies GmbH, 
B.2) when the firm founded in 2002 after seven years had 30 employees: “We now 
have reached a size which requires new structures (in German “Wir haben jetzt eine 
Größe erreicht, bei der man neue Strukturen braucht.”; cf. also Table I.90). 
Lars Hinrichs, the founder of German Xing AG (ch. 3.4.2.1; B.2), pointed to another 
relevance of the number 30 for firm development. During the early phase of Xing he 
held regularly meetings with his employees every Friday. Every employee was moti-
vated to speak out, what went well and what went wrong – and to make suggestions 
for betterments. This worked until the group reached the number of thirty as a 
threshold because with more people no longer everyone could or would speak up. For 
more people in the firm corresponding meetings were organized by department in a 
face-to-face manner or for distributed departments via video conferences. 
According to the above view one can assume that the “30 marker” more or 
less ends a startup’s state of organizational success as an outcome of a dy-
namic organization-wide and all employees embracing process. 
It is notable that, for instance, Autio [2005] interconnects the “25 threshold” to “high-
expectation activity” which is attributed to “all startups and newly formed businesses 
which expect to employ at least 20 employees within five years’ time.” His rationale: 
achieving the size of 20 employees is not simple (cf. also Solazyme – Table I.90). 
Firms of this size, typically, will have a developed internal specialization, identifiable 
management roles and some separation of ownership and employees, in the sense 
that not all employees are also owners of the company. 
Several entrepreneurs the author spoke to mentioned that the “twenty-five employees 
threshold” has shown up as a dip in the firm’s productivity chart (revenue per em-
ployee). Crossing successfully the “twenty-five employees threshold” has been identi-
fied as inducing a period with a rather long lasting organizational stability – unless 
other factors like recessions interfere. 
An economic recession may show up every 5-10 years (with predictable oc-
currence, but ignorance when it will occur and with what intensity). Further-
more, a recession requires usually other qualities of leadership/management 
than a “normal” growth phase. In particular, it may turn an NTBF’s state into 
“survival mode.” 
Hence, a recession does not only affect the financial state of the organization, 
but also the organization in terms of management, control and execution. 
The “150 rule” has been put forward, for instance, by Sonnete [2011] through a social 
hypothesis, which covers also the “10 - 25” part: The brain size constrains the size of 
social networking (by group size) which requires memory on relationships and social 
skills. And the human brain can only remember 150 meaningful relationships. 
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Indeed, evolutionary anthropology suggests a hierarchy of social networking accord-
ing to the number of sub-group members [Sonnete 2011]: Support Clique (ca. 3-5 
members), Sympathy Group (ca. 10-15), Camp (ca. 25-30), Village (ca. 130-180) and 
Tribes (ca. 500-1,000). This fits also with the organizational hierarchy of the army with 
Sections (squads) (10-12 soldiers), Platoons (of 3 sections, ≈ 35 soldiers), Companies 
(3-4 platoons, ≈ 120-150 soldiers) and Battalions (3-4 companies plus support units, ≈ 
550-800). 
The “150 threshold” is also seen in Microsoft’s (Table I.67) and Xing’s (B.2; Figure 8) 
productivity data. 
Gladwell [2000] also remarks upon the unusual properties tied to the size of social 
groups. Accordingly, groups of less than 150 members usually display a level of inti-
macy, interdependency and efficiency that begins to dissipate markedly as soon as 
the group’s size increases over 150. This concept has been exploited by a number of 
corporations that use it as the foundation of their organizational structures and market-
ing campaigns. 
Staged models mostly emphasize the fit between the design of the organization and 
growth stage. Growth is considered to distort the balance between the design of the 
organization and the stage of growth, and the task of leadership/management is to re-
store a balance. In this sense, the models are also metamorphosis models, as the 
organizational architecture of the firm needs to be changed for each stage. 
The above patterns do not generally apply to VC-based NTBFs and NTBFs striving for 
large scale productions. Here, the following rules of thumb may be useful (Table I.73). 
Table I.73: Approximate time-markers for developments of VC-based and production-
oriented NTBFs. 
 Venture capitalists assume that “lemons” ripen in two or three years, but the “pearls” 
take seven or eight. 
A new business rarely establishes itself in less than three or four years. 
 Developing a company of sufficient size out of a new business development (NBD) 
initiative of a large firm will take five to eight years [Runge 2006:464]. 
 A seven-eight years requirements is also often observed in non-technical areas, e.g.  it 
took FedEx eight years from idea to become operational [Bhidé 2000:168-185]. 
 For (existing) companies observed for a period of almost a century it took 6-11 years to 
transform laboratory results into mass production [Runge 2006:654-655]. 
This seems also to be the case for NTBFs (cf. Nanophase Technology (Figure I.140) 
and biofuels startups – A.1.1). The related phenotype of growth corresponds often to 
that of “delayed growth” (Figure I.107). 
However, delayed growth may also be associated with an “unexpected event,” such as 
a political interference as in the case of US firm First Solar (Figure I.154) and the 
German firm Enercon GmbH (Figure I.150; B.2) or due to firm-specific development 
issues, as observed for US Closure Medical [Runge 2006:98-103]. 
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As a summary, staged approaches do have the merit of making observations of firms’ 
dynamics with regard to revenues and number of employees as growth indicators – 
and combining both into productivity. However, without observations at the firm level, 
the mechanisms and processes of growth remain obscure. 
Disregarding VC-based startups with their stage (“series”) approach (Table I.27), “life-
cycle and staged models” fail to adequately account for the great variety in the man-
ner in which new technology-based firms grow. Moreover, comparing developments of 
“Ford versus General Motors” there appeared “great differences in how the two 
competitors developed their assets and routines, and in the role of their founders.” 
[Bhidé 2000:245-247] 
VC-based NTBFs follow often the VC-staged process (Table I.27) for (anticipated) 
growth which is structurally related to the Stage-Gate® (PhaseGate) process for inno-
vation in large firms (ch. 1.2.7.2 Figure I.76, Figure I.180). In large firms intrapreneur-
ship is often following strict phased processes with decision points and a restricted 
number of progression paths for innovation, NPD or NBD processes. Here, the proto-
type is the Stage-Gate® process (Figure I.79, Figure I.180).  
Moreover, the early phases of a new product development project (which is concept 
generation and product planning) are commonly acknowledged to play a central role 
in the success of product innovation of large firms. Early decisions are unlikely to be 
changed during downstream phases, unless high costs and time are experienced. 
They have therefore the highest influence on project performance. 
However, early analysis and problem-solving is also a difficult task, because the ne-
cessary information and insights are not available until one gets into detailed design. 
Most companies are locked in this dilemma between anticipation (anticipating deci-
sions in the early phases of product development, where influence on performance is 
substantial) and reaction (delaying decisions to downstream phases, where informa-
tion and opportunities are manifest). 
A structurally similar situation is also found for startups. Though for a large part of new 
technology ventures developments seem to evolve in a phased manner following 
“stimulus-response” mechanisms and representing particular states of the firm the ab-
sence of prototypical initial startup constellations and conditions in stage-based mod-
els and the absence of predetermined development paths precludes so far some com-
mon features in the growth of NTBFs. 
4.3.2 The Initial Architecture and Initial Configuration 
The startup constellation represents a key for entrepreneurship as the basis for further 
development of the firm and its assessment by others (“observers,” particularly finan-
cial backers). It will generate expectations concerning the development or even gener-
ate expected values for the firm (,for instance, financial projections of VCs). 
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In line with the GEM model (Figure I.15) we assume this constellation to be preceded 
often by a  “pre-startup” phase comprising linking idea generation and revealing op-
portunity and conceptualizing the firm (Figure I.125). In the GEM-approach (Figure 
I.15) the pre-startup phase covers activities of the “potential entrepreneur” and the 
“nascent entrepreneur.” 
The diaries of the German firm Suncoal Industries GmbH (B.2) provides a lucid insight 
into the pre-start phase of an NTBF. 
Basically, one must differentiate the founding success and the survival of the new firm. 
We shall denote the one to four years period after firm’s foundation as the “startup 
thrust phase” (Figure I.125). Our discussion will follow an approach focusing on the 
founder person(s), resources and environment as well as the founding process. Here 
the vision and mission of the founder(s) (ch. 2.1.2.7) are important for building the firm 
and expectations. 
Previous research suggests that the initial choices of the entrepreneur or the team 
have a lasting impact on the way the company evolves. In particular, they may facili-
tate self-reinforcing mechanisms (ch. 2.1.2.5), positive feedback mechanisms, by 
which a system’s conversion processes and output (Figure I.5) or states are enhanced 
or brought into a more favorable situation. 
For instance, group formation is often associated with processes of system’s develop-
ment by self-reinforcement and self-enforcement (ch. 2.1.2.5). Early decisions refer-
ring to intangible and tangible resources (Table I.8) will be important (ch. 4.2.2). 
The discussions so far emphasized the fact that startup and NTBF development will 
be affected not only just by financing, but also by associated issues of ownership and 
control of the new firm. Correspondingly, initial architectures of NTBFs must be differ-
entiated – by one of several classes of taxonomy given later in Table I.74  and Figure 
I.128 – to discuss the various NTBF developments adequately (cf. also A.1.1.6). 
Initial resource endowments – the stocks of resources including the founders’ experi-
ences (ch. 2.1.2.4) that entrepreneurs contribute to their new firms at the time of 
founding – may explain the different life chances of new firms during start-up (cf. 
[Bhidé 2000; Klepper 2001]). In that way certain firms, such as spin-outs of industrial 
firms or serial entrepreneurs already control a relatively large productive base and 
some financial reserves at start. 
Initial financing and very early development will often rely on own resources and re-
sources of family and friends (3F) and significant cash flow (Table I.23, Table I.24, 
Table I.25). 
And there is a number of NTBFs which were started because the founders had al-
ready customers (notable cases cited in this book are ChemCon GmbH (B.2) and 
PURPLAN GmbH (Box I.21) whose founders started as consultants or engineering 
planners, IoLiTec GmbH and Solvent Innovations GmbH (A.1.5), WITec GmbH (Table 
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I.41, Figure I.123; B.2) and US Cambridge Nanotech ([Yang and Kiron 2010], Table 
I.80; B.2) , SAP AG (A.1.4) and Concept Sciences, Inc. (CSI; Box I.11). 
Furthermore, family and family members may not only provide financial resources (3F, 
ch. 1.2.7) or buildings/land to the entrepreneur, but also other business-related sup-
port and advice or other commitments as observed for William Henry Perkin in Britain, 
the “father” of the synthetic organic dye industry (A.1.2.), ChemCon GmbH (B.2) and 
Nanopool GmbH [Runge 2010]. 
Additionally, the Family & Friends System (ch. 1.2.2, Figure I.16, Figure I.17) may pro-
vide emotional support and role modeling. For instance, spouses with similar or com-
plementary talents, skills or education (for instance, commercial rather than technical 
orientation) may enter the startup of the entrepreneur full- or part-time, as described 
for the role of spouses of the US firms Osmonics, Inc. and Avery Dennison [Runge 
2006:91-94, 474-477]. Spouses also founded Cisco Systems in the US (both with IT 
competence; Figure I.145) or in Germany ATM Group AG (B.2), CeGaT GmbH 
([CeGat 2011], B.2) and OHB AG (end of ch. 2.1.2.4). 
Hence, many entrepreneurs owe much of their success to parental education or inher-
ited or won family contacts. WITec GmbH could take advantage from two factors. One 
of the founders, J. Koenen, got a loan from his father-in-law who also served as a role 
for being self-employed (Table I.41). 
Special family-related cases occur if entrepreneurial activities sprout out of existing 
firms of the family. One case concerns business succession. Another case is “branch-
ing” or “specialization” of a family-owned firm. For instance, the German startup 
“Heppe Medical Chitosan GmbH” providing nano-chitosan as well as high-quality and 
high-purity chitosan and chitosan derivatives for medical and cosmetics applications is 
run by Katja Heppe (now Katja Richter), whose parents run the company Heppe 
GmbH. The parents’ firm produces among other things chitosan for industrial paper 
and textile applications. 
Chitosan is a natural product, a linear polysaccharide, which is produced for commer-
cial use from the shells of shrimps and other sea crustaceans. It is one of the most 
important renewable raw materials of the world, cellulosics being the most important 
one. 
At the startup phase the founders’ aspirations, ambitions, experiences, competencies 
and skills are crucial to the company’s growth, as are financial and business re-
sources. But, potentially interconnected to financing aspects, the initial startup setting 
is influenced by the fact whether the startup will strive for large-scale production or 
whether the characteristics of the opportunity requires fast development for entering 
the market. 
 662 Chapter 4 
Large-scale production requires tremendous amounts of capital. To be successful a 
rule-of thumb says: For markets with short product cycles the time till market entry is 
important, for longer product cycles cost of production is critical. 
For the startup the environment of the NTBF is relevant, for instance, statuses and 
developments of technology, existing or emerging functionally equivalent technologies 
and industry (segments, markets and competition, and other relevant systemic in-
fluences). Therefore, the entity of inquiry will be the initial configuration which covers 
the startup’s initial architecture (ch. 1.1.2; Table I.5). 
Technology entrepreneurship may be compared with an across country auto 
racing with a starting point and various initial conditions, but with a given 
finish. At the start there are cars with various technical and design features 
having a driver or driver team with various capabilities and experiences. But to 
reach the finish (goal) there are several courses with various hindrances, bar-
riers, ups and downs as well as bumpy or smooth roads and an environment 
affecting the course, for instance, wind and rain making the course slippery. 
And there will be gas stations to get needed power and cross-roads requiring 
a decision to follow the planned route or changing direction. The “starting con-
stellation” of the entity determines the momentum for “lift-off” and then deci-
sions will have to be made which route to follow initially (the “expected path to 
success”) and in which manner (“action and execution and speed”). 
A complementary metaphor can focus on the start of an aircraft: A runway is used for 
preparation and then there is a needed thrust for the departure of the aircraft (lift-off). 
All that is in the aircraft’s “potential”; and sometimes there may be an additional mo-
mentum, for instance, wind from behind (for instance, reflecting a startup having al-
ready customers on foundation, as described above). 
The metaphor concerns the “startup thrust phase” (Figure I.125) which may cover a 
one to four years period with the startup and the founder(s) having their new firm 
steam up (Figure I.122). 
For those NTBFs which started with having customers the thrust phase will be very 
short, probably one or two years. The startup thrust phase of NTBFs will be as-
sociated mostly with characteristic “average” growth rate patterns (Table I.70, Table 
I.71) reflecting “acceleration” to lift-off. The startup thrust phase must be differentiated 
from the “scale-up period” of new firms with large-scale production which usually takes 
six to eleven years until product launch into the relevant market (Table I.73). 
If vision is where the entrepreneur wants to arrive at (ch. 2.1.2.7), culture is 
the foundation he/she can get there (cf. also Table I.43). 
In this context of direction, execution and control Reid Hoffman, co-founder of 
LinkedIn (ch. 3.4.2; B.2), made some recommendations for entrepreneurship [Kaiser 
2004]: 
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“Smart people tend to think that they can execute on a complex plan. Executing on a 
complex plan is generally a recipe for failure. If you can’t make a startup work on a 
simple plan then your chances of success are very low. 
Another lesson is that as an entrepreneur you want to choose a project that is far 
enough away from what others are doing. You want as much distance from other 
players so that you have the opportunity to create something. 
The last thing I would add is that you want to measure your endeavor as soon as 
possible. You want to be able to gauge the viability at the earliest possible moment, so 
that you can change and adapt your model as needed. 
Entrepreneurs tend to want to launch only when their product or service is perfect. 
The problem is that waiting undermines the ability to evaluate whether the idea works 
as quickly as possible, so that you can correct course. Correcting course frequently is 
key to success.” (cf. overshooting, Figure I.88) 
Creating Firm Culture and Developing Employees 
In Silicon Valley, it is often said that the founder is the startup. 
One of the components of initial resource endowments of NTBFs, being also a differ-
entiator, is corporate culture which plays an important – though generally hidden – 
role. It emerges in the first few years of the startup. Particularly as an intangible asset 
a unique culture offers an advantage over competitors. It will affect product design, 
prototyping and realization, hiring practices and the values empowering employees to 
live the mission [Lowry 2011]. 
Usually it is assumed that the entrepreneurs play the key role in shaping corporate 
culture which is “intrinsic” to the initial architecture. Focusing on the founders we put 
forward a model of corporate culture to be formed essentially by a self-replicating pro-
cess. Figure I.120 illustrates this for “behavioral patterns” as the important and ob-
servable expression of culture. 
Self-replication is any process by which an entity will make a copy of itself – usually by 
distinct steps increasing the number of entities by one or more. The important ingredi-
ents to such a step comprise entrepreneurial leadership by example, influence and 
employee development (Figure I.141). Establishing behavior and “how things are 
done here” through “leading by example” (“walk as you talk”) is a characteristic of 
many CEOs of Hidden Champions (ch. 4.1.1). 
Metaphorically, assuming the founder(s) to determine the DNA for behavioral patterns 
can be compared with gene expression, which is the process by which information 
from a gene is used in the synthesis of a functional gene product. 
An NTBF usually starts with up to five persons. That means shaping culture starts al-
most from scratch with the entrepreneurs/owners driving its direction. There is mostly 
one “leader” who has the greatest influence – usually the founder or the “primus inter 
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pares” of a team. Disregarding situations were only two persons form the new firm, the 
model of a self-replicating system can start with a three-person constellation. 
 
Figure I.120: Development of firm culture expressed by behavior of a firm’s leader or 
founder by a self-replicating system. 
Whereas Figure I.120 refers to a pattern-related process of firm culture evolution an 
interpretation of this process takes the following route. A small group, such as the 
founding members of a firm, does not face substantial difficulties in coordinating effi-
ciently. Once they have done so, they can establish a set of self-reinforcing rules or 
norms either tacit or formalized governing what actions and behavior are appropriate. 
These norms allow the group or organization to continue to successfully coordinate 
activities. 
As the group grows, new entrants’ exposure to these norms allows the entrants to be 
aware of the appropriate behavior and creating an expectation for everyone in the 
group of what everyone else (including the new entrants) will do. Therefore, relatively 
slow growth and exposure of new entrants to the group’s previously established 
norms can overcome large coordination failure. 
The missing part of this interpretation is the “new employee” (“entrant”) of the firm, 
which is associated with the firm’s hiring process. A complement to the interpretation 
could tentatively refer to a “targeted selection” process which is ubiquitously applied 
by large firms for hiring activities focusing on a primary facility (a technical, commer-
cial or administrative/managing specification) and a secondary facility of importance 
and additionally “needed to have” or “nice to have” competencies or personal traits 
and overall fitting with the corporate culture. 80 
 Chapter 4 665 
Creating NTBF culture is the leader’s responsibility to drive employee development by 
a directing or supporting style according to the employee’s status of competence and 
commitment (Figure I.121). Leadership focusing on people in startups will emphasize 
influence rather than power as a means of assertiveness and execution (influence > 
attitudes > behavior; ch. 1.1.2).  
Delegation and transfer of responsibility to the individual employee increases the level 
of identification with the firm. The leader’s goal must be: 
Keep the corporate culture across growth processes. 
The human resources philosophy of 3M made in 1948 can serve as prerequisite of the 
interconnection of employee development and firm growth: “As our business grows, it 
becomes increasingly necessary to delegate responsibility and to encourage men and 
women to exercise their initiative. This requires considerable tolerance. Those men 
and women to whom we delegate authority and responsibility, if they are good people, 
are going to want to do their jobs in their own way.” [McLeod and Winsor 2003] 
It is interesting to note that Greiner’s staged model of firm growth and associated style 
of management (Table I.68) for growth of the firm also emphasizes directing and dele-
gating as emphasized for leadership style for (individual) employee development in 
Figure I.121. 
 
Figure I.121: Leadership styles for employee development referring to employees’ de-
velopment levels. 
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Self-reinforcing mechanisms as described above occur specifically in the context of 
coordination (ch. 1.2.1, 2.1.2.5; Table I.8, Figure I.73). There is ample evidence in ex-
periments on coordination games that what a team did previously is likely to become a 
self-reinforcing norm about what to expect in the future. Game theorists have also 
recognized that organizational culture is one way in which a precedent helps select an 
equilibrium by reinforcement. 
Based on game-theoretical experimental settings with group sizes of 2 – 16 
persons it was shown [Weber 2002] that the ability of large groups or organi-
zations to coordinate successfully is critically affected by the group’s growth 
process itself. Consistent with previous experimental research, coordination is 
much easier in small groups. It was shown that, even though coordination 
does not occur in groups that start off large, efficiently coordinated groups can 
be “grown.” This corroborates also the interpretation of self-replication. 
The experiments, indeed, indicated that efficient coordination in large groups is pos-
sible when groups start small and then grow slowly (coupled with the exposure of new 
entrants to the group’s history). Moreover, the early failure of groups in the growth 
sessions of Weber’s experiments appeared to produce an instance of the common 
view in the business world that firms can “grow too fast.” 
Following Kaplan [2003b] skills related to building the firm’s culture comprise 
 Leadership (ch. 1.1.2; Equation I.1): ability to build consensus in the face of 
uncertainty 
 Communication: ability to keep a clear and consistent message 
 Being a good team player: knowing when to trust and when to delegate 
 Decision-making: knowing when to make a decision. 
Trust, competencies and commitment will always be the foundation of success 
through leading decision-making and related courses of actions and execution (Figure 
I.111, Figure I.117). However, the starting point is always beginning with communica-
tion to ensure understanding of the vision and mission (ch. 2.1.2.7) and agreeing on 
common priorities. 
Hence, 1) the leader must share his/her goals and objectives with the staff. And, after 
having a concept of activities and operations and specification of tasks in place he or 
she must 2) clarify coordinating instructions and 3) explain control and how to 
measure level of achieving objectives – having success (ch. 4.1). 
Building consensus means achieving agreements among a set of possibly very di-
verse people. Building consensus is in the context of risk and uncertainty (ch. 4.2.1) 
and making decisions (ch. 4.2.2) at the right time. The expected result is that every-
one of the new firm is aware what his/her role and job is and what he/she contributes 
to success. This implies to continuously check whether the firm’s operations (Figure 
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I.5) have generated value and, moreover, whether value creation has been achieved 
efficiently. 
Communication based on explaining what is and why what to do is a key capacity to 
influence someone else’s behavior as compared with one’s own behavior. In the con-
text of entrepreneurship and building consensus among all the people of a startup it is 
advantageous to refer to operational facets related to each individual’s decision pro-
blem in the context of objectives introduced by R. Ackoff. 
Ackoff’s suggestion as cited by Runge [2006:341] is concerned with the valuation of 
the objectives, the possible courses of action and the efficiency of each course of 
action in achieving each objective and the individual’s probability of choice for each 
course of action. Accordingly, there are three effects of communication with a related 
basis, options and results referring to individual behavior and actions: 
Motivation: Values of the objectives 
Information: Possibilities of choice of the available courses of action 
Instruction: Efficiencies of the available courses of action. 
Information usually affects a person’s mental state of cognition. Instruction refers to a 
finite number of actions to achieve a result which, as the simplest case, may proceed 
sequentially, but will become complicated through conditional branching options or 
loops. An everyday example of an instruction is the “cooking recipe.” Motivation is the 
major effect leaders should focus on. 
Concerning operations, behavior and social interactions corporate culture in large 
firms develops for new employees usually quite differently. Here one often observes 
three paths: 
 Official and Codified: 
“Manuals”; for instance, Operations Manual, Office Manual etc. (on paper or 
the firm’s Intranet); spelled out by supervisors 
 Official and Not-Codified: 
Expected behavior; “tacit,” rarely spelled out 
 Unofficial & Not Codified: 
Do’s and Don’ts; individual leaders’ approaches to coaching and supporting. 
This means, it takes rather long (and is costy) before a new employee has learned not 
only about the firm’s offerings and strategies, but also the culture. 
Initial Architecture and Initial Configuration with Corporate Culture 
Given 
The notions architecture and particularly configuration for (technology) entrepreneur-
ship (ch. 1.1.2; Figure I.16, Figure I.72, Figure I.73) are fundamental if we are looking 
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for that “footprint of a firm” which may be sufficient to understand, explain and make 
statements about what can be expected from a firm’s development. 
According to GST the architecture is always related teleologically to the founder’s 
goals interconnected with his/her aspirations and expectations. But there are various 
routes for the firm founder to reach the goals (Figure I.122). Accepting bounded ra-
tionality (ch. 4.2.2) the founder may not necessarily be aware of all the paths that are 
possible. As a reflection of competitive situations for startups striving to reach the 
“same goal” the systems view implies that there may be, for instance, 
 (Almost) identical architectures having different initial configurations (think of 
startups in different countries, think of different input material as is observed 
for the biofuels industry – A.1.1). 
 Initial architectures that may differ, for instance, just using generic technolo-
gies. 
 Different architectures which will usually follow different paths (such as vari-
ous conversion processes); 
however, at a particular “cross-roads” (Figure I.122), one architecture may 
switch to a path of another one; think of the many processes in biofuels when 
an initially thermochemical route switches over to a bioengineering process, 
becoming a hybrid process (A.1.1.3; Figure I.175). 
 But, different architectures can generate the same value for firms and thus 
would not provide competitive advantage. 
The initial configuration (Figure I.122), structurally initial architecture plus environment, 
depends essentially 
 on the industry’s or economy’s situations like a recession or a “bubble” or the 
start of a new industry and 
 on the market level and type, whether foundation is oriented toward a mega-
trend, a niche, requires building a market (disruptive innovation strived for) or 
start in a policy-driven market or mediatorial market (Table I.15). 
Entrepreneurship in an area of industry genesis represents a special initial configura-
tion for an NTBF (ch. 4.3.5; Figure I.143, Figure I.144, Figure I.145) and is often asso-
ciated with the phenotype of “exponential” growth (Figure I.107). 
Financing is a key component of a startup’s architecture. Initial financing of techno-
logy-based startups often begins before the formal incorporation of the new firm. It 
begins during the pre-startup phase (Figure I.52, Figure I.125). 
The “pre-startup phase” covers a time span which begins with the initial communica-
tion and discussions of startup intentions, driving forward related specific scientific or 
technical inquiries and continues until the formal foundation as a legal entity that has 
been authorized to operate by a state or other political authority (“incorporation”). 
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After firm’s foundation there is the startup thrust phase which coincides essentially 
with the phase of “early stage entrepreneurial activities” covering the first 3.5 years 
after formal firm’s foundation according to the GEM model (Figure I.15). 
Incubation of RBSUs (ch. 1.2.6.2; Figure I.) represents a particularly illustrative 
example of financing toward formal firm’s foundation. Concerning availability or gath-
ering of resources the pre-startup phase may overlap partially or totally with an 
incubation phase, which, on the other hand, may also extend into the startup thrust 
phase (Figure I.125; ch. 1.2.6.2; Figure I.). 
Independently from sources of financing (Figure I.52, Figure I.59, Table I.30) one 
should take the statement given by a “bioentrepreneur” as a general recommendation: 
“The key thing I have learned over the past six-to-seven years is the impor-
tance of having enough cash in the bank. ... I have learned that it is a good 
strategy to raise money, even when it is not needed, so that there is always a 
sufficient cash cushion for when the market is uncertain.” [DeFrancesco 2004] 
Initial financing as one basis of pursuing the business opportunity is a key component 
of the startup’s (initial) architecture and configuration (ch. 1.2.7). As founders’ attitudes 
(and goals) toward financing in relation to control/ownership of the new firm differ the 
initial financing structure is an important factor and issue when addressing a firm’s 
development and growth. 
For proper discussion we shall introduce a taxonomy for financing of NTBFs (including 
initial financing) according to ownership and control by founders as given in Table I.74 
(cf. also Table I.30). Control affects essentially leadership/management and strategy 
or strategy logics, respectively, and, hence, decision-making concerning the firm’s 
development or growth path and pace. Initial NTBF configurations may show initial 
financing according to all these types. For instance, a large number of biofuel startups 
started with venture capital (A.1.1). They are “VC-based startups.” 
Obtaining massive amounts of venture capital or capital from an IPO does not neces-
sarily mean loss of control. For instance, due to a dual class structure of common 
stock, a Class A share may be accompanied by five voting rights, while a Class B 
share may be accompanied by only one right to vote, or vice versa. Also dissection 
into three classes is observed. 
A detailed description of a company’s different classes of stock is included in the 
company’s by-laws and charter. In this way the founders of the US firms Google (Box 
I.24), Groupon, Zynga, LinkedIn and Facebook (ch. 3.4) retained control over their 
firms. 
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Table I.74: Taxonomies of financial structures of technical startups’ initial architec-
tures in terms of ownership and control by founders and related typical sources for 
financing. 
(Almost) Full 
Ownership, 
Full Control 
Majority Ownership, 
Almost Full Control 
Minority Ownership, 
Little (almost no) Control 
Examples (any combinations or left out of one or more of the given components) 
Bootstrap; 
Cash flow; 
3F + Bank loans; 
3F + bank loans + 
“angels” + public R&D 
projects 
3F, cash flow; bank loans + 
public R&D organizations (e.g. 
universities’, research insti-
tutes’ ownership in exchange 
for IP) + CVC + angels + silent 
partnerships of (public) 
investors or even VC 
3F + VC +CVC + private 
large-scale investors 
(“VC-backed startups”) 
The vast majority of NTBFs fall into the two groups in which the founders’ control over 
the firm is retained (over the first ten to twelve years of their existence). VC-based 
NTBFs account for no more than 5 percent of all the NTBFs (Table I.23, Table I.24, 
Table I.25). Their economic significance results particularly from the number of jobs 
they generate for the national economies (ch. 1.2.7). 
We shall consider VC-based startups always as a class of NTBFs where venture 
capital firms or corporate venturing companies exert control over the firm. Sometimes 
there are firms which may have venture capital from investors or companies, but con-
trol remains with the founder(s), such as the above mentioned companies (Google 
etc.) or in Germany CeGaT GmbH (B.2) or Gameforge AG (ch. 3.4.1.1, B.2). 
The transition from of a fledgling business or NTBF to a well-established medium-
sized or large company is associated with fundamental transformations. If a startup 
becomes a VC-based NTBF the associated change from leadership and management 
roles of the founders does not only mean a change to professional management 
(Figure I.118), but usually also a switch to approaches of Management Science and 
Technology and Innovation Management (TIM, Figure I.1) with formalized structures 
and work processes, such as New Product Development (NPD), New Business Deve-
lopment, PhaseGate innovation processes (Figure I.79, Figure I.134, Figure I.180) etc. 
Particularly, approaches, visions and leadership/management style of a CEO estab-
lished by VCs – usually persons with one or two decades of experience in relevant 
positions in large firms – may clash with that of a founder taking a CTO or CSO 
position as observed for Amyris Technologies (Table I.99; A.1.1.5). 
In line with phased models we assume that the paths of the startup to reach its goal 
are interrupted by “transitions of one into another state” with a certain period of dura-
tion (ch. 4.3.4), the “transition states.” These are depicted as squares in Figure I.122 
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and occur as “crises” in Greiner’s model (Table I.68) or “adaptations” in Bhidé’s 
[2000:22] view. Transition states will “relax” to new states which will be “dynamically 
stable” characterized by a new configuration until the next “interruption” occurs. 
Additionally, it is assumed that 
the “transitions” and associated development phases are distributed uneven 
and usually not foreseeable for the whole path to sustainable growth. 
“Interruptions” of a firm’s development are initiated by events, happenings or “pertur-
bations.” And we regard a “firm event” (or “firm happening”) as any effect from inside 
or outside of a purposeful system with a positive or negative impact on reaching the 
organization’s goal(s) or keeping the organization’s current state. 
If these events or happenings become aware to the organization’s control system (for 
instance, the firm’s leadership or management team) they will require to make de-
cisions how to proceed to reach the goal(s). Here, it is to be noted that for purposeful 
systems the principle “one cannot not decide” applies. This means, even no decision 
will have an effect on the firm’s further development (ch. 4.3.5.1). 
 
Figure I.122: Relating initial configuration with associated architecture and variability 
of paths to goal achievement for NTBFs. 
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Usually unpredictability of specific growth paths is assumed to be due to the increas-
ing complexity of the firm as it grows. But, moreover, a purposive system like a firm 
must always exhibit choice of alternative courses of action (Table I.6), a choice of 
paths. The mix of tangible and intangible resources required for growth is rather pre-
cise, but shortages of any one resource, for instance, by a recession, can create bot-
tlenecks with knock-on effects. 
Apart from consideration of goals there may be requirements of pace for the growth of 
a startup. Pace can be defined by the entrepreneurs themselves (Box I.20). But in 
case of external financings there may be pushes for pace (or urgency) by investors or 
lenders. Another criterion for pace and speed up will be a conscious decision to 
compete against another large or small firm on pace if the entrepreneur knows that 
the  particular competitor has a slowly moving organization, for instance, a bank 
[Hoffman 2007b]. 
Hence, pace or urgency as a driver of development may have an influence on the 
decision concerning the path to be followed to reach the goal. 
On the other hand, Bhidé [2000:61] pointed out that there may be a number of start-
ups which have no clearly defined goals, but follow an approach of adaptation to 
emerging or revealed opportunity: One third of the Inc. 500 sample entrepreneurs 
changed their initial concept. 
Additionally (ca twenty years ago) 41 percent of the Inc. 500 entrepreneurs had no 
business plan at all and 26 percent had just a rudimentary plan [Bhidé 2000:54]. 
For technology ventures, however, one can assume that the situation has drastically 
changed. One can assume that currently the vast majority of the related technical 
startups have clear goals and plans (and will use a business plan). But there continue 
to be successful foundations without explicit and formal planning documents and are 
based essentially only on purposeful action (German PURPLAN GmbH, Box I.21). 
Box I.21: Jump starting a company by finding, attracting and binding customers 
rather than writing an explicit business plan or doing detailed planning 
[Wintzenburg 2009; PresseBox 2012]. 
The German NTBF PURPLAN GmbH was founded in 2003. It had revenue of €14.2 
million, 114 employees and 15 apprentices in 2011 and had revenue of ca. €18 million 
with ca. 120 employees in 2010 and an export rate of ca 50 percent (in 2009 €10.6 
million and 120 employees; 2008 data: ca. €16 million and 103 employees; 2007 data: 
80 employees, 2006 data: ca. €7 million and 65 employees). Since the year of 
foundation revenues have increased by a factor of ca. eight. 
PURPLAN plans and constructs complex plants for storing and refining liquid sub-
stances – many of which are water-contaminating or inflammable, such as MDI and 
TDI and polyols for polyurethanes, hardeners, binding agents, pentane, solvents or 
glues. PURPLAN with a distinct focus and targeting consequently a niche in estab-
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lished markets has been recognized by the German National Founders’ Award as one 
of the Top-Climbers (Box I.17). 
PURPLAN carries out demanding tasks combining high-tech-planning and precise 
workmanship and executing its contract jobs through project teams in which engineer-
ing competence and practical project-handling skills complement each other success-
fully. Running successfully the interfaces between engineers, master craftsmen and 
craftsmen is PURPLAN’s core competency. 
Usually, there are firms which are good with planning or good with fast and cost-
efficient construction, but only few can combine both areas. The interface is very 
difficult to manage. Characteristic features of all PURPLAN plants are holistic system 
solutions, high user comfort, quality and pronounced safety systems. In the area of 
automation programming is performed and software-solutions are compiled which 
meet the most sophisticated requirements. 
PURPLAN has two mid-aged (ca. 45 years old) engineers as founders and firm’s 
foundation resulted from frustration. One of the founders, Andreas Sandmann, was an 
employee and engaged considerably for fifteen years in building a machinery firm. 
However, in the end his boss rejected to delegate more responsibility to him. 
Sandmann wanted to shape more, wanted more decision-making authority and more 
reward. 
Fully upset by this situation he decided to leave the firm and founded together with a 
colleague, Oliver Schawe, the firm PURPLAN – without a business plan, credit and 
starting capital. Their major “capital” was experience and contacts and networking. 
The team just called potential customers by phone (“cold call”) and caught the first 
orders for selling a plant for production of polyurethane foams – via sub-contractors. 
At the beginning they just wanted to plan the plants. But with an increasing number of 
orders growth started and customers suggested that they themselves build the plants 
– and they started PURPLAN. In retrospect Sandmann’s conclusion was: “I now reap 
the fruits of several years of employment. This would not have been possible immedi-
ately after leaving the university.” 
This path of experience-based entrepreneurship starting with not much planning to 
change over to production compares with starting with consulting (ChemCon GmbH, 
B.2) and focusing directly on customers without much explicit planning; and it is 
similar to the path the founders of SAP AG (A.1.4) followed. 
PURPLAN followed “opportunistic adaptation” [Bhidé 2000:18] which means without 
much effort to prior planning and research or only sketchy planning and rather high 
risk entrepreneurs adapt to unexpected circumstances in an “opportunistic” fashion. 
PURPLAN GmbH is one of the above mentioned NTBFs which almost from the start 
are involved in commercial activities and production-oriented firm’s foundation oc-
curred through initiatives of customers. Some key components of the initial architec-
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ture include the founders having industrial experience in the startups activities, the 
firm type being “other (academic) NTBF” (Figure I.122; Table I.2) and relying on 
unique core competencies (Box I.21). Firm developments followed an exponential 
growth until 2008, when the Great Recession began. 
As market entry by catching customers represent a key step and event for a startup 
and having already customers at the foundation provides simultaneously an emer-
gence of an initial configuration out of the initial architecture. 
Having orders and/or customers already at firm’s foundation is a special favor-
able initial configuration as it does not only provides revenues (and positive 
cash flow) from the beginning, but makes further planning of penetration into a 
largely known market rather reliable. 
Correspondingly, it will be much easier to attract external financing, if needed. 
The below Figure I.123 illustrates this situation for the case of WITec GmbH, which 
was founded as a university spin-out (firm type RBSU) by an entrepreneurial triple 
(Table I.41). Similar to PURPLAN growth of WITec in terms of revenues exhibits a dip 
when a recession (here Dot-Com Recession) occurred. Otherwise growth follows 
roughly a linear pattern. Though revenue data are still missing, WITec does not seem 
to exhibit a decrease of revenue in 2010 as most firms do during the Great Recession. 
A “full” description of WITec’s entrepreneurial configuration is given in Table I.80. 
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Figure I.123, continued. 
German WITec GmbH (from Ulm in Germany; B.2) started 1997 with a real cus-
tomer and some more customers with purchasing intentions and provided reliable 
expected values of profit data for 1998 [Koenen 2010]. This opened options to 
choose among three banks which offered needed loans for expansion (financial 
resource base). WITec’s initial architecture is additionally characterized by a favor-
able leadership team (Table I.41, Figure I.73) and resource building. 
Since 1998 revenues of WITec exhibited strong linear growth (squares represent 
real data, the dashed arrow extrapolates early revenue data). CAGR (Equation 
I.10) between 1998 and 2009 is ca. 29 percent. Since 2000 productivity of WITec is 
extraordinary and consistently around €271,000 per employee (configuration in 
Table I.80). WITec shows both innovation and investment persistence. 
WITec could finance its growth essentially from generated cash-flow (“organic 
growth”; Figure I.127). In 2010, however, it added non-organic growth to its strat-
egy. It acquired a majority stake of the Ulm company omt optische messtechnik 
GmbH which focuses on industrial process control. 
Figure I.123: Revenue development of German WITec GmbH. 
Similar situations of initial configurations (Figure I.124) when entrepreneurs start with 
customers with foundation of the new firm are the management buyout (MBO) and 
business succession (as described for Aluplast GmbH and KWO, B.2). A key differ-
entiator here is the architecture with regard to education and/or experience of the en-
trepreneur(s). Admittedly, business succession is rarely a “new firm.” It could be one, 
if the successor(s) reduces activities in the old business considerably and adds a new 
one or changes over to a totally new business model for the firm. 
If there is an a priori strong interconnection of the founders’ intentions and an explicit 
goal, there may be situations happening inside or outside the company that require 
changing the path. Furthermore, if the founders evaluate particular paths to be equiva-
lent so that they cannot decide which path to follow they find themselves in a situation 
of “experimenting” – probably by trial and error. 
The theme remains, but the way of implementation and execution changes. Then, it is 
of extreme importance to stick persistently to the vision and the essence of the goal – 
there must be goal persistence (Figure I.122). Take, for instance, the US company 
PayPal (A.1.7) that provides people the opportunity to pay online. Recently, payment 
by PayPal became also available for smartphones and PC-tablets. 
According to Wikipedia, PayPal, founded in 2000 as a merger of two startups, is an e-
commerce business allowing payments and money transfers to be made through the 
Internet (“e-payment”). Online money transfers serve as electronic alternatives to tra-
ditional paper methods such as checks and money orders. A PayPal account can be 
funded with an electronic debit from a bank account or by a credit card. The recipient 
of a PayPal transfer can either request a check from PayPal, establish his/her own 
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PayPal deposit account or request a transfer to their bank account. In October 2002, 
PayPal was acquired by eBay for $1.5 billion (ch. A.1.7). PayPal dominates e-pay-
ment globally. 
 
Figure I.124: Initial configurations for new firms having customers with foundation ex-
tended to management buyout (MBO) and business succession as an aspect of entre-
preneurship. 
According to Reid Hoffman who is also a co-founder of LinkedIn (ch. 3.4.2.1; B.2), 
over the years PayPal has made multiple significant pivots. The company started as a 
mobile encryption platform. Then it was a mobile payments company. Next PayPal 
was a combination of mobile and Web site payments company. Finally PayPal be-
came an email payments company. 
Each pivot over the life of the company was the result of rethinking the business but 
maintaining the vision. The focus was always to become a payments operating sys-
tem; but the nature of the operating system changed multiple times [Hoffman 2010]. 
Such goal persistence can show up when it is operationally possible to accept long-
term duration of developments to reach the goal (versus short-termism). 
Goal persistence will be intimately related to the reason why to become an entre-
preneur (Table I.39, Table I.40, Figure I.66), for instance, if the entrepreneur follows a 
vision or dream or wants to transfer science or technology into applications. In this 
case there is a directional relation to addressees, customers and markets. 
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On the other hand, if the driver of firm’s foundation is reflexive to the entrepreneur, 
such as wealth generation, having self-determined work or seeking challenges, rather 
than goal persistence entrepreneurship may follow a path of opportunistic adaptability 
(ch. 2.1.2.4) indicated as an option in Figure I.122. However, focusing on self-
determined work and independence without a clear direction following opportunistic 
adaptability may end up in a situation to be one’s boss for a business one is able to 
manage, but does not like or is not convinced of. 
Furthermore, goal persistence does not make sense, if the founders of a new tech-
nology venture recognize during the very early (“thrust”) phase of their startup that 
their business idea will not materialize. Such a false start requires an immediate 
change of business direction and redefinition of the business goal (“failing fast” princi-
ple [Runge 2006:787]). 
A corresponding situation is described for the 3M Corporation (ch. 1.2) or more re-
cently observed for the German startup NanoScape AG which appears currently as a 
provider of porous, nanocrystalline materials (particularly nanocrystalline zeolites) and 
a developer of tailored application solutions for the CleanTech markets. Customer 
orientation of NanoScape means modification of NanoScape’s materials to suit the 
needs of each individual application or adaptation of NanoScape technology to fit its 
customers’ processes. 
The road to the current orientation, however, was rather illustrating. NanoScape AG, 
founded in 2001, is a spin-out of Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich (Germany) 
and the Fritz-Haber Institute of Max-Planck Society in Berlin. It was highly awarded in 
a business plan competition and got much publicity in the media through its catalytic 
(nanotubes-based) process of producing styrene, a fundamental raw material for the 
chemical industry (with the prospect that the technology could halve the cost of mak-
ing styrene, targeting bulk chemical producers such as BASF, Dow and RoyalDutch 
Shell as customers) [NanoScape 2002; NanoScape 2005; Marsh 2003]. 
However, the original business orientation on catalysis and high-throughput technolo-
gies did not materialize which the founders realized soon. Due to the (dot-com) reces-
sion the founders encountered additional problems of financing. Hence, they ceased 
activities in the area of carbon nanotube catalyst development and some other active-
ties and repositioned their business model. NanoScape has so far survived on equity 
investments totaling less than €1 million. With 13 employees, it has built sales up to 
about €1 million in 2008 [Marsh 2008]. 
The NanoScape founders characterized their false start in the following way: 
“After an exciting jump start in the wrong direction NanoScape has now the 
right position to start toward a successful future.” 
(in German: “Nach einem begeisternden Frühstart in die falsche Richtung ist 
nun die NanoScape in der richtigen Position, um einer erfolgreichen Zukunft 
entgegenzustarten.”) [NanoScape 2005] 
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The additional lesson learned here is: Even being perceived as a high potential start-
up on the basis of a business plan assessment and gaining general recognition and 
much attention in the public are no secure basis and guide to establish a successful 
NTBF. 
The same can appear even to large firms. For instance, Dow Chemical won an R&D 
100 Award regarded by The Chicago Tribune as “the Oscars of Invention” for develop-
ing a new plastic material, ethylene styrene interpolymers introduced as INDEX® 
Interpolymers, which was a novel family of plastics. However, this “new-to-the-world 
plastics flopped” terribly [Runge 2006:280]. 
Expanding the Resource Base by Networking 
Finally, the role of networking providing resources for startups, not necessarily only for 
their initial architecture or configuration, has been described for the national innovation 
systems in terms of the concept of a “networked economy” (ch. 1.2.6, A.1.3; Figure 
I.39, Figure I.51). In its function to provide tangible (financial) and intangible resources 
to startups, such as access to analytical, testing or information services, corporate 
venturing (CV) arms of large firms (ch. 1.2.7.2; Figure I.125) are special. Corporate 
venturing, for instance, is not amenable to all kinds of NTBFs as CV follows either a 
strategic intent or specific interest in a particular technology and market(s). 
CV may appear as the lead investor who then increases credibility of a startup to 
catch also other investors. Additionally, access to resources like those of the investing 
firm, for instance, to analytical or testing services and consulting, is also possible by 
networking with universities or public research institutes, as described for IoLiTec 
GmbH (A.1.5) and in many other case studies (B.2). 
Variability of resources in a networked environment promises that there is scope for 
NTBFs to obtain leverage from financial resources (“smart money”) affecting access to 
other resources (ch. 5.2) and tackling different aspects of resource requirements of 
the NTBF. But there are also pitfalls. The startup’s leaders may not be aware of the 
gain of knowledge and experience of their (human) resources cooperatively involved 
with partners of the investing firm and, hence, may not fully leverage the (CV) re-
source from a strategic point of view. 
The other situation concerns the situation if the firm investing in the startup will be 
simultaneously a customer, which may look for customized products. This apparent 
advantage may turn to serious problems when the initially favorable configuration of 
having a customer (and also money) becomes flawed. 
For instance, as part of the business model of the US NTBF Nanophase Technologies 
(Figure I.140), the company expected its market partners to fund equipment that is 
primarily dedicated to produce their partners’ products – not just only providing equity 
and consulting and services with the characters of an alliance. 
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Figure I.125: Example of leveraged startup resources by networking with corporate 
venturing and academia. 
German specialty chemicals firm Altana uses Nanophase’s nanomaterial products as 
ingredients and additives for paints, coatings, polymers, plastics, inks and sealants 
under its NanoBYK brand. Altana made a $10 million equity investment in Nanophase 
during 2004. Altana also lent Nanophase $1.6 million to purchase and install nanoma-
terials production equipment during 2006 to support capacity requirements related to 
volume growth. 
Early, during 2000, also German chemical giant BASF loaned Nanophase $1.3 million 
to purchase and install production equipment to produce nanomaterial products for its 
Z-Cote brand (zinc oxide into sunscreen applications). In particular, the role of BASF 
as a customer of Nanophase turned out to be highly critical (Figure I.140). 
Apart from acquisition of an NTBF after corporate venturing into an NTBF (for in-
stance, hte AG, B.2) also a marketing and sales agreement with a large firm may 
ultimately lead to acquisition, if the alliance was viewed as a strategic partnership with 
the NTBF (Closure Medical [Runge 2006:99-101] or Solvent Innovation GmbH; A.1.5). 
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More “Interruptions” for NTBFs’ Developments 
What was widely observed in the past and also in the present for a startup’s initial 
architecture (for instance, in biofuels; A.1.1) is that its need of large investments often 
means a change of ownership to venture capital or similar investment firms with addi-
tional significant changes in leadership/management, fast increasing number of em-
ployees, organization and imposing urgency of development. 
Figure I.126 illustrates these situations, often for startups aiming at large-scale pro-
duction, referring explicitly to a VC case (cf. also Equation I.11). In this case not just 
the strategy of the firm to reach the firm’s goal may be changed, but even the original 
goal may be changed. 
 
Figure I.126: Leadership/management change and equity ownership/control changes 
inducing organizational implications. 
On the other hand, also changes of a startup’s leadership/management to profes-
sional management or persons with profound leadership/management experience in 
industry or large research institutes without affecting ownership and control may be 
associated with a notable change of organizational (and probably strategic) settings. 
Both effects can be expected to significantly influence development (and growth) of 
young firms, as does the “management crunch” (Figure I.118) for privately held 
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NTBFs (with full or majority ownership and control). We regard all such effects as 
relevant “interruptions” for new firm development. 
A further related notable effect of cash influx for the young firm’s development is a 
rather early IPO issuing public stocks which may or may not affect the majority stake 
situation. Going public of startups sometimes occur very fast, three to five years after 
foundation. Examples are the US Internet firms Groupon (founded 2008, IPO 2011; 
ch. 3.4), Zynga, Inc. (foundation 2007, IPO 2011; ch. 3.4.1.1; B.2) and Google 
(founded 1998, IPO 2004; Box I.24, Figure I.159) and German Xing AG (founded 
2003, IPO 2006; ch. 3.4.2.1; B.2). 
Basically, after initial financing and early commercial activities growth of NTBF may 
proceed along two different processes (Figure I.127): 
 Organic growth: 
Growth essentially by own resources of the firm (cash flow or ownership and 
control keeping financial options) 
 Non-organic growth: 
Growth through investment in other (micro or small) firms or acquisitions of or 
mergers with other (micro or small) firms. 
While developing organic growth resembles the same entity to wind up by persistent 
innovation and investment cycles to reach the goal(s). Non-organic growth resembles 
an independent loop initiated by investment in a different entity – a new asset. The 
value results from financial contributions and – hopefully – also particular synergies of 
resources. Both kinds of processes may contribute to the overall observable growth. 
In case of a merger or acquisition to generate a new firm issues relate essentially to 
leadership structure, creating a generally accepted (new?) mission and fit versus 
clashes of firms’ cultures. 
Due to the amount of money involved investment at any level in another com-
pany may represent an “interruption” of a firm’s development path in the 
sense of Figure I.122. 
Non-organic growth by acquisitions is often associated with a change to a group 
(“holding”) structure of several firms at different locations. Legally, the “holding” covers 
controlling the individual “subsidiaries.” The other option is integrating the acquired 
firm at the location of the acquiring firm. Very fast growth of startups is often achieved 
by non-organic growth (LinkedIn and Zynga; ch. 3.4). 
Basically, both modes of growth will (have to) be linked to innovation and investment 
persistence. 
In the context of entrepreneurship non-organic growth has notable consequences. 
When observing numbers of employees (or revenues) a jump in the figures may lead 
to erroneous conclusions concerning the firm. And concerning the embracing econo-
mic system, the total number of jobs created by firm merger or acquisition may not 
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have increased. On the contrary, firms’ mergers and acquisitions are often associated 
with job losses. 
A central issue of investment decisions and activities (illustrated by Figure I.154) is 
associated with the firm’s deciding on 
 invest following demand or 
 invest anticipating (before) demand. 
For instance, private firms relying much on generated cash flow for development tend 
to invest after demand (Box I.20). 
 
Figure I.127: Differentiating organic and non-organic growth of (new) firms. 
The most prominent example of organic growth versus non-organic growth of NTBFs 
is the “Ford versus General Motors” case [Bhidé 2000:246]. The Ford Motor Company 
(FMC; started in 1903) evolved in line with Henry Ford’s engineering and manufactur-
ing interest and was build essentially using initially raised capital from friends. He 
turned his vision of large-scale production to manufacture cars that everyone could af-
ford through raising capital without losing majority control. 
General Motors (GM), founded by William Durant, followed a different route. In its 
early years it grew through acquisitions of smaller companies then in the automobile 
production rather than building its own plants, for instance, in 1904 the Buick Motor 
Company etc. GM as a holding company for further acquisitions was formed in 1908. 
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Organic growth and non-organic growth may occur very early during the development 
of the NTBFs, already during the startup thrust phase. And there is no way to differen-
tiate these processes referring to the typical growth indicators – revenues or number 
of employees. 
A striking example is the Nanogate AG 81 / Nano-X GmbH (B.2) cases in Germany. 
Here, both NTBFs where spun out at almost the same time from the same research 
institute, both having a person with high leadership/management experiences in the 
foundation team and both targeted markets for surface coatings on the basis of chemi-
cal nanotechnology. Both firms had different initial financing sources and very different 
growth strategies, in particular, non-organic growth versus organic (Figure I.137, 
Figure I.141). 
Furthermore, it seems that firm’s foundation by persons with deep and broad experi-
ence in technology, markets, management and simultaneous responsibilities for 
several subsidiaries of a large firm are more ready to build their grow strategy on non-
organic growth (ATMgroup AG, B.2). 
Finally, on their road to SMEs based on organic growth, ten or more years after start-
up, NTBFs may also select non-organic growth as an additional path to growth. This is 
observed, for instance, for the German optical instruments (“nano-tools”) firm WITec 
GmbH (Figure I.123). On the other hand, the German optical instruments firm JPK 
Instruments AG, which addresses similar markets as WITec with a related technology 
followed non-organic growth rather soon after foundation (Figure I.141). Also Google 
followed a non-organic growth path  (Box I.24). 
Features of new firms’ development described so far in terms of a general systems 
view, using teleology and specific effects from inside and outside the firm influencing 
further development, suggest evolutionary models to contribute to additional insights 
into growth of new firms. 
Evolutionary models [Bhidé 2000:249-254; Runge 2006:7-8] essentially map startup 
and firm developments to Darwinian Theory of hereditary factors as the origins of 
change variations and “natural selection.” Accordingly, history (of the initial architec-
ture) matters – and firm development would be largely “path-dependent” unless a 
“mutation” induced by external factors gives rise to spontaneous and permanent 
change in the DNA of a “gene” of the firm. 
In Darwinian Theory hereditary factors are determined by the principle of homology. 
Hereditary factors will only be transformed in small steps and the degrees of freedom 
of these hereditary factors will be retained (under negligible or slowly changing ex-
ternal conditions) and will only change according to certain patterns. In social sys-
tems, for instance, one has processes of homologation for values and behavior of 
persons, layers of groups and larger organizational units. 
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The related Darwinian natural selection according to reproductive fitness, however, 
cannot explain all the shaping. Functionality has to be differentiated from “pattern for-
mation.” Structural evolutionary theory is concerned with pattern formation and works 
to explain why Nature favors relatively few structural archetypes. It limits the choices 
available for selection and explains formation of similar patterns as “Variations on a 
Theme.” Some aspects of this theory can be used for a GST approach to develop-
ment of firms (A.1.6). 
4.3.3 Resource-Based Views 
Entrepreneurs who are involved in the early stages of business creation are unlikely to 
become preoccupied with life-cycle issues of decline and dissolution. Inspection of 
major factors for decline of young firms refers often to lack of resources (Figure I.114, 
Figure I.115) – often already at the start of a new venture. 
“What an organization knows at its birth will determine what it searches for, what it ex-
periences, and how it interprets what it encounters” [Huber 1991:91]. One implication 
is that a new firm’s learning and capability accumulation may influence its decision-
making and paths of development markedly (cf. Figure I.129 and below text). 
When dealing with startup architectures and configurations and their significance for 
the development of young firms the previous discussions have emphasized a number 
of tangible and intangible resources (Table I.8). Some of them are sufficient, some 
being necessary and some fulfilling both requirements to expect viability and growth of 
a technical startup of a particular type (RBSU, Other academic NTBF, EBSU). 
Apart from country-specific factors, we dealt, for instance, with a variety of resources 
of the entrepreneur(s) or the startups, respectively. Personality (ch. 2.1), cognitive 
abilities, creativity and revealing opportunities, education and experience (ch. 2.1.2; 
3.2, 3.3), personal competencies (Figure I.72), a team for firm’s foundation (ch. 
2.1.2.4; Table I.41, Figure I.72, Figure I.73) and team extensions (including an 
Advisory Board), communication and coordination (ch. 2.1.2.4), networking and 
cooperation issues (ch. 4.3.2), financial endowment (ch. 1.2.7) etc. were emphasized. 
We also dealt with macro-economic events like recessions, markets, industries, com-
petitors and national legislations etc. and interconnected endogenous factors of a 
firm’s internalities with exogenous factors from external analysis (Figure I.114, Figure 
I.115). Finally we observed a “strategic group” in Germany with very similar architec-
tures to exhibit from the start good to high growth patterns to become mid-sized or 
large firms (Hidden Champions, ch. 4.1.1). 
Concerning viability and growth of startups all this directs special attention toward 
resources (ch. 1.2.5.2) and sustainable competitive advantage. Hence, it is important 
to inquire into the role the economics-oriented resource-based theory or the resource-
based view (RBV) 82 of firms [Bhidé 2000:214-216; Alvarez and Busenitz 2001] and 
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which role it  should or can play for dealing with developments of new technology ven-
tures in the context of technology entrepreneurship. 
Resource-based theory was extended to include the cognitive ability of individual en-
trepreneurs [Alvarez and Busenitz 2001], but having corresponding attitudes, aspira-
tions and intentions to act and pursue resources are also important. Resource hetero-
geneity is the most basic condition of RBV and it assumes at least some resource 
bundles and capabilities underlying offering generation are heterogeneously distrib-
uted within the firms. 
Competency and skill heterogeneity of the founder team has been discussed (ch. 
2.1.2.5; Figure I.68, Figure I.72, Table I.41). Skill heterogeneity plus a constraint is 
emphasized, for instance, by a founder’s experience: “Early on, one of the most inspir-
ing lessons we learned was the value of bringing people together with different back-
grounds and skills” but, furthermore, “almost all {interviewed founders} would agree on 
the importance of getting the right people, based not just on their expertise, but on 
their attitude as well.” [DeFrancesco 2004] This attitudinal aspect was also a reason to 
dissolve the founding team (in agreement) of the German NTBF Attocube AG (B.2). 
Driven essentially by the currently dominant view of corporate strategy RBV regards a 
company as a collection of resources and “capabilities.” In RBV a capability is usually 
considered a “bundle” of assets or resources to perform a business process (but cf. 
Equation I.2). The business is composed of individual activities or, in the sense of 
GST, a “system of activities.” For instance, the product development process involves 
conceptualization, product design, pilot testing, new product launch in production, pro-
cess debugging, marketing etc. across the firm’s functions – for NTBFs usually tasks 
and roles for activities along a value chain (Figure I.7). 
Note that in RBV it is generally assumed that resources are tradable and non-specific 
to the firm, while capabilities are firm-specific and are used to engage the resources 
within the firm. 82 
However, a firm will usually focus on certain capabilities consistent with its strategy or, 
in case of entrepreneurship, with strategy logics to reach the founders’ goal. The 
resource-based perspective fits the GST framework if it highlights the need for a fit 
between the whole external context in which a company operates and its internal 
capabilities and potentiality (Equation I.2). 
That is, dynamic capabilities (ch. 1.2.1) are required, the adaptability to the environ-
ment to renew and re-configure the competencies in response to key factors and 
conditions of the environment. 
The essence of the resource-based perspective is a knowledge-based view and tak-
ing GST this will include foreknowledge which means intelligence (ch. 1.2.3). This is 
associated with a particular constraint. Tacit knowledge (or technology) which can be 
learned only through personal experience is an example of know-how as a resource 
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that is difficult to have or transfer ex ante (before or on foundation). Furthermore, as-
suming bounded rationality (ch. 4.2.2) cognitive limitations imply that no two in-
dividuals possess identical stocks of knowledge. 
That all means, entrepreneurship and RBV adopt precisely one common unit of ana-
lysis – the resource. These resources may manifest themselves in several different 
ways and different phases of NTBFs’ developments. 
One kind of difference occurs in the ways entrepreneurial leaders and managers of 
small versus established (large) firms utilize the resources to exploit (business) op-
portunities. Another important difference is that for NTBFs founders often learn on the 
job how to utilize and build up resources, for established (large) firms there are edu-
cated and trained “professional managers.” And importantly, the relevance of re-
sources emerges in the face of competition when the NTBF must answer four ques-
tions about its competitors’ resources: 
 How do they compare in terms of size and components? 
 How efficiently are they used? 
 How effectively can we learn from their experience and practice? 
 How do we maintain our own competitive advantage? 
According to RBV each organization is a collection of unique resources and capabili-
ties that provides the basis for its strategy (logics) and that is the primary source of its 
performance and, hence, returns. According to common views [Autio et al. 1997] to 
provide a competitive advantage resources and capabilities must exhibit the attributes 
listed in Table I.75. 
Table I.75: Key attributes to provide competitive advantage. 
Attribute (VRIO) Resources, Effects 
Value Allow the firm to exploit opportunities or neutralize threats in its ex-
ternal environment with the resource/capability 
Rarity Control of the resource/capability, possessed by few, if any, current 
and potential competitors 
Imitability 
(Non-substitutable) 
When other firms cannot obtain them; 
the significant cost disadvantage to a firm trying to obtain, develop 
or duplicate the resource/capability 
Organization The firm is organized appropriately to obtain the full benefits of the 
resources/capabilities in order to realize a competitive advantage 
(cf. also Equation I.2) 
For NTBFs value and imitability in the sense of VRIO is related to technical value con-
cerning the producer/supplier (ch. 1.2.5.2). To the supplier or producer technical value 
is measured by how protectable from the competition the product is or how exploitable 
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the product is as a basis for further offerings, for instance, based on a platform tech-
nology (Table I.12). A discussion of applying the VRIO-approach to the competitive 
advantage for a startup in the new technical field of “ionic liquids” is discussed for the 
case of German IoLiTec GmbH (A.1.5, B.2). 
The resource-based view suggests that heterogeneity is necessary but not sufficient 
for a sustainable competitive advantage. For instance, it has been shown that often 
heterogeneity requires interfaces or gatekeepers or management of these, respec-
tively, reducing inherent barriers imposed by the differences of particular (human) 
resources (ch. 1.2.3; Figure I.20, Figure I.73). 
As Conner and Prahalad [1996] argue, any (strategy-oriented) theory that seeks to un-
derstand performance differences between firms must incorporate a theory that ad-
dresses the question of why firms exist. This key question is also fundamental for GST 
and its emphasis on purposeful behavior and the strive to reach goals. It is tackled 
with regard to the entrepreneurs’ reasons and motivations to found a firm (ch. 2.1.2.5; 
Table I.39, Table I.40), the ideas and opportunities they pursue (ch. 3) and the risk 
they take and decisions and actions they make (ch. 4.2). 
Often it is the founder (or founding team) who possesses much of the technical and 
managerial knowledge that make-up the assets of the firm. Hence, an entrepreneur’s 
expanding knowledge base and absorptive capacity may become the entrepreneurial 
firm’s competitive advantage. Furthermore, concerning intangible assets these are (al-
most) inimitable because they have a strong tacit dimension and are socially complex. 
In the entrepreneurship domain, tacit socially complex assets are often also directly 
generated by the founder(s) and spread across the organization, such as firm’s culture 
(Figure I.120) and hiring and developing human capital (Figure I.121). These are idio-
syncratic assets, distinctive, even unusual features of individuals that are more valu-
able when used in the particular firm than outside of the firm. Such assets tend to be 
difficult to observe, describe and value but have a significant impact on a firm’s com-
petitive advantage. 
Related, in an interview [Hof 2008], one hears from Eric Schmidt, then Google’s CEO, 
how Google manages the tricky process of innovation and its relation to corporate 
culture which is not transferable: 
“Why aren’t many other companies doing this, too? I think it’s cultural. You 
have to have the culture, and you have to get it right. 
So we’re likely to see even more acquisitions by Google? I would think so. But 
small. The likelihood of us doing big things is pretty low because we’d have to 
assimilate the culture. Nobody works the way we do. The Google culture 
makes sense if you’re in it, and no sense if you’re not in it.” 
RBV sees companies as different collections of tangible and intangible assets and ca-
pabilities, which determine how effectively and how efficiently a company performs its 
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functional activities. To apply RBV it is essential to identify the firm’s potential “key” re-
sources. 
According to GST, however, the perspective of RBV has to be complemented. 
Resources are dependent on interactions and combinations with other re-
sources and therefore no single resource or a set of individual resources – 
tangible or intangible – can become the most important one for firm’s perform-
ance. Resources and capabilities form open systems which require time to 
achieve a quasi-equilibrium but, due to the open system paradigm, they will 
evolve over time – even in a phase of stable growth (cf. ch. 5.2). 
Open system means: the system under consideration is adding or destroying, increas-
ing or decreasing, exchanging or sharing mass-based or power-based assets, infor-
mation, people and values (including money) with other systems. 
Systemic effects in small or large firms do not only emphasize interactions of re-
sources, but also feedback and reinforcement mechanisms, largely out of the control 
of leaders/managers, which affect the firms’ development (growth). 
The processes of combining, organizing and leveraging resources let “new” systemic 
resources emerge. For instance, sharing knowledge resources within a network of 
partner firms may add to the originally shared knowledge resource of the individual 
partner; close customer relationships and common projects may add to the inno-
vativeness of the “supplier.” 
For technology entrepreneurship Autio and Garnsey [1997] introduced, for instance, 
an extended RBV model emphasizing a firm to be an open system interacting with 
others in its environment to identify incentives and constraints which originate from the 
environment and those which form through the internal dynamics of growth. This RBV 
extension concerns the influence of network relationships (Figure I.51, Figure I.125) 
on growth processes and competence building. 
The authors take growth-reinforcing and growth-offsetting effects into account that de-
termine the firm’s capacity for resource accumulation. They present a systemic evo-
lution model which, however, is a specialization to NTBFs founded either as a spin-out 
firm or as a private venture. The technology, application, and the capabilities of the 
management team determine the potential of the firm to reach stand-alone growth. 
The development path follows a link of the NTBF to an innovation network or manu-
facturing chain. Within these structures there is scope to obtain leverage from re-
sources and to pursue external opportunities. The internal pressures will be reinforced 
by external pressures in the growing firm, as funders, customers and distributors call 
for expansion so that as a next step a cluster is formed. 
In the approach of Autio and Garnsey [1997], for individual firms there is the opportu-
nity to grow with the network. But, at this point, the NTBF is often very dependent on a 
network’s “locomotive firm” which drives the development. As an example that has 
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been observed in practice the many of Nokia Corporation’s small supplier companies 
in the Finnish telecommunications industry are hinted at. 
Therefore, apart from the business idea and opportunity, according to RBV assessing 
startups will have to put a strong emphasis on people and organization: 
 Most of the value of the venture is attributed to people – the entrepreneur and 
his/her “team” – a key resource. 
People build the startup; leadership, corporate culture and execution associ-
ated with a sense of market urgency are important. 
 The other large part of value of the venture relates to a successful and sound 
structure and processes right at the start. 
Without a structured and validated offering development, operation, market, sales, 
and financial plan (reasonable financings) and team for execution the entrepreneur(s) 
will constantly reacting to competitive or other forces and will be often in “fire fighting 
mode.” Entrepreneurs cannot expect, in uncertain businesses, to gather reliable data 
on potential demand and competition. In many niche businesses the specific informa-
tion generated by doing is therefore more valuable than excessive search for relevant 
information [Bhidé 2000:59]. 
One can believe that a technical startup merits a positive “premoney valuation” de-
rived from intellectual properties, human capital and other intangible resources (Table 
I.8). The capacity of Inc. companies in the US [Bhidé 2000:29] and NTBFs in Ger-
many to finance high growth rates through internally generated “funds” (cash flow) 
suggest that their profit margin were significant. 
The founders’ capacities to differentiate their offerings through their personal efforts 
seem to be an important reason for profitability (cf. CEOs’ knowledge of customers 
with Hidden Champions; ch. 4.1.1). The entrepreneur(s), rather than a product or 
technology, represent the source of the startup’s profits [Bhidé 2000:47] – and the 
firm’s productivity and performance. 
As a summary, the question is whether a firm’s model defining a firm as a distinctive 
bundle of assets, resources and capabilities (a firm’s “business system”) and charac-
terized by a related portfolio allows explanation or even reliable expectations and has 
prescriptive implications for new technology ventures. Here, the following restrictions 
are notable. 
The resource-based model refers to a constellation at a particular point in time, usu-
ally in the past to describe and explain the development of a firm to that point in time 
and often uses that for “predicting” future developments – mostly without considering 
developments of the firm’s human resources and the role played by developments of 
social interactions of employees, such as the formation of “Communities of Practice” 
(CoPs) [Runge 2006:372] and reinforcement of behavior (Figure I.129), information 
resources for decision-making of the firm’s leaders etc. (cf. Ashby Memory 84). 
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In contrast, for instance, to an Input/Output (I/O) Model, the resource-based view is 
grounded in the perspective that a firm’s internal constitution, in terms of its resources 
and capabilities, is more critical to the determination of strategic action than is the ex-
ternal environment. “Instead of focusing on the accumulation of resources necessary 
to implement the strategy dictated by conditions and constraints in the external en-
vironment (I/O model), the resource-based view suggests that a firm’s unique re-
sources and capabilities provide the basis for a strategy. The business strategy cho-
sen should allow the firm to best exploit its core competencies relative to opportunities 
in the external environment.” [Hitt et al. 2005] 
RBV often assumes that resources are relatively immobile. However, both people 
(with tacit knowledge) and information are transient, both can disappear immediately. 
And this may be highly critical for young firms (with only few employees). Furthermore, 
RBV does not consider serendipity or luck as a factor of firm’s foundation and growth. 
Technology entrepreneurs can use market forms of governance and political/public 
forms of governance to coordinate many resources necessary to realize an economic 
opportunity (Figure I.59, Table I.30). 
RBV refers essentially to (only) economic markets; the role of other types of markets 
(Table I.15) is non-existent or underdeveloped. 
In particular, the massive interference of policy with technology entrepreneurship and 
support of (technology-based) SMEs and the direct and indirect resource provisions in 
terms of financial support, legislation (Box I.1, Figure I.34 ; A.1.1), research grants and 
networking in terms of competence networks, funding R&D projects, science and 
technology parks and clusters (ch. 1.2.6.2) restrict applicability of RBV to firm’s 
foundation and early development to only selected aspects. 
Finally, strategic orientations of technology ventures often follow several aspects 
which are complementary rather than exclusive: 
 Resource-oriented - Resources of the firm push 
 Market-oriented - The market drives 
 Interrelation-oriented - Alliances and networking are key 
 Opportunity-oriented - Fast opportunity identification and exploitation drives. 
4.3.3.1 Bootstrapping a Technology Startup 
Initial and growth financing of NTBFs relies very often on the founder’s (founders’) 
own funds and 3F funding as resources and subsequently on cash flow from business 
operations (Figure I.52; Table I.23 (for Inc. firms), Table I.24, Table I.25, Table I.26). 
That means initial funding of a technology venture occurs to a large extent by “boot-
strapping” (bootstrap financing). However, there is no generally agreed upon defini-
tion of the notion “bootstrapping.” Often, it means “to start a firm by one’s own efforts 
and to rely solely on the resources available from oneself, family and friends.” [Dorf 
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and Byers 2007:411-413] However, for most cases of German NTBF foundation dealt 
with in this book the startups did not rely only on resources available from the 
founder(s), family and friends. 
A more elaborate definition is given by Eckmann [2008]: “Bootstrapping is a means of 
financing a small firm through highly creative acquisition and use of resources without 
raising equity from traditional sources or borrowing money from a bank. In short, 
‘bootstrapping’ means starting a new business without external start-up capital.” 
Here, on the one hand, emphasizing “creative acquisition and use of resources” opens 
the spectrum of accessible resources and methods of financing. On the other hand, it 
remains unspecified what actually “traditional” would embrace. Eckman adds a 
specification: “It is characterized by high reliance on any internally generated retained 
earnings, credit cards, second mortgages, and customer advances, to name but a few 
sources.” 
Wikipedia 83 emphasizes that “financial bootstrapping is a term used to cover different 
methods for avoiding using the financial resources of external investors.” And, more-
over, bootstrapping can be defined as “a collection of methods used to minimize the 
amount of outside debt and equity financing needed from banks and investors.” (Em-
phases added) 
Emphasizing the notions “avoiding” and “minimize” the author thinks that last definition 
provides the necessary scope to discuss bootstrapping in the context of technology 
entrepreneurship where a wide variety of financial and other resources and methods 
of financing are available for entrepreneurs (ch. 1.2.7.3; Figure I.59, Table I.30). 
The financial requirements of the startup and the availability of capital in the market 
will determine if bootstrapping is an appropriate means (ch. 1.2.7.1). But choosing that 
way is also related to attitudes toward the various sources of capital for technology 
entrepreneurs (Box I.20). Software-based ventures typically require less start-up 
capital than, for instance, either electronics or biotechnology ventures, thus is more 
likely to rely solely on personal funding (ch. 3.4). Furthermore, growth orientation 
(Table I.63, ch. 4.1) will also influence the decision for bootstrap financing. 
Bootstrapping is often associated with the opportunistic adaptability approach of tech-
nology entrepreneurship when time and effort trade-off are considered: Many months 
spent trying to raise money (with no guarantees!) versus same time spent starting 
business, establishing proof of customer and product and building traction. 
The interconnections of bootstrapping and opportunistic adaptability are lucidly de-
scribed by Klaas Kersting [2012], the co-founder of German Gameforge AG and 
Flaregames GmbH (B.2). He put it into several steps for “Building a Startup” with the 
premise “fail early, fail often – and learn” (ch. 5.1). 
 Find some money. (Hint: friends, family or fools are a good starting point.) 
 Focus and prioritize (Hint: Just do the important things.) 
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 Get to market fast. (Hint: you don’t know the market until the market knows 
you.) 
 Know your numbers. (Hint: you cannot know too much.) 
 Avoid overhead. (Hint: you might not need to hire your cousin as a consultant 
just yet.) 
 Cash flow is everything. (Hint: buy low, sell high; collect early and pay late.) 
Key questions for bootstrapping are: 
 How much cash do you need, and when (Figure I.57)? 
 If nothing changes, when will you run out of money? 
For the early phase of NTBFs it is often difficult to separate acquisition of financial re-
sources and methods of financing by business operations. Bootstrapping in the broad 
sense is characterized largely by high reliance on any internally generated monetary 
reserves. For understanding the role of business operations for bootstrapping basics 
of accounting and financing one can refer to Dorf and Byers [2007:403-436] and the 
author’s Course Material (Handout Lectures 10-13; pp. 1-18) of the Technology 
Entrepreneurship Web. 
Bootstrapping offers many advantages for technology entrepreneurs and is a good 
method to get a startup operating and well positioned to seek equity capital from out-
side investors at a later time – if needed. In particular, a business that makes money 
builds its credibility – with suppliers, employees and customers. Keeping costs con-
sciously below revenues will position the company to survive in lean times which will 
always come! 
Fundamentally, NTBFs and RBSUs have the possibilities to go for capital fo-
cusing on research and development grants, scholarships, financial contribu-
tions or subsidies of federal or state governments, NGOs and national science 
organizations (such as, NSF or DFG) or grants for technology projects, which 
are sometimes cooperative projects (ch. 1.2.6, 1.2.7). 
Learning the nuts and bolts of running a business takes time. Start learning from the 
birth of the firm. 
The portfolio of bootstrapping targeting sources, methods and activities minimizing ex-
ternal financing (debt and equity) focuses simultaneously on expenses versus profits 
and cash flow. Superior execution is the key for the components of such a portfolio. 
Basic operating expenses comprise (“buy low”): 
 Location selection (cost of renting offices and laboratories, etc.; in an incuba-
tor, science or technology park – ch. 1.2.6) and networking including utiliza-
tion of infrastructure of the parent organization, if the startup is a spin-out 
(RBSU) or the founder of an NTBF has strong ties to research institutes or 
academia. 
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 Renting (or leasing) sophisticated technical instruments or devices rather than 
purchasing them. 
 Outcontracting selected activities of the NTBF’s value chain through external 
contract services (ch. 4.3.1) or strategic alliances. 
Profit orientation means 
 Go fast to market (customers); have the ability to adjust to a rapidly changing 
industry or environment; build experience and know-how as you go. 
 Focus on cash-generating activities (Hint: Just do the important things.). 
 Look for quick breakeven (ch. 1.2.7.1, Figure I.53). 
Offer high-value products or services that can sustain direct personal selling: 
 (Bootstrapping) entrepreneurs should pick high-value products and services 
where personal salesmanship can replace an expensive marketing scheme. 
 Meet customers’ specifications; do not overshoot (Figure I.88). 
 Provide high-value service and support to customers. 
 Focus on one offering (of probably few more) which represents a “cash cow.” 
 Learn from the customer(s) and adjust the business model, if needed. 
An issue of going fast to market is the question of how to bring the product to market. 
Is it going to require a change of behavior on the part of intended customers? Most 
startups underestimate the difficulty, not to mention the time and money required, to 
get a product launched and established in the marketplace. 
Overcoming customer inertia is easier and cheaper if a product offers some tangible 
advantage over the alternatives. Concrete product attributes – with data to support – 
can lead to sales. Make the risk of dealing with the startup small for the customer as 
compared with the risks associated with not solving his/her problem (ch. 4.2.1.1). 
Cash flow management (“is everything”): 
 Keep cost to a minimum and have positive cash flow (ch. 4.2.3). 
 Adjust the revenue (income) and expenses (loss) curves, the profit curve. 
 Carefully track currency exchange rates, if the startup has international ori-
entation. 
In particular, “working capital” (ch. 1.2.7.1) is primarily concerned with the day-to-day 
operations rather than long-term business decisions. Managing working capital has to 
ensure a company has sufficient cash flow in order to meet its short-term debt obliga-
tions and operating expenses. 
Following Investopedia “working capital management” is a managerial accounting 
strategy focusing on maintaining efficient levels of both components of working capital 
(Figure I.130), current assets (essentially cash, accounts receivable, inventories) and 
current liabilities (such as accounts payable), in respect to each other (“collect early 
and pay late”; defer your payments as long as possible).  
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The accounting entry accounts receivable (giving credit or allowing late payment by 
customers) are assets of the customer and must be financed by the startup. Accounts 
payable are a way of financing the startup’s assets. 
Accounts Receivable 
(collection of what a 
business/startup is owed) 
The receivable conversion period (RCP) is the time be-
tween the sale of the final product on credit and cash re-
ceipts for the accounts receivable (cf. DSO). 
Inventories The inventory conversion period (ICP) refers to the length of 
time between purchase of raw material or input for produc-
tion of the goods or service, and the sale of the finished pro-
duct. 
Accounts Payable 
(Payment of what a 
business/startup owes) 
The payable deferral period (PDP) is the time between the 
purchase of raw material or input on credit and cash pay-
ments for the resulting accounts payable. 
“Days sales outstanding” (DSO) is a measure of the average number of days that a 
company takes to collect revenue after a sale has been made. A low DSO number 
means that it takes a company fewer days to collect its accounts receivable. A high 
DSO number shows that a company is selling its product to customers on credit and 
taking longer to collect money (Investopedia). 
Be careful with discretionary expenses, such as 
 Going for a highly professional representation on the Web. 
 Sales and marketing programs. 
 Growth initiatives. 
Keep growth in check: 
 Start expanding, once the new venture starts growing while keeping the cost 
curve below the revenue curve (Box I.20). 
 Expand at a rate that you can afford and control. This enables you to develop 
management skills slowly and to iron out problems under less pressure. 
 Re-invest profit for growth; target investment and innovation persistence 
(Figure I.117, Figure I.127). 
 Invest in new people if there is no other alternative, not in advance of needs 
(Box I.20). 
 Hire workers the business needs (but only pay what you can afford). 
 Develop people internally (Figure I.121). 
Cultivate banks before the business becomes creditworthy: 
 Keep good financial records, sound balance sheets. 
 Look for bank overdrafts and line of credits. 
 Prepare early for the next step of financing (ch. 1.2.7.3). 
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4.3.4 Cybernetic Principles and Concepts for 
Technology Entrepreneurship 
Building on preceding and previous discussions and metaphors (ch. 2.1.2.9, ch. 4.1; 
Equation I.2) concerning observation and expectation we shall approach understand-
ing and explaining growth of new (technology-based) firms by achieving appropriate 
qualitative or even quantitative descriptions. 
At best, expectation, not prediction, will appear as being comparable with weather 
forecasts which are made by collecting quantitative data about the current state of the 
atmosphere and using scientific understanding of atmospheric processes to project 
how the atmosphere will evolve. However, incomplete understanding of atmospheric 
processes mean that forecasts become less accurate as the difference in time be-
tween the present moment and the time for which the forecast is being made (the 
range of the forecast) increases – being also one of the issues of RBV. 
Observation will refer to indicators of tangible output, outcomes or benefits of a con-
version process (Figure I.5). But input and the conversion process in terms of vari-
ables and parameters (ch. 1.2.1) will address often intangibles which will refer to 
intervening variables – interpretations of observed facts. 
An intervening variable reflects theoretical processes that are assumed to take place 
between what is observed as the “before” conditions and the “after” conditions. The 
situation is displayed for learning as an intervening variable in Figure I.3. Conse-
quently we shall often follow a “reasons for thinking that” approach rather than a 
“reasons why” rationale (Figure I.2). 
Information on intangibles (firm’s culture, leadership, entrepreneurial commitment, 
team interactions, interactions with the Advisory Board, networking, etc.) can, at least 
partially, be grasped by direct observation in the firm or by telling of the founders or 
the firm’s employees or reporting by others. But we shall not know how founders will 
decide to respond to serious events or crises, unless observation takes place during 
such effects (cf. volition; ch 2.1.2, 2.1.2.9). 
It has turned out that fundamental cybernetic principles and concepts can provide a 
basis for progressing. With regard to measurement of human-activity systems one 
often refers to a difference scale related to a concept of “change.” 
Following one of the fathers of cybernetics, in line with Ashby [1957], we shall assume 
in all cases that the changes occur by finite steps in time and that any difference is 
also finite. The change will occur by a measurable jump, a discontinuity or a “turning 
point” (in German Wendepunkt) of a measured curve reflecting growth or decline, if 
the change is tracked on the basis of an appropriate, measurable indicator. 
In the sense of Equation I.6 we shall follow a differentiation between a state and its 
related characteristic in terms of an observable attribute, a value of the related indica-
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tor. Within GST we concentrate on a system’s states: A state of a system ψ is any 
well-defined representation of the conditions of its existence and an associated pro-
perty that can be recognized if it occurs again. 
Every system will naturally have many possible states. That which is acted on will be 
called the operand; the factor inducing a change will be called the operator (given in 
Script font similar to the Hamilton operator in Equation I.6), and what the operand is 
changed to will be called the transform. 
The change that occurs, which one can represent by a relation in terms of a mono-
directional graph, A → B, is the transition. A set of transitions, on a set of operands, 
is a transformation. The series of positions taken by the system in time defines a 
trajectory or line of behavior [Ashby 1957]. The transition is specified by the two states 
ψ1 and ψ2 and the indication of which changed to which. 
∆ψ = ψi → ψi+1 
A priori, the transformation is defined in the sense of cybernetics, “not by any refe-
rence to what it ‘really’ is, nor by reference to any physical cause of the change, but by 
the giving of a set of operands and a statement of what each is changed to. The 
transformation is concerned with what happens, not with why it happens.” [Ashby 
1957]. 
Cybernetics does not treat things but ways of behaving. It does not ask “what 
is this thing?” but “what does it do?” and “what can it do?” (for which purpose) 
[Ashby 1957]. 
However, with GST as the overall framework, to make these concepts appli-
cable to the field of entrepreneurship, one must consider the related fields 
(psychology, sociology, economics, business administration, etc.; Figure I.1) 
and any kinds of their relevant observations and their ways of measurements, 
principles and concepts. This will provide an abstract system of combined 
theories, empirical basements, principles, concepts, etc. from the various (sci-
entific) disciplines as the basis. 
The resulting abstract theoretical system will rely on “borrowed” knowledge, 
approaches and methods from the various involved fields. This means, a 
particular approach provided in one abstract system may be “switched” to 
another (usually higher) system to find an “appropriate” description or expla-
nation or causal interrelationship for presenting expectations (or probably 
forecasts) for a company system under consideration as characterized in 
Figure I.128. 
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{A   B   F   D} 
↓ 
A transformation will be called closed if all 
the transforms involve only the elements of the 
original basis set (all transforms restricted to A, 
B, F, D) [Ashby 1957]. There is no “inflow” and 
no “outflow as in open systems.  
{D   B   F   A} 
This set of transforms obtained contains no element that is not already present in the 
set of operands. A closed transformation creates no new element, the “domain” and 
the “range” being identical. And for non-interacting elements the closed transformation 
corresponds to a permutation. A large capital influx into a firm by investors would 
represent a typical “open transformation” which is common for open systems. 
A test for closure is made by reference to the details of the transformation itself. It can 
therefore be applied even when one knows nothing of the cause responsible for the 
changes. 
Furthermore, a transformation increasing the number of entities it acts on is an “exact 
transformation” in the sense of self-replication if the original is retained (copy of A   B   
F   D as above), otherwise it is a “similarity transformation” like (D    B   F   A). Hence, 
in reality forming firm culture (Figure I.120) in this sense should be considered a simi-
larity transformation rather than a copy. 
A special transformation is the identity transformation, in which no change occurs, in 
which each transform the same as its operand is. 
Which effect of a transformation we observe (or disregard or do not detect) enters 
essentially into our “reasons for thinking that.” For instance, the change from a square 
with four corners to a four-pointed star, one with a fourfold and the other with a twofold 
rotation axis with regard to the plane in Figure I.2 can be achieved by similarity 
transformations such that the ratio of the two diagonals in the square and the stars is 
kept, leaving them invariant. 
Hence, investigating or observing just ratios of diagonals and not additionally the 
shapes of the objects and the lengths of the individual diagonals “make both objects 
identical,” the result of an identity transformation. Furthermore, there may be more 
attributes associated with change. Including also colors (“colored symmetries” 
[Shubnikov and Koptsik 1974]) for representing objects the right hand side of Figure 
I.2 exhibits three different objects (or systems). 
A transformation is single-valued if it converts each operand to only one transform. If it 
is not single-valued and not one-to-one it will be open and correspond to a “one-to-
many” situation. 
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A transformation of the kind 
A B C D 
B or D A B or C D 
is not single-valued. 
We have just seen that after a transformation T has been applied to an operand α, the 
transform T(α) can be treated as an operand for T again, getting T(T(α)), which is 
written T2(α). In exactly the same way T(α) may perhaps become an operand to a 
transformation P, which will give a transform P(T(α)). Generally, operators are not 
commutative: P(T(α)) ≠ T(P(α)). 
In the current context of time developments a transformation of a firm’s state empha-
sizing a change by an event (“interruption”) will always refer to a current state. This 
means, for instance, an event that a venture capital firm (VC) participates in an NTBF 
(Figure I.126). Empirically founded, the transformation will induce a change by the 
combined or interrelated, respectively, effects of several factors which are sufficiently 
strong to be observable in totality after a certain period of time and described by the 
transformation Equation I.11. Here V C is the corresponding operator changing, for 
instance, equity, ownership, control, management and number of employees and 
organization of the firm (Figure I.126). 
Similar to Equation I.6 (ch. 2.1.2.9) the following notation will be used to describe the 
intrinsic relation between the two components, operator and operand. The result will 
be a changed state of the entity associated with an observable and measurable value 
VC induced by several presumed effects given in braces. 
Equation I.11: 
V C  |ψi > → VC {add equity – (other, more) owners – other firm control – install 
management – add employees – re-organize firm}|ψj > 
 
or, in short, V C → VC {add equity – (other, more) owners – other firm control – install 
management – add employees – re-organize firm} 
The above notion separating contribution by dashes represents a “systemic transfor-
mation” were the various changes represent an overall change by the combined ac-
tion of the given transforms. The dashes bare the relation to a representation by an 
“array.” Viewed in this sense for an array to be unchanged, each component must be 
unchanged. 
The effects of the individual transforms can rarely be observed in isolation. Moreover, 
a selected measurement by a selected indicator may not be meaningful due to the 
“impact time” periods of the individual “(non-systemic”) transforms. These may be 
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rather different. Compare adding equity being observable for a particular day or week 
versus number of employees observed at the end of the year or as a yearly average. 
The particular types of measurement have different “time resolutions.” In soft sciences 
the minimum or even common time span between two subsequent measurements 
that can be meaningfully interpreted (as a change) is the resolution of the measure-
ment. For instance, tracking numbers of employees year after year will make most 
associated transforms with shorter impact time unobservable and will induce the 
transformation to appear as an overall systemic effect. 
On the other hand, if there is a possibility to (largely) separate the individual trans-
forms of a transformation (“weak coupling”) we will continue to use the common set 
notation (“listing”), separating elements by commas {A, B, C, …}. 
In our context, a transform with an observable effect would be, for instance, if an 
NTBF catches a very huge order of the NTBF’s product from a major customer. On 
the other hand, changing the legal form of a limited liability company (LLC, GmbH) to 
a non-public stock company (AG in Germany) may represent a transform retaining 
largely everything else of the firm and may be a transform without any measurable 
effect on the other sub-states of the firm. 
If we associate a transform with a measurable quantity of interest, the transform may 
turn out to be a “positive” (“growth-inducing”) or a negative (“decline-inducing”) change 
of the related particular measurable quantity. Consequently, existing transformations 
are not necessarily observable, positive and negative effects may level off, if they 
occur (almost) simultaneously. 
In terms of cybernetics control was previously defined as the purposive influence 
toward a predetermined goal involving continuous comparison of current states to 
future goals (“is” versus “shall” assessment). The above transformation “V C  → “ with 
attributed transforms has an inherent shortcoming. It does not take into account any 
possible changes that concern the pace (time) to reach the goal or even modifying the 
original goal (Figure I.122, Figure I.126). 
A teleological relation (start to end; Figure I.78) which may be associated with signifi-
cant changes (observable through appropriate variables, parameters and indicators) 
can be viewed as a set of transformations. Specifically, according to GST, a firm’s 
foundation (the “birth”) is the first transform which causes the founder or founding 
team with their ideas and perceived business opportunities, motivation, aspirations 
and expectations to strive for their particular goal(s) by means of a firm. And this 
changes, for instance, their states of personalities (Figure I.16, Figure I.122). 
Connected to the goal expectation can be viewed as a transformation of the personal-
ity. The entrepreneur as a firm founder, owner and leader with control over the firm 
has explicit qualitative and quantitative goals which induce expectations. Basically, 
there are founders who tend to emphasize keeping control over the firm (autonomy 
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and vision) or making money (wealth) accepting venture capital, losing control as seen 
in Table I.39, Table I.40, Figure I.65 and Figure I.66. The corresponding “entrepreneu-
rial expectations” E E (type) can be represented, for instance, by Equation I.12. The 
second example is not single-valued. 
Equation I.12: 
E E (aspiration, motivation) → (autonomy, vision) {confidence in own business idea – 
revealed opportunity – internal locus of control – perseverance – risk taking - 
tolerance for ambiguity – self efficacy – ownership/control – organic growth} 
E E (aspiration, motivation)→ (wealth) {confidence in own business idea – revealed 
opportunity – internal locus of control – perseverance – risk taking – tolerance for 
ambiguity – self efficacy – accept venture capital – lose OR keep control – organic 
growth OR non-organic growth – selling firm is an option} 
Following Ashby [1957], although the system may be passing through a series of 
changes, there is (often) some aspect that is unchanging. Hence, some statement can 
be made that, in spite of the incessant changing, is true unchangingly. The simplest 
case occurs when a state α and a transformation are so related that the transforma-
tion does not cause the state to change. Algebraically it occurs when T(α) = α. That 
means, the state α is a state of equilibrium under T. 
The same phenomenon may occur with a set of states. Take S(↓) to be a non-sys-
temic transformation or one in which the operands of a state are only slightly coupled, 
that is open (“unclosed”) and has no state of equilibrium, but exhibits a domain that 
generates no new state. Such a state is stable with respect to S. 
a b c d e f g h b g S(↓):= 
p g b f a a b m 
S(↓):= 
g b 
Using transformations and the stability concept are associated with an issue of reduci-
bility of a complex situation that avoids dealing with a situation that every factor (vari-
able or parameter) had an effect, immediate or delayed, on every other factor. When a 
dynamic system can vary continuously, disturbances are, in practice, usually acting on 
it incessantly. For this reason the only states of equilibrium that can, in practice, per-
sist are those that are “stable” in the above sense.  
The (last b g) transformation is closed, so something persists, and the observer who 
looks only at this level of discrimination can say of the sub-system: “it persists,” and 
can say no more [Ashby 1957]. Classification and taxonomy according to given criteria 
is related to such a persistence (Figure I.128). 
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In a new firm’s development there is no invariant overall state because dif-
ferent problems arise, affect particular sub-states and are addressed corre-
spondingly in different ways leaving the “rest” stable. Without observations at 
the firm level and identifying the prototypical problems, the mechanisms and 
processes of growth as linked to expectation or goals remain obscure. 
“That something is ‘predictable’ implies that there exists a constraint.” If an aircraft, for 
instance, were able to move, second by second, from any one point in the sky to any 
other point, then the best anti-aircraft prediction would be helpless and useless. The 
latter can give useful information only because an aircraft cannot so move, but must 
move subject to several constraints. There is that due to continuity – an aircraft cannot 
suddenly jump, either in position or speed or direction. There is the constraint due to 
the aircraft’s individuality of design” [Ashby 1957:132] and its “resources” (engine and 
fuel) determine the distance it can cross. 
This reference to a process is essentially that of using a mapping – using a convenient 
(for instance, mathematical or graphical) representation rather than the inconvenient 
reality. 
Figure I.128 summarizes the landscape of elaborated constraints for technology entre-
preneurship which provides a “navigator” for the entrepreneur where he/she wants to 
be or be active in and the advisor or consultant to properly advise, propose and guide 
the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurship researcher to properly select criteria to 
create samples and interpret measurements and findings. 
Leaving out a constraint reduces the strength of “prediction” and, in case of complex-
ity, requires being very conscious about the limits of the domain of interpretations and 
even more “predictions.” 
The many seemingly different, controversial and even contradictional results and find-
ings concerning growth of young firms [Garnsey et al. 2006] means that the people 
selected different constraints for inquiry and often are talking about different systems 
of investigation. The related issues of statistics are often associated with selecting a 
sample which is assumed to provide class properties and, furthermore, how response 
rates of questionnaires distort the originally selected sample structure. 
For the taxonomies of industries related to characteristics of technologies (Table I.1; 
TVT, HVT) in terms of “research intensity” (RI = R&D expenses / total revenues) the 
differentiation is based on the proportion of financial quantification of research and 
development expenditures which cuts across industry taxonomies according to busi-
ness or offerings. 
Figure I.128 illustrates a fundamental dilemma of technology entrepreneurship, the 
complexity of constellations and the question whether and how results of macro-ap-
proaches have relevance for practice and, in particular, for individual entrepreneurs 
and those providing advice and consulting to them. 
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Industry taxonomy as given in Figure I.128 combined with firm type (RBSU versus 
other academic NTBFs) and ownership/control and financing (VC-based versus non 
VC-based) seems to be the bare minimum. How just one industry – biofuels – for 
understanding technology entrepreneurship has to be boiled down is illustrated in 
Figure I.183, Figure I.184, Figure I.185 (A.1.1.5) and Table I.17. 
 
Figure I.128: Constraints as a basis of taxonomies for technology entrepreneurship to 
characterize configurations of NTBFs (read sub-tables from left to right). 
And there seems to be even notable differences in industry segments in attracting 
entrepreneurial personalities. Entrepreneurs may take big risks to bring the latest 
scientific tools to market. For instance, the people who take personal risks to bring 
new scientific instruments to market are a special breed. Many of these entrepreneurs 
are well-educated scientists who could make a fine living working as consultants or as 
employees in high-technology companies. Yet they risk their livelihoods and their own 
money for the chance to start up their own firms [Reisch 2011a]. 
Stability is commonly thought of as desirable, for its presence enables the system to 
combine of flexibility and activity in performance with something of permanence, 
something “generic” which, for instance, is the focus when dealing with entrepreneur-
ship over time (history) and space (regional culture; comparing Germany and the US). 
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Goal-seeking behavior is an example that stability around a state of equilibrium is ad-
vantageous. Nevertheless, stability is not always good, for a system may persist in re-
turning to some state that, for other reasons, is considered undesirable or proceeding 
to some new state that is highly necessary, due to a changed environment. 
In this way, these concepts may be used to explain and illustrate the transition from 
core competencies to core rigidities (ch. 2.2.1, Box I.8) as a combined effect of per-
sistence and self-reinforcement (“success breeds success”) resulting in a firm’s “rou-
tines” and “routinized decisions” – how things are done here or how things are de-
cided here (Figure I.129). This kind of persistence is, of course, a special property of 
the whole system focusing on just one aspect. 
Self-reinforcement is essentially determined by decision-making self-reinforcement 
(that is, past acceptances make future acceptances more likely) and adaptive expec-
tations (further belief in prevalence; Box I.17) (ch. 2.1.2.5). 
 
Figure I.129: The progression of core competencies toward core rigidities. 
The descriptive path to “core rigidities” can help understand the well-known fact that 
the founding configuration (including firm culture) and the early development of a start-
up influences further development of the firm. This means it can account for path-
dependency of NTBF development, if observed or searched for. 
If the founder has industrial experience (or is a serial entrepreneur) corresponding 
path-dependency (decision-making, behavior) may already enter the starting configu-
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ration of a new firm. The same is true if the founder(s) has hired early on an “experi-
enced manager.” 
The Special Focus on the Single NTBF 
The following approach to technology entrepreneurship and NTBF developments 
(growth) will have to make more use of concepts and principles of economics and 
business administration and findings (including situations in large firms) for NTBFs as 
given in this book so far and the author’s previous book [Runge 2006]. The emphasis 
will be the entrepreneur(s) and the firm and tracking changes of states of the firm 
through reference to mainly the finances related indicators. The corresponding situa-
tion and framework is depicted in Figure I.130. 
The use of an abstract system of concepts – principles etc. from various scientific 
disciplines for a GST- and cybernetics-based theoretical framework for (technology) 
entrepreneurship – refers also to the levels of describing phenomena. When dealing 
with growth of startups reference will be made, for instance, to how physics ap-
proaches the phenomenon of light. For light effects physics refers to a “particle model” 
(light as composed of discrete quanta called photons) and use this to explain the 
photoelectric effect and the “model of continuous waves” to explain light interference. 
This approach is a reflection not just of the particular subject of inquiry, light, but for 
explaining experimental settings including interactions with a particular substrate or 
with itself. Hence, for a given experimental setting “behavior of light” can be explained 
for the particular context “as if …” According to the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
Quantum Theory, the wave and particle pictures, or the visual and causal representa-
tions, are “complementary” to each other. That is, they are mutually exclusive, yet 
jointly essential for a complete description of quantum events. 
Switching between knowledge of different disciplines or using metaphors and analo-
gies also means switching between epistemology. Epistemology is the investigation 
into the grounds and nature of knowledge itself. It is important because it is fundamen-
tal to how we think. Without some means of understanding how we acquire knowl-
edge, and how we develop concepts, describe and explain in the various disciplines, 
we have no coherent path for our thinking. 
Sound, though basic epistemologies are necessary for sound thinking and reasoning 
to deal with the interdisciplinary phenomenon of entrepreneurship. In particular, we 
shall switch always between a “why-thinking” (cause-effect thinking) and a “how-
thinking” (how an effect of an operator on an operand leads through a process to a 
result). 
It is clear that growth indicators reflect the outcomes of many different interacting 
causes that influence new firms’ growth paths. Figure I.130 does not only indicate that 
the numbers of employees (as a resource) and revenues (indicative of the financial 
state) are taken as indicators for the whole state of the growing firm. 
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Furthermore, due to non-accessibility to other data, performance during development 
(growth) and particularly productivity as defined in Equation I.2 and referred to in 
Figure I.130 will be taken as an indicator how efficient the goal is achieved which may 
be related to leadership and/or management and organization (specialization, com-
munication, coordination etc. (Table I.69) of the firm and, hence, an “organizational 
state.” 
In doing so we are always aware that even reported revenues in official documents, 
for instance, in income and loss statements, may contain “Extraordinary Items,” one 
time expenditures for a given year which may “deform” the revenue indicator by an 
unexplained effect. 
Reformulating the productivity, a capacity, defined in Figure I.130 generates an 
expression for (financial) strength or “energy” (Equation I.13).This is the typical form 
used in physics and chemistry for various types of energy and performance, some of 
them being also listed (in normal font). 
Equation I.13: 
Revenue = Productivity x Number of Employees 
→ (Financial) Strength or “Energy” 
[$,€/Employee];  
Energy-Related Phenomenon → Capacity ⊗ Intensity 
Volume Energy → Volume ⊗ Pressure 
Thermal Energy → Entropy ⊗ Temperature 
Shaping Energy (Power)→ Form (“Gestalt”) ⊗ Elasticity 
Note that capacity in this sense is different from capability as understood by RBV: Ac-
cording to Merriam-Webster capability is the quality or state of being capable; the fa-
cility or potential for an indicated use or deployment; a feature or faculty capable of 
development (“potentiality”). 
Figure I.130, Figure I.87 and Figure I.5 allow a further metaphor to be established 
between the factors for development of the state of “total energy” E of a new firm map-
ping what the firm “has, can, gets and owns” to potential energy Epot and “does” (deci-
sion, implementation, execution) to kinetic energy Ekin: 
E → Epot + Ekin 
These notions clarify differences between performance and productivity which are of-
ten used as synonyms. According to Equation I.2 performance is related to the com-
parison of current achievement on the basis of existing resources and constraints 
(Actuality, A) and what could be achieved by developing resources and removing 
constraints (Potentiality, P) which is A / P. 
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Figure I.130: The constellations and interrelationships that characterize states and 
performance of a growing NTBF. 
On the other hand, productivity was related to Capability C, the possible achievement 
with existing resources and within existing constraints, as A / C. Actually, as defined in 
Figure I.130, productivity is an indicator derived from other, for NTBFs more or less 
readily available indicators for NTBF growth. Correspondingly, we view: 
Change of productivity is an indicator of performance 
(as illustrated in Figure I.132). 
Conceptually, productivity is often related to how well an organization converts input, 
resources (labor, materials, machines etc.) into output and outcomes (goods and ser-
vices). This is expressed by ratios of outputs to inputs. That is, for instance, (input) 
cost per (output) good / service. It is not on its own a measure of how efficient the 
conversion process is. But this definition is not practical for systematic investigations 
(of NTBFs) as relevant data are rarely accessible.  
Performance is a relation between “what is” and “what could be,” or verbalized “more 
with the same or even more with less.” In essence, in the current context performance 
is related to the first derivative of productivity and “performance persistence” is ex-
pressed by “constant” productivities (cf. also Figure I.10, Figure I.132). 
 Chapter 4 707 
According to these definitions we associate leadership with an emphasis on perform-
ance and intangible resources (developing firm’s culture, employees, etc. to get more 
out of these resources), but management with an emphasis on productivity and tangi-
ble resources. 
Figure I.130 provides an outline of a model for the description of NTBFs’ develop-
ments (growths) in terms of sub-states which will be characterized by relevant, ac-
cessible indicators. The “has, can, gets” block (essentially non-financial tangible and 
intangible resources and assets), the “resource state,” is interconnected to what the 
firm needs in terms of financing (“financial state”) and how effective and efficient the 
goal is achieved in terms of leadership and management and organization (“organiza-
tional state”) related to productivity. 
A mismatch between available input and resources (has, can, gets) and required input 
and resources (needs; finances) to reach the goal(s) may constrain the amount of de-
velopment that can be undertaken at any given time. 
Figure I.132 illustrates performance increase with a “more with the same” or “more 
with less” constellation, thus, for a firm, achieving higher profitability. Notably, market 
share as an antecedent of organizational performance is consistent with models pro-
posed in numerous empirical studies [Den Hartigh et al. 2002]. 
“Full” information concerning relevant indicators about the states of a firm is readily 
available only for public stock companies in terms of annual reports and documents 
for the stock exchange. For the overwhelming proportion of NTBFs information about 
the firms’ states is often rudimentary. 
Furthermore, the input-conversion-output cycle in Figure I.130 and the extended one 
of Figure I.5 generate an impression of linearity of the involved processes. However, 
the GST/cybernetics approach emphasized that for new venture growth a number of 
systemic interactions generates self-reinforcing processes, such as 
 Founder team formation (Figure I.70); 
 Building company culture (Figure I.120); 
 Organizational learning (the learning curve, ch. 2.1.2.5); 
 Scale effects, often referred to as” economies of scale” which imply that the 
average total cost will decline with growing production volumes (Figure I.154). 
 Decision-making self-reinforcement (that is, past acceptances make future 
acceptances more likely; ch. 2.1.2.5); 
 Spiraling innovation persistence and investment persistence (Figure I.127); 
 The transformation of core competencies into core rigidities (Figure I.129); 
 Adaptive expectations (further belief in prevalence; Box I.17). 
 Downfall of the young firm’s financial state by interaction of internal factors 
and processes and external effects and processes bound to customers, mar-
kets, factor markets and financing (Figure I.114). 
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The last aspect represent interaction effects with the environment, market-bound self-
reinforcing mechanisms whereas the other ones are firm-bound self-reinforcing me-
chanisms. Adaptive expectations are also important for the NTBF’s interactions with 
customers. This occurs when a customer’s preference for a product is dependent on 
the opinions or expectations of other (potential) customers (ch. 4.2.1.1). The inter-
dependence of opinions is based on information sharing and “escalation” (ch. 4.3.5.2). 
Startups, hence, try to utilize this effect by publishing a list of “reference customers” on 
their Web sites. 
A further market-bound self-reinforcing mechanism refers to “utility of an offering,” 
when the economic utility of using a product becomes larger as its network grows in 
size. Network size is determined by the number of suppliers and users of products 
based on a common technology standard. Network size is important in many markets, 
but most visible in the markets like telecommunications, computer equipment and 
software [Den Hartigh et al. 2002]. 
4.3.5 A Bracket Model of New Technology 
Venture Development 
It is the theory that decides what we can observe. 
Albert Einstein 
The basis of the following “business bracket model” of development (growth) of new 
technology ventures follows largely the above described lines incorporating aspects of 
the stage-based and resource-based views and reliance on a number of inferences 
from empirical observations outlined so far. It concentrates on the social and econo-
mic context. It establishes a relation between the firm’s development due to internal 
and external factors and appropriately selected observable indicators. 
Focusing on NTBFs it is important to re-emphasizing that we are dealing with rela-
tively low level organized complexity. This is we are dealing usually with human-
activity organizations of two to forty or rarely one hundred persons, at the highest. 
Furthermore, we often encounter young firms with very few (1-3) products and few 
customers (1-5) whose number does not exceed a dozen – even if their revenues ex-
ceed one billion dollars (or euros)(cf. First Solar Inc. in ch. 4.3.5.2 and Figure I.154). 
The central constellation for growth (cf. also Figure I.5) is in terms of business 
processes, functions, resources and capabilities and organization (Figure I.131). The 
bracket model emphasizes growth, but includes not intended growth, and may also 
cover firm’s failure. 
HP co-founders David Packard and Bill Hewlett “did not believe that growth 
was important for its own sake,” but concluded that “continuous growth was 
essential” for the company to remain competitive and they continued, 
“Growth: to emphasize growth as a measure of strength and requirement for 
survival.” (citation [Bhidé 2000:230]). 
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In this regard, for NTBFs “growth persistence” is in line with goal persistence 
(ch. 4.3.2), innovation and investment persistence (ch. 4.2.3). 
Pressures for growth and capacity for growth are discussed by Bhidé [2000:230-233]. 
Apart from driven to grow by the entrepreneur’s aspiration and intention pressures for 
growth result partially from self-reinforcing processes. Some of these are the follow-
ing. 
 A firm cannot remain small if its rivals increase market share by exploiting 
economies of scale or if customers believe that size is a precondition for long-
run survival. Longevity goes hand in hand with growth. 
 The external labor market may initiate pressure for NTBFs to grow. A depend-
ency on highly talented people and researchers means the firm has to offer 
opportunities for personal development and progress. A stagnant firm risks 
losing its talented employees. 
 The accumulation and experiences and the development of decision-making 
routines may lead to an increase in the capacity of the firm’s managerial and 
supervisory personnel, creating more efficient capabilities, which increases 
the potential for growth. 
The bracket model assumes that there are no “invariant states of activity” in young 
firms the way a stage-based view often suggests. In the sense of open systems with 
continuous input/resources and output/outcomes (Figure I.5) there is continuous con-
version activity including continuous learning of leading and managing, resource and 
asset re-grouping and resource allocation characterizing a firm’s states which will be 
interrupted by changes through (unbalanced internal and/or external) events and deci-
sions and actions. And, furthermore, 
“A firm cannot easily stop growing after it has reached some fixed critical 
mass.” [Bhidé 2000:230] 
For technology entrepreneurship a critical mass for non-growth NTBFs could be ca. a 
dozen employees (ch. 4.3.1; Table I.69, Table I.71). 
In this regard one can create certain associations with Newton’s First Law of Motion – 
sometimes referred to as the Law of Inertia. The First Law is often stated as: 
An object at rest stays at rest and an object in motion stays in motion with the same 
speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force (italics 
added). 
Relating the notion “object staying in motion” to a firm with continuous growth one can 
speak of dynamic stability of sub-states of a growing (open) human-activity conver-
sion system or firm (Figure I.5) if it keeps “growth regularity” among sub-states. This 
would be described by a (mathematically) strictly monotonic increasing function be-
tween state variables S, like Si(t+1) > Si(t) or their respective indicators. 
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The description would be valid over a certain period of time, the “dynamically stable 
interval” <t0, tn.> (uninterrupted progression in one direction). Though not of particular 
interest in the current context, the model will allow also monotonic decreasing rela-
tions for dynamically stable sub-states, with no stop leading to firm failure. 
NTBF growth for a period of observation, hence, will be represented by dynamic stabi-
lity of subsequent sub-states of the firm in terms of their intervals of existence that ap-
pear with unchanged growth regularity (including constancy) of the appropriate indica-
tors separated by a variety of  to-be defined interruptions. 
This shows structural and functional similarity with what Abrahamson [2000] regards 
in the context of “change management” for firms as “dynamic stability: a process that 
alternates major change efforts with carefully paced periods of smaller, organic 
change.” 
Dynamic stability in our context of open systems is not what usually is understood as 
dynamic stability in engineering. Here this is the property of a body, such as a rocket 
or plane, which, when disturbed from an original state of steady flight or motion, 
dampens the oscillations set up by restoring movements and thus gradually returns 
the body to its original state. 
It is important to be noted that dealing with an open system a transition into 
another stable state does not mean the system may recover the initial stable 
situation (state). After overcoming the perturbation it will proceed in another, 
new state targeting the system’s goal. Every new dynamics drives the sys-
tem’s states toward the final state of goal achievement. In so far, there is a 
link to dynamic capabilities. 
Inquiring into dynamic stability investigates primarily what happens during the time af-
ter a disturbance. To an outside observer a dynamically stable state may appear 
rather insensitive to certain “small” perturbations as, if necessary, a system may adapt 
to such effects in a non-observable way. 
Conversely, strength and stability means that, for observation, only the severe pertur-
bations may disrupt dynamically stable states to make these distinguishable from 
“underlying noise” of measurements. A summary of such usually observable perturb-
bations of dynamically stable (sub)-states based on the outlines in this book will be 
given later (Table I.76). 
The notion of the “small perturbation” is associated with another issue, that changes 
are relevant due to unbalanced internal and/or external events and related decisions 
and actions. 
Observing a particular indicator may reflect the combined, interaction of oppositely 
acting factors which may result in rarely observable small perturbation, though the 
overall state of the system may be affected significantly. For this reason the current 
approach will usually consider not just only one indicator, but usually several ones 
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which may reflect the perturbation differently. Reference to the details of the firm’s in-
ternalities, a switch to the micro level, can provide necessary insights. 
When accepting that an economic recession can usually be viewed as a severe per-
turbation of the growth of an NTBF Figure I.123 shows this to be the case for the Ger-
man WITec GmbH for the Dot-Com Recession (2000/2001). However, the same fig-
ure suggests that the even more pronounced Great Recession is not reflected by the 
growth curve. Understanding and explaining this effect is only possible focusing ex-
plicitly on internalities of the firm and the markets it serves. 
Internalities of the firm will emphasize a balance of basic business processes of the 
value chain (Figure I.7), indicated, in the sense of GST, by circular arrows in Figure 
I.131. It is the responsibility of leadership/management to keep innovation and invest-
ment persistence and own continuous learning and build related business experi-
ences. The innovation process is interwoven with all other processes. 
For NTBFs with an early on export orientation it is very important to organize distri-
bution, usually by local distributors as these know the specifics of the local markets. 
And for complex technical products there must be user training, consulting and tech-
nical service in the countries. 
 
Figure I.131: Key activities to be balanced for a growing NTBF. 
Figure I.131 exhibits implicitly the customer-facing process when researchers (scien-
tists and engineers) are actually interacting or communicating directly with customers 
(face-to-face, visits) – which is not a business service feature experienced or seen by 
the customer. This combination of development, demonstration and distribution by 
researchers is not only relevant for disruptive innovations, but also for getting ideas.
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Formalism, Constraints and Special Cases of the Growth Model 
Following the formalism of quantum theory for treating energy levels of molecules 
which separates electronic, (nuclear) vibrational and (total molecule) rotation states by 
factoring, 
Ψ = Ψelectronic · Ψvibrational · Ψrotational, 
we shall use the “bra(c)ket notation” (Equation I.6, Equation I.12) to describe the over-
all system state of an NTBF Ψ by weakly coupled sub-states (Equation I.14). 
This factoring of states means that there is only weak coupling between the states and 
that their related observables can be measured (almost) independently from each 
other. Weak coupling, however, may be observable, for instance, for molecular ex-
cited states. The dominating bands of electronically excited states measured by UV or 
CD spectroscopy 85 will often be superimposed by a weak structure of vibrational 
states. 
Equation I.14: 
|Ψ (Overall System State)> → |ψSF (Financial State)>⋅|ψRS (Resource State)>⋅ 
|ψOS (Organizational State)⋅|ψNS (Networking and Coop State)>⋅… 
For NTBF development (during the first ten-twelve years) we assume that for certain 
time intervals weak coupling between sub-states exists, such as the financial (FS), re-
source (RS) and organizational (OS) states. This means, in terms of indicators (“ex-
pectation values” for given states in the sense of Equation I.6), for instance, due to 
only loose correlation increasing revenue is not necessarily associated with increasing 
productivity or strictly monotonically increased revenues (Si(t+1) > Si(t)) may not mean 
strictly monotonically increased number of employees (Figure I.149, but cf. Figure 
I.145). 
And increasing the number of employees very fast may result in organizational coordi-
nation problems (ch. 4.3.2) leading to decrease of productivity, as David Packard put it 
(cited Bhidé [2000:233]), “more businesses die from ingestion than starvation.” It is to 
be noted that some of the entrepreneurs the author had discussion with mentioned to 
track productivity and used decreasing productivity as a trigger to initiate organiza-
tional change. 
We associate the organizational state with only the internal situation of the firm, 
whereas the firm’s interconnections to outside entities will reflect “network organiza-
tion.” If we would assume strong coupling between OS and NS for an exceptional 
case we shall note it and use just one indicator to cover both and continue to call it an 
“organizational state.” Generally NS may contribute to FS and RS (“add-ons”). 
Concerning the combined organizational and networking states leadership and man-
agement capabilities and “coordination capabilities” are important which refer to the 
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maximum heterogeneity that the firm’s coordination routines allow to derive a positive 
net benefit from. 
Strong coupling, not separable sub-states, may occur when large amounts of capital 
infusion by investments or venture capital (financial state) result in adding large num-
bers of employees (resource state) and adding a management team (organizational 
state). Strong coupling may also show up for corporate venturing which combines fi-
nances, other resources and networking and cooperation (Figure I.125). 
Based on available observable data and simplifying complexity we associate the over-
all state of an NTBF Ψ to the firm’s indicators of sub-states, namely revenues, number 
of employees and productivity, plus an empirical bulk “multiplier” N which may account 
for remaining influences on the sub-states’ including firm-internal and external effects 
(Equation I.15). 
Equation I.15: 
S(Overall System State) → N ⊗ FS(“Financial State”; Revenues) ⊗  
RS(“Resource State”; Employees, R&D) ⊗ OS(“Organizational State”; Productivity) 
We regard revenues (R) as an indicator of the financial state allowing to finance a 
firm’s development – for instance, organic growth via own cash flow or capital infusion 
via external investments or non-organic growth via acquisition of another firm. The 
financial state FS is susceptible to self-reinforcing processes with positive or negative 
effects (Figure I.114). FS may reflect investment persistence and RS innovation 
persistence (Figure I.127).  
As an interesting aspect of new firm development a study by Chandler and Hanks 
[1993] suggests that the great majority of entrepreneurs have growth concerns that far 
outweigh their concerns about profitability. 
The resource state is assumed to cover non-financial resources, in particular, em-
ployees. Specifically, in Equation I.15 R&D means the number of employees in a 
research and development function (department). R&D as a resource is usually meas-
ured by R&D Intensity (ch. 1.1.1; Table I.1; cf. also TVT, HVT in Figure I.128). 
R&D is a “potential” and is a resource for innovation by a company-wide process 
which, when strongly coupled with innovation persistence as an organizational com-
petence and strength, builds sustainable competitive advantage. The role of R&D 
activities of the R&D function of a firm becomes more obvious in terms of revenues, if 
the firm’s offerings refer to inventions, for instance, by selling IP (licenses) or providing 
contract research (Table I.3). 
As the approach to dynamically stable sub-states allows equality (Si(t+1) ≥ Si(t)) a 
growing firm with constant productivity (P) is a special situation of growth with a stable 
organizational situation for a particular “dynamically stable interval” <t0, tn.>. For this 
interval, with revenue (R) and number of employees (EN), one can write the formula 
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R1⋅(EN1)
-1 =  R2⋅(EN2)
-1 = constant, resembling the well-known relation of ideal gases 
which is a good approximation to the behavior of many gases under many conditions 
and leads us to consider the notion equation of state. Classical thermodynamics is 
much concerned with equations of state. 
The equation of state for an “ideal gas” is p1⋅V1 = p2⋅V2 = constant for a given tempera-
ture T with pressure (p) and volume (V) as state variables or p⋅V = n⋅R⋅T (R is a 
universal gas constant and n is equal to number of moles, the mass (m) divided by the 
molecular mass (M)). 
In cybernetics there is a special condition of systems in growth states called the 
steady state condition. This special condition is possible after some time, when all 
input and output quantities are and remain constant. A relation between input and 
output quantities for a system in a steady state condition has been called “Static 
Transfer Response of the Dynamic System” [Ruhm 2008]. 
In our context, we shall not be so strict when speaking of a steady state condition. For 
dynamic stability we relax the steady state condition emphasizing OS(Organizational 
State; Productivity) (Equation I.15) to require only “negligible” change of productivity 
over a certain period. We shall denote these as “dynamically stable states” – of the 
whole system. 
This situation of NTBFs with “constant” productivities shows a metaphorically compa-
rable situation with the notion of a “steady state” as a model in cosmology (an alterna-
tive to the Big Bang theory). Accordingly, a steady state has numerous properties that 
are unchanging in time; the universe is always expanding but, by observation, is main-
taining a constant average density (mass in relation to volume). 
Therefore, one could speak of a “steady state firm growth” for the special case when 
growing through states of relatively stable organization, when expanding but maintain-
ing a constant average “density” which here would be related to (inverse) productivity. 
This is illustrated in Figure I.132. Admittedly, such a relation between counts of com-
ponents and size (firm revenues) does not differentiate components and their inter-
actions in terms of organization including structures of leadership, coordination and 
communication. 
In purposeful and organized social (human-activity) systems like firms change is usu-
ally associated with resistance by those who are or perceive to be affected by the 
change. Hence, it requires structured efforts (“energy”) of leadership/management of 
firms to implement necessary changes of activites and processes and organization 
(“change management”). Such a period of implementing change proceeds via an un-
stable “transition state” (Figure I.133). Due to a lack of observing details  such a tran-
sition state is regarded as a “black box”. However, to a certain degree, a transition 
state may be compared with the startup thrust phase directly after firm’s foundation 
which is often an unsteady process with considerable risks of failure, searching for 
structure and organization dealing with changes for all the persons involved in it. 
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Figure I.132: Illustrated steady state growth and performance versus productivity of 
an organized entity. 
After firm’s foundation with a particular purpose and goal in mind and formalized by a 
transformation (Equation I.12), the startup thrust phase (ch. 4.3.2, Figure I.125) re-
presents the first transition state of more to come for a new firm’s development. Due 
to proportionately high risk of failure a new firm may operate here in “survival mode.” 
For firms, unless balanced by a simultaneously occurring second change, the transi-
tion state will exhibit a change of the relevant indicator function (revenue or employ-
ees) in the positive or negative direction. It may also be observed by a temporary 
increase/decrease of productivity and/or performance. Transitions states can be con-
ceptually related to Greiner’s “crises” (Table I.68). Internal change of the firm can be 
initiated by external effects. But there may also be intentional change of a firm’s 
organization by the founder as described for Osmonics by Runge [2006:91-94]. 
Metaphorically a new firm’s development via transition states can be compared with 
chemical reactions where an energetically stable initial state of educts (A + B) requires 
energy to bring the (closed) system via a transition state (admittedly with a very short 
life-time) into a more stable “product state” (C + D). 
The non-stable transition state will have certain duration between two dynamically 
stable (sub-)states. Apart from referring to the startup thrust phase an idea of the 
duration of such an “intermediate” state can be got from revenue and employee de-
velopments of the German Nano-X GmbH, when after catching a big order, it in-
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creased first the number of employees, then increased production capacity and finally 
turned to delivery of the products. (Figure I.137, Table I.77). 
 
Figure I.133: Interruptions of NTBF developments by “transition states.” 
A transition state requires usually another style of leadership/management and exe-
cution, sometimes even a totally different style if the new firm has to enter “survival 
mode.” 
As described previously in various contexts a transition state initiated by a switch to 
(or start as) a VC-based NTBF or one getting huge private investments follows usually 
a path into a state that corresponds largely to intrapreneurial states and initiatives of 
innovation management of existing large firms (Figure I.134). Most notably, change to 
a VC-based NTBF is usually associated with a change of the leadership/management 
team, organizational structure and organizational processes (Figure I.126) and 
expressed by a transformation described formally, for instance, by Equation I.11. 
Figure I.134 and Figure I.130 contrast implicitly the challenges of building a firm with 
those of managing (“running”) an established firm. Building requires the entrepre-
neur(s) to develop tangible and intangible assets, organization and coordination me-
chanisms more or less from scratch. The focus of executive managers of established 
companies revolves around existing assets, their strategic uses and related mecha-
nisms. 
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Figure I.134: The transition of an NTBF into a new state after becoming a VC-based 
NTBF characterized to be similar to those of large existing firms. 
VC-Based NTBFs represent an entity intermediate between a privately held or pri-
vately controlled firm and a large corporation. Key differences refer firstly to 
Opportunities 
 Uncertainty is less – VCs tend to go into rapidly growing, large markets with 
proven teams (or replace founder entrepreneurs by experienced management 
if things do not develop as anticipated) 
 Potential profits are higher than typical privately held or controlled, respec-
tively, firms. 
There is more planning than in startups. VC-based startups work from a business plan 
and run “standard” financial management and technology/offering development proc-
esses as in large firms. In particular, fund raising by VC-based startups is synchro-
nized with development phases and achievements of milestones (Figure I.52, Table 
I.27) similar to the Stage-Gate process of large firms (ch. 1.2.7.2; Figure I.79, Figure 
I.180). The second aspect concerns resources: 
 There are more resources available than in bootstrapped (ch. 4.3.3.1) or 
private firms, but less than in big corporations (for intrapreneurship). 
CleanTech (Table I.52) and particularly biofuels and biobased chemicals (A.1.1) are 
areas where technology entrepreneurship is focused largely on VC-based NTBFs. 
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Considering all the previous outlines there are bridges to fundamental concepts used 
so far in treating new firms’ dynamics according to: 
 Stage-based views (ch. 4.3.1), 
 Resource-Based Views (RBV, ch. 4.3.2) 
 Input/output (I/O) models (4.3.2). 
The current phenomenological approach seeks essentially for qualitative and quan-
titative descriptions in terms of equations of state rather than explanation. That part re-
lates to a basic cybernetic model (ch. 4.3.4) and relates metaphorically to quantum 
theoretical and physical fundamentals. The bridge between description and explana-
tion is achieved focusing on “interruptions” or “perturbations of growth, which means, 
“the transformations concerned with what happens, not with why it happens.” 
Explanation is approached by providing information on the nature of the “interrupt-
tions,” “why it may happen,” in terms of a list of assumptions and common ways of 
perceiving forces in firms and forces in markets and industries and their interactions 
dealt with by business administration and economics (Table I.76). 
4.3.5.1 The Bracket Model 
The following approach will focus on NTBFs, young technology ventures in no more 
than the first twelve years of their existence (ch. 1.1.1.1). It takes the position of an ob-
server and identifies and utilizes mechanisms and drivers of changes of states of a 
new firm entrepreneurs being a part of. 
Phased firm growth in the sense of GST is a result of a relation-oriented pur-
poseful process of development in which a linear or circular interacting series 
of changes from inside or outside the firm lead irregularly to new development 
states associated with increases (or decreases) of appropriately selected ob-
servable indicators of the developing entity. 
That means, the approach focuses on the firm and its relevant super-systems, such 
as the economic and political systems, and consequently switches between macro- 
and micro-levels. 
The model follows a teleological approach emphasizing often not “why things happen” 
but emphasizing ways of behaving and asking 
 What can it do? (the resources) 
 What does it do? (the phased process) 
  How does it proceed to reach the goal? 
 What can be expected with regard to reaching the goal – often providing “rea-
sons for thinking that” (Figure I.2)? 
Necessary resources during the pursuit of the entrepreneurial goal(s) are specifically 
given in Figure I.120 and Figure I.121, Figure I.125, Figure I.126 and Figure I.130. 
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“That something is ‘predictable’ {“expectable” in our context (ch. 4.1)} implies that 
there exists a constraint.” [Ashby 1957:132] (Braces added). The below presented 
“bracket model” of development of NTBFs takes time as an implicit variable (states at 
given times, usually on a year-by-year basis) and focuses on some fundamental con-
straints for a hierarchy of  taxonomies (Figure I.128): 
 Firm type RBSU (“spin-outs from academia”) versus “other academic NTBF” 
and “other NTBFs” (Table I.2) 
 Full and majority ownership and control versus minority ownership, little (al-
most no) control (VC-based NTNFs; Table I.74) 
VC-based NTBF do not only affect ownership and control, but also endow-
ment with large financial resources and change in terms of management and 
organizational structure and probably strategy as well as execution following 
closely approaches used by large firms (ch. 1.2.7.2, Figure I.126, Figure 
I.134; A.1.1). 
 Differentiation of organic and non-organic growth (Figure I.127). 
It is to be noted that concerning VC-based NTBFs the emphasis will be on combined 
ownership, control and financial endowment. Other types of (large) investments, for in-
stance, for large-scale production-oriented NTBFs, may decouple these categories, 
for instance, through association with “silent partnerships” in the NTBF. 
Furthermore, there may be always cross-roads when NTBFs with full and majority 
ownership and control change over to VC-based firms (Figure I.52). Prototypes of VC-
based NTBFs will catch capital often during or at the end of the startup thrust phase 
(Figure I.125) or within the first five to eight years of existence. Several new biofuels 
firms were started immediately with venture capital (A.1.1). 
The differentiation between organic and non-organic growth may be a “moving” typo-
logy. For its growth and a restricted phase of its development an NTBF may switch 
between both modes (Figure I.123). Non-organic growth exposes a firm usually to in-
tegration risk. While having a stake in another firm mostly improves revenue opportu-
nities. Full acquisition improves often revenues, but iintegration risks means issues of 
management, coordination and performance. 
Development of new firms is irregular. It proceeds via states of different life-times and 
modes of development. These exhibit three basic observable types of development 
(growth) as displayed in Figure I.107 depending on the founders’ goals and cha-
racteristics of the firm which can be measured by appropriate indicators, for instance, 
 Linear growth which may be “high” (steep) or “low (cf. Figure I.123, Figure 
I.137, Figure I.141, Figure I.149); 
 Exponential (or hyperbolic) growth, which is typically “super high” and pro-
ceeds often very fast (EGCs, “gazelles”; for instance, Figure I.145, Figure 
I.159) or occurs after a delay (Figure I.143, Figure I.144, Figure I.154); 
 Asymptotic growth, which will express “non-growth” situations. 
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Furthermore, as growth will be “perturbed” or interrupted, respectively, by firm-internal 
or external factors or both and associated with “transition states” (Figure I.133) 
change between different phenotypes of growth may occur (cf. delayed growth in 
Figure I.107). NTBFs with large-scale production will usually show significant growth 
patterns only after five to eight years of development and scale-up. 
Basically, we assume to be sufficient that for growth dynamically stable states exhibit 
only (continuously and monotonously increasing) linear, slightly curved or exponential 
behavior for an observable interval <t1, t2> (Figure I.133). 
If we can associate two subsequent dynamically stable states to the intervals <t1, t2> 
and <t5, t6>, then the life-time of the in-between transition state (or states) will be 
attributable to <t3, t4>. For instance, for the German WITec GmbH (Figure I.123) the 
interval <2000,2002> would relate to a transition state (cf. also Figure I.156). This 
indicates that transition states of new firms may have life-times which are comparable 
in duration with dynamically stable states. 
Formally, transition states may show up as an overlay on the overall growth pattern 
which let a gross observable indicator appear its indicator function to keep continuity, 
but not necessarily with increasing character.  
If strong change is associated with a very short “life-time” of the transition state, the 
growth function will exhibit a “jump” as illustrated in Figure I.21 and seen for the reve-
nue curves in Figure I.137, Figure I.139 as well as Figure I.140, where a basically 
exponential growth pattern of Nanophase Technologies between 1994 and 2000 is 
interrupted at 1997. 
The bracket model is resource-oriented as well as activity- and process-oriented 
where “events” trigger a corresponding change of the state of the firm including the 
state(s) of the involved persons or groups of persons, respectively (Equation I.14, 
Equation I.15). 
We define a (business) bracket as a generally observable, but also expected 
(Figure I.136) impact of a transform or a transformation into a new state of a 
firm in a specific business area. The associated observable quantity, reflecting 
the time development of the impact, will start with a usually difficult to detect 
onset, then there will be a peak-like or wider, skewed bell-shaped center re-
presenting the essence of the impact, and finally a very long-tail characteriz-
ing formally a slowly but continuously reducing effect of the transform or trans-
formation, respectively (Figure I.135). 
A business bracket will be represented by a graphical map of an event, the 
“perturbation” of the time-development of a properly selected observable 
quantity characterizing a change into a firm’s transition state whose life-time 
ends when a following new dynamically stable state can be detected by an 
observable regular shape of the indicator function (Figure I.135, bottom). 
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That means one may identify a “front bracket” rather well, but principally never an “end 
bracket.” For practical purposes and special cases one could “declare” an end bracket 
with regard to the point when the impact of the transform/transformation is assumed to 
become so small that it can be viewed as having no further significant influence on the 
measurement result – and this may be the end bracket to coincide with the emer-
gence of a new bracket. 
Business brackets originate 
 externally from non-controllable effects or internally (controllable or uncontrol-
lable) ones or 
 from unintentionally or intentionally effects – initiated by firm-internal decisions 
and actions. 
Structurally, a bracket refers to a relation associated with a change of a systemic state 
of the entity under consideration. A long tail of a bracket map simulates artificially that 
a “bracket event” leads to a new state of the affected entity which will also influence 
future states, for instance, in terms of decision-making, actions and behavior. In this 
regard it simulates “organizational memory” (Figure I.136, Figure I.129) which actually 
corresponds to an “Ashby memory” [Ashby 1957:115-117], a theoretical construct 
evoked to explain behavior of an incompletely observable system by reference to an 
event in the past. 
“If a determinate system is only partly observable, and thereby becomes (for 
that observer) not predictable, the observer may be able to restore predictabil-
ity by taking the system’s past history into account, i.e. by assuming the exis-
tence within it of some form of ‘memory’.” [Ashby 1957:115] Ashby provides a 
very illustrative example of reference to “memory” for a “living system.” 84 
A business bracket reflects a business event which may affect a company’s competi-
tive position in a positive or negative direction. It reflects influences on the develop-
ment of a (new) firm as it affects measurably what a firm has, can, gets, owns, does 
(also as a response to external effects) or delivers (Figure I.130) in relation to the 
firm’s mission and goals. 
Business bracketing emphasizes the micro (entrepreneur and firm) level of entrepre-
neurship with the issue of connection to the macro level. 
 It relies on observations at the firm level to reveal mechanisms and processes 
of growth to be operative and focus on dynamics – through sequencing of 
events and their interactions and mutual reinforcements (Figure I.114, Figure 
I.115). 
 It provides explanatory guidance to make sense of the mechanisms and pro-
cesses that give rise to new firms’ developments. 
The business bracket concept has to be differentiated from the concept of “bracketing” 
of social theory and sociology, in particular, temporal brackets (ch. 1.2.2). Here, brack-
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eting would be a process related to the entrepreneurial person(s) in the context of the 
venture’s development, specifically a focus on people. 
Temporal brackets, for instance, refer to cognition when a company-internal process 
or event will start (the front bracket) and an expectation how long an event or process 
will take to complete (end bracket) or, after a period of time, the cognition of an event 
that will start a subsequent event or an intentional start of a new bracket in anticipation 
of an event to occur. Their identification requires observation and direct inquiry into 
entrepreneurs’ intentions, decisions and behavior. Defining front and end brackets 
means the entrepreneur is largely in control of the bracket. 
Temporal brackets can, for instance, be related to strategic actions or decisions taken 
by actors or to planning. That is, each temporal phase started either by cognition of a 
significant exogenous or endogenous event and a related or an unrelated endogenous 
decision and action taken by organizational decision-makers. Some of these brackets 
get formalized into timetables such as business plans. Some critical brackets associ-
ated with pacing may be made explicit as sub-goals or milestones. Hence, temporal 
brackets may structure venture development, which is at least partially controlled by 
the entrepreneur [Bird 1992]. 
For ventures to emerge as recognized and reliable entities with a competitive advan-
tage, the timing must be right. For this to happen, the entrepreneur needs to be aware 
of and understand the time requirements of the different events and processes. 
Entrepreneurial growth of NTBFs will be described by periods of dynamic stability of 
states interrupted by transition states (Figure I.122, Figure I.133) initiated by business 
brackets. 
With regard to observable indicators maping a business bracket and its time-depen-
dency to a “wave” with positive or negative amplitude (the event’s impact) has the 
consequence that, for a curve, overlapping “waves” may exhibit, for instance, a dip or 
may even “extinguish” each other (“balanced forces”), as is seen for the interference 
effect of light. This is illustrated for the case of a bracket by an economic recession 
with a negative impact in Figure I.135 (for an example cf. also Figure I.123). 
Depending on the subject under observation it is important to select an adequate indi-
cator as a bracket may show up for one indicator, but not for another. To reveal an in-
dicator Figure I.89 demonstrates this effect referring to the example of choosing the 
right indicator to demonstrate a relevant macro-trend. For this reason the current 
bracket approach to NTBF growth will usually consider both, revenues and numbers 
of employees (cf. Figure I.149) – and productivity. 
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Mapping the time-dependent impact of a business bracket to a specifically 
shaped “wave” 
 
How resulting growth is reduced by the effect of a recession 
Figure I.135: Defining a bracket’s time-dependent development concerning its impact 
and how brackets with negative impacts add up through overlap resulting in an 
observable dip in an observable growth curve. 
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For instance, recession stems primarily from the (enlarged) economic system and 
may affect (almost) any kind of an entrepreneurial firm. It is a general bracket. If only a 
particular kind of NTBF is affected, for instance, of a specific industry or market, we 
have a special bracket. 
Concerning observability and meaning the bracket approach depends on an 
(almost) complete data set for the relevant effects (transforms, transforma-
tions) whose collection for NTBFs is generally a challenging exercise. 
Brackets may, or usually will, affect the whole system relevant for (technology) 
entrepreneurship (Figure I.13), but will often be associated with only a particu-
lar sub-system’s states due to limitations of access to relevant needed data 
(viewing “pars pro toto”; Equation I.15). 
According to the bracket model entrepreneurship appears as a series of transforma-
tions accompanying a new firm’s development into a viable small or medium-sized 
firm. Each transformation corresponds to a bracket generating a transition state. The 
transition state is a critical period of the firm’s development into a new dynamically 
stable state involving decision, actions and activities of change to respond adequately 
to the initiating bracket or brackets. 
As brackets represent relations, between an operator and an operand (or a 
firm and a market/customers or a firm and the economic system in a reces-
sion) they will exhibit regional dependencies concerning their impacts. 
Differences, for instance, in sales effects to customers may be due to different 
cultures, attitudes and preferences in different countries. An example for the global 
level would be: An internationally operating food company introduces a new product 
based on genetically modified objects (GMOs) and increases distinctly its revenues 
specifically through this product in the US. On the other hand, in Germany the product 
may be rejected largely by the public – and, moreover, the firm’s reputation may 
decline generally in Germany so that revenues for all its other products also decrease. 
And there may even be country-specific regional differences. A case of introducing 
one kind of innovative self-cleaning roof tiles in Germany by the firm Erlus Baustoff-
werke AG from the south of Germany [Runge 2006:237-239] is an intentional bracket 
generation. If considered as one bracket for whole Germany, it would have a distinct 
regional impact – fewer sales than potentially possible. The reason is, there are clear 
regional differences for color preferences for roof tiles in Germany: In the north pre-
ferences are for grey/black, whereas in the south red/brown is preferred. 
Focusing on the above growth and bracket indicators (measured revenues, number of 
employees, probably profit and productivity) sometimes does not allow to detect a 
bracket by an observer – though the firm “feels” all its impact. This is illustrated in 
Figure I.136 for a growth situation where two brackets occur within a rather short pe-
riod of time, and the latter having at least the same impact as the previous one. 
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Inspecting simultaneously several indicators may be a clue that may reveal the impact 
of the latter one. This applies to two positive, but also negative brackets. 
An example that several brackets occur which will not be resolved by our common in-
dicators is shown in Figure I.144. The brackets may occur so fast after one another 
that the in-between phases cannot be observed. If the time period between the two 
bracket events is larger, the corresponding growth curve may exhibit a “shoulder” of 
the clearly emerged latter bracket. 
A final remark concerning brackets and their time dependencies should be made. A 
bracket and its time development is a representation of an individual, single event 
which will not change sign of the amplitude (impact) over time (Figure I.135). It reflects 
a change of a firm’s state in one direction, by a positive or negative impact. 
However, brackets may sometimes apparently appear to be reflexive. Envision a 
pharma firm having launched a new “blockbuster” drug in the market that made $700 
million in sales over the first two years – product sales associated with a positive 
bracket. But, in the third year, after critical lethal side-effects were detected, the firm 
was subjected to a number of lawsuits, the cost of related litigations amounting to say 
$600 million (in the US; cf. the Vioxx and Lipobay cases, Table I.66). This seems to be 
a conversion of the original bracket, a change to a “negative wave” induced in the firm 
and by the same set of customers that generated the positive impact. 
However, we encounter here decoupled brackets! The impact of the first positive 
bracket, being an intrinsic part of a relation (to customers), means the firm has 
changed its state and when the firm encounters the negative effect it meets the impact 
(of the customers) in a different state: these are separate, different brackets by con-
cept. 
The result of a bracket in the current understanding and GST approach to 
initiate a firm’s new state has the consequence that its development (and 
growth) corresponds to an irreversible process. 
There is no “fall-back position” to the previous state (status quo ante) as a 
strategic option for decision-making. What can principally be re-established is 
an “empty shell,” a constellation which will be used by persons and agents of 
the system who, however, will have changed knowledge, attitudes, decision-
making potential etc. for initiating actions. 
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Figure I.136: Burying a bracket from observation such as revenues resulting from im-
pacts within a short time difference. 
The bracket approach is a “perturbation theory” treating firms’ developments and 
associated states as essentially dynamically stable growth, for instance, with innova-
tion and investment and productivity persistence and appropriate sets of input, re-
sources, activities and decisions, etc. to be perturbed by company-internal or external 
effects. 
In this way the notion “back on track” has a particular meaning: After a perturbation of 
a dynamically stable state the firm will proceed to a new dynamically stable state 
which, however, may or may not be structurally comparable to the previous one (linear 
– linear; Figure I.133, left) or (almost linear – exponential; Figure I.133, right). 
The bracket model is an irregular phase model of new firm development contrasting 
the common stage-based views, such as that of Greiner (Table I.68) which associates 
growth with a set of structurally and operationally predefined phases initiated by a very 
small set of given initiators and related generic activities to proceed through the re-
lated phase. 
We shall proceed assigning a variation in the measured/observable curve to changes 
of the particular state of the firm (Equation I.11; Figure I.135, Figure I.136) by one or 
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more unbalanced forces and providing the reasons for thinking that the observed 
changes are due to particularly significant effects out of a set of conceivable effects. 
These possible effects are derived either from empirical facts, cases, experience 
and/or rules of thumb established for NTBFs or existing large firms or from general 
theories like Porter’s Five Forces Model and the Encapsulated Six Forces Model (ch. 
1.2.5.3; Figure I.33, Table I.16, Table I.18 ) and reference to firms’ failures (Figure 
I.114, Figure I.115) and finally hazards and risks for NTBFs (Table I.65, Table I.66). 
A key role will be played by generally known effects (of super-systems) affecting 
NTBF growth like an economic recession or, for instance, the “silicon cycle” affecting 
specifically the semiconductor and photovoltaic industries as well as legislation for 
policy-driven markets (CleanTech like wind and solar power or biofuels). In this line, 
the recent (March 2011) Earthquake/Tsunami catastrophe of Japan affected, at least 
in certain countries like Germany, the nuclear power industry and attitudinal markets. 
It should be noted, however, that for new firms endowed usually with only little re-
sources brackets may emerge which will affect medium-size and large firms to only a 
little extent. 
The first business bracket of entrepreneurship has been attributed to firm’s 
foundation with aspects of initiating the legal form of the firm and ownership 
and control (Table I.74). This event induces a startup state which can be 
viewed as a transition state (Figure I.133) which including its duration (life-
time) corresponds to the startup thrust phase of the initial configuration (ch. 
4.3.2, Figure I.125). 
Firm’s foundation is particularly also a fundamental temporal bracket for the founder 
person(s) implicitly represented in Figure I.15 (firm’s birth) and Figure I.16, the 
transition from intention to deed. 
Instability of that very early state may be due to the formation process of agreement 
concerning the new firm’s mission, roles and responsibilities of the leadership team 
and, if present, functions of employees and formation of the firm’s culture. This state 
may also require, for instance, to relief initial group tensions as described specifically 
for a team in Figure I.70. 
The startup thrust phase may also be associated with financing issues and establish-
ing network connections, such as building the firm’s advisory board or setting up co-
operative connections with other firms. And there may be intentional changes of the 
original business idea or goal – becoming aware of a false start (ch. 4.3.2; 3M, 
NanoScape) – or revealing a new opportunity to be pursued. 
A probably incomplete list of corresponding perturbations of NTBF growth will be sum-
marized in Table I.76 in a structured manner referring partially also to risk classes for 
technology entrepreneurship (Table I.65). 
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The suggested growth models will be framed by classifying bracketing along several, 
often interconnected dimensions, sometimes associated with rough time markers for 
brackets to occur (Table I.71 - Table I.73). In particular, environment-related brackets 
reflect that we are dealing with open systems (Table I.76). There is 
 Risk taking (ch. 4.2.1; Table I.65, Table I.66) 
 Financing steps (ch. 1.2.7.2, Figure I.52; ch. 1.2.6.2) 
 Firm growth and internal organizational factors, such as specialization, inte-
gration, coordination, communication etc. (Table I.69) 
 Scale-up (for production related NTBFs) (Figure I.8, Figure I.9) 
 External: economic and industry cycles or legislation (Figure I.34). 
Bracket events show up often with “polar” effects, such as the economic boom – bust 
occurrence, getting a (singular) big order or making big sales versus losing the biggest 
customer (of only a small customer base), getting a key researcher or leader or 
manager, the actual company architect (Figure I.126), versus losing one. Loosing key 
researcher is often observed when technical firms merge. 
The unexpected bracketing is often associated with opportunistic adaptation as de-
scribed by Bhidé [2000:53,61,63]. 
In this way the bracket model has become a form of exploratory data analysis. It 
seeks to find patterns in data that are of theoretical, empirical and conceptual rele-
vance. It is related to a sequence analysis involving the temporal ordering of events 
that mark the transitions of one stable state into another one. The issue is: getting 
sufficient data to find out whether hypothesized brackets will show up in the figures. 85 
Table I.76: Selected expected bracket events for new technology-based firms during 
their first ten years of existence. 
Bracket Events Comments, Examples 
General – Global or Local; the Overall Economy or a Special Industry 
General economic recession Usually reduction in demand; 
change of a firm’s organization; 
change of management style 
(control, execution); 
some sectors are little affected by 
recessions, e.g. health and phar-
maceuticals (life science”), 
the same is true for industrial re-
search or public research as a 
customer 
Special industry boom/bust cycle “Silicon Cycle” of the semiconduc-
tor industry (Figure I.152) 
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Life-cycle stage of the industry, particularly “birth of 
the industry” 
Examples through, SAP, Micro-
soft, Cisco 
Societal changes of attitudes or behavior  
Natural disaster, hurricane, overflooding, earthquake 
etc. 
Hurricane Katrina for the US Golf 
Coast in 2005; 
the March 2011 Tsunami and 
earthquake in Japan 
Firm-Related Brackets 
Firm’s foundation as the first bracket This bracket may coincide with 
selling an offering to the first cus-
tomer(s) –  e.g. WITec, 
Cambridge Nanotech (Table I.80), 
etc. 
Both growth inducing and growth limiting factors can 
create organizational problems. 
Hitting a critical mass of custom-
ers or employees is a “tipping 
point” which upon crossing leads 
to significant growth (decline of 
productivity?) 
Issues within the founding team; 
change of organizational structure (integration, co-
ordination, communication issues); 
change of the leadership/management team, in 
particular, a simultaneous change of ownership 
(Figure I.126) and VCs establishing “professional 
management” and organizational changes; 
change of management, for instance, “firing” by VCs, 
uncertainty, concern and anxiety of employees 
(effects on productivity); 
one key person/researcher leaves the NTBF or a key 
person appears in the leadership or management 
team 
Ca. 14 percent of young German 
closed firms went bankrupt due to 
disagreements and tensions 
within the leadership team without 
any economic reason (ch. 4.2.3). 
It is always a negative signal if a 
CEO and co-founder leaves the 
NTBF. 
 
After firm’s foundation a CEO ap-
pears from outside as a leader 
and ultimately the “company 
architect” (3M, Avery Dennison, 
Bayer AG; ch. 4.2.3) 
Introduction of “quality management” process for 
NTBFs with production is often seen to be associ-
ated with organizational frictions. 
This is particularly pronounced for 
the research function. 
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Table I.76, continued. 
Intentional change of the NTBF’s development and 
growth direction; 
“business model innovation,” 
intentionally changing the business model, 
stepping up in the value system 
False starts (3M, NanoScape); 
Business Self-Assessment (BSA):  
Tired of buying reverse osmosis 
membranes from other companies 
for use in equipment, the founder 
of Osmonics, Inc. Dean Spatz 
wanted to accelerate growth by 
directly manufacturing mem-
branes himself [Runge 2006:92]; 
 
change intentionally firm’s direc-
tion totally (Zweibrüder Opto-
electronics GmbH, B.2); 
in 2008 MetroSpec Technology, 
Inc. was migrating from a service 
engineering/design company to a 
manufacturing company (Figure 
I.167) 
German Xing AG (ch. 3.4.2.1, 
B.2) introducing new sources of 
revenue 
Intentional change of organization Osmonics, Inc. 
Breakeven Reaching profitability, Figure I.53 
“Sudden” changes of the NTBF’s financial states “Sudden” large capital inflows af-
fecting operations;  
successful IPO; 
“sudden” stop of capital inflow, for 
instance, if agreed upon pay-
ments do not show up due to 
problems of the investor (seen 
during the Great Recession, 
MnemoScience, B.2) or 
investors/backers stop financial 
contributions (Zoxy Energy 
Systems AG, B.2) 
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Technology/development steps; 
a technological milestone (Novaled AG, Zweibrüder 
Optoelectronics GmbH) or breakthrough; 
achieving a dominant design, achieving an “industry 
standard”; 
achieving the “Holy Grail” of an industry 
Affecting a technical process like 
scale-up or a general break-
through effect (large processing 
cost reduction) or overcoming a 
“critical mass” effect 
Successful launch of a new product, instrument, de-
vice or service; disruptive or breakthrough innovation 
Henkel (Figure I.138) 
Patent, trademark (brand) infringement or other 
lawsuits 
Especially if associated with a big 
loss 
Non-organic growth; getting a stake in or acquiring 
another firm 
Google, founded in 1998; bought 
Applied Semantics in 2003 that 
had a little piece of software 
called AdSense (Box I.24) or 
merging of new firm’s (PayPal, ch. 
4.3.2; A.1.7), ATMgroup AG (B.2) 
Environment-Related Brackets 
First commercial activities (selling goods/products, 
services, licenses); 
 
 
specifically start already with a customer or customer 
base or 
 
 
startup backed by a supply agreement with a 
customer 
Found a firm after having a cus-
tomer or having already sold 
something forming the basis of 
the startup; 
IoLiTec and Solvent Innovations 
(A.1.5), WITec, ChemCon, 
Attocube, PURPLAN, Cambridge 
Nanotech 
Concept Sciences, Inc. (CSI) - 
Box I.11 
Establishing sales and distribution Own organization of sales and 
distribution (“sales forces,” e-
business, franchising) versus “out-
contracting” sales and distribution 
(and probably marketing) includ-
ing cooperation and networking 
with large firms (Figure I.51, 
Figure I.125). 
internationalization for an NTBF’s 
offerings (including issues of 
currency exchange rates; Figure 
I.116) 
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Table I.76. continued. 
Market-related brackets: 
catching a very big order from a customer (including 
military) or special customer segment 
Losing a major customer (from a small customer 
base) or a large reduction of orders of customers; 
 
“Sudden” appearance of a competitive (substitutive) 
offering on the market or disappreance of a competi-
tor 
 
Adverse event due to supplier-customer relationship; 
 
 
Infrastructural effects (enlarging the basis of offer-
ings’ usage for technical or other reasons); 
 
 
Exchange rate issues; 
 
Election of a new government 
 
Blocked export by changes of national tariffs or in-
dustry standards; 
 
Changes of national laws, regulations or innovation 
policy, phasing out materials (chemicals) or technical 
components 
Examples: 
Nano-X GmbH (Figure I.137), 
Perkin & Sons (Table I.100) 
Nanophase Technologies 
(Figure I.140) 
 
 
 
 
 
German Nanopool’s issues with a 
customer/distributor [Runge 2010] 
 
The role of IBM for SAP’s and 
Microsoft’s growth (Figure I.143, 
Figure I.144) 
 
ChemCon, First Solar 
 
May influence S&T policy, 
regulations, subsidies etc. 
 
 
 
Policy-driven markets; renewable 
energy and energy efficiency 
The Unexpected Bracket, Chance-Related Bracket 
Windfall gains: 
can occur due to unforeseen circumstances in a 
product’s market, such as unexpected demand or 
government regulation; 
 
luck or serendipitous technical or commercial events 
Tsunami/earthquake in Japan: 
German Heyl GmbH & Co. KG 
(Berlin) 86 offers e.g. Prussian 
(Berlin) Blue for treating radio-
active cesium contamination by 
binding and washing out radio-
active cesium spilled by the 
Fukushima nuclear plant. 
There was not only tremendous 
demand in Japan, but also in 
other countries [Dankbar 2011]. 
Though playing a central role in the models of industry forces (Figure I.33), in Table 
I.76 a bracket related to competition (rivalry) occurs only once. Competition basically 
may adversely affect revenues and profitability (decrease in profits or market share). 
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On the other hand, strong competition has been listed as one of the reasons for firm 
failure (Figure I.114). Furthermore, the previous outlines strongly emphasized com-
petition or competitive advantage, respectively (Figure I.94, Figure I.114, Figure I.117, 
Figure I.122, Table I.75). 
One rationale for this situation is that the bracket model emphasizes effects which 
show up observably for a relatively short period markedly in the development indica-
tors of an individual NTBF. This requires competition to induce a “sudden” change of 
the particular development indicator as given in Table I.76. Or competition in a market 
corresponds to a permanent activity and represents a “ground noise” which cannot be 
separated from the development indicator’s curve. 
Disregarding new Internet and consumer service firms or software firms, most tech-
nology startups are not late entrants into a crowded space. They are often innovators 
entering new fields or new ways of doing business. They need to get to a significant 
size before established companies take notice. Furthermore, the sizes of the markets 
startups are operating in are usually too small to satisfy the needs of large firms (ch. 
2.2.2). 
Referring to 1989 Inc. 500 privately held startups Bhidé [2000:40,41] found that con-
cerning competition fewer than 5 percent competed against large (Fortune 500-type) 
companies, 5 percent against midsize companies and 73 percent compete against 
small companies or other startups. 
According to Saras Sarasvathy [Buchanan 2011] technology entrepreneurs see them-
selves not in the thick of a market but on the fringe of one, or as creating a new mar-
ket entirely. “They are like farmers, planting a seed and nurturing it,” she says. “What 
they care about is their own little patch of ground.” However, things may become pro-
nounced, if they get involved in patent issues (Nanion Technologies GmbH; B.2). 
Analyzing the cases of competitive groups in nanocoatings (Nanogate AG 87, Nano-X 
GmbH (B.2), Nanopool GmbH [Runge 2010], Nanofilm LLC – B.2) and ionic liquids 
(four cases; A.1.5) as well as discussing the issue of competition with other founders 
of NTBFs who gave presentations at the author’s course 1 suggests that technology 
entrepreneurs worry not so much about competitors. 
Not just those following competitive antagonism (Table I.32), but all entrepreneurial 
firms whose founders address directly the known competition operate consciously and 
continuously vis-à-vis the competition, but being confident and convinced that their 
offerings are and must be always better, lighter, higher quality, easier to use etc. (cf. 
“what if” questions of ideation, ch. 3.3; innovation and investment persistence). 
A different situation may occur for VC-based or other startups or NTBFs which have 
become very large in few years in a densely occupied market. Here adverse effects of 
competition could result in a sudden reduction of market share – particularly, when 
there is an “explosion” of startups, many new entrants into a market or industry in a 
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boom period or in policy-driven markets, such as the biofuels field (A.1.1) or other 
areas of CleanTech. 
Here “super-competition” between a very large number of small and large firms may 
emerge fast based on technologies, types of offerings, processes and business mod-
els (Figure I.181, Figure I.184, Figure I.185, Figure I.183, Table I.17). 
In this case startup entrants often hope that the market size is so large that even 
capturing only a tiny market share will satisfy the entrepreneur(s) ambitions and 
expectations. However, the situation will become soon more complicated when, for 
instance, for wind energy (wind turbines) and photovoltaic, companies from China and 
India enter the scene competing fundamentally on price (ch. 4.3.5.2). 
Usually, for new market or industry genesis, there are very many market niches to be 
occupied by startups to avoid a highly competitive field (cf. ionic liquids applications, 
A.1.5; WITec GmbH versus JPK Instruments AG, Figure I.141). 
The faster the startup can define its own market and secure customers the more likely 
it is to end up being the dominant player in the (new) segment. The time to start 
looking at competition is later in the life cycle. That does not mean startups do not 
need to do their homework though. Knowing who else is out there that may be a threat 
is important, but execution at early stage pays way more dividends than deep 
competitive analysis and defensive strategy. 
The concept of dynamically stable states and transition states and bracketing for new 
firm development implies that an entrepreneur (leadership/management team) will un-
dertake several different types of entrepreneurial activities at different times in relation 
to the goal of the firm and to “perturbations” from inside or outside the firm. Perturba-
tions require different competencies and different kinds of decision-making to lead 
growth, but also lead and execute through a “crisis.” 
Different types of entrepreneurial activity require different resources and skills of the 
entrepreneur, with different types of risks and the rewards. These different types of 
activity should not all be lumped together in empirical research. But one can hypothe-
size that viable NTBFs that face similar initial configurations and sensitivities to exter-
nal effects and similar developmental problems in sequence and access comparable 
markets will go through similar phases of activity and exhibit similar growth patterns 
(Table I.80, Figure I.163; A.1.6). 
So far, the emphasis to systematize technology entrepreneurship was on types of 
technology ventures (Figure I.128) and architectures and configurations (ch. 4.3.2, 
A.1.6). On the other hand, Kunkel [2001] suggested focusing on an alternative ap-
proach, classifying types of “entrepreneurial activities” which would be attractive when 
dealing with NTBF growth. However, we think that the current approach integrating 
structure, the order of componens, and function, the order of processes, is appropriate 
for the subject. 
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4.3.5.2 The Bracket Model for Framing Empirical 
Observations and Explaining NTBF Development 
Observation of actual and continuous development (growth) among NTBFs requires a 
long period (ten to twelve years) of investigation. But to deal with survival and growth 
of new firms the startup thrust and early development phases of NTBFs, particularly 
the initial configuration (ch. 4.3.2), will provide appropriate quantitative variables and 
parameters and criteria. 
The bracket approach provides a way to a systematic analysis of a firm’s ability to 
resist external shocks: “If there is a high probability of any negative event occurring 
and the hardship it imposes are generic, then one can incorporate the effect of ran-
dom events through the venture’s capacity for withstanding a common set of probable 
difficulties” [Woo et al. 1994:520]. In this sense the menu of (positive and negative) 
events in Table I.76 can be seen as a conceptual basis for the following discussion. 
The bracket approach boils down to “curve analysis” (“curve resolution”), 
origins of change and discussions of dynamic stability intervals of growth. 
For instance, when encountering a significant (positive) jump in an early linearly in-
creasing growth curve, as is observed in Figure I.137 for the German nanocoatings 
firm Nano-X GmbH (founded in 1999), the most straightforward assumption would be 
to associate the bracket with a remarkable sales activity. The earlier increase of the 
number of employees to prepare the related sales success (a further “reason why we 
think that”) indicates such an effect. And, indeed, this is the case. However, the actual 
cause of the jump, what the bracket represents, can only be grasped by switching to 
inspection on the firm level. 
In 2004 Nano-X (B.2) captured a very big order for a new innovative product including 
this order to provide continued demand in the near future. The firm’s first reaction was 
expanding production capacity and manpower (2003/2004 bracket of the employees’ 
curve). The second (2004/2005) bracket is the reflection of the revenues’ jump, dou-
bling revenues. The product concerned surface coating (scale protection of metal 
sheets avoiding high-temperature oxidation) with the automobile industry as the end-
user. The product is sold to German steel producer Thyssen-Krupp delivering the coils 
nano-coated by Nano-X technology for several types of metal sheets for the car body 
of the Volkswagen Passat model. 
The Nano-X case shows that future revenues and profits of young firms cannot be 
foreseen reliably and single big orders may exhibit tremendous influence – in the 
positive or negative sense if the firm depends on big orders of one of very few cus-
tomers (Figure I.115). 
A jump in revenues like that of Nano-X is also observed for German ATMgroup AG 
from 2008 to 2009. Without detailed knowledge about the firm’s internalities there 
cannot be a straightforward explanation – as in the case of Nano-X. The individual 
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details for an explanation are as follows: The firm was founded as ATMvision AG in 
2005 and in 2008 it acquired two other firms to become ATMgroup (B.2) which 
expresses the jump as a “resulting explosion” through non-organic growth (Figure 
I.127). Other examples of non-organic growth (Figure I.141) do not show such a 
marked effect. 
 
Figure I.137: German Nano-X GmbH with a jump of otherwise linear growth periods 
(dotted line replaces missing data points). 
A linear growth curve changing over into much steeper “linear” shape after a disrup-
tive innovation (Figure I.138) can be seen in the historical example of intrapreneurship 
of the German firm Henkel AG & Co. KGaA (Henkel & Cie. at that time). Founded in 
1876 in 1878 the firm’s first branded washing material “Henkel’s Bleich-Soda” 
(Henkel’s Bleaching Soda) entered the market. Almost linear growth of production 
from 1902 to 1907 (Figure I.138) is observed. Sales of the “Bleaching Soda” from 
1884 (239,000 German Reichsmark (RM) to 1900 (1,155,000 RM) [Feldenkirchen and 
Hilger 2009] showed roughly exponential growth over the period. For comparison in 
1914 the value of the US dollar had a factor of ca. 4.2 to the German Reichsmark 
[Runge 2006:473,474]. 
The total production increase after 1907 is due to the Persil innovation [Feldenkirchen 
and Hilger. 2009]. A rather steep exponential growth of Henkel’s revenues due to 
sales of Persil, the first “self-acting detergent,” was prevented by a very long lasting, 
terrible global event, World War I (WWI; Figure I.139). On the other hand, the devel-
opment in Figure I.139 reveals that even an extremenly strong force can be largely 
balanced by an extremenly successful innovation assumed to exhibit exponential de-
velopment (indicated by the dotted curve progression): Henkel’s revenue curve pla-
teaued during WWI, rather than showing a marked dip. 
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Figure I.138: The bracket of Henkel’s Persil innovation in Germany (production of 
glycerin ca. 1% of total neglected). 
 
Figure I.139: Bracketing observed for Henkel’s revenues by an extremely severe 
global factor. 
It is not uncommon that some few (fast) growing firms exhibit steep exponential 
growth keeping yearly revenue increase of fifty percent to one hundred percent from 
startup. Such companies achieve one billion dollar (euro) in revenues in just a few 
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years, usually less than ten years, as achieved by Cisco (Figure I.145), Q-Cells 
(Figure I.152, Figure I.153) or Google (Figure I.159, Figure I.160; ch. 4.3.6). 
More than often assignment of brackets to entrepreneurship-related effects, however, 
may become tough as the below Figure I.140 shows referring to Nanophase Techno-
logies Corp. Nanophase was founded in 1989 as a spin-out of Argonne National 
Laboratories. In the early years, Nanophase ramped up manufacturing technologies to 
commercial scale and established a viable manufacturing facility. In 1996 revenues 
were still quite small (approximately $600,000). 
From its inception in November 1989 through December 31, 1996, the firm was in a 
development stage of scale-up. Since January 1, 1997, the Company has been en-
gaged in commercial production and sales of its nanocrystalline materials, and the 
firm no longer considered itself in the development stage. It went public at the end of 
1997 and the common stock traded on the NASDAQ. 
The example of Nanophase Technologies shows the fundamental risk of new firms, 
namely dependency of revenues on very few customers. Nanophase shows both as-
sociated effects – much gain and much loss. 
Furthermore, the example stresses an important issue of the current and almost all 
approaches to growth of new firms relying on revenues and/or number of employees – 
the longer-term viability of a firm without positive cash flow and, moreover, rather than 
profit generating having net losses over years. Here patterns of decreased net losses 
follow essentially increased revenues.  
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Figure I.140, continued. 
The dip at 2001 of the curve is obvious – the Dot-Com Recession. It is not clear, 
however, whether there is a (negative) dip between 1997 and 2000 and how to as-
sign it. There is no straightforward explanation for one bracket of such a markedly 
negative effect which stops an exponential growth till 1997. 
Comparisons with other firms concerning the period 1996-1998 does not provide a 
clue. Hence, either there is a large one-time negative influence or the curve repre-
sents a one-time large addition to revenues which, for the 1996 – 1998 – 2000 pe-
riod, would show exponential growth. The last option is indeed is the case. 
Revenues from BASF and CIK constituted approximately 68.5 percent and 10.0 
percent, respectively, of the company’s 2000 revenues. 
 
The reduction of 2009 revenues to the level of 2005 could be a huge effect of the 
2009 Great Recession. The decrease of the revenue curve starting already after 
2007 and its tremendous magnitude in comparison to revenue reductions of other 
firms during the recession suggests the existence of an additional (negative) effect. 
The cause is revealed by inquiry on the firm level. 
Since 1996 Nanophase’s number of employees was hovering around fifty five (with 
a peak of 61 employee in 1997 and currently around 55). 
Figure I.140: Revenues and net losses of Nanophase Technologies. 
The actual financial state of a firm and its overall “health” is not generally reflected by 
revenues. The assumption of revenues to be an appropriate indicator for the new 
firm’s financial state or number of employees to reflect viability of growth is generally 
associated with some implicit premises – and the non-accessibility to more appro-
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priate data unless dealing with the few NTBFs which are already publicly traded at a 
stock exchange. 
Usually, one takes the “income state” (revenues) in the sense of “pars pro toto” as an 
indicator of a firm’s financial state to be sufficient for further growth. But, ideally at 
least the “loss state” (net loss) and “financial reserves” (cash, equity, or number of 
basic and diluted shares outstanding) should be taken into account. 
Patterns of non-organic growth (Figure I.127), which is essentially growing by having 
stakes in or acquiring other firms or establishing joint ventures (JVs), provide complex 
cases. But, for the few cases under consideration, related NTBFs do not show speci-
fically significant patterns. An illustration is presented by the two German NTBFs 
Nanogate AG and JPK Instruments AG (Figure I.141). These do not only belong to the 
same competitive group as Nano-X GmbH (Figure I.137) or WITec GmbH (Figure 
I.123), respectively, but are structurally very close – also with regard to years of firms’ 
foundation, being subjected to the Dot-Com Recession. 
In particular, WITec GmbH and JPK Instruments AG show comparable education and 
leadership structures of the entrepreneurial team (Table I.41; Figure I.73) and for both 
the founding team is the owner or majority owner, respectively, with full control of their 
firms. They both are university spin-outs (of physics departments) and offer nanotools 
(“nano-analytics”) on the basis of optical microscopy for research purposes address-
ing essentially “hard” substrates versus “soft” substrates like cells and provide “ena-
bling technologies” for use in industrial R&D departments and private or public re-
search organizations. 
Furthermore, WITec and JPK have a large proportion of customers from life science 
(pharmaceuticals) which make them rather resistant against economic crises like the 
Dot-Com Recession or the Great Recession. Both exhibit dedicated innovation persis-
tence and linear growth curve but have different CAGRs (JPG Instruments has 41 per-
cent between 2002 and 2010, WITec 29 percent between 1998 and 2009), and show 
different productivities (WITec ca. €270,000 per employee, JPK Instruments ca. 
€125,000 per employee). 
Both firms show marked innovation persistence. Contrary to WITec (Figure I.123). 
JPK Instruments (founded in October 1999) had it startup thrust phase during the Dot-
Com Recession. It launched its first product into the market only in the fourth year 
after foundation (in 2002). It is not clear whether the strong increase in revenues of 
JPK between 2002 and 2004 (from €650,000 to €4.5 mio.) is the result of increasing 
sales of instruments or taking a stake in the firm nAmbition or both. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that, in terms of revenues, WITec and JPK do not show 
any effect due to the Great Recession in 2008/2009. The most likely reason is that 
both address to a large extent customers from public or industrial research areas 
which mostly did not encounter any significant shortages of their budgets during the 
crisis. 
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On the other hand, Nano-X GmbH (founded 1999) and Nanogate AG 87 (founded for-
mally 1998), both having experienced leaders or managers, respectively (B.2), are 
active in nanotechnology for materials and materials’ surfaces (“chemical nanotechno-
logy”) and are based essentially on “enhancing technologies” and less on “enabling 
technologies” for industrial and consumer applications. 
Moreover, both are spin-outs from the same public research institute at almost the 
same time and both are located in close proximity. However, as Nano-X is a private 
company, Nanogate is VC-based, essentially a spin-out that resulted from a coopera-
tion of the German Bayer AG and the public Institute for New Materials (INM) with 
immediate involvement of the VC firm 3i. Furthermore, it is to be noted that two of the 
founders from INM left Nanogate relatively soon after foundation. 
 
Figure I.141: Revenue developments of German firms Nanogate AG (founded 1998) 
and JPK Instruments AG (founded 1999). 
The linear growth of Nanogate until 2004 and then the steeper linear growth until 2008 
do not exhibit any special remarkable effect driving revenue growth. However, the big 
jump out of the 2009 Great Recession is to be noted. Only knowledge of the non-
organic growth strategy and results of Nanogate would provide the clue to assign the 
jump in revenues to acquiring stakes in other firms rather than acquiring a big cus-
tomer as observed for Nano-X (Figure I.137). 
Productivities of both firms differ markedly: Nano-X (ca. €120,000 per employee), 
Nanogate (ca. €180,000 per employee). On the other hand, JPK Instruments with a 
non-organic growth approach follows linear growth, similar to the technologically di-
rectly comparable firm WITec (Figure I.123) without any indication about the role of its 
acquisitions or partial ownership of other firms. 
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For Nanogate the JV with Air Products and Chemicals from the US in 2004 opened up 
international markets the company might not have reached alone. But it is unlikely that 
the steeper increasing revenue after 2004 to be due to the JV event. 
One may assume that building of different kinds of resource base involves different 
kinds of activity. And this may affect different development states and paths. Concern-
ing financial resources for development, like cash flow, loans or equity provision with-
out losing control versus equity from large, private investors, venture capitalists or 
IPOs, differences do not seem to be mirrored observably by the underlying growth 
indicators for WITec versus JPK but for Nano-X and Nanogate. 
Also US NTBF Osmonics developed via non-organic growth [Runge 2006:91-94]. 
Considering also that Google in its early years took over another firm with no observ-
able macro-effects (Box I.24; Figure I.159, Figure I.160) it seems that getting a stake 
in another firm with the possibility of revenues’ development to behave like a big order 
does or massive addition of employees or both do not necessarily show up as a 
bracket in a revenue curve. Furthermore, the discussion of PayPal indicates that also 
mergers must be considered. 
Related to the relatively small sample of NTBFs discussed in this book, we feel that it 
is not clear whether NTBF development by non-organic growth should be taken into 
account as a development path with its own observable specifics if revenues or num-
bers of employees are considered. 
Nanogate exhibits a continuous pursuit of growth by both an internal and external fo-
cus. If, however, there is a marked increase in number of employees it can be expec-
ted to increase organizational pressure to integrate and consolidate, irrespective of 
whether it results from organic or non-organic growth. 
As observed for NTBFs with organic growth also Nanogate shows a marked decrease 
in productivity when the number of employees increased significantly (here from 41 
(2006) to 68 (2008) employees; Figure I.142). So far, a negative bracket has been 
associated with management and/or organizational issues. And this seems also to ap-
ply here. Nanogate’s annual report 2007 tells us: 
“As part of the implementation of the strategic growth programme NEXT, a new organ-
isational structure was created, a management stratum was established and the cen-
tral management strengthened with the addition of a commercial director and a man-
agement position for the buildings/interiors business segment.” 
Furthermore, in 2008 Nanogate Advanced Materials GmbH, the JV with Air Products 
& Chemicals, was fully acquired by Nanogate and in 2009 the related dip is addition-
ally enforced which should be an effect of the 2009 Great Recession. 
 Chapter 4 743 
 
Figure I.142: Increase of  number or employees and associated effects on productiv-
ity for German Nanogate AG. 
After having taken a general economic and other external effects, recession and WWI, 
into consideration we shall consider the industrial system, essentially early growth of 
particular new industries or markets (providing high growth opportunities). Macro ef-
fects for the synthetic dye and automobile industries including the fast rise of gigantic 
firms like the German BASF, Bayer and Hoechst were cited by Runge [2006: 274-275] 
in terms of entry and exit firms of the industry or given by the Ford and General 
Motors cases in the US [Bhidé 2000:245-247]. 
The birth of an industry (segment) usually induces a “boom” of firms’ foundation (cf. 
the biofuels situation; A.1.1). It represents a special opportunity for entrepreneurship. 
However, the particular “growth pushing events” for an individual new firm can rarely 
be foreseen or expected. 
Basically, the growth curve of corresponding (very) successful firms has the pheno-
type of “continuous – exponential” (Figure I.107). Birth of an industry (or a segment) 
means everybody is new in the business. And in such markets buyers have to deal 
with a new company or forgo the product or service altogether. 
A first more recent example refers to the “mainframe computer age,” here the emer-
gence of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software and the German SAP AG 
(A.1.4) “grasping” the opportunity (Figure I.143). SAP had to overcome the recession 
of the first oil-price crisis around 1974, but actually could take advantage from a 
market-related infrastructural effect. Mainframe dominating IBM on which SAP’s soft-
ware ran introduced a faster and cheaper model which enlarged the customer basis 
for SAP tremendously. 
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Early Growth of the Mainframe Computer-Based Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) Industry Segment 
SAP AG – Founded 1972; IPO 1988; (sources for data in A.1.4; compare pattern 
with that of Henkel, Figure I.138, Figure I.139); R/2 is a modular standard ERP soft-
ware, the basis of SAP’s success (ch. 4.3.6) – cf. also Figure I.189. 
Figure I.143: Brackets for the early growth of SAP AG. 
Before being able to fully take advantage from the favorable market effect, SAP had to 
overcome a further recession. This explanation interprets the middle growth phase 
(1981-1985) as an overlap of the 1980 bracket and the ca. 1983 recession. This 
means an interpretation overcoming the recession rather than introducing two brack-
ets at around 1981 and 1985. Further revenues developments of SAP are given in the 
Appendix (A.1.4). The quite linear revenue increase between 1976 and 1981 is 
associated with productivity data of SAP (Figure I.147) which are almost constant for 
the interval <1976,1979> and, hence, represent a dynamically stable state. 
In a similar way, increased growth of Microsoft after 1986 is seen as a sharply expo-
nential growth induced by a whole series of brackets between 1980 and 1985, some 
of them being listed in Figure I.144. Any revenues reducing bracket would be leveled 
off by these tremendous factors. Early revenue growth data are given in Table I.67. 
Microsoft has been very responsive to the demands of IBM to secure the crucial order 
for the PC operating system MS DOS from IBM in 1980. After the success of the IBM 
PC Microsoft could drive hard bargains with PC manufacturers to consolidate its posi-
tion in the existing PC operating system market to ultimately conquer the market. 
As for SAP IBM with its new mainframe to run SAP’s application also for Microsoft 
IBM played a key role of “accelerating” the developments of the firm. 
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Early Growth of the PC-Based Industry 
Microsoft Corp – Founded 1975; has been in the Inc. 500 List;  
Many immediately following brackets and also the IPO in 1986, getting big orders 
and showing innovation persistence: 
1980/1981: Huge contract with IBM to develop languages for their first PC including 
the operation system (DOS); arrival of the 16-bit IBM PCs. 
Becomes the first major company to develop products for the Apple Macintosh. 
1983: MS-DOS open to run on non-IBM machines; memory stretch beyond the ori-
ginal 640K limits of the Intel 8086 chip; MS Word for DOS 1.0. 
1984: Leading role in developing software for the Apple Macintosh computer, for 
instance, the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for Macintosh; provided the essential 
technology basis for the Windows versions of Microsoft Excel a few years later. 
1985: Graphical user interface (GUI) introduced (Windows). 
Figure I.144: Bracketing during Micosoft’s early development (Sources of data from 
Note 88). 
An example of early growth of a firm which did not suffer from any recession during its 
early growth phase is Cisco Systems, Inc. (Figure I.145). Furthermore, the Cisco ex-
ample shows that productivity in addition to other growth indicators  to be appropriate 
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to track company internal effects. Cisco exhibits a bracket which correspond actually 
to two related company-internal effects, getting venture capital, installation of a “pro-
fessional” manager and adding a huge number of employees (Figure I.126, Equation 
I.11) – definitely associated with serious organizational problems of integration and 
coordination seen in the productivity curve. 
Cisco Systems represents an NTBF, which, just having passed the startup thrust 
phase, after three years, became a VC-based NTBF. 
Early Growth of the Computer-Based Networking/Telecommunication 
Industry 
Cisco Systems: 
Husband and wife Len Bosack and Sandy Lerner, both working for Stanford Univer-
sity, wanted to email each other from their respective offices located in different 
buildings but were unable due to technological shortcomings. 
A technology had to be invented to deal with disparate local area protocols. And as 
a result of solving their challenge – the multi-protocol router was born. Since then 
Cisco has shaped the future of the Internet by transforming how people connect, 
communicate and collaborate. 
From the birth of Cisco (founded 1984, IPO 1990) until year seven of its existence 
no recession showed up and Cisco exceeded one billion in sales in 1993. 
Developments of Revenues and Numbers of Employees: 
Revenues and number of employees developed almost synchronously. 
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Figure I.145, continued. 
Productivity and employees’ numbers of Cisco: 
There is a marked negative dip. Employees’ numbers suggest that the large in-
crease in employees reflects organizational frictions affecting productivity. 
John Morgridge joined Cisco Systems in 1988 as President and CEO, and grew the 
company from $5 million to more than $1 billion in sales. 
After 7-8 years of existence Cisco showed a remarkable productivity of ca. 
$350,000 per employee. 
Figure I.145: Characteristics of Cisco Systems (Sources of data from Note 89). 
The management crunch (Figure I.118., Table I.72) and the  “10 - 25 - 150” rule of 
thumb (ch. 4.3.1, Table I.72), for instance, reflects essentially organizational issues 
resulting in decreasing outcomes and results, especially productivity of the firm. This 
means, this rule is associated with a bracket having a negative impact. Associations to 
a time-scale of NTBF development (Table I.71 - Table I.73) may facilitate reasoning 
when attributing observed brackets to related effects as does the knowledge about the 
occurrences of recessions. 
In a similar way to Cisco one can reveal organizational issues of Microsoft while show-
ing strong revenue growth (Figure I.146) and of SAP (Figure I.147; cf. also Table I.67). 
As Cisco does, also Microsoft shows significant reductions of productivity when em-
ployees’ numbers were increased by around ninety people (1980/1981). And, further-
more, for Microsoft obviously the dramatic increase in employees’ numbers after 1981 
induces further organizational issues – and subsequent brackets with escalating ef-
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fects. Additionally, Microsoft data are in line with the “management crunch” and the 
“10 - 25 -150 rule” (Table I.72). 
 
Figure I.146: Early organizational issues of Microsoft comparing productivity and 
number of employees. 
We characterized the tremendous decrease of productivity as an escalating effect 
when Microsoft’s number of employees tripled or doubled over a short period (40, 128, 
220, 476, Figure I.146). 
In general, we regard escalation as an expression of a binary relation originating with 
a special phenomenon or event and showing up either as an increase or rise, lifting 
something’s extent, volume, number, intensity or scope fast stepwise to a higher level 
or a corresponding decrease. Escalations can be described in terms of transforma-
tions. Escalation is also possible among different kinds of brackets (effects), in par-
ticular, by mutually reinforcing interactions. 
SAP exhibits two dips (eighteen and sixty-one employees) of the productivity curve 
paralleled by increasing growth in terms of number of employees and revenues 
(Figure I.147). One could be tempted to attribute the 1975-dip to effects of the 
1973/1974 recession. 1979-data represent definitely pre-recession effects. We attri-
bute the 13-18 employee dip to organizational issues (the “management crunch”; 
Figure I.118 ) without ruling out additional recession effects. SAP and Microsoft both 
have reductions of productivity after increasing the number of employees above thir-
teen. 
After seven to eight years of existence, SAP and Microsoft exhibit productivity of ca. 
€85,000 or $100,000, respectively – similar to that of Nano-X (Figure I.137). 
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Figure I.147: Early organizational issues of SAP derived from comparing revenues 
and productivity. 
Organic growth of NTBFs in terms of innovation and investment persistence (Figure 
I.127) can also be viewed as escalations. 
For instance, the disappearance of an NTBF due to financial problems (Figure I.114, 
Figure I.115) is a decreasing escalation. It represents a circular situation of develop-
ment in which a trigger in a system (a “cause”) leads to an effect in the sub-ordinate 
system, this effect simultaneously becomes a cause affecting the super-ordinate sys-
tem and, hence, the original cause initiates a reaction onto itself leading ultimately to 
an end state. 
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According to the cybernetic formalism (ch. 4.3.4) one can, for instance, describe such 
a development (decreasing revenues) triggered by “negative market effects” via the 
operator  NM as a stepwise process affecting the financial state of the firm and result-
ing in a disastrous (numerical) financial situation DFS of the firm and, finally, bank-
ruptcy: 
NM → {recession – reduced orders/demand – less customers} → nS(M} 
FS → {revenues/cost ratio – rejected application/denunciation of loans – bad debts 
(accounts receivables) – poor financial management} → FS 
Furthermore, we attribute the results of the transformations to corresponding (numeri-
cal) variables nS(M) and FS quantifying their effects. Disregarding the “hen or egg” 
problem, the start of the escalation (Figure I.114) is taken as the firm development by 
the transformation NM, such as losing the most important of only few customers af-
fecting FS. 
For the escalation one can take a logistic difference equation (Equation I.16; as seen 
in Figure I.70, Equation I.5) and start from FS = medium = 4 (, then acceptable = 3, 
bad = 2, very bad = 1) that simulates the path to the disaster of a non-sustainable fi-
nancial state DFS of the firm. The market influence is introduced by the factor nS(M) 
(assuming again -0.25): 
Equation I.16: 
FSj+1 = nS(M)·FSj ·(1 – FSj ) + DFS → DFS 
A summary of many of the brackets and related attributions to effects discussed so far 
for new technical firm development is provided by the example of German (VC-based) 
Novaled AG (B.2) in Figure I.148. Novaled is active in and a key leader in the organic 
LED (OLED) business for flat panel displays (FPD) and lighting. It expected to break 
even in 2011. 
Figure I.148 exhibits the origin of the firm (RBSU, as a GmbH – LLC) and its thrust 
phase (2001 – 2003), revenues and employee data, financing by venture capital in 
line with re-organization of the firm and the start of commercial activities, information 
for breakthrough technology developments and securing IRP by patents as well as 
further details for re-organizations associated with the first and second financing 
round. 
The first financing round of Novaled is important with regard also to establishing a 
very experienced CEO, who, with an engineering education, was in high management 
positions of two firms, each representing one of Novaled’s business targets. The rela-
ted bracket is reflected in data for revenues and employees. The tendency of venture 
capitalists to establish management (and CEOs) in terms of “veteran management” 
having long experience in managing and in the markets and industries the NTBF is 
active in can be observed ubiquitously in biofuels startups (A.1.1). 
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On the other hand, the effect of the Great Recession 2009 is only seen in the number 
of employees (Figure I.149). The capture of further rounds of financing was definitely 
facilitated not only by previous progress in revenues but also the tremendous techno-
logical breakthroughs in terms of world records, increase of trust and credibility. This 
means, technological advancements may have also created a bracket which, how-
ever, cannot be detected by the used indicators. 
Negative effects of re-organizations associated with the first (2004/05) and second 
round (2007/08) as seen in the productivity curve are probably more than leveled off 
by income (selling licenses, then also material) and overall productivity increase and 
probably less by the additional financial resources. Re-organizations associated with 
significantly increasing numbers of employees refers to building the Chemistry Group 
(in a more or less physics and engineering environment) and setting up a matrix 
structure for Novaled. 
Notably the financing rounds of Novaled concerning amount of equity and duration 
until the next round follow roughly the outline of Table I.27. The listed world records 
and the particular financing rounds occurred (accidentally?) in the same time window. 
 
Figure I.148: Developments and characterizations of various states of Novaled AG 
(Extracted from Blochwitz-Nimoth [2011]). 
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Figure I.148 exhibits several states contributing to the overall firm state characterized 
by certain features in different layers. From bottom to top one sees the R&D and tech-
nology state (“world records”), the income of the financial state linked with the state of 
personnel (resource state), the commercial state (selling different kinds of offerings), 
the financial state (VC financing rounds) and the firm’s organization including manage-
ment state. For further illustration Figure I.149 displays development curves of 
Novaled regarding productivity and number of employees. 
Re-organization of Novaled (B.2) concerning a business line approach in 2009 is 
outlined by Muth [2010], profit and loss development until 2008 by Böhme [2008]. 
Novaled Productivity Novaled AG 
Productivity in-
creased during the 
Great Recession re-
lated to leaving em-
ployees (no layoffs); 
Revenues have two 
dips in line with pro-
ductivity and one dip 
is due to the Great 
Recession; 
2007/2008 dip: new 
matrix organization 
Growth in terms of 
number of employ-
ees: 
Dip due to recession 
not seen in revenues 
(Figure I.148); 
shoulder at 2004 re-
lated to jump in num-
ber of employees as-
sociated with organi-
zational issues  
Figure I.149: Growth patterns of German Novaled AG. 
A key founder of Novaled is the entrepreneurial professor Karl Leo (B.2). Key charac-
teristics of an entrepreneurial professor for technology entrepreneurship are not just a 
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business mindset, but also revealing, supporting and encouraging entrepreneurial tal-
ents. 
Entrepreneurship in Wind Power and Solar Energy 
So far, the discussion has focused on (largely) economic markets. In Figure I.34 the 
constellation of the policy-driven biofuels segment is outlined and in the Appendix 
(A.1.1) a rather detailed industry analysis for the policy-driven biofuels segment in the 
US and Germany is presented. However, many other segments of “renewable energy” 
are also policy-driven, such as wind power (wind turbines) and photovoltaic (PV, solar 
cells). 
The most prominent beneficiaries of the German laws which induced a boom in entre-
preneurship in solar cells and modules and windpower are the German Enercon 
GmbH (wind power) and, for photovoltaic, Q-Cells AG as well as First Solar from the 
US with its vast majority of revenues from Germany. Ultimately, all showed strong ex-
ponential growth in line with the advantages to be taken from the German Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG – Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, Box I.22.). 
Box I.22: Outlining the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG – Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz) referring to solar and wind energy. 
Renewable energy is supported by governments of developed nations in various 
ways. In the US the solar incentive regime, for instance, is mainly on the basis of tax 
credits. Tax incentive programs exist at both the federal and state level and can take 
the form of investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation and property tax exemp-
tions. 
In Germany the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 90 provides a favorable legal framework 
based on German power grids; not just solar power (Figure I.152, Figure I.153, Figure 
I.154), but also wind power (Figure I.150, Figure I.151). Since 2003 the focus has 
been on grid-connected ground or large roof mounted solar power plants in Germany 
and other European Union countries with feed-in tariff subsidies that enable solar 
power plant owners to earn a reasonable rate of return on their capital. 
Governmental subsidies, economic incentives and other support for solar electricity 
generation generally include feed-in tariffs, net metering programs, renewable portfolio 
standards, rebates, tax incentives and low interest loans. 
Under a feed-in tariff subsidy, the government sets prices that regulated utilities are 
required to pay for renewable electricity generated by end-users. The prices were set 
above market rates and may differ based on system size or application. Net metering 
programs enable end-users to sell excess solar electricity to their local utility in ex-
change for a credit against their utility bills. The policies governing net metering vary 
by state and utility. Some utilities pay the end-user upfront, while others credit the 
end-user’s bill. 
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Under a renewable portfolio standard, the government requires regulated utilities to 
supply a portion of their total electricity in the form of renewable electricity. Some pro-
grams further specify that a portion of the renewable energy quota must be from solar 
electricity, while others provide no specific technology requirement for renewable 
electricity generation. 
The EEG was designed to level the playing field by taking into account external costs 
of conventional electricity generation, provided investment subsidies guaranteeing 
fixed income of suppliers of renewable energy fed into the grid and usually had a time 
table for cuts of these kinds of benefits. The German EEG became a model for other 
European countries. 
Already in the 1990s Germany required utilities to connect generators of electricity 
from renewable energy technology to the grid and to buy the electricity at a rate which 
for wind and solar cells amounted to 90 percent of the average tariff for ultimate cus-
tomers. There was support of private and professional customers of PV through spe-
cial interest rates and additionally a guaranteed feed-in subsidy to be pari by the big 
energy suppliers for two decades (reduced every year by 5 percent). This induced the 
photovoltaic boom in Germany – and corresponding technology entrepreneurship. 
The 1991 Power Feed-In Law (Stromeinspeisegesetz – StEG) required “big” owners 
of the electrical grid in Germany to accept feed-in of power by suppliers of renewable 
energy. Furthermore, suppliers were guaranteed a minimum royalty linked to the aver-
age earnings through the big electrical power producers. For the producers of wind 
power these tariffs kept cost of the suppliers of wind power and, hence, led to a wind 
power boom in Germany – and associated firms’ foundation. On the other hand, for 
suppliers of solar electricity the tariffs were far from cost recovery. 
The 2004 Renewable Energy Act, on the one hand, reduced support of electricity by 
wind turbines. On the other hand, there was a re-orientation of the Federal Govern-
ment toward solar energy after a significant impact of the so-called “100,000 Roofs 
Program” concerning solar energy. 
A drive in addition to issues of lifting oil dependencies and climate change and change 
to renewable energy occurred after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 in the Ukraine 91 
focusing on replacing nuclear power. The related societal attitude was strengthened 
particularly in Germany. And the nuclear Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011 again 
led to a societal and also political drive to phase out nuclear power by renewable 
energy. This means again opportunities for technology entrepreneurship. 
The privately held German ENERCON GmbH (B.2) is a production-oriented wind 
power firm that illustrates how a policy-driven market in Germany influences firm de-
velopment (Figure I.150) – taking advantage from the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 
and its precursors. On the other hand, from its start ENERCON showed innovation 
persistence with regard to building wind turbines and wind farms and occupying step 
by step the whole value system for constructing and distributing wind turbines. 
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Already in 1986 ENERCON built the first ENERCON wind farm with ten E-16 / 55 kW 
wind turbines. In 1988 there was construction of the company’s first own production 
facility and development and installation of E-17 / 80 kW as well as E-32 / 300 kW 
models. The year 1991 was occupied with development of the gearless ENERCON 
concept and the first prototype which was the fundamental technical breakthrough. 
In the below Figure I.150 growth of ENERCON, a German Hidden Champion (ch. 
4.1.1), is shown in terms of installed (electric) power by various types of wind turbines 
(usually for wind farms). Innovation persistence of the firm as the basis of growth in 
general and further growth strategies are displayed and the two growth “accelerating 
effects of legislation in 1997 and 2000. On the other hand, the two changes of the 
German EEG to the disadvantage of the supplier show up. These changes following 
reductions of feed-in tariffs weakened demand in key European markets. Notably, the 
2000 EEG more than outweighed the Dot-Com Recession at that time. 
Revenue data (with some specific ones missing) given in Figure I.151 do not indicate 
the effects as markedly as the data in Figure I.150. 
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Figure I.150, continued (time line for Enercon’s product development). 
1995 2002 2004 2006 2007: 2010 
E-66 / 
1.5 MW 
E-112 / 
4.5/6 MW 
E-48 / 
800 kW, 
E-70 / 
2,000 kW 
E-82 /  
2 MW 
E-126 / 
6 MW 
E-126 / 
7.5 MW 
Figure I.150: Installed (electric) power by German ENERCON GmbH through various 
types of wind turbines in relation to the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and its 
changes. 
 
ENERCON GmbH: 2009 – revenues €3.4 bil., employees > 13,000; 
founder Aloys Wobben (net worth €3.5 bil. according to the current Forbes World’s 
Billionaires list); 
in 2009 No. 4 (global market share 8.5%) of 10 firms covering ca. 80% or the global 
market, market share in Germany 60%; 
holds ca. 40% of wind turbine related patents in the world (more than German 
Siemens and US General Electric together; cf. also Box I.7); 
Business basics: gearless technology meaning less maintenance (> 50% of wind 
turbine failures are due to damages of the gear), innovation and investment per-
sistence, high compatibility with electrical grids, longevity of windmills, quality and 
reliability, high level technical service. 
Figure I.151: Revenue development of German ENERCON GmbH in relation to the 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG). 
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Growth of ENERCON can be viewed as the combined effects of the (German, Euro-
pean) Renewable Energy Acts, innovation persistence, global reach and integrated 
offering along the whole supply chain. Adverse effects of the EEG changes are 
probably levelled off by innovation efforts. 
Growth accelerating effects of the German EEG for the photovoltaic solar cell areas 
show up for two marked representatives. German Q-Cells AG and First Solar from the 
US are production-oriented, but originally not VC-based firms. Both used publicly sup-
ported investment organizations and subsidized loan possibilities or wealthy private 
investors as their financial basis. Q-Cells and First Solar differ with regard to several 
aspects, most notably technology, position in the value system and (low) cost strate-
gies (Figure I.11, Figure I.12). 
Q-Cells (updated analysis of [Runge 2006:281-282]) was founded in 1999 and, after 
starting production in 2001, could take immediate advantage from legislation and 
exceeded one billion euros in sales already in 2008 (Figure I.152). In 2009 it suffered 
considerably from the Great Recession. 
Q-Cells was founded in Berlin (Germany) by an entrepreneurial team of four experi-
enced persons (engineers and physicist); two of them participated in the foundation of 
the German PV-NTBF Solon AG (also founded in Berlin) and one was a former em-
ployee of Solon. The foundation team was complemented by a (McKinsey) consultant 
Anton Milner with an engineering background who became CEO. Q-Cells co-founder 
Reiner Lemoine, also a co-founder of Solon, was the Director Production and 
Technology of Solon. 
To establish production Q-Cells took advantage from more favorable financing condi-
tions in the German state Saxony-Anhalt than those in Berlin. It had several financing 
rounds: The initial financing of ca. €15 million for the first factory and a further ca. € 20 
million in a second round financing for the expansion of the Q-Cells 1 and Q-Cells 2 
factories. For development in 2004 the company invested further € 20 million. 
Investments were essentially by publicly supported investment organization, such as 
MBG and IGB, creating a private stock company. Investors had essentially silent 
partnerships getting a fixed rate for a given period plus a participation component of 
the firm’s profit. In 2005 Q-Cells issued an IPO. 
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Figure I.152: Revenue development of German Q-Cells in relation to the German 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG). 
Figure I.153 shows the innovation persistence of the firm. Concerning technology Q-
Cells started being active essentially based on monocrystalline and polycrystalline 
silicon solar cells. 
Between 2003 and 2005 in each year the number of employees almost doubled (from 
207 to 767) which can be expected to reduce the productivity due to organizational 
and management issues. This is seen in Figure I.153 in the productivity chart. On the 
other hand, productivity provides another dip at 2006/2007. The time period of this dip 
coincides with the “silicon cycle” which is the economic upturns and downturns unique 
to the semiconductor market. 
Usage of high purity silicon by the electronics and solar sectors (Figure I.11) had in-
creased from approximately 31,000 tons in 2004 to approximately 35,000 tons in 2005 
and 39,000 tons in 2006. The increase was driven by 5 percent year on year growth in 
the electronics sector usage and by a whooping 20 percent growth in solar sector 
usage. In the absence of an equivalent increase in capacity, the prices for high purity 
silicon increased sharply due to strong demand growth. 92 
Effects of the silicon cycle with higher cost of raw material could essentially affect pro-
fit of the firms. Or, if availability of silicon in the market is reduced, output would de-
crease and, keeping the firm’s workforce, would affect productivity negatively. 
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Large capital inflow (IPO) led to fast increase of employees’ numbers  and cor-
respondingly can induce decrease in productivity – jump in Wp to polycrystalline 
Q8TT. 
Photovoltaic power capacity is measured as maximum power output under stan-
dardized test conditions in “Wp” (Watts peak). 
Figure I.153: Development of employee numbers of German Q-Cells AG in relation to 
innovation persistence and productivity. 
However, the steady, continuous growth of Q-Cell’s revenues (Figure I.152) makes it 
unlikely that the silicon cycle is significantly responsible for the 2006/2007 dip in pro-
ductivity. Again it can be assumed that the tremendous rise in numbers of employees 
from 767 in 2005 to 2,568 in 2008 led to organizational problems. 
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The US company First Solar Inc. (as Closure Medical [Runge 2006:98-103]) repre-
sents a firm with a two decades history of entrepreneurial efforts (see below) and fi-
nally a breakthrough and big success based on the German Renewable Energy Act. 
For instance, its net sales in 2007 were obtained in Germany by 90.7 percent and 
98.8 percent of net sales were generated from customers headquartered in the EU. 
Even after efforts to bring down this dependency in 2009 Germany still accounted for 
65 percent of First Solar’s net sales. 
Furthermore, according to First Solar’s annual report 2010: “During 2009, principal 
customers of our components business were Blitzstrom GmbH, EDF EN Develop-
ment, Gehrlicher Solar AG, Juwi Solar GmbH, and Phoenix Solar AG. During 2009, 
each of these five customers individually accounted for between 10% and 19% of our 
component segment’s net sales. All of our other customers individually accounted for 
less than 10% of our net sales during 2009. The loss of any of our major customers 
could have an adverse effect on our business.” 
Germany has become an aggressive subsidizer of solar power – well known in the 
world and especially also in China. 
First Solar’s production did not reach 25 megawatts until 2005 (in Perrysburg, Ohio in 
2002 only 1.5 MW). The company built an additional line in Perrysburg, Ohio. But then 
First Solar took advantage form massive loans with favorable conditions from IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank AG, a long-term lender and service provider to medium-sized 
German companies (“Mittelstand”). 
When First Solar installed four 30 MW production lines in Germany cash outlays for 
the German plant were partially recovered through the receipt of $9.5 million and 
$16.8 million in 2007 and 2006, respectively, of economic development funding from 
various German governmental entities. The substantial German production incentives 
accounted for about 50 percent of capital costs. Additionally, it took advantage from 
feed-in tariffs though the 2003/2004 change of the EEG reduced these. 
Furthermore, the Company has participated, or is currently participating, in laboratory 
and field tests in the US with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), the 
Arizona State University Photovoltaic Testing Laboratory, and in Germany the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy, TÜV Immissionsschutz und Energiesysteme 
GmbH and the Institut für Solar Energieversorgungstechnik. 
First Solar had a predecessor Solar Cells Incorporated (SCI). SCI was founded in 
1990 as an outgrowth of a prior company, Glasstech Solar (founded 1984) founded 
and led by the US inventor/entrepreneur Harold McMaster. McMaster was an expert 
at making glass plates. During the energy crisis in the 1970s, photovoltaic technology 
gained recognition as a source of power for non-space applications. In the 80s, 
McMaster became interested in solar technology and experimented with different 
ways to put photovoltaic materials on glass. He worked first with silicon and then 
cadmium-telluride (CdTe) as the company was called Solar Cells. 
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Viewed as “The Glass Genius” he developed a process for making high quality 
strengthened, or tempered, glass used for architectural glass (for instance, windows in 
skyscrapers) and automotive glass. By selling the machines to produce these glasses 
he made a fortune. 
McMaster was aware that glass could easily be coated with thin layers of chemicals 
that change its color or ability to pass light. Glass is also an electrical insulator. Those 
two properties are essential for construction of photovoltaic cells – “solar cells” that 
change sunlight directly into electricity. Harold McMaster’s treated the actual solar cell 
as simply a different kind of coating on glass and his vision was to use that technology 
in commercial-scale production of electricity that would ease America’s dependence 
on imported oil. 
McMaster revealed the essential cost element of large area solar arrays to be glass. 
At first, McMaster looked into amorphous silicon research but gave up. He then raised 
yet again money to create Solar Cells Inc., to work on a different thin-film technology, 
cadmium telluride. By 1997, Solar Cells had a prototype production machine. Accord-
ing to a former head of the Thin Film Partnership program at the Department of 
Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), SCI was clearly the industry 
leader in thin-film photovoltaic technology. 
In 1999, True North Partners LLC, an investment arm of the Walton family, purchased 
controlling interest, and renamed the company First Solar LLC. John T. Walton (heir of 
Sam Walton [Bhidé 2000], who founded Wal-Mart, the largest retail organization of the 
world) put ca. $150 million into the firm until his death in 2005. Simultaneously, he 
installed professional management. 
The firm almost shut its doors. It is said that it was begging for government contracts 
with NREL. But it was lucky to have a generous supporter, John Walton. The ca. $150 
million investment is not the amount of money that a single VC might fork over to a 
solar startup these days. First Solar did not set up a pilot line until 2002. It began pro-
duction at its first commercial factory in the US in 2004, but as early as 2008 its reve-
nues exceeded one billion dollar (Figure I.154).  
Within the photovoltaic industry, First Solar faces competition from numerous crystal-
line silicon solar cell and module manufacturers, but also from efforts to commercialize 
silicon thin-firm solar cells/modules (Figure I.11). 
The thin-film based solar cells or modules, respectively, are generally less efficient 
than silicon cells. However, thin-film systems can be utilized at various temperatures 
and light/radiation situations. Basically, production cost for thin-film systems are lower. 
The value proposition of First Solar is to deliver a high performance and high quality 
solar module at a more affordable price. 
First Solar developed considerable competitive (cost) advantage over German solar 
cell producers which, like Q-Cells, relied on mono- or polycrystalline cells, by using 
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CdTe thin-film technology thus avoiding the silicon cycle and operating as a module 
supplier on a higher stage of the value system (Figure I.11). In contrast to the silicon 
batch process, 
Si-Feedstock – Ingot – Wafer – Solar Cell – Module (Figure I.11), 
First Solar’s CdTe thin-film PV is a fully integrated and automated continuous process: 
Glass in – Deposition – Cell Definition – Final Assemby & Test – Module Out. 
Additionally, for the end of the modules’ life-times it offers a module collection and dis-
posal program in the PV industry. 
Even when competing with falling polysilicon prices, First Solar still had a ca. “40 
cents-per-watt installed cost-per-watt advantage,” which delivers lower-levelized cost 
of electricity. 
Figure I.154 shows that First Solar could take advantage from economy of scale 
reducing average manufacturing cost from roughly 3 $/W to 1$/W, and even to 
$0.74/W by the end of 2010. Economies of scale for a firm primarily refers to reduc-
tions in average cost (cost per unit) associated with increasing the scale of production 
for a single product type. Economies of scope are conceptually similar to economies 
of scale. 
Economies of scope refer to lowering average cost for a firm in producing different 
products. Economies of scope make product diversification efficient if they are based 
on the common and recurrent use of proprietary know-how (cf. also platform tech-
nologies – Table I.12) and the learning effect (ch. 2.1.2.5). Further economies of 
scope occur when there are cost-savings arising from by-products in the production 
process (biofuel production with biobased chemicals as by-products; A.1.1). 
Existing business firms usually grow by increasing their scale and scope. The scope 
of a firm then relates to the number of its products. The scale of a firm is given by the 
size of its products. A firm like Microsoft gets few big products while Amazon sells a 
huge variety of goods, each of small size in terms of sales. For startups, often only 
having one to three products, both these concepts rarely apply. 
Overall competitive advantage of First Solar, expressed in terms of positive factors on 
revenue development, rests on the following number of combined factors compared, 
for instance, with Q-Cells. Compared with other PV firms which are not operating in 
Germany both have an additional support factor (n(EEG)) related to the German EEG. 
 The value system advantage, modules versus cells – n(VS) 
 Production cost reduction, advantage as a result of economy of scale – 
n(PCR) 
 Being independent from the silicon cycle – n(non-Si). 
Focusing on key components First Solar’s overall growth driver nCA can be expressed 
as: 
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nCA = n(EEG) ⊕  n(market demand) ⊕  n(VS) ⊕ n(PCR) ⊕ n(non-Si) ⊕ n(internalities). 
Finally, due to gaining most of its revenues in Germany favorable foreign exchange 
rate between the US dollar and euro could partially offset a price decline of First 
Solar’s products in Germany. The other way round was observed for German 
ChemCon GmbH (B.2) which, after foundation, had ca. 80 percent of sales in the US 
(ch. 4.2.3; Figure I.116). 
Considering these special effects as well as no indications of extreme sensi-
tivity in the other considered NTBF cases in this book (B.2) one may suggest 
that dollar-euro exchange rates will not, or rarely, show up as an observable 
bracket effect in revenue data. 
 
Figure I.154: Manufacturing capacity and revenues of US First Solar in relation to 
average manufacturing cost demonstrating economy of scale. 
Figure I.154 reflects a fundamental dichotomy of firms for decision-making associated 
with production. It is the question whether (increasing) production capacity (or expand 
space of labs and offices) shall follow demand (indicated by revenues) – as seen for 
the 2006 - 2008 period – or whether increasing production capacity shall precede de-
mand (2009/2010). 
In the first case the firm can lose money that could be earned, in the second case you 
lose money due to “unnecessary” investments. And, in the particular 2009/2010 case, 
expected increase of manufacturing capacity to meet demand was hit by the Great 
Recession with distinctly reduced demand. NTBFs relying on cash flow and loans 
mostly follow the first approach – as described also for Nano-X GmbH (Figure I.137) 
or ChemCon GmbH (Box I.20). 
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The next foreign NTBFs taking advantage from the German and European policy-
driven markets were the Chinese seeing firms Suntech and JA Solar emerging as 
“giants” based on their low cost positions. 
Overall, the global PV market had entered into a phase of strong consolidation as-
sociated with disappearance of firms, mergers of firms and business model innova-
tions of surviving firms and simultaneously capturing market share of thin film cell and 
module suppliers from suppliers of silicon-based offerings. Leading and surviving firms 
in the PV solar cells/modules area have left the class of NTBFs. They have achieved 
the situations of “normal” large to very large firms and operate correspondingly. 
For the area of CdTe thin-film solar cells and modules First Solar had almost a mono-
poly or monopoly-like position. However, for First Solar there was a risk of disruption 
from higher efficiency technologies, and especially other thin-film technologies. For in-
stance, there were some startups or other developing firms which were active in inno-
vative CIS (copper-indium-disulphide) or CIGS (copper indium gallium diselenide) 
thin-film photovoltaic (Figure I.11), such as in Germany Würth Solar GmbH & Co. KG 
[Runge 2006:257-258], a subsidiary of the Würth Elektronik Group which belongs to 
the Würth Group (Box I.23). 
The privately held Würth Group, with revenues of €8.6 billion in 2010 originally 
emerged as a Hidden Champion [Runge 2006:256-258]. It is a world market leader in 
its core business, the trade in assembly and fastening material. It currently consists of 
over 400 companies in 84 countries and more than 3 million customers all over the 
world. The group has been set up by (now) Professor Reinhold Würth who has be-
come one of Europe’s richest men. He has transformed a two-man business dealing 
with screws of his father since 1954 into a worldwide active group emphasizing the 
“fastening business.” 
While manufacturing can be scaled (Figure I.154) turning the modules into systems is 
mostly “variable” cost since the majority of the cost is materials (cabling, aluminum) 
and labor (BOS, Figure I.11). 
Box I.23: German Würth Solar and its Approach to CIS Thin-Film Photovoltaic. 
By 2009 Würth Solar saw itself as the world’s leading manufacturer of innovative CIS 
solar modules and also a provider of complete solar installations. Its revenues were 
€116 million with 280 employees in 2009 and a manufacturing capacity of 30 MW (in 
2005 €5.3 million and 103 employees; in 2004 €3.9 million with ca. 67 employees). In 
autumn 2006, Würth Solar started the first large-scale series production of its 
GeneCIS solar modules worldwide at its CISfab factory in Schwäbisch Hall, Germany 
which was especially built for this purpose. 
This kind of technology, utilizing a fully integrated and automated continuous produc-
tion process, put the focus on copper indium gallium selenium sulfur compounds 
(depending upon composition called copper indium gallium diselenide Cu(In,Ga)Se2 
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(CIGS) or CuInS2 (CIS)). Würth’s CIS technology and CIS modules can be used 
under the harshest environmental conditions, making them especially suitable for use 
in extreme climatic zones. 
Würth Solar with the Würth (Elektronik) Group as the majority and controlling owner 
(of ca. 80 percent) had two partners, utilities (energy) supplier EnBW (Energie Baden-
Württemberg) and ZSW (Stuttgarter Zentrum für Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-
Forschung) or Stuttgart Center for Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research. The 
University of Stuttgart (IPE; Institute for Physical Electronics) developed the CIS cell 
technology in the 1980s. ZSW developed the CIS prototype modules which continued 
to carry out research and development work for Würth Solar. Development and in-
stallation of a pilot plant cost ca. €40 million. 
The timeline of Würth Solar’s emergence is as follows: 
- 1996 a predecessor firm, Würth Solergy, starts first photovoltaic activities as a 
subsidiary of the Würth Elektronik Group. 
- 1999 foundation of Würth Solar GmbH & Co. KG 
- 2000 Würth Solar and ZSW enter the commercialization phase running a pilot 
plant. 
- 2006 Start of the first large-scale production of CIS PV-modules called GeneCIS 
in the world in the “CISfab plant” having a capacity of 15 MW 
- 2008 Capacity of CISfab extended to 30 MW. 
€55 million were invested in CISfab. Würth Elektronik Research provides support for 
and optimization of day-to-day production at the Würth Solar and CISfab production 
sites in Schwäbisch Hall (Germany). 
Related to the electronics group and based on the extremely wide and deep distribu-
tion and sales force of the Würth Group Würth Solar occupied all positions of the 
whole PV value system, emphasizing not just electricity for private homes (roofs), but 
also integration of their modules into architectural designs and architectural compo-
nents and module integrations into other customized products from a variety of appli-
cations. The firm showed up as a supplier of whole systems and solar power plants 
(utility-scale systems) as well as engineered, individual system solutions for solar 
energy. 
First Solar and Würth Solar share a rather close “initial” configuration: 
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 Both relied on research results of public research institutions and relied for 
developments on public research institutes (NREL versus ZSW). 
 Both are (or were) financed by wealthy persons related to large international 
firms. 
 Both had to go a long way before finally launching their primary offerings, thin-
film PV modules. 
 Both could make use of subsidies or other financial support of (State or 
Federal) Government. 
 Both make heavy use of the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG). 
Concerning thin-film technology in the US Solyndra, Inc. founded in 2005 went for de-
signs and manufacturing of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, comprised of panels and 
mounts, for the commercial rooftop market. It used thin film CIGS technology as Würth 
Solar and was producing cylindrical modules depositing CIGS on the inside of glass 
tubes rather than using plates of glass. The company had approximately 1,050 em-
ployees around the world, revenues in 2010 were approximately $140 million. 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) offered the Californian firm a $535 million loan 
guarantee of construction to expand its manufacturing capacity to 500 MW per year, 
expecting the new facility to employ some 1,000 people. After raising $1 billion (!), the 
company was forced to slash costs, close a factory, restructure the executive team 
and cancel an IPO. As a competitor for Würth Solar the Solyndra star faded in 2011 
[Kuo 2011; RenewableEnergyWorld 2010]. 
Solyndra’s CEO admitted to have made the twin mistakes of expecting too much 
growth and not putting enough focus on market development. Its $535 million loan 
guarantee from the Department of Energy was under investigation by the US 
Congress [GreenBeat 2010]. 
By the end of 2010 concerning the high cost of module production – the most troubling 
issue – the company said to have its average sales price over $3.20 per Watt, about 
65 percent more than leading crystalline-silicon PV manufacturers and its cost of 
manufacturing to be over $6 per Watt. The major cost and price declines in the 
crystalline PV sector hurt the competitive chances of Solyndra’s modules. The com-
pany’s next step was planning on having over 600 MW of capacity online by 2013. But 
soon Solyndra said [RenewableEnergyWorld 2010] it will have around 300 MW of 
capacity. 
In the second half of 2011 Solyndra filed for bankruptcy and was the subject of several 
federal investigations. Republicans on Capitol Hill have been critical of the Obama 
administration’s handling of clean energy programs, saying that it gave out a $535 
million federal loan in 2009 to a California solar energy company, Solyndra, without 
properly evaluating if its business plan made sense [Johnson 2011]. 
Worldwide solar photovoltaic (PV) market installations reached a record high of 18.2 
gigawatts (GW) in 2010. This represented growth of 139 percent over 2009. The PV 
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industry generated $82 billion in global revenues in 2010, up 105 percent Y/Y (year on 
year) from $40 billion in 2009. 
In 2010, the top five countries by PV market size were Germany, Italy, Czech Repub-
lic, Japan, and the US – representing over 80 percent of global demand. European 
countries represented 14.7 GW, or 81 percent of world demand in 2010. The share of 
global PV demand in 2010 93 were: 
 Germany, 42 percent 
 Italy, 21 percent 
 Other Europe, 18 percent 
 Japan, 5 percent 
 United States, 5 percent. 
The tremendous growth of photovoltaics let “giants” enter the photovoltaic scene 
largely determined so far by “grown up” NTBFs to build businesses in renewable 
energy – emphasizing the role of NTBFs for innovation approaches and new business 
development of large firms. These large firms usually waited until there is sufficient 
demand. 
For instance, the German giant privately held Robert Bosch GmbH, the world’s largest 
auto supplier (sales of €47.3 billion in 2010), but a global supplier of technology and 
services in the areas of automotive and industrial technology, consumer goods and 
building technology, took over Ersol Solar Energy AG which started as ErSol Solar-
strom GmbH & Co. KG in 1997 with production of multi-crystalline silicon solar cell 
and modules. Bosch became majority owner of the firm in 2008 and in 2009 Bosch 
Solar Energy AG emerged. 
From 2009 to 2012 Bosch invested around two billion euros in solar technology and 
bought with Ersol, Aleo and Voltwerk three companies [Weishaupt 2012]. 
In the US, General Electric (GE) took a bold step into solar PV with several announce-
ments, mainly its acquisition of PrimeStar Solar (with whom it had been working on 
CdTe thin film R&D). The startup created an NREL-confirmed record 12.8 percent 
efficiency (aperture area) panel on its 30 MW line in Arvada, CO, the company said in 
a statement [ElectroIQ 2011]. 
GE’s CdTe push was part of a planned $600M+ investment into solar technology and 
commercialization. The company projected global demand for solar PV will surge to 
75 GW over the next five years, much of that in utility-scale plants, an attractive 
market to be in. But more importantly, there were clear opportunities to bring costs 
down. 
While First Solar was leading the cost/W charge, GE seemed to think it can compete 
there too. Not only does GE planned to push efficiencies “much higher” than the 
current 13 percent, but “we probably can cut costs 50% over the next several years.” 
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Further, GE said it will build a 400 MW thin-film solar panel in the US (employing 400 
workers), what would be currently the largest in the country, reportedly ready by 2013. 
Monocrystalline-silicon firm German SolarWorld had the biggest US solar PV site, with 
its cell and module operation in Oregon scalable to a combined 500 MW. 
French oil giant Total SA agreed to buy as much as 60 percent of SunPower Corp. for 
$1.38 billion, taking advantage of increased global interest in renewable energy. 
SunPower, with sales of  $2.219 bil. in 2010 was the second-largest US solar panel 
maker. The deal was supposed to lead to more solar industry acquisitions as US and 
European suppliers sought for help competing against rival suppliers in Asia [Herndon 
et al. 2011]. 
But by early 2013 the PV market, particularly in Germany, had changed dramatically. 
Already by 2007 solar energy, the former niche market, had become a global busi-
ness. The industry was growing rapidly – too fast [Zeller-Silva 2007]. 
Moreover, the order situation was good and positive long-term forecasts estimated the 
annual growth of the market by 2020 to about 20 percent annually. But this deceived 
the businesses around the world to increase their capacity strongly. And skeptics 
feared that the demand would not grow to the same extent as the range. Additionally, 
the emerging, lucrative markets attracted competitors. In the US and in Asia powerful 
companies emerged that could be a real competitor for the German solar industry 
[Zeller-Silva 2007]. 
It was envisioned that tougher competition, the threat of overcapacity and declining 
public subsidies would make it hard for the industry in the future, to make money. And 
Frank Asbeck, chairman and founder of German firm SolarWorld, even spoke of an 
impending shakeout, despite the growing global demand [Zeller-Silva 2007]. 
And, indeed, starting in late 2008, the solar market shifted from supply-related to 
demand-driven. This was due to the plunging price of crystalline silicon cells and 
modules caused mainly by 1) falling silicon cost, 2) constrained availability of credit, 3) 
demand decline in certain previously high volume regions such as Spain, 4) over-
supply and 5) unfair competition of Chinese suppliers due to their extremely low prices 
bound to high export subsidies of the Chinese government. Furthermore, in Germany 
there were cuts of feed-in tariffs and a shift of emphasis from private rooftop in-
stallations to commercial utility-scale PV installations. 
As a result, the state of the industry changed over to consolidation of weak competi-
tors and NTBFs and bankruptcy of several PV companies, notably the above men-
tioned Solyndra in the US and Solon AG in Germany and even Q-Cells stumbled 
toward insolvency. 
Q-Cells and others had responded to Chinese competition by outsourcing some of 
their own production to Asia to cut costs. But that was not enough to save them.  
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By 2010 the era of the founders was over. Si-based PV had become largely a mature 
technology which means it can be used and built anywhere in the world, particularly in 
China. The original PV startups had become large-size firms with different require-
ments for operation in a highly competitive environment with the Si-based PV tech-
nology having changed over into commodity products. 
For too long, many solar companies have rested on the high subsidies. A concentra-
tion of the industry was imminent. And it was clear that from about 50 German compa-
nies only a handful would survive in the next two years probably as independent com-
panies. 
In February 2012 German installers and dealers could buy a Chinese module already 
for €0.77 per watt in wholesale. Modules from German production cost €1.03 per watt. 
Just the year before, the solar module prices had fallen by 30 to 40 percent. The 
share of German companies in 2011 in the total market was just 20 percent. The 
share of Chinese companies accounted for 54 percent [Weishaupt 2012]. Ca. 75 
percent of the German solar cell market was governed by non-German firms. 
Early in 2012 the largest solar cell manufacturers in the world were (DE = Germany, 
Ch = China) [Handelsblatt 2012]: Solarworld (DE, No. 20, 2007 No. 7), Q-Cells (DE, 
No. 13, once the world’s largest producer of silicon-based solar cells), Trina (Ch, No. 
5), Yingli (Ch, No. 4), JA Solar (Ch, No. 3), First Solar (US, No. 2), Suntech (Ch, No. 
1). 
Policy tried to help the endangered firms looking for tariff on imports of Chinese silicon 
photovoltaic panels – but in vain. A cascade of insolvencies showed up. Most promi-
nent among the herd of PV startups, in 2012 Q-Cells with ca. 2,200 employees be-
came insolvent and was taken over by Seoul-based Hanwha Chemical Corp. 
And in 2013 Bosch decided that the company had no choice but to abandon solar 
energy, to shut down the Solar Energy division – along with its roughly 3,000 employ-
ees. According to Bosch, cuts to European renewable energy incentives and the dras-
tic changes in the market, particularly the rapid increase in capacity in China, had put 
“unrelenting” pressure on Bosch’s Solar Energy division, which sustained a loss of 
one billion euros. Consequently, Bosch announced to cease production of all wafers, 
ingots, solar cells and Bosch solar panels by the end of 2014. However, the company 
will hold on to Bosch Solar CISTech GmbH – its thin-film research facility in 
Brandenburg, Germany [Energy Matters 2013]. 
In 2012 Würth Solar (Box I.23) divested substantial parts of its solar business to the 
Agricultural Trade Group Baywa and sold the rest to a second partner in 2013. 
And lately also Chinese solar cell and panel suppliers turned out not to be immune to 
insolvency. Chinese panel producer Suntech Power has put its largest subsidiary into 
bankruptcy [Riley, 2013] and a second Chinese solar company, LDK Solar Co., has 
defaulted on a debt payment to investors [Ma 2013]. 
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4.3.5.3 Selected Quantitative Applications of  
the Bracket Model 
It is the mark of an educated person to look for precision 
only as far as the nature of the subject allows. 
Aristotle (Stanford Encyclodia of Philosopy, Episteme and Techne) 
For a quantitative discussion of NTBFs’ growth we shall follow cybernetics (4.3.4) and 
use a heuristic approach of reinforcement for periods of growth of sub-states of a new 
firm. We use a phased process interrupted by brackets and associated transition 
states (Figure I.133, Figure I.134) and are guided by situations described by Equation 
I.16, Equation I.5 and Figure I.70. The heuristic will be verbally expressed by the well-
known saying 
Growth breeds growth. 
In the same category of algorithm, but including growth or decline (Figure I.114 and 
Equation I.16) one can cite the “Matthew Effect.” The Matthew Effect [Merton 1968] 
specifically refers to a statement in the Christian Bible (XXV:29): 
“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; 
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.” 
In this context of “growth breeds growth” and emphasizing VC-based NTBFs Gompers 
et al. [2008] present evidence of “performance persistence” (definition of Gompers et 
al. [2008])) in entrepreneurship and that entrepreneurs with a track record of success 
are much more likely to succeed (“success breeds success”) than first-time entrepre-
neurs and those who have previously failed. 
Similarly, related to innovation persistence, Flaig and Stadler [1994] revealed a posi-
tive impact of previous innovative success to further innovations in the following years. 
They studied product and process innovations of private German firms from the manu-
facturing sector (data between 1979 and 1986). And there is a combined internal and 
an external effect paralleling growth by innovation and investment persistence: As 
entrepreneurs build a track record, uncertainties about their ability and business pro-
positions diminish; the entrepreneur gets more self-confidence, confidence in the firm, 
experience of raising money from external financial backers as well as getting suppli-
ers and customers. 
We focus on dynamic stability during firm development which will be expressed by 
“equations of state” for a given “dynamically stable interval” of time <t0, tn> to describe 
time-dependent relations under a given set of conditions in terms of appropriate in-
dicators, such as revenues. Concerning firm growth we look at its financial sub-states 
(Equation I.15) and regard these is indicative for the firm’s growth (ch. 4.3.5.1). 
Let R(t) be the value (of revenue) at time t for the financial sub-state taken also as a 
growth indicator for the whole system and R(t+1) the value of one unit of time later. 
Following conceptually and structurally “growth breeds grows,” the innovation and 
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investment persistence growth cycles (Figure I.127) and Equation I.13 for an equation 
of state for dynamically stable states of NTBFs, intensity ⊗ capacity, makes R(t+1) 
proportional to R(t): R(t+1) → nR⋅R(t). 
The factor nR is an intensity covering interacting firm-internal and external effects. In 
particular, it may include responsiveness of the startup toward (changes of) the mar-
ket environment. To account for this effect and self-reinforcement of the capacity fac-
tor we complement R(t) by an additional factor [1 + ( R(t+1) / R(t) )] to finally suggest 
Equation I.17 as a fundamental systemic reflection of “growth breeds growth” for dy-
namically stable states of NTBFs. In particular, it shall cover dynamically stable states 
with a steady state condition as defined above (Figure I.132). 
We interpret the capacity term R(t)⋅[ 1 + ( R(t+1) / R(t) )] as being related to capability 
in the sense of  RBV (ch. 4.3.3). The factor nR is assumed to be a constant for a spe-
cific bracket interval and treated as an empirically determined factor. 
Equation I.17: 
R(t+1) = nR⋅R(t)⋅[ 1 + ( R(t+1) / R(t) )] 
t = 0, 1, 2, …n; nR a state and environment characterizing (empirical) factor; 
R(t+1) ≥ R(t) for all t; asymptotic behavior for nR = ½ gives R(t+1) = R(t) 
The equation of state describes the state over a period of time beginning after a front 
bracket at the time when the firm has adapted a new “dynamically stable” state (t = 0, 
R(0) until the occurrence of a new bracket ends the development of this dynamic state 
(cf. right part of Figure I.133)). This new bracket may be identifiable. 
On the other hand, based on an equation of state like Equation I.17 we regard a 
strong deviation of calculated values of an otherwise good fit between calculated and 
observed values as evidence for the impact of a bracket that cannot be directly ob-
served on the basis of indicator data. 
Equation I.17 is defined “recursively” – resembling to a certain degree the Fibonacci 
numbers [WolframMathWorld]. 
For Ri (i ≥ 2) we proceed taking R(0) and R(1) as the basis and then start with the 
mappings, e.g. R(1) → R1 and (R(1)/R(0) → R2/R1. 
Then the factors nR and (R2/R1) are fitted to acceptably describe the whole se-
quence of data on the interval <t0, tn>: 
R2 = nR·R1⋅(1 + R(1)/R(0)) → R2 = nR⋅R1⋅(1 + R2/R1) → Numerical fit for all data 
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We are primarily interested in an equation of state for monotonically increasing reve-
nue growth R on a given interval <t0, tn> The numerical values of the state-
characterizing factor nR and the starting quotient R(t+1)/R(t) of Equation I.17 will 
shape the curve, usually after a bracket. 
Curves as determined by different values of the factor nR and fixed values for an initial 
growth rate (R(0) and R(1) may exhibit various appearances as are given in the below 
Figure I.155. Shapes range from exponential (hyperbolic) to asymptotic growth and 
non-growth shape (Figure I.107). 
Equation I.17 reflects also a mechanism when early growth of revenues, due to an un-
favorable situation and insufficient magnitude of the intensity factor nR, can turn into 
decreasing revenues, as is illustrated in Figure I.114, and ultimately disappearance of 
a firm: 
 Failure paths all begin with one or more fundamental problems; 
 They all lead to a situation where the symptoms of the worsening situation be-
come visible in the financial situation. 
Furthermore, Equation I.17 can simulate the case that the “thrust capacity” for a 
startup’s development does not suffice for a successful “lift-off” for (revenue) growth. 
 
R(t+1) = n⋅R(t)⋅[ 1 + ( R(t+1) / R(t) )] (Equation I.17); 
Start: R(0) = 1.5, R(1) = 2.5 units; 
initial growth ratio: R(1)/R(0) = 1.67 
(simulating very strong growth of the particular state) 
An expansion of the curves for n = 0.50 and n = 0.52 is given on the next page. 
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Figure I.155: Prototypical development curves as shaped by relevant parameters. 
Equation I.17 becomes extremely simple if the quotient R(t+1)/R(t) is very small com-
pared to 1 and, hence, can be neglected or can be viewed as a non-negligible con-
stant g’. Then either we have 
R(t+1) = nR⋅R(t) or  
R(t+1) = nR⋅ (1 + g’)⋅R(t) 
Therefore, at least for a particular interval <t0,tn>, we propose a growth period of an 
NTBF to be described by the very simple formula Equation I.18 (nR⋅(1 + g’) → (1 +g)). 
Though we shall denote g as a “growth factor” it should be noted that its numerical 
closeness to a common growth rate, such as CAGR (Equation I.10), must be viewed 
as accidental. 
Through its relation to interwoven company-internal and external effects the growth 
factor g is related to nR. If we interpret growth of a new firm to be determined es-
sentially by growth of the market and firm-internal response (capacity) toward the 
market opportunity we can differentiate the development categories for new firms as: 
 Grow less than the market 
 Grow with the market and 
 Grow more than the market. 
Equation I.18: 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t) for <t0,tn> 
The following examples calculating revenue values for dynamically stable financial 
sub-states do not intend to provide numerically optimized solutions, but solutions with 
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“simple” numerical relations that will suffice to illustrate the essentials of the bracket 
model. 
The simplest case is provided by WITec’s closely linear growth (Figure I.123) or the 
linear growth periods of Nano-X (Figure I.137). 
The example of WITec (founded 1997) can be used to illustrate the essentials of the 
bracket approach. It is not about (statistical) curve fitting for an interval <1999,2009> 
or <2002,2009>. The bracket theory interconnects a time interval for development of 
states started by a front bracket as displayed in Figure I.123. 
The first bracket is firm’s foundation (ch. 4.3.5.1) with the startup thrust phase ex-
tending over the next three to four years being associated with rather unstable firm 
states and usually decreasing year on year growth rates (Table I.71). 
In Figure I.156 Equation I.18 could be used as a numerically sufficient approximation 
for the interval <2002,2009>. But this interval is “perturbed” by the Dot-Com Reces-
sion. In Figure I.156 it is argued why <2004,2009> would be most appropriate interval 
characterizing a dynamically stable growth state of WITec. The interval would proba-
bly start at 2003, but there are no revenue data available for 2003. 
Similar to WITec almost linear, parallel developments of revenues and number of em-
ployees for Nano-X GmbH (Figure I.137) express almost constant productivities for 
the intervals <2000,2003) (productivity ca. €63,000 per employee) and <2005,2008> 
(productivity ca. €118,000 per employee) and indicate these periods to be associated 
with dynamically stable organizational states. 
Corresponding effects are observed for SAP productivity (Figure I.147) which show 
little changing for the interval <1976,1979>. 
On the other hand, the Microsoft’s revenues (Figure I.144) between 1977 and 1982 as 
well as 1980 and 1989 with starting growth proportions of ca. 3.6 or 2.1, respectively, 
exhibit exponential growth. The recession of 1981/1982 separates both phases. 
Moreover, the period <1981,1986> is associated with many positive brackets and the 
IPO which together lead (probably) to accelerated growth expressed by a larger nR-
factor. The interval <1977,1982> of Microsoft’s early growth is organizationally rather 
unstable (Figure I.146). 
Equation I.17 is sufficient for the calculations (Figure I.157) of two dynamically stable 
financial sub-states of Microsoft separated by a recession bracket which, however, is 
not observable and obviously more than balanced by several positive brackets. 
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Formula: R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t) 
The tempting approach: 
Growth factor g = 0.13; R(0) = €3.29 mio. at 2002; CAGR (2002,2009) = 14.5% 
 
Comments: Actually, a very good fit is seen for the interval <2004,2009> (dashed 
line, g = 0.09) which is the most appropriate characterization of a dynamically 
stable financial state as the observed data for 2002 may still be affected by the Dot-
Com Recession, data for 2009 by the Great Recession. 
Furthermore, WITec exhibits almost constant productivity (Figure I.123). This 
means, for the related interval it has a financially dynamically stable state – and 
also a dynamically stable organizational sub-state showing a steady state condition 
with almost constant productivities (Figure I.123). 
An approach with 
growth factor g = 0.17; R(0) = €1.55 mio. at 1999; CAGR(1999,2009) = 18.6% 
provides a numerically acceptable approximation for the 1999-2009 period. How-
ever, it covers also the Dot-Com Recession. Such pure numerics are not in line with 
the bracket theory and, hence, are lacking explanatory power. 
Figure I.156: Calculated and observed revenues of WITec GmbH for a “perceived” 
dynamic stability interval <2002,2009> and contrasted with the theory-related 
<2004,2009> interval (dashed line). 
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Microsoft Corp., founded 1975, IPO 1986; Equation I.17 used: 
Above figure: R(0) = $0.38 mio. (1977), R(1) = $1.36 mio. (1978); nR = 0.585; 
R(1)/R(0) = 3.57 
After 1882 there are large deviations between calculated and observed revenues 
(calculated values much larger than observed ones) indicating a transition state. 
Below figure: R(0) = $7.52 mio. (1980), R(1) = $16.06 mio. (1981); nR = 0.605; 
R(1)/R(0) = 2.13 
 
Figure I.157: Calculated and observed revenue growth of Microsoft. 
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When looking at the examples of Cisco and First Solar (Figure I.158.) Equation I.17 
turned out to be inadequate and required modification. Cisco’s starting growth propor-
tion was 3.63 and that of First Solar is 4.21. 
For both cases it has turned out that Equation I.19 different from Equation I.17 by the 
reinforcement factor is more appropriate for calculations. Its applicability is also shown 
for Google in Figure I.159. 
“Similar” to Equation I.10 for CAGR growth relates to a fixed starting value R(0) in the 
series of R(t) across the dynamically stable state. Disregarding the construction of 
some sort of geometric mean through the t-eth root the emphasis on a fixed value of 
R(0) for the state seems to show that for the (financial) growth a particular initial 
constellation exerts a decisive influence. 
For Cisco a good fit is observed and its revenues for the 1991 recession are obviously 
more than balanced by sales (and more employees). On the other hand, referring to 
productivity Figure I.145 shows that Cisco’s organizational state is by no means stable 
across the early 1987-1994 period. 
Due to the small number of cases treated by Equation I.19 one can only speculate 
about what is behind R(0) – a large capital injection at the start of the dynamically 
stable period adding to the “base line” development of each of the R(t)’s which will 
drive the growth over the whole period, a jump in other resources like employee num-
ber, or an extremely successful shift to another source of revenue. 
Equation I.19: 
R(t+1) = nR⋅R(t)⋅[ 1 + {R(t) / R(0) }
1/t ] 
t = 1, 2, …n; nR a state-characterizing (empirical) factor 
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Calculations using Equation I.19 
Cisco Systems: R(0) = $1.50 mio. (1987), R(1) = $5.45 mio. (1988); nR = 0.585; 
R(1)/R(0) = 3.63 
 
First Solar: R(0) = $3.21 mio. (2003), R(1) = $13.52 mio. (2004) ; nR = 0.650; 
R(1)/R(0) = 4.21 
 
Figure I.158: Calculated (Equation I.19) and observed revenues of Cisco Systems 
and First Solar. 
The large deviation between observed and calculated revenues for First Solar after 
2008 due to the Great Recession and the change of the EEG in Germany shows that 
the financial sub-state to grow regularly only between 2004 and 2008. This is different 
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from Cisco whose regular growth was obviously not affected essentially by a reces-
sion. 
As a summary, the preceding discussions have presented growth categories (Figure 
I.155) for early development states of young firms (NTBFs) in terms of equations of 
state which are essentially recursive relations (Equation I.17 - Equation I.19) and re-
flect self-reinforcement verbalized as “growth breeds growth.” This means, a series of 
interacting internal sub-states’ changes leads to increases in size (observed for reve-
nues) accompanied by not necessarily synchronous changes of the characteristics of 
other sub-states of the growing entity over a certain period of time (Figure I.149). 
Based on the calculational results in this chapter it appears that irregularities 
ending an otherwise good fit when comparing calculated and observed reve-
nues may provide a means to detect brackets which may not show up in 
observed curves. 
The development patterns represent systemic features of different types of growth 
paths of new firms for a given time period starting at a specified point in time that may 
initiate the search for explanations on the firm level. In the above text it has been 
pointed out that after a perturbation, a bracket, the firm will not return to the original 
state, but rather develops further into a new state. 
This shall be illustrated by different theoretical descriptions in terms of different formu-
las to be used before and after a bracket for the German NTBF Nano-X (Figure I.137; 
Table I.77) and Google (Figure I.159). 
For Nano-X the discontinuity, the bracket R(2004) → R(2005) of +2.33 units for the 
interval <2002,2008>, is surrounded by two states differing by the g-factor of Equation 
I.18. Table I.77 provides a “full” theoretical description of the (financial) states of 
Nano-X. The jump suffices qualitatively to identify the different states. Admittedly, the 
quantitative approach of the early state with g = 1.52 is not satisfying. 
The significantly more pronounced growth rate for the 2000 to 2004 period cannot be 
explained straightforwardly. This period covers the Dot-Com Recession with no ob-
servable negative impact for the revenues. However, Nano-X financed the first years 
essentially via R&D projects (“Verbundprojekte”; ch. 1.2.6) of the German federal/state 
governments, the EU and NGOs as well as cooperation with other SMEs. As project 
money is usually counted as revenue, it can be hypothesized that the significant reve-
nue growth during the first years, from almost its start, are due to larger contributions 
from projects to revenues. 
Therefore, the theoretical description of the pre-2005 dynamically stable state of 
Nano-X should be confined to the interval <2002,2004>, though it cannot be ruled out 
that it covers also the 2000 and 2001 range. 
On the other hand, more successful applications of Equation I.18 are discussed later 
(Figure I.163, Figure I.164, Figure I.165, Figure I.166). 
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Table I.77: Theoretical descriptions (Equation I.18, <2002,2004>) of two developing 
financial states of the German Nano-X GmbH separated by a bracket with pronounced 
discontinuity, a “jump.” 
Year 
Revenues 
(€, mio.) 
Calculated Revenues 
(€, mio.) 
R(t+1) = (1 + g) * R(t) g = 0.52 g = 0.05 
2000 0.50 0.50 
 
2001 1.00 0.76 
 
2002 1.4 *) 1.16 
 
2003 N/A 1.76 
 
2004 2.50 2.67 
 
 R(2005) = R(2004) + 2.33 
2005 5.00  5.00 
2006 5.20  5.25 
2007 5.40  5.51 
2008 6.00  5.79 
Average Productivities (€ /employee): *) Estimated from average 
    productivity (70,000) 
70,000 118,000 
It is interesting to note that in its early years also SAP’s growth follows Equation I.18 
(g = 1.70 for <1972,1974> and g = 1.63 for <1975,1978>; Figure I.147). 
For Google (Box I.24) two growth periods according to different theoretical ap-
proaches can be identified with a transition state (“bracket”) at 2002/2003 (Figure 
I.159) when revenues “jumped” from $86 million (2001) to $440 million (2002). 
Starting with the period 2000 – 2003 it turns out that after 2003 the gap between 
calculated and observed revenues widens drastically. Hence, by trial, it was found 
with which formula to describe the 2003 – 2008 period. 
Early Growth of Contextual Advertisement on the Web. 
After 2002 ca. 97 percent of Google’s revenues were from advertisement! In 2001 
ad revenue accounted for 77% and in 2002 it was already 92%. Advertising income 
is earned as Google operates its own Web sites, but it distributes ads also to part-
ner Web sites. Its software AdWords (launched in 2000, major overhaul in 2002) is 
Google’s unique method for selling online advertising. AdWords analyzes every 
Google search to determine which advertisers get each of up to 11 “sponsored 
links” on every results page. It is one component for the link between searching and 
advertising. The second part is AdSense which relates to semantics [Sullivan 
2004]. 
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In 2003 Google launched its AdSense contextual ad program and then greatly ex-
panded AdSense, meaning ad serving application. AdSense placements are almost 
certainly the reason why Google has seen network-derived ad revenue rise so 
sharply. 
There is another factor whose effects, however, cannot be assessed. Google 
bought Applied Semantics in 2003 and also three other companies [Sullivan 2004]. 
 
Google: 
Founded 1998 
by Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin 
primary focus: 
a better search 
engine for the 
Web (Box I.24) 
Calculated values according to 
Equation I.18 (small chart), g = 3.75, R(0) = $19 mio.); 
Equation I.19 (large chart), R(0) = $440 mio., R(1) = $1,467 mio., nR = 0.50 
Figure I.159: Theoretical descriptions of two developing financial states of Google se-
parated by a bracket with pronounced discontinuity, a “jump” (data from [Tech 
Crunchies 2010]). 
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So far, brackets were identified on the basis of revenues or employees/productivities. 
In case of Google revenue data do not reveal a 2002/2003 bracket (cf. Figure I.136). 
Fortunately, for Google the theoretical description is corroborated by other data: The 
pronounced “jump” characterizing the transition into the second state in clearly seen in 
the development of Google’s profit (Figure I.160). 
Based on the limited number of cases, it has turned out that IPO brackets could not be 
detected consistently though they may represent drastic changes of a firm’s sub-
states. Change will relate to ownership and potential change of control (change of 
leadership or management), respectively, to huge addition of capital (financial 
resources) which can be used, for instance, to pay back debts or increase of human 
resources in terms of R&D and marketing, sales and distribution (exploiting existing 
markets and enter new markets) or increase capacity of production. 
IPO brackets are sometimes associated with increase of the number of employees 
which is observable by a decrease of productivity (Q-Cells, Figure I.153). But for Cisco 
(Figure I.145) in a steady state this does not show up. 
 
Figure I.160: Timeline for development of Google’s profit (data from [Tech Crunchies 
2010]). 
Summarizing the presented aspects of the theoretical approaches to early growth of 
NTBFs one is led to suppose that for early unperturbed growth phases Equation I.17 
and Equation I.18 are appropriate if the growth is essentially driven by cash flow from 
income (WITec, Nano-X, SAP, Microsoft and Cambride Nanotech and US LED given 
in ch. 4.3.6). This would be reflected by the cyclic process of innovation and invest-
ment persistence in Figure I.127. On the other, if large capital comes from outside 
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sources, but not through an IPO (Cisco, First Solar, Google), Equation I.18 seems to 
be adequate. However, this is still a proposition. 
The equations do not only provide numerically satisfying descriptions of dynamically 
developing growth states for NTBFs, but in certain cases various structures for dif-
ferent intervals may differentiate states without prior identification of brackets. In so 
far, for the developmental processes of NTBFs’ patterns of growth are created that 
characterize growth states. However, a more detailed understanding of the observed 
effects must be bolstered by reference to the micro-level of the firm under considera-
tion if common features for such states shall be revealed. 
Specific initial startup configurations and random occurrences of largely conceivable 
bracket events and related proceedings concerning decision-making will lead to over-
all differences in the growth of new firms. But there are periods, time intervals of 
growth, which are structurally comparable for the dynamics of developments of 
different firms. 
4.3.6 Expectations of Growth of Technology Ventures 
Past performance is, as investors like to say, no guarantee of future results. 
In the context of entrepreneurial success (ch. 4.1) various perspectives of success 
and aspirations were discussed, in particular, those of the entrepreneur(s), financial 
backers, such as venture capitalists, and policy with a special focus on job creation 
(Table I.64). Currently, particularly in the US and Germany, there is great interest of 
policy in high growth and fast growth young firms that become major employers. In the 
following discussions we shall put the emphasis on details of generating and “measur-
ing” expectations (Box I.17). 
The issue is the assessment of technical startups by third-parties and entrepreneurs 
to generate expectations of survival and growth or even growth levels which is often 
associated implicitly with mixed arguing along the lines of “reasons why” versus 
“reasons for thinking that” (Figure I.2). 
Covering samples of technical and non-technical samples various studies have shown 
that the activity pursued in the startup process (organizational effort) has a major im-
pact on founding success. Furthermore, both the founding success and (short-term) 
new venture survival of nascent entrepreneurs improved when the nascent entrepre-
neur engaged in early and careful planning activities [Keßler et al. 2010]. 
In particular, one can argue that, disregarding cases with issues of scale-up for pro-
duction, a talented team, with a large market in which to innovate and excellent execu-
tion justifies expectations of survival and good growth of a startup. 
Bhidé [2000:209] has argued generally “that the ambition and the capability of individ-
ual entrepreneurs have a significant impact on firm longevity and growth.” High growth 
of NTBFs is essentially related to the aspirations of the founders if aiming to maximize 
long-term value of the business, or merely seeking an increase in income, wealth 
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creation and independence, for instance, by selling a successful firm after a few years 
(cf. William Henry Perkin; A.1.2). 
In the following discussion we shall focus on expectations of growth, in particular, high 
growth of startups/NTBFs from an observer’s or venture capitalist’s point of view 
rather than “high-expectation” startups which, according to Autio [2005], refer to “all 
start-ups and newly formed businesses which expect to employ at least 20 employees 
within five years’ time.” (ch. 4.1) 
In the teleological environment of GST expectations make special connections be-
tween goals of the firm founders and their related strategy, their opportunities in terms 
of markets and industries including competition and accessible resources and should 
reflect ex ante statements (Box I.17). 
In order to inquire into expectations of the evolutions of NTBFs we use comparative 
approaches. One of it is looking for features which make the NTBFs’ next steps of 
development – become a medium- and large-size firms – survive, be successful and 
keep competitive advantage for their evolution. This relates also to Bhidé’s aspect of 
firm longevity. 
As this is a frame for the transition between two constellations looking at medium- and 
large-sized firms in a particular industry (Figure I.118) can be useful to create expecta-
tions of developments of NTBFs by searching for fits between relevant features of 
both these classes. Furthermore, we shall focus on top decision-makers who control 
the enterprise and who have a significant stake in its fortunes. 
This is to a certain degree in line with Bhidé [2000:2009] who stated that “knowledge 
of the origins and destinations of the origins and destinations of the typical long-lived 
corporations will help us identify the important common elements of their evolution.” 
Another way to create even semi-quantitative expectations compares the initial confi-
gurations of startups (ch. 4.3.2, A.1.6). A given NTBF with a given initial configuration 
providing information of its modes of growth and achievements will be used to gener-
ate expectations. Hence, knowledge and tools derived from ex post analyses are used 
to generate ex ante expectations (Table I.80, Table I.81). 
Success Factors of Mid-Sized Enterprises 
So far, we have learned that developments of privately held or privately controlled 
technical SMEs (Table I.4, Table I.74, Figure I.128) in the US and Germany are rather 
similar and reference to the German situation will allow some generalizations. Notable 
differences may occur with regard to extent of globalization and internationalization, 
where generally German firms put much more emphasis on than American SMEs. 
As will turn out small and large high growth firms put much emphasis on strategy and 
execution, summarized, for instance, by the characteristics 1-7 of the German Hidden 
Champions (ch. 4.3.5.2). Thus there will be a relation to strategic groups, defined by 
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M. Porter as “a group of firms pursuing similar strategies along strategic dimensions” 
[Runge 2006:221]. 
An investigation of 1,300 German mid-sized firms, usually family-controlled, and com-
parisons with the 180 firms showing the strongest growth revealed that the top firms 
have growth rates of 10 – 39 percent, far exceeding the others. And, furthermore, they 
also invest significantly more than others. This was attributed to the following factors 
[Fröndhoff 2008]. 
1. Taking advantage from megatrends. 
Adapting the business model very early to global market trends, in particular, 
mobility, health, energy and process and control technologies. 
2. Strong internationalization 
The firms with the highest growth rates have an export rate of 50 percent and 
more. Even small firms have set up a distribution network including sales and 
service offices or even production facilities. 
3. Premium products and services 
The firms with the highest growth rates have decade-long experiences in their 
segments and focus on premium products. They have high innovation rates 
and thus can keep their lead times and withstand competition. They specialize 
and focus on few businesses in global markets. Their lead in knowledge and 
experience allow them to launch tailored products in the markets. Further-
more, they offer additional services for their products.  
4. Manufacturing and networking 
Bundling product and associated service is seen as a successful strategy for 
competing with young firms from developing countries. Firms with the highest 
growth rates set off themselves through difficult to copy knowledge of produc-
ing high-tech products. And they often cooperate with universities and public 
resource institutes and develop products together with customers or firms of 
other branches. 
5. Local roots 
The high growth firm has local ties expressed by social engagement. 
A study of Ernst & Young [2011] inquired into 68 mainly technically oriented (German) 
mid-sized and large firms, actually finalists of the “Entrepreneur of the Year” contest, 
which showed above average growth over a series of years. They had on average 
revenues of ca. €115 million per year and 815 employees. The majority of the firms 
generate their revenues in the home market. 
The majority of these firms (ca. 60 percent) operated in lucrative niches or promising 
and growing market segments. A high proportion of sales – on average 14 percent – 
is attributed to the research and development departments. Sustainable growth relies 
on permanent innovations including internal processes and high appreciation of the 
firm by employees and customers [Ernst & Young 2011]. Main success factors 
include: 
 786 Chapter 4 
1. Look at the bigger picture (“Über den eigenen Tellerrand schauen”). 
During an upturn 45 percent of the firms turn to new markets, ca. 30 percent 
turn also to new target groups. Apart from the well-known European markets 
growth markets in Asia and South America are seen as big opportunities. 
2. Perceive competition as chance. 
Though three quarters of the firms complain about higher competition they ac-
cept the challenges to optimize their offerings and arouse new needs. Glo-
balization is not seen only as a threat, but also an opportunity to access ideas, 
talents, customers and businesses. 
3. Innovation and investment persistence (Figure I.127). 
cf. for instance, German Erlus AG [Runge 2006:237/238].and its cooperation 
with Nano-X GmbH (B.2). 
4. Continuously improve not only offerings, but also organizational processes. 
During an upturn, if competitive pressure tends to decrease, 75 percent of the 
firms take the time to assess their organizational processes and to re-
configure them so that new ideas can spread and get promotion and support. 
5. Inform and motivate employees. 
The majority of the firm sample has a style of cooperative leadership concern-
ing firm orientation, strategy and goals of the firm. The targeted incentives, but 
also demands of employees are appreciated – 80 percent of the firms can 
trust that their employees are committed to these plans and new develop-
ments. 
6. Plan ahead. 
The firms prepare for possible uncertainties and issues in their business, in 
particular on those, which they can influence even in the worst case. 
All the above success factors correspond essentially also to those which are typical 
for the class of the German Hidden Champions (ch. 4.1.1). 
In a comparative study of technical and non-technical high-growth companies from 
around the world in ca. 30 industries versus their less successful competitors Kim and 
Mauborgne [1997] presented a rationale for the differences. They found high-growth 
to be achieved by small and large organizations, in high-tech and low-tech industries 
and private and public firms. The origin of the differences was the companies’ funda-
mental implicit assumptions about strategy which sought to make their competitors ir-
relevant through a strategic logic they called “value innovation.” 
They inquired into the five textbook dimensions of strategy given in Table I.78. For 
value innovation logic the first and last dimensions exhibit typical systemic features. 
They found that managers of less successful companies all thought along conven-
tional strategic lines. 
The high-growth companies used a value innovation approach, and it was consistently 
applied to business initiatives in the market place. This means, value innovation logic 
requires execution (Figure I.87). 
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Table I.78: Two types of strategic logic for value innovation [Kim and Mauborgne 
1997:106]. Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Review. Copyright ©1997 by 
Harvard Business Publishing; all rights reserved. 
Five Dimensions of 
Strategy 
Conventional Logic Value Innovation Logic 
Industry assumptions Industry’s conditions are 
given. 
Industry’s conditions can 
be shaped. 
Strategic focus A company should build 
competitive advantages. 
The aim is to beat the 
competition. 
The competition is not the 
benchmark. A company 
should pursue a quantum 
leap in value to dominate 
the market. 
Customers A company should retain 
and expand its customer 
base through further seg-
mentation and customi-
zation. It should focus on 
the differences in what cus-
tomers value. 
A value innovator targets 
the mass of buyers and 
willingly lets some existing 
customers go. It focuses 
on the key commonalities 
in what customers value. 
Assets & capabilities A company should leverage 
its existing assets and capa-
bilities. 
A company must not be 
constrained by what it 
already has. It must ask: 
What would we do if we 
were starting anew? 
Product & service 
offerings 
An industry’s traditional 
boundaries determine the 
products and services a 
company offers. The goal is 
to maximize the value of 
those offerings. 
A value innovator thinks in 
terms of the total solution 
customers seek, even if 
that takes the company 
beyond its industry’s tradi-
tional offerings. 
Value innovation is expressed by the departure from the conventional logic of the par-
ticular industry and can emerge from a so-called “value curve” which relates valuation 
of the customers (Table I.13) versus experiences of the customer (Figure I.161). 
Value innovation provides inquiries into answering four key questions [Kim and 
Mauborgne 1997]: 
1. What factors should be eliminated that our industry takes for granted? 
2. What factor should be reduced well below the industry standard? 
3. What factor should be raised well above the industry standard? 
4. What factors should be created that the industry has never offered? 
This often is a relation of the kind: increase utility drastically while reducing similtane-
ously own costs or, alternatively, give customers more of what customers need or ap-
preciate most and much less of what they are willing to do without. 
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As an example in curve 2 in Figure I.161 the customer will get a device from three 
suppliers with above average advantages for elements C, D. E concerning functional-
ity (C and E) and delivery, but the price (A) is rather high and it is not easy to use (B). 
Curve 1 represents a device with extremely favorable elements A and B (price and 
ease of use), but serious disadvantages concerning C, D. E. 
The innovation displayed by curve 3 means combining advantages of D and E con-
cerning delivery, functionality and B (ease of use) and disregarding C, which is op-
tional features and meaning cost. The offering of curve 1 (maybe by an entrant) 
targets essentially customers who so far did not use the particular device due to a 
high price and learning efforts. 
Value innovation is different to technological innovation, considered as innovation that 
integrates interfaces, marketing and operations. The emphasis is on product, service, 
and delivery. Competition is the key building block of strategy and positioning is by 
differentiation from the competitive pack by “breaking” the rules of the “standard 
game” to create fundamentally new and superior customer value. 
In so far, value innovation can be useful as an instrument to assess young firms con-
cerning growth in a competitive market by assessing in how far the they may provide 
appropriate answers to the above four questions. 
 
Figure I.161: A “value curve” for value innovation. 
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How the logic of value innovation translates into a company’s offerings in the market 
has been described by Kim and Mauborgne [1997], for instance, for the German 
originally Hidden Champion SAP AG (ch. 4.1.1; Figure I.143; A.1.4) as follows. 
Until the 1980s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) appeared as “business-applica-
tion software.” Providers focused on sub-segmenting the market and customizing their 
offerings to meet buyers’ functional needs, such as payroll, human resources, pro-
duction management and logistics. And the emphasis of the makers was focusing on 
improving the performance of particular software products. 
Instead of competing on customers’ differences, SAP sought out important commonal-
ities in what customers value. SAP’s founder/leaders correctly hypothesized that for 
most customers the performance advantages of highly customized, individual software 
modules had been overestimated. Such modules forfeited the efficiency and informa-
tion advantages of an integrated system, which allows real-time data exchange across 
a company. 
In 1979, SAP launched R/2 (Figure I.143), a real time integrated business-application 
software for mainframe computers. R/2 had no restriction on the platform of the host 
computer; buyers could capitalize of the best hardware available and reduce their 
maintenance cost dramatically. Most important, R/2 led to huge gains in accuracy and 
efficiency because a company needed to enter its data only once. And R/2 improved 
the flow of information. A sales manager, for instance, could find out when a product 
will be delivered and why it is late by cross-referencing the production database. 
SAP’s growth and profits have exceeded its industry’s. 
Concerning technology entrepreneurship our interest in expectation of levels of suc-
cess is the top ca. 20 percent of firms that create ca. 80 percent of jobs by high or fast 
growth (Figure I.119). The interest is to assess the fate of a startup from its initial con-
figuration, its “birth” including the “startup thrust phase” (ch. 4.3.1, 4.3.2; Figure I.125) 
in a given environment. 
We shall tackle the scope of ex ante expectations referring to three situations 
 Statements about essentially survival and rough growth levels at the time of 
firm’s foundation based on its initial configuration (“year 0” of existence and 
the first year at the highest)  
 Statements about the situations after the startup thrust phase (year three or 
four of existence when the period of highest level for a firm’s failure has suc-
cessfully passed) or generally, 
 Firms’ development after a significant bracket in terms of dynamically stable 
states (as outlined in ch. 4.3.5.3). 
In restricting to the time one must keep in mind that startups with (anticipated) produc-
tion often need a period of four to eight years before they can commercialize their of-
ferings (“delayed growth”). Such long “projection” into the future restricts expectations 
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seriously, as not only the market and competitive landscape will have changed. The 
expectation would require assumptions about the scale-up process into large-scale 
production and a successful entry into the market. 
The first case will be similar to that of natural science when usually the initial condi-
tions and corresponding equations of motion (or situation-related differential equa-
tions) suffice to predict time-dependent trajectories. For the current discussion the ini-
tial configuration (ch. 4.3.2) would be the starting point. 
We shall take care as far as possible of the caveat that the very dynamic develop-
ments of new firms in the first years in business (Table I.71) and short-term success 
does not allow inferences about sustainable success. 
Serious issues for ex ante approaches are raised by the high complexity of new tech-
nology-based firms (Figure I.128) which makes statistical approaches largely ques-
tionable due to sample selection and keeping the structure in the answer sets. The 
multi-dimensionality of factors contributing to survival and growth of an NTBF and the 
much randomness of environmental changes impacting firm size result in situations 
which are often not expectable. 
The Unexspectable 
Intrinsic to a discussion of expectations is the unexpected, the “surprise” which may 
lead to: 
 the unexpected success, 
 the unexpected failure 
 the unexpected outside “unique event,” the unexpected development of a situation 
or an entity (ch. 1.2.1, 3.2.1). 
Drucker [1995] illustrates the unexpected for systematic innovation which monitors the 
innovative opportunity from the point of view of innovators or management of firms. 
The unexpected success is described as the area in which no other area offers richer 
opportunities for successful innovation. “In no other area are innovative opportunities 
less risky and their pursuit less arduous. Yet the unexpected success is almost totally 
neglected; worse, managements tend actively to reject it” (p. 37). The unexpected 
success is seen as an opportunity, but it does make demands (p.45). “In exploiting the 
opportunity for innovation offered by unexpected success requires analysis” (p. 41).  
Unexpected success is a symptom; however the question remains; a symptom of 
what? Drucker describes the unexpected success as the underlying phenomenon 
which may be nothing more than a limitation on our own vision, knowledge and under-
standing (p. 41). 
Then there is the unexpected failure. “Failures, unlike successes cannot be rejected 
and rarely go unmotivated. But they are seldom seen as symptoms of opportunity. A 
good many failures are of course, nothing but mistakes, the results of greed, stupidity, 
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thoughtless bandwagon climbing, or incompetence whether in design or execution” (p. 
46). 
Finally, there is the unexpected outside event (cf. the German firm Heyl; Table I.76) 
This area indicates that “outside events that is events that are not recorded in the 
information and the figures by which a management steers its institution, are just as 
important. Indeed they often are more important” (p. 52). 
Unexpected events or developments are often associated with the metaphor of the 
“Black Swan.” And specifically (according to Nassim Nicholas Taleb) technological 
breakthroughs are referred to as “positive Black Swans” – unexpected events or de-
velopments with huge positive consequences that in retrospect look inevitable. Some 
of them, such as Google (Box I.24) in technology entrepreneurship, come seemingly 
out of nowhere to dominate within a short time. Others take years to mature and are 
surprising only as people forgot they were there. 
In the GST context expectation of a startup’s development by an outside observer is 
teleologically bound to known, explicitly measurable goals (objectives) or an explicit 
definition of what is viewed as “success” (Figure I.78, Figure I.122, Figure I.130) by 
the founders referring to the level of achieving the objectives – making intrinsic con-
nections with varieties of strategy expressed in various forms. 
Therefore, Google does not represent a “Black Swan.” Its early success is incommen-
surable (impossible to measure or compare in value or size or excellence) with its 
early intentions and goals. It was “unexpectable” (Box I.24)! 
Box I.24: Could one have expected extremely high growth on and soon after 
Google’s foundation? 
Google Inc. is an American multinational Internet and software corporation specialized 
in Internet search, cloud computing, and advertising technologies. It hosts and deve-
lops a number of Internet-based services and products and generates profit primarily 
from advertising through its AdWords/AdSense programs. The company was founded 
by Larry Page and Sergey Brin in 1998 while the two were attending Stanford 
University. 94 
For Google an exorbitant jump in revenues is observed very few years after founda-
tion (Figure I.159, Figure I.160). Google achieved crossing explosion-like the marker 
of $10 billion just eight years after foundation. Google has grown into one of the 
world’s biggest Web companies by market capitalization since its 2004 initial public 
offering. 
According to Larry Page Google’s rise was due to being an innovator in both techno-
logy and business. In order to be successful in technical innovation, said Page, you 
must understand the business and marketing side of the equation [Page and Schmidt 
2002]. 
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We shall consider the first five to six years of existence of Google, but shall focus, in 
particular, on the business orientation at and shortly after foundation (the first three 
years). This would provide the relevant information input into the expectation of further 
development (and growth) of the firm by an outside observer. 
Google began in January 1996 as a research project by Larry Page and Sergey Brin 
when they were both PhD students at Stanford University in California. 94 The primary 
focus of “the “Google project” was to create a better search engine for the Web – 
better, for instance, than AltaVista or Excite. The project was called “The Anatomy of a 
Large-scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine” or simply, The Anatomy of a Search 
Engine. 
The challenge was to crawl the Web efficiently and provide more relevant results than 
the search engines that were available at that time (better search and information 
handling). The project should provide a solution of the following problem: The dra-
matic growth of the Web presented problems for crawling the Web – keeping the 
crawled information up to date, storing the indices efficiently, and handling many que-
ries quickly. The Google project relied on the PageRank technology that the pair 
developed. [Woopidoo]. 
The famous search algorithm of Larry Page and Sergey Brin is essentially applying 
the ranking method used for academic articles (more citations equals more influence) 
to the sprawl of the Internet. 
PageRank is not the Google ranking algorithm. Instead, it is just one of many different 
factors. However, it is the most known and a key element of what Google does. Stan-
ford University, where PageRank was developed by Google’s co-founders, owns the 
patent on PageRank. However, Google’s IPO filing revealed that Google has been 
granted a perpetual license and that in October 2003, it extended an agreement giving 
it exclusivity to PageRank through 2011 [Sullivan 2004]. 
Page and Brin decided to convert their research project in Stanford University’s com-
puter science graduate program into a formal company. Originally, Google was run 
from within the university under the Stanford University Website, with the domain 
google.stanford.edu. 94 
The founders started with their own funds and those of their friends and family, but the 
site quickly outgrew their own available resources. In its early year Google allowed no 
advertising in their search engine results. The search engine became profitable in 
2000 with the introduction of unobtrusive text advertisements placed along side 
search results. They eventually received private investments [Woopidoo]. 
The early assumption was that although ads would be an important source of reve-
nue, but licensing search technology and selling servers would be lucrative. However, 
Internet search was considered such a low priority at the time that Page and Brin 
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could not find anyone willing to pay a couple of million dollars to buy their technology 
[Lietdke 2008]. 
The first external funding for Google was an August 1998 contribution of $100,000 
from Andy Bechtolsheim, co-founder of Sun Microsystems, given before Google was 
even incorporated. They filed incorporation papers so they could cash a check made 
out to Google Inc. (incorporated on September 4, 1998). Google was based in a 
friend’s (Susan Wojcicki) garage in Menlo Park, California. And Craig Silverstein, a 
fellow PhD student at Stanford, was hired as the first employee. 94 
Early in 1999, while still graduate students, Brin and Page decided that the search 
engine they had developed was taking up too much of their time from academic pur-
suits. They went to Excite CEO George Bell and offered to sell it to him for $1 million. 
He rejected the offer, and later criticized Vinod Khosla, one of Excite’s venture capital-
ists, after he had negotiated Brin and Page down to $750,000. On June 7, 1999, a $25 
million round of funding was announced, with major investors including the venture 
capital firms Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers (KPCB) and Sequoia Capital. 94 
After foundation in 1998 Larry Page and Sergey Brin channeled their energy into its 
free search product and left much of the business planning to a 22-year-old Stanford 
graduate named Salar Kamangar, Google’s ninth employee. Larry Page and Brin 
managed the company up until it reached more than 200 employees in 2001, when 
they handed over the CEO position to Dr. Eric Schmidt [Woopidoo]. Eric Schmidt 
joined Google as chairman and chief executive officer – and revenues jumped tremen-
dously for 2001-2002 (Figure I.159, Figure I.160). 
“Kamangar joined Google after graduating from Stanford University in 1999, five years 
before the initial public offering, and his meteoric rise mirrored the company’s own 
comet-like trajectory. In seven years, Kamangar has gone from newbie to key player 
in one of the most remarkable corporate success stories of the decade. Among his 
accomplishments were writing the first business plan, becoming a founding member of 
the Google product team, and leading the engineering team that launched AdWords, 
Google’s proprietary method for tailoring Web ads to search terms.” [DeBruicker 
2006]. Google generated profit primarily from advertising through its AdWords pro-
gram. 
In 2000, against Page and Brin’s initial opposition toward an advertising-funded 
search engine, Google began selling advertisements associated with search key-
words. 94 
Google’s rapid growth since its incorporation triggered further developments, acquisi-
tions and also partnerships. In particular, there was another piece of software impor-
tant for Google, “one they stumbled into when they bought Applied Semantics.” 
[Altucher 2009] Sergey Brin has long been friends with Applied Semantics co-founder 
Gil Elbaz, Google pointed out. Interestingly, both Google and Applied Semantics had 
similar beginnings, as search engines with funky names launched in the late 1990s. 
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However, Applied Semantics moved more properly into the contextual advertisement, 
when it launched its AdSense program [Searchenginewatch 2003]. 
Google did not invent AdSense. Instead, they acquired the AdSense technology lock, 
stock and barrel – including the AdSense name – from Applied Semantics that Google 
purchased in April 2003 which was known as Oingo Inc. “Applied Semantics tooted 
their own Adsense horn well before Google picked them up.” An Oingo press release 
mentioned AdSense already on December 4, 2000 and an application for a trademark 
on October 22, 1999 showed the name already [FirstMention]. 
AdSense 95 is a proprietary search algorithm that was based on word meanings and 
built upon an underlying lexicon called WordNet, which was developed by researchers 
at Princeton University. The AdSense program places paid listings into Web pages, by 
analyzing the content of those pages and then selecting ads that seem most appro-
priate [Altucher 2009]. 
“Applied Semantics is a proven innovator in semantic text processing and online ad-
vertising,” said Sergey Brin, Google’s co-founder and president of Technology. “This 
acquisition will enable Google to create new technologies that make online advertising 
more useful to users, publishers, and advertisers alike.” 96 
When Google acquired Applied Semantics in April 2003 Susan Wojcicki, director of 
product management, explained more benefits. “Bringing on additional engineering 
support is also a key component.” [Searchenginewatch 2003]. With the acquisition 
Google gained additionally employees already versed in the contextual ad space, an 
engineering team with its own unique ideas and methods of powering contextual ads 
plus a few existing partnerships [Sullivan 2003]. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of Applied Semantics gave Google new traffic for its paid 
listings, new strengths in the contextual advertising space, which Google entered and 
also potentially hurt then major Google-competitor Overture [SearchEngineWatch 
2003] 
Google’s core business of selling search-based advertising, which allows companies 
to purchase ads tied to specific keyword searches, became one of the most lucrative 
and rapidly growing markets in the high-tech sector. A detailed description of Google’s 
contextual ad business, Googlenomics, is described by Ley [2009]. 
Google’s early years were during the Dot-Com Recession and the disruptive jump in 
revenues in 2001/2002 cannot be attributed straightforwardly. However, reference to 
the origins to Google’s profits (search services versus advertisement contributions) 
provides the answer: It is the explosion based to a large extent on its AdSense ap-
proach (Figure I.159). 
As a summary, given the original intention when founding the firm on focusing on Web 
search Google’s later shift to contextual advertisement including the enforcement of 
the ad orientation and the related change of the business model, the role of Salar 
 Chapter 4 795 
Kamangar for developing AdWords and by taking over the firm Applied Semantics 
with its AdSense program, stumbling into that as Altucher [2009] described it, the 
explosive growth of Google (Figure I.159, Figure I.160) could not be expected 
considering founding intentions and orientations, but could not even expected looking 
at the development over the first two to three years. 
What and How to Expect 
For NTBFs there are two situations for which survival can be expected and the lowest 
level concerning growth: 
 Non-growth or very low growth by intention, for instance, growth in line with or 
slightly above the inflation rate. 
Basically, for configurationally similar young companies according to class properties 
outlined in Figure I.128 with similar growth aspirations (Figure I.122), one can assume 
that they face and solve similar developmental problems and will be exposed to simi-
lar unbalanced internal and/or external factors or events and will go through similar 
phases of decision-making and actions which will affect their growth states. 
Therefore, we propose to generate expectations by comparisons (and call the related 
approach “ex comparatione”): 
 Expectation of growth referring to the configurationally “nearest” case (growth 
parallel to the nearest similar, analogous or competitive firm). 
The fundamental variable of the initial configuration of a startup for dealing with growth 
developments of a firm reduces basically to “measure” (ask for) the intention or aspira-
tion of the entrepreneur whether he/she wants the startup to grow or is satisfied with 
“non-growth” (ch. 4.1). 
However, it may well be that an original non-growth attitude may change over time, if 
the NTBF has the “potential” to grow (Figure I.97). The entrepreneur’s intended mode 
of growth has an important consequence for expectations. If entrepreneurs do not rule 
out non-organic growth for the early development phases, there is, at best, only a 
qualitative statement of future growth possible: will (likely) survive and grow. 
In a GST context, not knowing about the entrepreneur’s growth intention or aspiration 
(Figure I.122) has an important consequence. Whenever there is a researcher’s (or 
any third party’s) assessment of a startup based on the initial configuration he/she is 
in the situation that his/her expectation actually induces a statement with conditionals 
(Figure I.2), a “reason for thinking that” (“… will grow significantly unless the foun-
der(s) do not want to grow”, “… unless a serious event/bracket prevents that.”). 
Following an ex comparatione approach the fundamental statements with regard to a 
firm’s growth, for instance, in terms of revenues, would refer to “more, equal, less” or 
“higher growth, equal growth, less growth” compared with a “standard.” This can be 
extended numerically to an “average growth,” if a class of “nearest cases” is consid-
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ered or even to semi-quantitative statements, if variables and parameters of the re-
lated configuration are considered and mapped. Correspondingly, concerning expec-
tations referring to growth we may have “growth above average” or “growth below 
average.” An average-related expectation of growth could refer to (statistical) 
averages of (non-VC controlled) NTBF types, such as TVT or HVT or both combined 
(Table I.1, Table I.70, Table I.71). 
As the definition of an entrepreneurial configuration contains the firm’s environment, 
particularly the market it operates in, statements about growth of a firm ex compara-
tione can become statement with conditions concerning the market or industry, 
respectively. 
The related approach would assess the capability of a new firm to capture a share of a 
developing market and focus expectations on relations of the firm’s growth to its 
markets using the following level of qualitative scores. Such an approach does not 
usually apply to disruptive innovations, as there may be no markets (exception: a Holy 
Grail; ch. 1.2.5.1). The assessment would have to focus on the firm’s potential to cre-
ate a new market (cf. also ch. 4.3.5.3 for assessments related to “growth factors”). 
 Growth less than the market/industry 
 Growth with the market/industry 
 Exceeding the growth of the market/industry 
 Exceptional high growth (“super growth”). 
However, one must admit that expecting super-growth at or shortly after NTBF foun-
dation is almost impossible. One situation one can think of will again refer to a Holy 
Grail of an industry (ch. 1.2.5.1). 
The ex comparatione approach represents essentially a measurement of order 
against a fixed point or constellation, in particular, against a “standard” (as for person-
ality disposition, Figure I.60). Ex comparatione relies on knowing the class properties 
of the “standard.” And establishing the level of match between the new firm with the 
“standard” is a way of “multidimensional case-based reasoning” to generate expecta-
tions. For very close matches one can assume expectation to fit realities with accept-
able reliability. 
However, an external, scientific observer of a startup may miss a bracket (Figure 
I.136) for the standard or the target firm. Thus the observer may lack some informa-
tion, fact or event to fully understand developments and outcomes. That means, the 
observer may not be aware that, for his/her understanding and explaining outcomes, 
rather than dealing with the “reason why”, he/she is about to deal with “reason why 
thinking that” (Figure I.2). 
A semi-quantitative ex comparatione approach referring to a “standard” is presented 
by The Venture Alliance (TVA) which targets fundability of startups by investors (Box 
I.17). 
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TVA addresses fundability of firms and entrepreneurs [TVA]. They intend to help 
entrepreneurs in their quest for funding by providing how an investor would view their 
offering (ch. 4.1) and what areas of their business need improvement.  
TVA’s methodology measures how well a company conforms to “fair and acceptable” 
funding criteria at a specific point in time and results in three products and associated 
services which represent a stepwise process to the Fundability Assessment. 
1. TVA’s Qualifier is a specialized test designed to function as a reverse busi-
ness plan. It is occasionally offered for free but, has a variety of upgraded 
options. Its 65-question test covers the aspects of the business and will give 
applicants a clear look at what their business is providing to a potential in-
vestor and where it needs work. 
The Qualifier is the starting point for determining which companies make the 
Forbes list “America’s Most Promising Companies” (AMPC; Box I.17). 
2. The Vulnerability Feedback is a follow-up to the Qualifier. During this process, 
professional analysts at TVA work one-on-one with applicants to explain the 
results of the Qualifier, what the Qualifier results reveal about their business. 
3. The Fundability Assessment which also serves for the Forbes AMPC list is a 
1,000+ question questionnaire. It enables TVA to produce a 12-15 page report 
on the business that will enhance every aspect of the applicant’s business 
plan as presented to investors. 
TVA has a consistent methodology. It developed a scoring algorithm based on a vast 
range of variables that determine a company’s potential – ultimately, its worth to 
investors defined by the fundability. Aggregation of measurements – conversion of a 
1,200 point scoring system – leads to one “Fundability Score” and to twelve categories 
for macro interpretations to be visualized by a “TVA Radar Graph” (Figure I.162). The 
categories present criteria investors typically focus on as part of their due diligence. 
The overall Fundability Assessment provides a view of the assessed business as it 
currently stands and includes, apart from a report, 
 The numerical TVA Fundability Score (required to continue the funding pro-
cess). 
 Two of TVA’s trademarked Radar Graphs showing 1) how the company com-
pares to an “ideal” model related to type and stage of company and 2) how 
the company compares to other companies that are “similar” (“competing” and 
“comparable”). 
As the entrepreneurs’ situations usually change fast TVA places an expiration date to 
every analysis they do of six months. 
For those TVA clients whose score exceeds 800, help with funding sources may be 
available. Those whose score exceeds 1,000 will have a broader range of funding 
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opportunities including, but not limited to, being published in one of more of TVA’s 
TIGER (Top Investment Grade EntrepreneuR) lists, such as the Forbes list. 
Hence, TVA’s approach has many features of the ex comparatione approach de-
scribed previously. Specifically, TVA takes input by the entrepreneur and determines 
which of its twenty-four models (“standards”) is the most appropriate one to measure 
the new firm against. Each model examines and weighs twelve key areas to reach an 
assessment against the perceived “ideal” represented by the template model. The 
Radar Graph of Figure I.162 is a visualized example of this approach. In this regard it 
is similar to “measurement of personality disposition” (Figure I.60). 
Apart from “Investment Value” all the other TVA categories, by sense not terms, will 
play also a role in the current approach to expectations based on firms’ configurations 
(Table I.80; A.1.6). 
Typical questions related to each of the twelve categories are given below with score 
points in parentheses (Total: 1070). A corresponding listing with largely explanatory 
character of the categories is given by Nelson [2009]. 
1. Management Team: Who are they? What’s their track record? Etc. (170) 
2. Founder Commitment:  What have the founder’s done to show they are seri-
ous? (20) 
3. Entrepreneurial Experience: Does the team have a track record we can be-
lieve in? (60) 
4. Accomplishments: What has the team done to show progress? (100) 
5. Market Opportunity:  Is there a real market for the products? (170) 
6. Marketing/Sales Strategy: Do we believe in their value proposition? (110) 
7. Competition:  What is their “unfair” competitive advantage? (140) 
8. Intellectual Property:  Can they protect their advantage? (100) 
9. Directors & Advisors: Who does this team listen to? (40) 
10. Financial Performance: What have they done since founding the company? 
(100) 
11. Corporate Structure & Ownership: Does ownership and structure make 
sense and help or hurt the company? (20) 
12. Investment Value:  Is this a good investment for what is being offered at the 
anticipated risk level? (40) 
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Figure I.162: The TVA Radar Graph to assess fundability of startups by investors –
”The more (light) GREY you see (RED in the original), the greater the room for im-
provement.” (Source: [TVA], courtesy of James W. Casparie). 
A similar scorecard-like approach to assessing young firms is presented and illustra-
ted for university “spin-out” companies (RBSUs) as compared with a group of compa-
nies arising from the community as a whole by De Coster [2004; 2005]. The assess-
ment was based on key success criteria (Table I.79) and on information provided by 
the business plan of the new venture plus an interview with key personnel – plus 
secondary research. The scoring system focuses on criteria that have been identified 
in the research literature. The assessment methodology has been developed and 
operated over a period of four years by Clive Butler, HSBC Chair of Innovation at 
Brunel University, UK. 
The methodology was primarily designed for the use of a major UK bank (HSBC) and 
now widely employed to assist in deciding whether debt financing is appropriate. Com-
pared with VC investments, such funding tends to be early stage and the amounts re-
latively small. Such funding cannot bear the cost of in-depth due diligence procedures. 
To improve the reproducibility of the assessment method the scoring method is seen 
to have the benefits that the assessments are more objective and there is less re-
liance on the individuals undertaking the assessment. A scorecard-type approach will 
usually also be used for business plan contests to judge all submitted business plans 
consistently. 
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To each key success criterion a verbal description is employed. The best fit deter-
mines the scoring number. The scales were developed by identifying the two end-
points presenting the extremes of expectations of successful development of an early 
stage NTBF (most negative and most positive expectation; for instance, scoring 
between 1 and 10). The mid point of the scale for the scale will represent a median 
state of an NTBF when seeking funding. The overall maximum achievable score 
represents the ideal business in their industry/stage of development [De Coster 2004; 
2005]. 
Not all the criteria of this approach are considered to be of equal importance or inde-
pendent of one another. Weightings (not shown) were assigned to each of the criteria 
to reflect the levels of importance. 
Table I.79: Criteria for assessing RBSUs according to De Coster [2004; 2005]. 
No. Criterion Aim 
1 Technological and Commercial Risk To assess will it work 
2 Level of Product Innovation To assess the Unique Selling Proposi-
tion (USP) 
3 Market Criteria – How it satisfies a 
market sector 
To assess market demand 
4 Market Criteria – Timeliness To assess the market timeliness 
5 Product Extensions – Longevity/ 
Repeat Orders 
To assess whether it fits into a family 
of products to permit company estab-
lishment or development 
6 Product Extensions – Family of 
Products 
To assess the longevity of product or 
product line 
7 Entrepreneurial Background  
8 Protecting Competitive Advantage – 
Sustainable 
To assess the intellectual property 
rights 
The proposed “ex comparatione” approach in this book to generate expectations 
about new firms’ development referring to a configurationally “near” case will require a 
set of criteria to be matched similar to those discussed in this sub-chapter and si-
multaneously a match between comparable dynamically stable states of the two firms. 
As indicated in Figure I.128 there will be several criteria to describe an entrepreneurial 
configuration by “major coordinates,” which house a number of attributes (“specifica-
tions”). The last ones could provide values (usually numerals for scores) if a scoring 
procedure should be built. The gross criteria would be associated with weights. It must 
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be admitted, however, that a scorecard approach is not in line with GST: It treats the 
significance of an individual factor as independent from all the other factors. The lack-
ing systemuc effects would be partially mitigated by weighing the “major coordinates.”  
As an example of how to proceed with generating ex comparatione statements one 
can look at two poster child companies offering nano-tools, with well growing markets 
(“scientific instruments”), proprietary technologies, real products and real customers. 
Here, the earlier founded German firm WITec (Figure I.123) is the standard against 
which Cambridge Nanotech from the US will be matched. 
Table I.80 provides the suggested configurational categories following largely the tax-
onomies discussed in Figure I.128. This makes the approach explicit and let emerge 
the close similarities of the two firms’ configurations – simply by inspecting and com-
paring textual descriptions of related categories rather than performing a quantified 
approach based on scoring, such as the TVA Radar (Figure I.162). 
Cambridge NanoTech founder and CEO Jill Becker turned her Harvard chemistry the-
sis research into a rapidly growing company whose revenue hit $17.6 million in 2010 
(B.2). Due to strong roots in Atomic Deposition Layer (ALD) research, Cambridge 
NanoTech enjoys exceptional access to novel ALD applications and many great op-
portunities to nurture these applications to maturity. 
The successful transition from serving academic customers to manufacturing cus-
tomers has been in response to specific market needs and to developing products 
working closely with industry partners, research collaborators and key customers. 
Gross margins of the business are around 70 percent [Yang and Kiron 2010]. 
Atomic Deposition Layer originates in chemical nanotechnology and means a method 
of creating thin film materials by laying down a layer material a single atom’s thickness 
at a time. ALD is an ideal coating technology because of its perfect, conformal, ultra-
thin films that are scalable to large-area substrates. ALD simultaneously offers excel-
lent thickness uniformity, film density, step coverage, interface quality, and low tem-
perature processing, making ALD beneficial for both roll-to-roll flexible substrates and 
rigid substrates. 
As both firms have very close configurations, apart from being sure about the firm’s 
survival, Cambridge Nanotech would be assumed to further develop solidly and dy-
namically similar to WITec (Figure I.163). Furthermore, one can assume the devel-
opment curve in terms of revenue to be described with the formula (Equation I.18) 
used for WITec’s dynamically stable period (Figure I.156). 
Though all this has turned out to be true from the start of the firm (2003) until 2008 
and seemingly also until 2011 two unexpected, seriously negative brackets led 
Cambridge Nanotech to close doors by the end of 2012. 
 802 Chapter 4 
Table I.80: Matching entrepreneurial configurations of US Cambridge Nanotech 
against WITec GmbH to derive growth expectations for the former one. 
Configurational 
Categories 
WITec GmbH 
(Germany; B.2) 
Cambridge Nanotech, Inc. 
– CNT (US; B.2) 
Basic Firm Characteristics (Industry: Both in Nano-Tools, Scientific Instruments) 
Vision/Mission – Growth 
Strategy 
“Focus Innovations,” 
constantly introducing new 
technologies and a commit-
ment to maintaining cus-
tomer satisfaction through 
high-quality, flexible and in-
novative products; 
Organic growth (Box I.20; 
B.2) 
Co-founder Jill Becker: “My 
fantasy was to marry sci-
ence and business; sell a 
version of an ALD system, 
and evangelize this beautiful 
technology.” [Yang and 
Kiron 2010] 
Organic growth 
Firm Type RBSU – university spin-out; 
direct commercialization of 
science 
(founded 1997) 
RBSU – university spin-out; 
direct commercialization of 
science 
(founded 2003) 
Legal Firm Form Private, GmbH (LLC) Private, Inc. 
Special Externalities Suffered early from Dot-
Com Recession soon after 
start 
 
Initial Financing Own resources and debts 
(bank loans) 
Own resources, “boot-
strapping” (plus loans?) 
Further financing Essentially cash flow Essentially cash flow 
Research (or R&D 
Intensity) 
TVT (top value technology; 
Table I.1) 
TVT (top value technology; 
Table I.1) 
Networking Ongoing contacts/coop with 
“home university” 
Ongoing contacts/coop with 
“home university” and other 
universities 
Founders’ Personalities, Leadership and Corporate Culture 
Founders Entrepreneurial Triple Entrepreneurial Pair 1); 
50:50 equity share in CNT 
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Motivation/Experience Originally, team wanted to 
found an IT firm, grasped 
other opportunity; 
Father-in-law of one founder 
is self-employed (contrib-
uted also to initial funding) 
Key founder Jill Becker 
always wanted to have own 
firm, marry science and 
business; 
father was serial entre-
preneur [Yang and Kiron 
2010] 
Entrepreneurial professor 
during doctoral thesis 
Leadership Team: 
Managerial Roles and 
Execution 
Personality and competency 
oriented distribution of man-
agement roles (Table I.41); 
Founders learning on de-
mand; 
Strong business plan and 
financial planning [Koenen 
2010] 
Founder (Jill Becker) 
grasped first organizational 
skills managing university 
group, became Harvard 
Professor Roy Gordon’s 
Chemistry lab de facto office 
manager; in charge of pro-
curement, managing vendor 
relationships, tracking in-
ventory and managing the 
lab’s budget [Yang and 
Kiron 2010], gathered ex-
perienced team. 
By mid 2007 Becker hired 
Jay Ritter, a semiconductor 
industry veteran, as a man-
ager 
Technology, Innovation and Products/Services 
Technology Enabling technology (nano-
tool); nano-analytical micro-
scope systems 
(Raman, Atomic Force 
Microscope – AFM, 
Scanning Near-Field Optical 
Microscope – SNOM); 
with the first Confocal 
Raman Imaging system, 
WITec outperformed the 
existing Raman mapping 
techniques 
Platform technology for 
coatings; Atomic Deposition 
Layer (ADL); creating thin 
film materials by laying 
down a layer material a 
single atom’s thickness at a 
time. 
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Table I.80, continued. 
Technology, Innovation and Products/Services 
Innovation Persistence Steadily developing different 
types of instruments; 
first, combining SNOM and 
AFM in one single instru-
ment; 
then, modular design allows 
the integration of Confocal 
Raman and Scanning Probe 
Microscopy (SPM) in one 
system; 
this innovation instigated a 
boom in combined 
Raman/SPM systems 
Steadily developing different 
types of ADL systems and 
coatings devices 
Technology Ownership 
(Own Development, 
Partnership, Licensed) 
Own research and develop-
ment at the University of 
Ulm, Germany 
Developments based on 
Becker’s dissertation; not 
known whether there is 
licensing with Harvard; 
presentation of  Rogers and 
Mead [2011] induce some 
evidence for licensing 
IP Protection Own Patents Patents 
Regulatory Factors for 
Technology 
None None 
Instrument Production Utilizing university infra-
structure to develop instru-
ments including assembly of 
first instruments 
Utilizing university infra-
structure to develop in-
struments including as-
sembly of first instruments; 
founder Jill Becker hand-
assembled the first 13 units 
Production Own facilities Contract manufacturers 
located in Massachusetts 
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Market and Opportunity 
First Customer Available 
(Startup Thrust Phase) 
Sales of scientific (lab) in-
strument to (US) academics 
led to nano-tools startup: 
initial sales – research to 
research 
Started with academic cus-
tomer (sales to Stanford 
University); 
initial sales – research to 
research 
Commercialization or 
Business Model 
Research, development, 
production and sales / 
distribution of scientific in-
struments; user education 
and support; technical 
service; 
consulting concerning appli-
cations; 
analytical (nano)tools 
focusing on material and life 
sciences 
Research, development, 
production and sales / 
distribution of scientific in-
struments and devices; user 
education and support; 
technical service; 
consulting concerning appli-
cations; 
providing coating services 
for a variety of materials 
the products are used in 
various applications, includ-
ing optical, nanostructures, 
electronics, energy, bio-
medical, anti-corrosion, anti-
stiction, chemical, etch re-
sistance, internal tube 
liners, magnetic, roll to roll, 
semi and nanoelectronics, 
MEMS, and wear resistant. 
Real Customers From academic and in-
dustrial research, imme-
diately 
(“real” products or services, 
e.g. no selling of licenses); 
international orientation 
From academic and in-
dustrial research, imme-
diately 
(“real” products or services, 
e.g. no selling of licenses); 
international orientation 
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Table I.80, continued. 
Market Characteristics Economic and policy-driven 
markets; 
global; almost recession 
proof; 
industry: scientific instru-
ments (in a broad sense); 
analytics; 
Starting with customers 
primarily from academia; 
in 2005 the estimated SPM 
world market was €113 
mio., Japan ca. 30%; 
in many cases, researchers 
order an SPM customized to 
their research purposes, 
and it is estimated that such 
a special SPM occupies 
30% to 50% of the entire 
demand for SPMs 
Economic and policy-driven 
markets; 
global; almost recession 
proof; 
industry: scientific instru-
ments (in a broad sense) 
and surface coatings 
Almost none for the time of 
foundation! 
Starting with customers 
primarily from academia; 
currently: by 2012 observers 
expected the global ADL 
market to be $1 billion or 
10% of the total market for 
deposition equipment. CNT 
estimated to have captured 
a 5-10% share of the cur-
rent market for ADL equip-
ment sold for R&D [Yang 
and Kiron 2010] – often 
customized products 
Competition, 
Competitive Advantage 
A few known “big guys” and 
a lot of “little guys;” 
however, small firms are in 
a better position to supply 
specialized instruments and 
accessories to the compa-
nies and research and 
educational institutions that 
work at the micro and nano 
levels; small firms look for 
lucrative niches (e.g. 
German JPK Instruments 
AG focuses on BioSMP, 
Figure I.141) 
Advantages: leadtime, 
Raman/SPM leader, 
innovation persistence 
The top-five ALD equipment 
suppliers had an 81% share 
of the global ALD equipment 
market, middle tier of ALD 
equipment suppliers, most 
with less than $10 mil. 
CNT knows their most sig-
nificant threats and competi-
tors with the potential to be-
come significant threats. 
[Yang and Kiron 2010]. 
Advantages: Innovation 
persistence 
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Marketing/Promotion 
and Customer Educa-
tion 
Customer workshops 
(“WITec Academy”); online 
webinars (home page); 
conferences, exhibitions 
and fairs 
Online tutorials (home 
page); literature database 
(Knowledge Center); webi-
nars, Customer Papers; 
conferences, exhibitions 
and fairs 
Sales and Distribution Subsidiaries: US, Singapore 
(US sales office 2002; 
Singapore sales office 
2010); 
early on worldwide network 
of distributors (sales and 
customer support) 
Subsidiary (UK 2009); 
early on worldwide network 
of distributors (sales and 
customer support) 
1) One founder – Douwe Monsma – left CNT in 2008: company experienced serious friction be-
tween the co-founders, was resolved when in Oct. 2008, Monsma accepted a $5.4 mio. buy-out 
offer from Becker financed by a bank loan; Jill Becker further developed the firm – till its end. 
Comparisons between CNT and WITec have to be made for equivalent dynamically 
stable states after the startup thrust phrase. However, immediately after the startup 
development of WITec was perturbed by the Dot-Com Recession. Therefore the  
<2004,2009> period may serve as a guide (Figure I.123, Figure I.156). The actual 
growth factor of Cambridge Nanotech for good fit is 0.51 (Figure I.163) for 
<2005,2008>. The introduction of the Phoenix instrument let a new bracket emerge in 
2009 amd immediately after that two additional new instruments were introduced. 
According to the bracket theory the data of 2010 comprise the occurrence of two new 
brackets. Indeed, the bracket is likely to be associated with launches of two new pro-
ducts which got a lift-off adding to revenues in 2010 (B.2) – despite the Great Reces-
sion. And also 2009 data should be affected by this recession. This situation of 
crowded brackets with negative effects being leveled off is similar to the situation of 
Microsoft depicted in Figure I.144. 
Concerning technology there is plasma and thermal ALD. By mid of 2009 Cambridge 
Nanotech announced the launch of its first line of plasma ALD systems, the Fiji Series, 
but with the ability to conduct thermal ALD as well. According to Jill Becker “the Fiji is 
a breakthrough in ALD system design.” “We built it from the ground up for the specific 
purpose of plasma ALD, but with the ability to conduct thermal ALD as well.” Further-
more, in 2009 Cambridge Nanotech also launched its Tahiti system engineered for 
large-area manufacturing operations ensuring repeatable, exceptionally uniform, 
pinhole-free thin films on substrates. 
Expectations (of the author) that CNT would follow a secure and successful develop-
ment did not materialize due to frictions in the founder team in 2008. By the end of 
2012 its auctioned assets and intellectual property were acquired by Ultratech, Inc. 
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Cambridge Nanotech, Inc.: Founded 2003; 
Expected growth relation after startup thrust (Figure I.123, Figure I.156) beginning 
at 2006; 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); using R(0) = $1.24 mio. at 2005, g = 0.51 
End of 2007: Ray Riiter (20 years experience) hired as a full-time COO; 
net profits of $3.6 mio; $1.8 mio. net income in 2008 [Yang and Kiron 2010] 
Figure I.163: Calculated and observed revenues of US Cambridge Nanotech and 
innovation persistence by launch of of instrument series. 
Currently the broad analytical and life sciences instrumentation market enjoys consid-
erable growth rates. It is reported, for instance, that the life sciences (academia and 
government) segment has a magnitude of $10 billion and annual growth rate of 8 per-
cent, pharmaceutical and biotechnology is $9 billion with 5 percent growth rate, indus-
trial (computers and semiconductors) has $5 billion and 4 percent growth rate and 
chemical & energy exhibits $2 billion and 5 percent growth [Thayer 2011]. 
Another technology startup with a configuration rather close to those discussed is the 
German firm Attocube Systems AG founded in 2001 (B.2). The then founders of the 
RBSU Attocube also had a sale of a university laboratory device to recognize the op-
portunity and after firm’s foundation they grasped fast real customers.  
Though founded during the Dot-Com Recession Attocube already made a profit in its 
first year of existence. It was financed essentially with own resources, used an ena-
bling technology for its offerings to deliver international customers from academia and 
industry and proceeded with innovation persistence. The major differences to the 
above cases are that Attocube got early involvement of an angel investor who occu-
pied a key role in the leadership team. Attocube is a private stock company. 
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Attocube’s technology covers those of CNT (“moving atoms”) and WITec (special 
microscopes). Attocube targets positioning of atoms which requires having them at 
rest with no fluctuations due to thermal energy – close to the absolute zero tempera-
ture 0 deg.K (which is -273.3 deg.C). 
It provides the research market and industry with a reliable, compact, nano-precise 
and micro-precise positioning system that is capable of executing sample movement 
from the sub-nanometer to a centimeter range even in a large variety of extreme envi-
ronments, such as ultra-high vacuum, extremely low temperatures (-273 deg.C) or at 
high magnetic fields. Simultaneously it provides tools to control and observe the 
positioning which are special microscopes allowing to operate under such extreme 
conditions. 
In Figure I.164 the expectation to describe the growth of Attocube analytically by the 
same formula as used for WITec and Cambridge Nanotech with g between 0.35 and 
0.51 is corroborated. Observed data for 2008 are incomplete, but, moreover, ac-
cording to theory Attocube’s dynamically stable state for the period <2003,2007> 
ended in 2008 due to the new front bracket of the “Wittenstein event.” 
 
Attocube Systems AG 
Founded 2001 
Expected growth relation after startup thrust beginning at 2003; 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); 
using R(0) = €0.9 mio. at 2003, g = 0.45; data for 2008 reported in September 2008 
Productivity <2005,2007> almost constant, ca. €214,000 per employee 
Figure I.164: Calculated and observed revenues of German Attocube Systems AG. 
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By September 2008 the German Hidden Champion Wittenstein AG acquired a 74 
percent equity stake in Attocube keeping the two founders as executive managers and 
the angel investor as a member of the Supervisory Board. 
Next we shall consider generating expectations ex comparatione for non-RBSUs, in 
particular, expectations for survival and growth related to experience of the founder(s) 
including expectations of execution. The emphasis will be on serial entrepreneurs and 
those with profound industry experience, relying on technical, commercial and mana-
gerial experience from previous jobs (Figure I.64). 
Based on the fundamentals of US LED (Table I.81; B.2) one can expect the firm to 
successfully catch market share in its field of activity. Particularly strong arguments 
are the founder to be an experienced serial entrepreneur, initial financing being se-
cured, detailed market knowledge and a favorable customer interface and distribution 
system and a focus on a strongly growing segment. Hence, there is little arguments 
why not expect US LED to grow at least with the market. 
Table I.81: Key characteristics of a firm, here US LED Ltd., for generating expecta-
tions of firm growth. 
Firm Type Other NTBF (Table I.2, Figure I.128) 
(founded 2001) 
Legal Firm Form Private (Ltd., LLC); majority ownership/almost full control 
(Table I.74) 
Initial Financing Financed as a spin-off of US Signs 
Research Intensity HVT (high value technology; Table I.1) 
Founder Single entrepreneur (Ron Farmer) 
Motivation/Experience Serial entrepreneur; founded several companies but the 
most noteworthy are US Signs (founded in 1980) and US 
LED, both of which he still owns and participates in. 
Though relatively small with $22 million revenue, US Signs 
focused on neon lighting; ranks in the top 100 of the 
30,000 sign companies in the US 
Leadership//Management As CEO for US LED , Ron Farmer helps manage the 
company and contributes to product development and 
sales 
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Technology and Application 
Focus 
LEDs – light emitting diodes; impact as a generic (and 
emerging) technology for the lighting area; 
US LED focuses primarily on “channel letter lighting” for 
illuminated signs for advertising and creating attention. 
Promoting LED relies on large cost savings as LED uses 
nearly 80 percent less electricity and lasts up to 16 years 
with no maintenance. 
Neon was and is still a strong illumination provider of chan-
nel letter lighting, but LEDs have already overtaken neon 
in 2008 in general-purpose channel letter signs in North 
America 
Market and Opportunity Economic market with strong components of (“green”) 
attitudinal and policy-driven markets (Table I.15). 
In 2011 it was reported that the “high-brightness” LED 
market is forecast to grow to $19 billion in 2014 from last 
year’s $5.3 billion, at an average annual rate of 29 percent. 
The fastest-growing segment is in displays and signs, 
which is predicted to grow 61 percent annually in the five 
years. It will also be the largest sector, accounting for 51 
percent of the market, up from 36 percent this year. 
The general illumination segment is the next fastest-
growing, at 45 percent a year, to $4.2 billion from $645 
million during the period. Automotive applications are also 
projected to grow rapidly during the forecast period. 
LED lighting is one of the last analogue-to-digital transi-
tions in the technical area. When so-called smart grids 
(computerized electricity distribution systems) are com-
mercialized in 5 to 10 years’ time, the energy-saving 
features will be magnified by demand-driven automatic 
dimming capabilities. 
In 2007 the worldwide market for “high-brightness” LEDs 
used in lighting applications reached $337 million, up from 
$205 million in 2006. 
Haitz’s Law: the performance of an LED doubles every two 
years; this may explain the exponential growth of the LED 
lighting industry; 
every decade, the cost per lumen (unit of useful light emit-
ted) falls by a factor of 10, the amount of light generated 
per LED package increases by a factor of 20, for a given 
wavelength (color) of light 
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Table I.81, continued. 
Regulatory Factors for 
Technology 
None 
Attitudinal or Political 
Aspects Affecting Sales 
Positive, energy efficiency (energy saving) aspects 
Initial Customers, 
Real Customers 
After its startup thrust phase US LED as a spin-off could 
rely on customers of US Signs. 
Generally, ca. 10-20 percent of customers are about retro-
fitting neon with equivalent LED products and, thus, US 
LED could take advantage from existing customers of US 
Signs. 
LEDs are deployed in two areas of channel letter lighting; 
the first is new signs where the preferred lighting source is 
LEDs. The second area is replacement for previously 
installed sign projects, where for reasons of cost savings, 
the sign owners have opted to change out the neon with 
an LED system. 
US LED targets the home (US) market. 
Innovation Persistence LED as a platform technology; 
US LED started with lighting for signage, but expanded ap-
plications; it migrated into lighting for convenience store 
refrigeration, for parking lights, under canopy lights, indus-
trial lighting, warehouse lighting, etc.; 
is working on the fluorescent tube lighting replacements for 
office lighting. 
Competitive Advantage US LED does not only provide LED for lighting, it also 
focuses on making it easy to install and easy to work with. 
US LED can rely on the widespread sales and distribution 
organization of US Signs, 
seems to be able to protect competitive advantage 
Special Externalities Ron Farmer: “…in 2009, we actually dropped back for the 
first time since we’ve been in business. We dropped back 
by about nine percent, but our piece count sales actually 
were up 50-percent.” 
According to the market data in Table I.81 one could expect US LED to grow with the 
market and have an average annual growth rate between 30 percent and 60 percent 
after its startup thrust phase, suggesting.to assume g ≈ 0.5 in Equation I.18. 
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Actually it turned out US LED to grow in line with the maximum value estimated for the 
related markets (Figure I.165). It should be noted that according to the bracket theory 
calculated and observed values are restricted to the interval <2004,2008> stopping 
with the Great Recession. The nice fit for 2010 data is accidental; picking up previous 
growth occurs in a new firm’s state! 
 
US LED Ltd.: Founded: 2001 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); using R(0) = $1.30 mio. at 2004, g = 0.65 for <2004,2008> 
Figure I.165: Calculated and observed revenues of US LED. 
US LED can serve as a model for expectable development of US Albeo Technologies 
Inc., founded 2004. Its firm type is “Academic Startup” (Table I.2) and is active in LED. 
The founder and members of the management team have 20+ years industrial experi-
ence, specifically also in the LED area (“veterans approach”). Founder and owner of 
the firm Jeff Bisberg spent more than 25 years developing and marketing innovative 
solid-state technologies (SST), with 20 years focused on light-emitting technologies, 
including developing novel organic LED, miniature LED print-heads, and an award 
winning laser printing system. 
Albeo Technologies Inc. is a pure LED lighting company. It designs, manufactures and 
sells white LED lighting systems (intelligent lighting fixtures) for commercial and in-
dustrial indoor general lighting applications. Its products replace traditional fluorescent 
and high-intensity discharge lighting to decrease energy usage and maintenance. 
Albeo targets the home (US) market. Albeo sells its lights for both new construction 
and retrofit projects, with the latter growing to 85 percent of sales. Albeo has designed 
a flexible system so that it is very easy to customize. Albeo delivers the “exact solu-
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tion” to the clients (“solution provider”). It sees itself as a leader in the white-LED 
general-illumination fixture market.  
Albeo’s products and systems benefit from the “green” momentum as they reduce 
power consumption and maintenance for commercial and industrial facilities, and ex-
hibits simultaneously environmental benefits (reduce carbon dioxide emissions). Its 
primary goal is to enable businesses to lower their total operating costs (total-cost-of 
ownership, TCO). The advantages over traditional lighting technologies, significant ef-
ficiency, lifetime and environmental advantages, mean also providing a short return on 
investment. 
Expectation of Albeo’s growth includes the applicability of Equation I.18, growth 
roughly comparable with that of US LED (g ≈ 0.7) and an observable front bracket due 
to the Great Recession after a dynamically stable state for the <2005,2008> period. 
This can be seen in Figure I.166. The fit for 2010 must be viewed as accidental – not 
in line with theory. 
 
Albeo Technologies Inc.: Founded in 2004 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); using R(0) = $0.23 mio. at 2005, g = 0.96 for <2005,2008> 
Revenue data were obtained from values given for 2007 and 2010 in “The 2011 
Inc. 5000 List of America’s Fastest Growing Companies”; other data were derived 
from various statements of growth rates for the firm in the literature. 
Figure I.166: Calculated and observed revenues of US Albeo Technologies. 
Contrary to the situation of US LED the Great Recession shows up here only as a dip 
of revenue reflecting reduced continuous growth. The much larger absolute growth of 
Albeo Technologies (g = 0.96) is only partially surprising as for Albeo Technologies 
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reference is made to the very early growth state of the firm which will exhibit generally 
much higher growth than later phases (Table I.71). 
Actually, the previous discussions focused on the top 20 percent of NTBFs contribut-
ing most to job creation (Figure I.119) through related growth which makes sense from 
the point of view of economics of the country. We have dealt with “promising firms” or 
“promising NTBFs” (ch. 4.1, 4.3.1), respectively, which show good or high growth and 
the 33 – 46 percent of entrepreneurs who intended their firms to grow (Table I.63). 
There is one fundamental issue of semi-quantitative expectations of growth for techni-
cal startups for the very early phase. Starting on a rather low level of revenues 
(200,000 – 300,000 dollars or euros per year) and catching just one big order valued 
double or triple the previous level of revenue in relation to the current revenue level 
would make any semi-quantitative expectation impossible. Moreover, the observed 
jump – similar to that in Figure I.137 – would mean a front bracket and a new firm 
state with different growth characteristics (Table I.77). 
In line with US LED and Albeo Technologies Inc. privately-held MetroSpec Techno-
logy LLC (incorporated in Minnesota) also from the LED field represents a notable 
case to be discussed in the context of expectations utilizing the bracket model. “The 
2011 Inc. 5000 List of America’s Fastest Growing Companies” puts MetroSpec on 
#439 of the 2011 ranking with a “3-year growth” (2007, 2010 revenues) of 795 
percent. 
If one looks into the TECH{dot}MN company directory one will find [TECH{dot}MN]: 
“MetroSpec Technology manufactures FlexRad LED light sources exclusively for light 
fixture manufacturers for use in architectural lighting, streetlights, and signage. The 
company has grown from a provider of engineering design and short-run production 
services to a high-volume manufacturer of its patent-pending FlexRad LED technolo-
gy.” Three patent applications of MetroSpec from 2008/2009 have been converted to 
granted patents in 2011/2012. 
Originally, MetroSpecc engineered products from concept through to production – 
involving and teaming with its customers at every step of the path to provide speed 
and quality in product development that can go hand in hand. 
From Web-based job announcement (“Diversity Minnesota”) of MetroSpec one learns 
that it “is the manufacturer of the “FlexRad“ brand of high intensity LED light sys-
tems. These systems are used by light fixture manufacturers to convert over their pre-
sent incandescent and fluorescent products into highly reliable and lower operating 
cost products using LEDs.” 
Finally, on MetroSpec’s Web home page one can read that its focus is on high volume 
production of LED light circuits. Utilizing its unique, patented FlexRad LED technology 
and working with “customers daily to fulfill all their specific LED light circuit needs.” 
This allows providing superior LED light circuits and services. MetroSpec has an out-
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standing market position by offering the only high intensity flexible LED light circuit 
which is customizable to any shape and size. It is not the typical low wattage flexible 
circuits which are limited in light output due to poor thermal performance. FlexRad is 
the exact opposite of these solutions; its flexible circuits are customizable to use 1W, 
3W or even higher wattage LEDs. All this means the ability to perfect fit light fixtures. 
Referring to the similarity with US LED as a manufacturer of LEDs and targeting also 
light fixture manufacturers for use in architectural lighting and signage we would ex-
pect for MetroSpec to exhibit growth in revenue in its LED segment in a comparable 
way as US LED (Figure I.165; g = 0.65) for the time period when it operated as a high 
volume LED circuit manufacturer. 
However, considering the transition from an engineering firm to a manufacturer we 
would expect the appearance of a related bracket (Table I.76; “business model 
innovation”) somewhere between 2001 (year of foundation) and 2010 showing up as 
either a jump or a steep increase in revenue extending over ca. two years. 
This indeed is the case (Figure I.167). For Metrospec Technology one can see a jump 
in revenue from 2007 to 2008 which means a transition from the original “engineering 
state” into a new “manufacturer state.” This coincides with the fact that MetroSpec 
reviewed its business plans in 2008 with SBDC consultants, “just as the company was 
migrating from a service engineering/design company to a manufacturing company.” 
[SBDC 2012] 
The growth of the “manufacturer state” for the period <2008,2011> with g = 0.45 is 
distinctly smaller than anticipated (g = 0.65), but can be accepted as a crude estimate 
on the basis of a correctly anticipated structure of the state equation. Based on 
comparisons with US LED and Albeo Technologies (Figure I.165, Figure I.166), 
however, it could not be expected MetroSpec to exhibit no or only a small recession 
dip at 2009. 
The example of Metrospec Technology re-emphasizes the need of differentiating a 
firm’s states for growth periods rather than focusing indiscriminately on “firm growth.” 
Metrospec Technology shares its path of migrating from a service engineering and de-
sign company to a manufacturing company with German PURPLAN GmbH (Box I.21) 
and British Quiet Revolution, Ltd. (Table I.60; B.2) which started as an engineering 
and design studio providing low carbon solutions for the urban environment. 
As a conclusion the bracket model in the context of GST contributes to understanding 
and explanation of technology entrepreneurship. And even its (semi)quantitative use 
concerning expectations provides promising facets though, admittedly, it refers to only 
a relatively small number of case-based examples for corroboration. 
As no surprise the bracket model is plagued by the fundamental issue of soft 
sciences. This is the occurrence of not expected or unexpectable events (“brackets”) 
which impact a firm’s development and the related observable indicator, respectively, 
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significantly in a positive (Figure I.167) or a negative way (Figure I.163). In the last 
case the 2008/2009 bracket (“co-founder issue”) as well as the coincident Great 
Recession do not even show up in the revenue curve. 
As vision, mission, leaders and and culture (ch. 2.1.2.7; Figure I.120) provide the 
framework for attitudes, motivation, behavior and achievement of a new firm employee 
development (Figure I.121), organizational learning, resources and resource develop-
ment, organization (particularly coordination) and systems of activities form the basis 
for sustainable development of the new venture (ch. 5.2). 
MetroSpec Technology LLC: 
Founded in 2001 
In 2008 the company was migrating from a service engineering and design com-
pany to a manufacturing company. 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); using R(0) = $0.16 mio. at 2004, g = 0.23 for <2004,2007> 
R(t+1) = (1 + g)⋅R(t); using R(0) = $1.43 mio. at 2008, g = 0.45 for <2008,2011> 
Revenue data were obtained from values given for 2007 and 2010 in “The 2011 
Inc. 5000 List of America’s Fastest Growing Companies,” 2009 and 2006 data from 
Inc.’s 2010 list; 2006-2011 data were also obtained from PrivCo’s database; 2004 
data are from “Allbusiness” company profiles (no longer available on the Web). 
Figure I.167: Calculated and observed revenues of US MetroSpec Technology. 
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5. PATHS OF TECHNOLOGY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Paths are made by walking. 
Franz Kafka 
Wege entstehen dadurch, dass man sie geht. 
By relying on General Systems Theory (GST) for technology entrepreneurship we are 
ultimately led to the question of the relation of founding and developing a technology 
venture and Systems Design or its partial revival in terms of Systems Thinking. In the 
context of GST the notion “design” is a process, an action, a verb not a noun. It is a 
protocol for solving problems and revealing new opportunities. 
Systems Design can be seen as a methodology of change which proceeds essentially 
from the system outward, understanding the system and its relation to all other sys-
tems larger than it or interfacing with it (ch. 1.2.1). 
In our context of Systems Design [Van Gigch 1974:2] there is currently in the US a 
new wave (and probably hype) with Design Thinking [Dziersk 2008; Wong 2009a, 
2009b] which we shall critically consider for the framework of Systems Design. 
In our context, apart from chance detection or serendipity, we have differentiated re-
cognizing, identifying and discovering opportunities and ideas as different processes 
(ch. 3.2; Figure I.87). 
As cited by Dziersk [2008] Herbert Simon, in the “Sciences of the Artificial” (MIT 
Press, 1969), has defined “design” as the “transformation of existing conditions into 
preferred ones” (p. 55). Design Thinking is, then, always linked to an “improved” 
future. Unlike critical thinking, which is a process of analysis and is associated with the 
“breaking down” of ideas, Design Thinking is a creative process based around the 
“building up” of ideas. Herbert Simon describes Systems Design by a seven steps pro-
cess: Define, Research, Ideate, Prototype, Choose, Implement and Learn. 
Designed systems necessarily always include the goal of the designer as the main 
driving instance. Corresponding artifacts are built as purposeful systems since the 
specification requires the dualism of a priori defining the components and their inter-
actional relationship with the “environment” before the entire system starts to work. 
Systems Design for entrepreneurship focuses on establishing a relation of value 
creation between a new firm and its founders or owners, respectively, and its mar-
ket(s) and customers as part of an all-embedding environment. Design will depend 
largely on constraints. 
For the establishment of the relation there is a corollary: 
Go fast to market to learn about the market and as Kersting [2012] put it, “you 
don’t know the market until the market knows you.” 
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Systems Design is a creative process which for specific situations may be subjected 
to formalization. It means initiate and implement change in or through man-made 
things or entities which includes totally new things or entities. The focus is the problem 
at hand and the manner in which problem-solving options are considered, ideas are 
created and refined and selections are executed (Figure I.80, Figure I.87).  
In our context we shall not consider design generally as a prescribed process. It is not 
consistently a rational process. It may begin with the identification and analysis of a 
problem or need and proceeds through a structured sequence in which information is 
researched and ideas explored and evaluated until the “optimum” or satisficing solu-
tion to the problem or need is devised. 
In the context of social systems and entrepreneurship Systems Design is a future-
oriented, partly disciplined inquiry. People engage in this inquiry in order to design a 
system that realizes their vision of the future, their own expectations, and the expecta-
tions of achieving them. 
The future environment of the system has to be forecasted! If the design of the system 
has been set and is established, “systems improvement “refers to the process of en-
suring that a system, or systems, perform according to expectations (ch. 1.2.1, ch. 
3.2.1). Systems Design firms stand apart in their intention and willingness to cross the 
chasm to engage in and execute continuously re-designing their business. They do so 
with an eye to creating advances in both innovation and efficiency. 
The result of Systems Design has to pass the test of personal commitment – it 
requires conviction. 
One question to be dealt with is how Systems Design and Systems Thinking affect 
foundation of new technology-based firms and interconnection of today’s decisions 
and actions with past and future contextual factors. For the reasoning process under-
lying design one should be aware of whether following a line of “reasons why” versus 
“reasons for thinking that” (Figure I.2). 
Systems Thinking will include past and future and that determines behavior in the 
present. 
Past Present (“Today”) Future 
Analytic (Explain) Context Synthetic (Build)) 
Experiences, 
Perception 
Imagination, 
Perceptiveness 
Observations, Patterns  Opportunities, Possibilities 
Extrapolations, Strategy Trends, Stories 
Achievements, Certainty 
 
 
Expectations, Uncertainty 
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Systems Design questions assumptions on which old forms have been built or com-
mon or “standardized” recommendations on which new forms (“startups) have to be 
built. Correspondingly, the role of a system’s leader is to influence trends rather than 
satisfying trends [Van Gigch 1974:9]. Intuition-oriented firms wax and wane with indi-
vidual leaders. 
In essence, Systems Design for value creation in terms of innovation or entrepreneur-
ship requires bringing together two prevailing points of view on business today, ana-
lytically structured processes and intuitive originality. 
Using GST means that instead of relying exclusively on analysis and deduction deeply 
ingrained into Western thinking we proceed also with synthesizing and being inductive 
(ch. APPROACH). Design Thinking means intuitive thinking – the art of subjectively 
knowing without reasoning and “strategy logics” (ch. 1.2.2, 2.1.2; Table I.33) being 
subjective logics. It relates to perceptiveness, a feeling of understanding. 
According to mainstream approaches business organizations are dominated by ana-
lytical thinking. Strategy is based on rigorous, quantitative analysis. In this model ana-
lytical thinking harnesses the familiar Western forms of logic, deductive reasoning, to 
declare truths, facts and certainties about the (business) world. This model means 
mastery through formalized, continuously repeatable analytical processes. Judgment, 
bias and variation are the enemies. However, by sticking closely to the tried and true, 
organizations dominated by analytical thinking enjoy one very important advantage: 
they can build size and scale. 
To summarize, neither rational reasoning nor intuition alone is enough. Using Systems 
Design and Design Thinking for entrepreneurship do not try to reconcile the two 
modes throughout the foundation of a new technology venture and its first dozen 
years of development. Both approaches will have different levels of significance for 
the various stages of firm development putting more emphasis on “designed” pre-
start, foundation and early growth phases as illustrated in Figure I.1, but addressing 
particular sub-processes like financing in a rational and analytical manner. 
As has been discussed (ch. 2.1.2.3) prevalence of one over the other mode of thought 
may be related to culture conditioned by higher education, in particular, for technology 
entrepreneurship by scientists versus engineers (Figure I.62) or scientists versus 
people for economics or business administration. 
Engineers and application-oriented natural scientists tend to prefer rational, analytical 
thinking; they are “doers” (exception: software developers). They are used to plan, im-
plement and execute “experiments” (or preparations) and measure outcomes. They 
are used to look for “recipes” and instructions and examples of how to do the experi-
mental setups and what may go wrong. Hence, they appreciate “recipes” for founding 
and running a firm. And, therefore, writing a business plan matches often their educa-
tion and culture. 
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The systems view provides some connections with “contingency theory” 124 which is a 
class of behavioral theory that claims that there is no best way to organize a corpora-
tion, to lead a company or to make decisions. Instead, the optimal course of action is 
contingent (dependent) upon the internal and external situation. 
Key aspects close to GST are: 
 Organizations are open systems that need careful management to satisfy and 
balance internal needs and to adapt to environmental circumstances. The 
design of an organization and its subsystems must “fit” with the environment. 
 There is no one best way of organizing. The appropriate form depends on the 
kind of task or environment one is dealing with. An organizational/leadership 
style that is effective in some situations may not be successful in others. 
 Different types or species of organizations are needed in different types of 
environments 
In other words: The optimal organization/leadership style is contingent upon various 
internal and external constraints. And the needs of an organization are better satisfied 
when it is properly designed. 
5.1 Firm’s Foundation as Systems Design 
Today perceptiveness is more important than analysis 
Peter Drucker [Business Week 2005] 
 
Who misses the first buttonhole  
will not manage buttoning up. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
Wer das erste Knopfloch verfehlt, 
kommt mit dem Zuknöpfen nicht zurande. 
For technology entrepreneurship we have seen that for a significant amount of NTBF 
foundations started with customers and knowing or, at least, having a good estimate 
about the market(s) they may address. This means, the path to growth and success 
can rely to a large extent on planning (and having or writing business plans). 
Apart from planned (goal-driven) approaches there are also goal seeking approaches 
based on a “seed of ideas,” testing hypotheses and creating an options set of opportu-
nities from open-ended business ideas, and also paths following opportunistic adapta-
bility (ch. 1.2.1, 2.1.2.4). 
Finally, we encountered situations where entrepreneurs created opportunities by cre-
ating new markets or even industries, in particular, in a “technology push” manner. 
This last aspect covers disruptive and sometimes discontinuous innovation and ulti-
mately also intrapreneurship in existing large firms. All these situations can be as-
sumed to take advantage from Systems Design and Design Thinking. 
Opportunistic adaptability refers to a style of reasoning and behavior. It means to 
“adapt to unexpected circumstances in an opportunistic” fashion.” It relates also to the 
fact that many ventures do not find success in their initial business idea. And, for 
instance, both the US firms YouTube and Yelp, Inc. learned a valuable lesson from 
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PayPal: The first idea is not always the best. YouTube started as a video dating play. 
After an aborted start as an email recommendation service Yelp, Inc. is a company 
that operates yelp.com, a social networking user review and local search Web site 
(A.1.7). 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs with limited funds cannot afford to spend much time and 
efforts to prior research and planning. Sketchy planning and high uncertainty requires 
adapting to the many unanticipated problems and opportunities. They “cannot afford 
to sacrifice short-term cash for long-term profits” [Bhidé 2000:18] – and follow op-
portunistic adaptability. 
Moreover, there is no point in engaging in elaborate strategic planning which is based 
solely on what the entrepreneur would wish to happen in a more or less ideal setting. 
It is necessary to adapt aspirations to what is achievable in terms of access to re-
sources and to build in a capacity for opportunistic adaptability as external circum-
stances change. And “achievable” means the goals and preferences of the entre-
preneur for financial (ch. Box I.20) and other resources are distinct variables before 
implementing and testing a strategy. 
Preference for financial sources by entrepreneurs has been treated by the “Pecking 
Order Theory” (ch. 4.2.2). Preferences of an entrepreneur (Box I.20), for instance, 
rejecting venture capital, is part of the entrepreneur’s disposition and thus part of the 
decision environment (Figure I.111). 
Examples of the opportunistic adaptability are also observed for animals. There are 
birds which are always looking for new sources of food. They observe other birds 
eating and try it for themselves. The coyote’s opportunistic adaptability emerges if one 
examines the coyote’s feeding habits. Coyotes in the US, or foxes in Europe which 
are settling in large cities, will eat almost anything they can chew – demonstrating the 
enormous flexibility and opportunistic adaptability of biological systems. 
For entrepreneurship and innovation aspects of Systems Design (ch. 1.2.1) for open 
(human-activity) systems key concepts or drivers, respectively, were distributed 
across the previous text in various contexts. These and some further concepts for 
firm’s foundation shall be summarized and specified. 
The System 
The issue of systems and, hence, entrepreneurship, will be in how far to “compose” or 
“organize” the “entrepreneur system” into larger systems (Figure I.13, Figure I.16). 
For composing a firm as a system one needs (ch. 1.2.1) 
to recognize or identify, respectively, “what is connected with what,” “with 
what intensity/strength,” and “what follows after what (“order,” “function”)?” 
The system’s (new firm’s) environment fundamentally also includes the position of a 
new firm in a value system (Figure I.7), if it already exists. 
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For Systems Design the The Environment-Modification Principle of General Systems 
Theory states (ch. 1.2.1 – for instance, for technology push approaches): To survive, 
systems have to choose between two main strategies. One is to adapt to the environ-
ment, the other is to change it. And dealing with the future is in line with the old saying 
of Samuel Johnson (1709-1784), Peter Drucker (1909-2005) and Dennis Gabor 
(1900-1979) (the mottos of ch. 1.2). 
Transferring these chapter mottos into a Systems Design paradigm for entrepreneur-
ship and managing research and innovation they should read: 
 Assess the businesses and current competencies; 
 Find out how business and technology has changed recently and find the key 
factors for these changes; 
 Get a sense and good feeling how things could change in the future; 
 Develop a system that meets current needs and opportunities, identifies and 
responds to threats and positions the company for the future and supports 
future decision-making. 
For composing systems and their stability note The Variety-Adaptability Principle (ch. 
1.2.1): Systemic variety enhances stability by increasing adaptability. Variability refers 
also to paths to goal achievement for NTBFs and opportunistic adaptability versus 
goal persistence (Figure I.122). 
In technology-based businesses dealing with the future means an emphasis on tech-
nology and commercial intelligence, which is “foreknowledge.” A detailed overview on 
“intelligence” and intelligence systems is given by Runge [2006:520-531; 978-835; 
934-970]. The systems approach is invariably bound to the foreknowledge part of 
intelligence (ch. 1.2.3; Box I.17), which has to position “technology forecasting,” fore-
sight, prognosis, technology trends, scenarios (Box I.19) etc. into appropriate con-
texts. 
Accordingly, what distinguishes leaders from followers and laggards is the ability to 
have a unique imagination of what could be. Leadership is not to benchmark the 
competition and imitate its methods and offerings, but to develop an independent point 
of view about tomorrow’s opportunities and devise a strategic architecture with which 
to implement and exploit them. 
In our world with an always increasing complexity and pace of change imagi-
nation and perceptiveness – a feeling of understanding and the “known 
unknowns” – become key for Systems Design. 
Technology entrepreneurship occurs often in cross-industries environments with peo-
ple from various scientific or engineering disciplines. In this book, in particular, the role 
of chemistry and material science and the chemical industry for co-evolutions with 
other industries were emphasized. 
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Systems Design suggests to put teams in situations where they are forced to synthe-
size meaningful opportunities out of incomplete and highly subjective information 
about the world (environment) and the future needs of end-users. Multi-disciplinary 
teams or persons interwoven in a multi-disciplinary environment are particularly appro-
priate to reveal opportunities across technologies or industries. Of special importance 
are boundary spanners, also called gatekeepers (ch. 1.2.3; Figure I.20). 
The means, for firm founders having or hiring so-called T-shaped individuals may pay 
off. These tend to be professional in one area, but are skilled in many other areas. 
They are highly intuitive. The advantages of “diverse experiences” for problem-solving 
(ch. 3.2, Figure I.86) result from “mental restructurings,” as the problem is only solved 
after someone asks a completely new kind of question. 
According to GST decision-making (ch. 4.2.2) will occur in a decision environment 
(Figure I.111). 
Business Ideas 
As characterized previously (ch. 3.1) for entrepreneurship a “business idea” is action-
able and associated with the following processual features 
 A business idea acts as the basis for detailed considerations and targeted 
inquiries concerning a related commercial opportunity and a decision of firm’s 
foundation and is associated with expectation. 
 A business idea is associated with implementation – execution. For a startup 
the assessment of the significance or value of the idea is coupled to execution 
– with a disproportionate ratio which puts high weight on execution. 
 Execution for the realm of technology entrepreneurship is coupled with 1) as-
sociated contextual insight in and options for applications in “real life” and 2) 
characteristics of the commercial opportunity. 
Implementation and execution of a business idea means testing a hypothesis. It is in 
the same category as “strategy” as viewed generically in this book (ch. 1.2.1) and also 
the business model as a hypothesis to be tested (ch. 1.1.1.1). The “thrust approach” 
of exploratory research and technology explorations in the laboratory of large firms 
[Runge 2006:608, 726-727] are also testing hypotheses (thrust: research directions 
essentially given, more specifications needed). 
Firms’ foundation processes of technology ventures were specifically outlined for 
“bootstrapping startups” (ch. 4.3.3.1). Though accounting for only a small proportion of 
NTBFs (around 5 percent) VC-based NTBFs are at the center of MBA-style ap-
proaches in standard (text)books of technology entrepreneurship. Foundation pro-
cesses and early phases of VC-based NTBFs can be seen as intermediate between 
bootstrapping and innovation and intrapreneurship in large firms (ch. 4.3.5, Figure 
I.134). 
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As described by Dorf and Byers [2007] foundation of  a VC-based NTBF focuses on a 
business plan, its financial plan emphasizing financing by venture capitalists and the 
firm’s IPO [Dorf and Byers 2007:379-399, 414-419, 428-436]. After “presenting the 
plan and negotiating the deal” details of executing the business plan are given [Dorf 
and Byers 2007:456-465]. 
If strictly applicable, firm’s foundation and the early phase of a new firm based on prin-
ciples of Systems Design can be boiled down to a six steps process (modifying the 
suggestion of Herbert Simon and Dziersk [2008]): Define the Problem; Create and 
Consider an Options Set, Refine and Test Selected Directions; Choose, Implement 
and Execute; Learn. And firm’s foundation will have to ask: What are the critical 
success factors (CSFs) for a related “problem-solving project”? 
Define the Problem 
In our context an idea can be an expression of a hypothesis for solving a problem 
(Figure I.80, Figure I.87) and a problem is associated with an explicit or implicit need. 
Problems can be framed by questions, such as 
 Whose problems shall be solved? 
 Are there generics in the problem to be solved? 
 Is the offering a complete solution for the customer or only part of the solu-
tion? 
 What is the level of urgency to solve the problem? 
 Can the addressees, the customers, state the problem explicitly without bias 
(specifications, latent needs)? 
Talking to your end-users will bring fruitful ideas for later design as a response to a 
problem. Observation can discern what people really do as opposed to what you are 
told that they do. Getting into the field and involving oneself in the process and offer-
ing is fundamental. Cross-functional insight into each problem by varied perspectives 
as well as constant and relentless questioning – target the right problem to solve, and 
then to frame the problem – is a way that invites creative solutions. 
Asking the right questions is fundamental to understand and solve a problem. Pro-
blem-solving by reference to existing information and knowledge has to 
 review the history of the issue; revealing or remembering any existing ob-
stacles and 
 collecting examples of attempts to solve the same issue (Figure I.80). 
Related issues of information overload for problem-solving and asking the right ques-
tions are described by Runge [2006:520]. 
Accessing information and the number of information resources has increased dra-
matically, and the information changes more rapidly than our ability to acquire or 
master it. And accordingly it is said that “The educated person used to be the one who 
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could find information. Now, with a flood of data available, the educated mind is not 
the one that can master the facts, but the one able to ask the ‘winnowing question’.” 
(Emphasis added).  
Concerning the efforts that have to be put into searching for the right questions one 
can refer to Einstein: “Einstein once remarked that if he were to be killed and had only 
one hour to figure out how to save his life, he would devote the first 55 minutes of that 
hour to searching for the right question. Once he had that question … finding the an-
swer would take only five minutes.” 
Problem solving and generating related (business) ideas is also seen as an issue of 
creativity (Table I.9;  ch. 2.1.2.2) which can be related essentially to recognize and 
interrelate that which is not obvious – whether it is chunks of data and information, 
patterns of entities, similarities, associations, metaphors etc., such as mavericity (ch. 
2.1.2.2). 
Cognition will be used to deal with revealing solutions of problems and opportunities 
as will rational processes. We tend to order our experience and perception in a man-
ner that is regular, orderly, symmetric and simple within borders. Boundaries differenti-
ate essentially thinking and perception in Western from Eastern cultures. 
Concerning Western reductionism as a basis for recognition and reasoning Aristotle 
wrote about Pythagoreans that for them emptiness serves to divide things and define 
their boundaries. Crossing the borders of a (real or conceptual) system for problem-
solving represents a fundamental barrier for cognition. 
The nine dot puzzle of Figure I.81 introduced as stepping out of perceived boundaries 
of a system defined by the nine dots can be more generally interpreted comparing 
Western and Eastern thinking concerning emptiness (or “void”) serving to divide enti-
ties and define their boundaries. 
Referring to Innocentive (ch. 3.2; Figure I.86) and the posted problems people created 
a solution for it was found that often “problem solvers” were most effective at the mar-
gins of their own fields of expertise (“outsider thinking”), not inside their field of exper-
tise and thus avoiding to run into the same stumbling blocks that held back their more 
expert peers by their “cognitive frameworks” (ch. 3.2). Furthermore, there is a trap of 
solving a problem the same way every time. Especially when successful results are 
produced and time is short. 
Many times we are not aware of the filters we may be burdened with when we create 
answers to problems. In this stage opportunities may appear. The trick is to recognize 
them as opportunities. Multiple perspectives (“diverse experiences”) and teamwork 
are crucial to overcome the barriers. 
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Create and Consider an Options Set 
When we have needs to satisfy or a problem to solve decision-making is required (ch. 
4.2.2). Systems or Design Thinking requires that no matter how obvious the solution 
may seem, many solutions be created for consideration. Generate as many ideas as 
possible to serve identified needs. Ideation may be used to create an options set for 
problem-solving or opportunities (Figure I.80; Box I.13) as well as researching (“explo-
ration”) in the laboratory or experimenting in a workshop. A model for the search 
process by which the mind generates alternatives is given in Figure I.113. 
Seeking opportunities for Systems Design may rely on “technology intelligence” and 
“commercial intelligence” to generate a “choice set” of alternative market opportuni-
ties, an “opportunity landscape.” Assessing the choice set to reveal the most pro-
mising ones may induce consideration of opportunity cost (ch. 1.2.5.2). 
For the “choice set” 
 Reserve judgment (ch. 4.2.2; Box I.17) and maintain neutrality. 
 Seek feedback from a diverse group of people; include your end-users (cus-
tomers). 
Refine and Test Selected Directions 
A handful of promising results need to be embraced and nurtured for hatching pro-
tected from the idea-killers (Table I.46) of previous experience and cognitive frame-
works. On the other hand, decision-making is often constrained because the time and 
effort to gain information or identify alternatives are limited. The time constraint simply 
means that a decision must be made by a certain time (“urgency of decision”) utilizing 
accessible resources (ch. 4.2.2). 
Design Thinking requires allowing the potential of business ideas to be realized by 
creating an environment conducive to growth and experimentation, and the making of 
mistakes in order to achieve out of the ordinary results. This means not only refining 
and expanding ideas but also combining promising ideas. 
In terms of Systems Thinking evaluation of outcomes means: 
 The envisioned outcomes of a decision are evaluated for fit with the objec-
tives, but also more possible positive and negative consequences (Figure 
I.111). 
 The decisive actions are taken, and additional actions may be taken to pre-
vent any adverse consequences from becoming problems and starting both 
problem analysis and decision-making all over again. 
“Prototypes of solutions” representing hypotheses shall be tested to find the “best” 
path to problem-solving – similar to the “thrust” approach to exploratory research (ch. 
2.2). 
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Test hypotheses! – “If they are confirmed, you have learned something; if they 
have failed, you also have learned something.” [Kersting 2012] 
The importance of testing ideas on customers using rough-and-ready prototypes has 
been emphasized also based on the following argument: Customers “will be more 
willing to give honest opinions on something that is clearly an early-stage mock-up 
than on something that looks like the finished product.” [The Economist 2011] 
Furthermore, R. Hoffman, the co-founder of LinkedIn (B.2), pointed out that entrepre-
neurs should take “intelligent risks” comprising how he or she sees something others 
do not and emphasized the importance of holding and testing contrarian views. 
Choose, Implement and Execute 
After enough paths have been traveled to expect success (Figure I.122) it is the time 
to decide which one to follow, implement the design and finally commit resources to 
achieve the early objectives. The by-product of the process is often other unique ideas 
and strategies that are tangential to the initial objective. Key activities have to be 
balanced for a fledgling NTBF (Figure I.131). 
 Plan processes, tasks and roles; make task descriptions;  determine neces-
sary resources (cf. overt strategy logics, Table I.33) 
 Assign tasks/roles. 
Feasibility and workability of designs is an important distinguishing feature of a busi-
ness design. Designers repeatedly ask, “Does it work?” and “Does it work better than 
what we have now?” According to Figure I.87 feasibility interconnects the revealed 
opportunity options set and opportunity evaluation and the related offering option(s). 
Feasibility does not only refer to have or to access, respectively, resources, but should 
also include first contacts with (potential) customers testing the offering(s) as outlined 
for creating and considering the options set. 
Feasibility relates the designed firm to the addressees of its offerings for problem-
solving. Operational feasibility is a measure, an expectation, of how well a proposed 
system solves the problems, and takes advantage of the opportunities identified dur-
ing scope definition and how it satisfies the requirements identified in the requirements 
analysis phase of system development. 122 
As a final assessment let outsiders know why this will work and be able to 
support what you believe in! 
“Implementation is the utilization or adoption of change,” the actions of accomplishing 
some goal or executing some order where “utilizing” will refer to  find a practical or ef-
fective use for something, especially to find a profitable or practical use for (ch. 1.2.1).  
The success of implementation have been found to depend on the extent to which 
goals are “operational,” that is (cf. Figure I.10), when a means of testing actions is per-
ceived to relate a particular goal or criterion with possible courses of action. For imple-
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mentation of change to occur it has to be timely (“Window of Opportunity”; Figure I.4, 
Figure I.92). Execution comprises 
 Determine if the solution of the problem met its goals.  
 Gather feedback from the customers.  
 Discuss what could be improved. 
 Measure goal achievement by collecting relevant data. (Kersting [2012]: 
“Know your numbers”; ch. 4.3.3.1). 
Failures and Learning  
As we have seen (false starts of 3M or NanoScape AG; ch. 4.3.2) failure to meet initial 
goals is a poor indicator of success to come. “Success and failure are not polar oppo-
sites: you often need to endure the second to enjoy the first. Failure can indeed be a 
better teacher than success. It can also be a sign of creativity.” “One must do is distin-
guish between productive and unproductive failures.” [The Economist 2011] 
On the other hand, poor preparation of firm’s foundation (including poor design, imple-
mentation and execution) leading to the startup’s disaster is definitely an unproductive 
failure if insights of the founder(s) were lacking that it would be better not to start, that 
their proper self-assessment would reveal that they do not have what is needed to get 
the job done or that founders are not in the position to convert their business idea into 
a functional company design. 
Additionally, a further challenge is notable, getting a good handle on the competitive 
environment that the business will face. Many startups make the major mistake of dis-
missing the competition. 
When to stop or terminate a venture may also be important as knowing when to start. 
The particular aspect of sunk cost 123 may enter decision-making. Sunk cost is cost 
that has already been incurred and thus cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are inde-
pendent of any event that may occur in the future and cannot be affected by any 
present or future decision. Sunk costs greatly affect actors’ decisions, because many 
humans are loss-averse and thus normally act irrationally when making economic 
decisions. 
When making business or investment decisions, organizations typically look at the fu-
ture costs that they may incur, by following a certain strategy (logics) and plan. For in-
stance, investment in a plant for manufacturing a particular material by a process 
which is entirely dependent on just one particular intermediate (irreversibly committing 
resources) may become sunk cost if, for instance, a legal regulation prohibits the use 
of that intermediate. It represents a total loss of the original expenditure. Similarly 
sunk cost may emerge if a firm exits a particular business (ch. 1.2.5.3). 
Generally a more tolerant attitude to failure can help entrepreneurs and companies to 
avoid destruction. Here national cultural difference are important (ch. 2.1.2.3). Among 
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the countries by many metrics the US actually has a bad education system. Why is it 
that the US has a superb entrepreneurship and innovation track record? 
It is because, the author believes, culturally: The US has a lot of people who have no 
fear of failure and failure is not “punished” by society. The advantage of the US culture 
is that people will rebound from failure. And as from a nation’s or a firm’s point of view 
entrepreneurship and innovation is a numbers game (ch. 4.1, last paragraph) this 
bodes well for the US with overall very many firms’ foundations (and very many fail-
ures). 
Concerning failure there is the old saying “Fail early, fail often” [Kersting 2012], but 
there is no point in failing fast if you fail to learn from your mistakes [The Economist 
2011] – “fail early, fail often – and learn.” “Failing fast” is also a principle of innovation 
projects of large firms – to minimize innovation cost [Runge 2006:787]. 
Though “failure is the opportunity to begin again, more intelligently” (Henry 
Ford) it is better to do it right from the start of the firm (ch. 4.3.2). 
Learning: occurs on the individual or the group level (ch. 1.2.1; Table I.7). In the con-
text of Systems Design organizational learning, which is a systems characteristic, 
must be emphasized. Conditions under which organizational learning occurs, its five 
disciplines and learning for the future, are relevant (ch. 1.2.3). As a venture evolves 
the entrepreneurs will transform resources, largely through organizational learning, 
into valuable and ideally unique organizational resources. 
Learning business activities and processes during firm evolvement occurs on the 
individual and the organizational level. For instance, J. Koenen, a co-founder of Ger-
man WITec GmbH (Table I.41) learned management and administration on the job 
and on demand (ch. 2.1.2.4) and N. Fertig and the team of Nanion Technologies 
GmbH learned professional project management for developing a new very complex 
product for growth after having launched already successfully products. 
Hence, one can differentiate resources and skills which are related to learning. An en-
trepreneur who wants to be successful must learn to develop his or her skill set. Once 
learned, the skill set is something the entrepreneur can use routinely. 
5.2 The Startups’ Evolvements for Growth 
The next question concerning the role of Systems Design after firm’s foundation con-
cerns to look into the process of firm’s growth in more detail (Figure I.130). 
So far some systemic processes associated with foundation and growth (or decline) 
were described. These include, for instance, the phased formation of the founder team 
by self-reinforcement (Figure I.68, Figure I.70) or decline and “death” of startups by 
reinforcing sub-processes leading to a non-viable financial state (Figure I.114) or 
setting up corporate culture by the founder or founder team, respectively, by the 
founder’s leadership by self-replication and leading by example (Figure I.120). The 
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leadership team and corporate culture represent two important resources for a firm’s 
development. 
For explaining or understanding, respectively, evolvement for growth of a micro NTBF 
(1-9 employees) to a small (10-49 employees) and then to a mid-sized company (50-
249 employees; Table I.4) one can assume that the starting resource endowments are 
qualitatively not so different for “similar” ventures, but the resource development path-
way (Figure I.130, Figure I.131) will be affected to a considerable extent by systemic 
principles embedded in the concept of the “initial configuration” of the NTBF (ch. 4.3.2; 
ch. 4.3.3). The initial configuration provides a way to differentiate evolvement in terms 
of relevant variables and parameters. 
In the framework of the bracket model (ch. 4.3.5) venture development is described as 
a sequence of a firm’s dynamically stable states, interrupted by transition states in-
duced by internal or external events (Table I.76), such as setbacks, challenges or par-
ticular management tasks, which may lead to new growth states. The bracket model 
implicitly emphasizes adaptability of an NTBF/SME and related responsiveness to any 
effect that influences its competitive position as an important systemic resource. 
Resources (and input) are fundamental for the conversion processes (“throughput”) of 
the firm by which elements in the system change state (“systems dynamics”, Figure 
I.5). This brings in the resource-based view (RBV) of venture growth (ch. 4.3.3) for the 
early stage of startups. 
The essence of the resource-based perspective is a knowledge-based view 
and in the context of GST this will include foreknowledge which overall means 
intelligence perspectives (ch. 1.2.3) which are important for adaptability. 
While it is important to know the industry sector of a business to assess which type of 
market (Table I.15) and growth factors come into play even within sectors there will be 
differences in the type (Table I.12) and stage of technology and processes used. For 
instance, in biotechnology and the related biofuels sector (A.1.1), at the greatest level 
of industry and market sector detail, there remains a great deal of heterogeneity.  
The timing for entrepreneurs to enter a particular life-cycle stage of the industry (ch. 
1.2.4; Figure I.32) has revealed the significance of the markets’ birth and emergence 
phases for SAP (Figure I.143), Microsoft (Figure I.144), Cisco (Figure I.145) and 
Google (Figure I.159). 
The entrepreneur is the primary resource, and his or her expectations about the future 
of the venture are central to its strategic direction. Each entrepreneur begins with a 
personal resource endowment at the start of the resource building process. The first 
resources (for instance, education, experience, credibility and reputation, network con-
tacts, knowledge of the industry etc.) exist in the entrepreneur rather than the new 
venture. 
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According to Bhidé [2000:47] the founders’ capacity to differentiate their offerings 
through their personal efforts seem to be an important reason for profitability (cf. 
CEOs’ knowledge of customers with Hidden Champions; ch. 4.1.1). The entrepreneur, 
rather than a product or technology, represents the source of the startup’s profits – 
and the firm’s productivity and performance (ch. 4.3.3). 
However, there are a number of technology startups, RBSUs, whose foundation is in-
duced because the to-be founders can start already with a product and customers (to 
name some: ChemCon GmbH, WITec GmbH, Nanion Technologies GmbH, Cam-
bridge Nanotech, Inc., all in B.2; IoLiTec GmbH (A.1.5) and PURPLAN GmbH – Box 
I.21). 
Founding a firm means a decision which is often made after consulting with other peo-
ple and taking also advice from others into account. In particular, firm’s foundation of 
new technology ventures is often associated with the establishment of an Advisory 
Board. The Advisory Board does not only provide advice and consulting to the leader-
ship team of the new firm, but, depending on “names,” may add reputation and credi-
bility for the leadership team which may affect funding and hiring talented people. 
The Advisory Board or other stakeholders of the new firm and their advices are part of 
the decision-environment of the firms’ founders and in this way represent also a sys-
temic aspect (Figure I.111; ch. 1.2.6.2, ch. 2.1.2.4). 
Many technology entrepreneurs begin with a rather complex and often instrumental 
human and social capital that they have developed in another professional enterprise 
or work setting. They achieved industrial experience or management experience in 
large firms or gained experience of funding by public sources in public research 
institutions or acted as a serial entrepreneur (Figure I.64). They leverage these 
resources to acquire financial and physical resources, and to hire and develop 
qualified individual personnel. 
Notably, serial entrepreneurs use often a totally different resource base when they 
start another firm (for instance, Klaas Kersing with Gameforge – B.2; Lars Hinrichs 
with Xing – B.2; Reid Hoffman with LinkedIn (B.2)) and can additionally utilize ex-
tended networked resources (cf. the PayPal Mafia – A.1.7). 
Ventures that are unable to transition from reliance on the individual re-
sources of the founder(s) and extend those to organizational resources will be 
constrained in growth. To make the transition happen a strategic resource de-
velopment plan may involve creating systems and routines, defining policies 
by which people work, and creating incentive systems for employees [Brush 
et al. 2001]. 
The process of building an initial resource base from scratch and transforming it for 
growth is a complex task – and even more for technology entrepreneurship. And its 
description is too – due to the broad variety of existing resources and usable re-
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sources by the startups – depending on their proper classification according to many 
dimensions (Table I.74, Figure I.128) and the potential to combine these dimensions 
in a meaningful way. 
There are fundamental types of technology startups referring to taxonomies of finan-
cial structures of technical startups’ initial architectures in terms of ownership and con-
trol by founders versus VC-based firms (Table I.74), RBSUs and Other (academic) 
NTBFs with/without large-scale production, the industry the startup is operating in 
(Figure I.128), networking (Figure I.51, Figure I.127), and organic versus non-organic 
growth (Figure I.127). 
Describing entrepreneurial efforts striving for growth as a teleological relation (“startup 
→ mid-sized firm”; Figure I.78) allows to describe and discuss a development path 
from a given NTBF configuration to a configuration of successful mid-sized firms, such 
as Hidden Champions (ch. 4.1.1) or by mapping an NTBF’s growth of a given con-
figuration to a known, successful NTBF with a compatible configuration and its growth 
path in terms of the ex comparatione approach (ch. 4.3.6; Table I.80, Figure I.164). 
A more prescriptive approach would look for an NTBF to fit or implementing CSFs of 
mid-sized firms (ch. 4.3.6; Table I.78). This would be a quasi top down approach for a 
startup to SME path by a perspective from the end result. 
Such an approach is oriented toward growth factors which may be interdependent as 
is done by Bordt et al. [2004] who looked into characteristics of technology ventures, 
mainly from biotechnology as well as electronics, information and communication, that 
grow from small to medium size. Growth factors may correspond to resources, such 
as IPR, but also processes, such as R&D and combined “innovation and investment 
persistence” and managing finances. 
RBV sees companies as different collections of tangible and intangible assets and ca-
pabilities, which determine how effectively and how efficiently a company performs its 
functional activities. To apply RBV it is essential to identify the firm’s potential “key” re-
sources. However, the processes of combining, organizing and leveraging resources 
let “new systemic resources” emerge. 
According to GST resources are dependent on interactions and combinations 
with other resources and therefore no single resource or a set of individual 
resources can become the most important one for a firm’s performance (ch. 
4.3.3). 
Moreover, systemic effects in small or large firms do not only emphasize interactions 
of resources, but also feedback and reinforcement mechanisms, largely out of the 
control of leaders/managers, which will affect the firms’ development/growth (ch. 
4.3.3).  
For NTBFs one typically encounters multi-dimensionality of resources. Concerning 
systemic effects this can be lucidly seen, for instance, considering the roles of angel 
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investors or corporate venturing companies (CVC) which can be treated primarily as 
financial resources. However, angel investors may act additionally as a member of the 
leadership team or an adviser of founders for various aspects of the business. In 
these role angels may act reflexivety affecting the financial situation of the firm, adding 
not only money to the company, but increasing the monetary return (“smart money”) of 
the firm (ch. 1.2.7.2) and of themselves. 
Corporate venturing (ch. 1.2.7.2) may result in leveraged startup resources in the 
sense of a “networked economy” (Figure I.125) inducing a three-way interaction be-
tween the NTBF, the investing large firm which is supporting financially or coopera-
tively and public research institutes (Figure I.51). With regard to financial resources 
the large firm may not only provide a particular investment sum, but additionally in-
crease the NTBF’s credibility and become a lead investor inducing more investments. 
Furthermore, the NTBF may have access to other, non-monetary resources of the 
large firm, such as access to analytical or information services and advice, thus saving 
expenses compared with getting these otherwise. And, finally, there are often estab-
lished joint research or development alliances (JRAs, JDAs), production alliances or 
contract production, sales and marketing agreements or the large firm acts as a cus-
tomer for the NTBF. 
Qualitatively, NTBF growth depends on financial resources (Table I.30). In the context 
of organic growth generating profit and cash may initiate a self-reinforcing cycle of in-
novation and investment (innovation and investment persistence; Figure I.127). 
According to RBV entrepreneurs in emerging organizations must first assemble and 
acquire or access resources to meet a perceived opportunity, then combine them to 
build a resource platform that will yield distinctive capabilities before they are allocated 
to fit an offering and market strategy. But this does not cover the non-negligible set of 
NTBFs whose foundation is initiated by customers as described above providing cash 
to the to-be entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, RBV suggests that, related to NTBF growth, building an initial resource 
base in a new venture and then further develop the resource base may not only lead 
to growth but also achieve sustainable competitive advantage – a quasi bottom up 
view concerning the path “from startup to SME.” 
Strategies for attaining competitive advantages emphasize developing and configuring 
existing resource strengths into a valuable and unique resource base. Such a process 
requires for technology-based startups three fundamental differentiations: 
 Tangible and intangible resources (Table I.8) and 
 Internal and external resources in the sense of a “networked economy” 
(Figure I.51). 
The third important differentiator for applying RBV to NTBF growth concerns owner-
ship and control of the startup (Table I.74) where in VC-based startups venture capi-
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talists may decide on types of resources to be used and the way to develop a re-
source base rather than the founder(s) who may have different ideas how to initiate 
and keep venture growth. Venture capitalists may also establish a leadership or man-
agement team whose strategies are not in line with those of the founders. 
Following Brush et al. [2001] we differentiate resources by their application to the pro-
ductive process as 
 Utilitarian resources that are applied directly to the productive process or com-
bined to develop other resources and 
 Instrumental resources that are used specifically to provide access to other 
resources. 
Financial resources are considered instrumental because they can be used to obtain 
other resources, such as people or equipment (or needed technology licenses). 
Proprietary technology may be either utilitarian or instrumental depending on whether 
it resides in an individual (intangible; tacit technology - Table I.12) where it might be 
instrumental, or whether it is, for instance, a patented process applied directly to the 
production process of the firm – or sold on the basis of Intellectual Property Right 
(IPR) in terms of licenses. 
Applying RBV to growth of a startup means also considering instrumental resources 
over a period of time. If, for instance, financial resources relate to public funding, such 
as research or development projects which are funded by government or research as-
sociations for some few (two to four) years, the time restriction may not only affect the 
financial situation, but at the end of the funding period may mean laying off important 
personnel. And there are more constraints (ch. 4.3.3). 
Generally, each resource type will have different dimensions along a scale of com-
plexity ranging from the simple and discrete to the complex and systemic. Further-
more, we regard resources that can be acquired by learning  as simple, such as learn-
ing behavior as well as processes (like financial management and controlling) by out-
side education and training courses as well as inside employee development (Figure 
I.121) or learning by imitation focusing on “best practice” or learning by example, 
doing or mistakes (trial and error) (Table I.7). 
The set of resource dimensions, simple to complex and utilitarian to instrumental, pro-
vides a basis for mapping possible combinations and applications of resources at the 
launch of a new venture in a quadrant and additionally specifying the resource type as 
tangible versus intangible and firm-internal versus external (Figure I.168). 
One of the qualitative differences between small and medium-sized firms is the de-
gree of functionalization, specialization, formalization of their organization and plan-
ning. The medium-sized firm will exhibit management specialization (development, 
marketing, human resources, administration, etc.) as well as more formal business 
planning (Figure I.72, Table I.69) with an emphasis on coordination and communica-
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tion in the organization, and complementing leadership by various levels of manage-
ment (Figure I.118) upon growth. Issues of coordination as a resource in growing ven-
tures were emphasized by the “10 - 25 - 150” rule of thumb (ch. 4.3.1; Table I.72). 
A challenge for a successful entrepreneur(s) will be to transfer the personal resource 
base into organizational resources to grow the enterprise. Correspondingly, resource 
development of startups entails building and transferring knowledge by creating a 
shared understanding among employees of the venture’s direction and focus (vision, 
mission,goals). The entrepreneur may need to engage in intense and frequent com-
munication to develop this shared understanding. 
But a necessary condition to transfer the resource base into organizational resources 
is to obtain buy-in from employees, associates, management, suppliers and custom-
ers. Knowledge and reputation are not sufficient to gain organizational buy-in. 
 
Figure I.168: Types of resources to be acquired or developed with selected interrela-
tions to have an NTBF grow (underline – external; italics – systemic; capital – internal 
or external – except R&D and IPR). 
Understanding the resource development pathway in terms of initial inputs (types of 
resources) and early uses (application of resources) is central to efficient, effective, 
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and timely management of the resource building process as well as development of a 
competitive advantage. 
In both exercises, one can sort resources into several differrent bins: human (individ-
ual traits and skills, knowledge and experience), social (team work, external rela-
tionships, networks, communication), financial (personal wealth, access to funds), 
physical, technological, and organizational (internal structures, processes, coordina-
tion and relationships). 
It should be re-emphasized that we regard coordination capability as a key resource 
for NTBF development and view the competency for coordination as a “critical meta-
asset of long-lived companies” (ch. 1.2.1). 
In Figure I.168 resources assumed to be relevant for technology venture growth are 
displayed. But specification of the enterprise’s needs will include not only estimates of 
types of resources needed, but also of quantity, quality, timing, and sequence of deliv-
ery. This enables the entrepreneur to stage resource acquisition and development. 
While consulting and advice to found and grow a firm can be purchased from external 
services or received from friends, families or other persons of the social environment 
of the founder(s), the Advisory Board of a new NTBF is viewed as an entity with sys-
temic features. Networking and customer and supplier relations viewed as “organiza-
tional capital” (Table I.8) also have systemic characteristics. 
For working with a set of tangible and intangible resources (assets) two different direc-
tions seem to be advisable which have to be related to execution. 
 “Tangible assets” are managed efficiently according to “best practice”! 
 Working with “intangible assets,” the founder’s personality and the firm’s em-
ployees (the human resource), firm culture, relations with customer or sup-
pliers, networking etc., can create a fundamental differentiator for sustainable 
competitive advantage and growth. They can be transformed into core com-
petencies. 
Human capital (Table I.8) is likely to be particularly important in the context of tech-
nology entrepreneurship. A significant percentage of the value of technology-based 
new ventures is likely to be determined by the quality of the company’s employees, 
especially the top management team (TMT) [Shrader and Siegel 2007]. 
When we ask whether one can identify prototypical paths for developing a resource 
base of NTBFs referring essentially to those resources given in Figure I.168 we shall 
look at a resource development pathway that allows the entrepreneur to begin with 
starting (initial) endowments and connect the specification or identification steps to ac-
quisition of resources or to having access to specific ones. 
The entrepreneur must consider how one type of resource can be leveraged to ac-
quire another one (as exemplified in Figure I.125). Such an assessment allows for ac-
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quisition strategies specific to the situation at hand to be developed. As the period of 
building a resource base the emphasis will be on the NTBF’s first five to six years of 
existence, which cover more than the startup thrust phase (ch. 4.3.2, Figure I.125). 
In the context of GST, to account for interrelations of resources, we propose a process 
of resource acquisition and development to be represented as a layered rather than a 
simply staged process. The development process of the resource base will be visual-
ized by layered phases and “cyclic arrows” indicating interdependencies and feedback 
between resources of the layers as is also used for displaying a firm and its supersys-
tems by shells of relevant interacting systems (Figure I.13). 
Figure I.169 provides a first example of privately held NTBFs of the TVT industry (all 
using nanotechnology) with an almost compatible taxonomy (Figure I.128) producing 
scientific instruments or devices for (first) academic and (then) industrial research 
customers – WITec GmbH, Cambridge Nanotech, Inc. (Table I.80, Figure I.163, B.2) 
and Nanion Technology GmbH (B.2) as well as Attocube AG (Figure I.164, B.2). 
 
Figure I.169: Building a resource base of structurally compatible RBSUs in the field of 
nanotechnology-related scientific instruments or devices. 
Nanion used capital from public investment firms, partially with a silent partnership, 
and Attocube an angel investor with no interferences in the firms’ leadership in addi-
tion to 3F and bank loans as sources of financing. Firms’ foundation occurred as uni-
versity spin-outs (a science2business process) based on research of the founders. 
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Specialization in terms of business lines here means essentially types of instruments 
or devices and their related applications in the markets. 
Firm development followed essentially a bootstrapping process (ch. 4.3.3) for an 
RBSU and all the above firms as well as IoLiTec (Figure I.170) generated a business 
plan. All these RBSUs were located close to their parent universities and started with 
customers (Figure I.124) and achieved profitability fast. This means, also cash was 
generated as a resource and innovation and investment persistence characterize the 
firms’ organic growth process. For instance, WITec was always profitable (from year 1 
on) and Nanion founded in 2002 became profitable in 2004. Having already customers 
(market pull) facilitated considerably access to bank loans for these RBSUs to 
complement own funds. 
Further monetary resources, mainly for R&D, were pursued catching project grants of 
related ministries of government or public non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and capital-equivalent support by using university infrastructure free-of-charge. Some-
times grants were for cooperative projects. 
The initial endowments are essentially associated with the founder team in terms of 
R&D and technology knowledge and financing contributions and its leadership capa-
bility to establish the firm culture. For Cambridge Nanotech there were serious fric-
tions in the entrepreneurial pair with one of the founders eventually left the firm (Table 
I.80, [Yang and Kiron 2010]). 
It is to be noted that industry growth has been found to have a positive effect on both 
profitability and sales growth of new technology ventures [Shrader and Siegel 2007]. 
For building a resource base by a different approach we shall consider an academic 
NTBF, the German IoLiTec (Ionic Liquids Technologies) GmbH founded in 2002/2003 
(Figure I.170), which followed also a science2business path, but is not a typical uni-
versity spin-out. Only one of the three founders came directly from a university. 
IoLiTec entered and survived the entry into the new technology area of ionic liquids for 
which commercial interest emerged around 2000 though the technology has been 
known for decades (A.1.5). This case may also shed some light on the reasons why 
two other startups in ionic liquids, one from Germany and one from the UK, did not 
survive: One (Solvent Innovation GmbH) was purchased by a large firm and the other 
went bankrupt (Bioniqs Ltd.). 
Ionic liquids represent a platform and enabling technology. The basic approach for en-
trepreneurship in the new class of materials is looking for their applications and re-
lated potential markets. Correspondingly, there was much need of educating (poten-
tial) customers or even generating new markets. For instance, IoLiTec promoted the 
new technology and its applications since 2005 by a free-of-charge newsletter “Ionic 
Liquids Today” (news and need-to-know facts) with currently globally ca. 6,500 sub-
scribers. 
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Hence, for its development IoLiTec is essentially on a technology push path and fur-
thermore, it has a major barrier for market entry of a new technology associated with 
the high cost of ionic liquids. It has a strong emphasis on research and development 
activities and its R&D intensity is 40-50 percent (A.1.5). 
IoLiTec’s technology is protected by IPRs. Between 2004 and 2007 IoLiTec submitted 
six patent applications, most of them citing two of the firm founders (A. Bösmann and 
T. Schubert) as inventors and some of them in cooperation with the University of Frei-
burg (Germany). 
A key resource of IoLiTec is technology intelligence, emphasizing tracking scientific 
developments in the field, state-of-the-art and current awareness, by searching the 
scientific literature and tracking technology development and applications and protec-
tion of technology and applications by patent searches including competitor and mar-
ket tracking. 
This means organizing and managing the flood of data and information by appropriate 
data processing systems and, furthermore, utilizing the existing information and 
knowledge base for consulting and revealing optimum offerings to meet customer 
specifications on the basis of the existing data and information set using structure-
property and structure-activity relations and corresponding software for data process-
ing. 
Furthermore, technology intelligence can also help identify not only commercial oppor-
tunities, but also spot opportunities for financing the startup’s development by “public 
money” (Figure I.59). 
In Figure I.170 the building process of a resource base for IoLiTec GmbH (A.1.5, B.2) 
is displayed. The formal foundation of IoLiTec (legal status: German GbR) occurred in 
November 2002 in Cologne/Aachen (Germany;). The search for a proper location any-
where in Germany (criteria: cost and networking) led to the BioTechPark in Freiburg 
with the near Freiburg University providing a potential for networking with academic 
ionic liquids experts. 
Operation started in May 2003 (changed legal status to GmbH & Co. KG). In October 
2003 the first employee was hired. For needed expansion in June 2005 the firm 
moved to the industrial area (in German “Gewerbegebiet”) in Denzlingen near 
Freiburg as renting cost in the BioTechPark, particularly for laboratories, was very 
high. 
IoLiTec started with an entrepreneurial triple (three chemists with experience in the 
technical field) and having a customer. One of the co-founders who brought in the 
customer left already after three months. Having a customer (a manufacturer of sen-
sors) who placed an €180,000 order had a decisive influence to get a bank loan of 
€200,000. In 2005 and 2006 further funding occurred by loans from banks [Schubert 
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2008a]. IoLiTec was profitable from day 1 on. Hence, IoLiTec could rely also on cash 
for its operations. 
In January 2004 it began offering custom synthesis of ionic liquids. During the startup 
phase IoLiTec used its Web site as a resource to promote its offerings. It could take 
advantage from the general interest in ionic liquids in academia and industry which 
ultimately led firms to directly contact IoLiTec via telephone or email. But due to its 
technology push approach it had often to create (“grow”) its market. 
In 2004 the “residual team” was complemented by a business angel (focused on fi-
nancial, tax and law). Funding by an angel did not only affect the financial structure of 
the startup, but, as the angel took over administrative and financial responsibilities, 
IoLiTec could rely very early on professional financial management as a resource (B.2 
– IoLiTec – Figure 1, Figure 3). 
In 2006 IoLiTec’s original leadership team lost again one of its founders. A. Bösmann, 
the CSO with broad technical experience in ionic liquids based on his dissertation at 
the Technical University of Aachen with Germany’s key scientist in the field, left the 
firm to return to academic research. T. Schubert who drove the foundation and acted 
as a Managing Director (CEO) remained in his position (B.2 – Figure 1, Figure 3). 
 
Figure I.170: Building a resource base of NTBF IoLiTec GmbH in the field of ionic liq-
uids. 
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Schubert earned his doctoral degree in the group of Prof. Berkessel of the University 
of Cologne in bioorganic chemistry; the latter one became a member of the Scientific 
Board (B.2 – Figure 1, Figure 3). 
Before founding IoLiTec T. Schubert gained experience (2001-2003) as a Sales Man-
ager responsible for the technical synthesis and marketing of ionic liquids working for 
the startup Solvent Innovation GmbH in Cologne being also active in ionic liquids 
which actually meant a competitor for his startup. 
Hence, Schubert could contribute a variety of resources to IoLiTec, technical, market, 
marketing and sales knowledge in the field and having networking contacts with large 
firms. Therefore, Schubert could earlier complement leadership by management 
(Figure I.118) and establish faster formalized business processes for running the 
firm’s growth. 
IoLiTec GmbH founder T. Schubert [2004, 2008a] lists twenty six specific applications 
clustered into six different general areas for applications of ionic liquids. This broad 
spectrum show what choices IoLiTec could make from existing options (A.1.5) and 
which ones it finally made. 
Concerning organization in 2004 IoLiTec decided to focus on five areas of specializa-
tion [Schubert 2005]: 
1. Contract R&D services 
2. Special chemistry (ionic liquids) 
3. Sensor technology 
4. Energy 
5. Nanotechnology. 
Corresponding product lines according to these five areas are given by Schubert 
[2008a:slide 27]. 
The plan was to develop each focus into an independent division each one relying on 
the core platform technology “ionic liquids.” Various fields of applications for ionic 
liquids let business lines emerge which showed up in 2006 (B.2 – Figure 2). 
For the science2business path “out of the ivory tower” [Short 2006] into the market 
IoLiTec put much emphasis on its Advisory Board which functions as a “Scientific 
Board.” Leveraging the Scientific Board occurs for consulting activities and analytical 
services for customers mediated through IoLiTec (B.3). 
The very intense networking of IoLiTec with academia is reflected by defined links be-
tween IoLiTec’s researchers with members of the Scientific Board or other professors 
from universities in related scientific fields (B.2 – Figure 3). Networking with public 
research institutes (B.2) as “partners” is essentially with relevant institutes of the 
Fraunhofer Society (FhG). FhG institutes became often partners in publicly funded 
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cooperative projects of consortia which represented a significant factor of financing 
IoLiTec’s R&D activities. 
In June 2004 IoLiTec organized distribution of its products via Merck KGaA and JDA 
(cooperation contracts) with Degussa AG (now Evonik Industries) as strategic part-
ners. 
Apart from the above NTBFs which started from a unique technology or design as de-
scribed above many NTBFs take advantage of market disequilibrium, “catch a wave,” 
such as biofuels (A.1.1) or CleanTech, to anticipate profits. But they have to share the 
markets with many new entrants – small and large, attracted by potential profits. Re-
lated NTBFs belong largely to the class of VC-based startups and, specifically in bio-
fuels, are addressing policy-driven markets (Table I.15). 
In biofuels corresponding NTBFs often target large-scale manufacturing, but most of 
them are still struggling with the associated scale-up process. Financing these firms is 
often from the beginning or in an early stage of the scale-up process. Venture capi-
talists do not only infuse money into these firms but establish simultaneously an ex-
tended management team with massive experience in target or related markets and in 
leading a firm – and even having  ties to policy concerning plant and production per-
mits (“veterans approach”; A.1.1). The original founders of these firms, when being 
scientists or engineers, usually took the roles of a CSO or CTO in the management 
team. 
Biofuel firms additionally take advantage from “public money” in terms of loan guaran-
ties and tax exemption by public entities, cooperative R&D projects with national or fe-
deral research institutes and seek cooperative projects with large firms of the oil or 
chemical industry (Figure I.179, Figure I.183). 
Such NTBFs behave like a large sophisticated company very early on or even from 
the start. For the innovation and firms’ development processes they follow essentially 
the highly formalized processes of large firms (Figure I.134), in particular, the phase 
gate process or RD&D staged path for scale-up of production (Figure I.79, Figure 
I.180). 
In particular for biofuels, venture capitalist V. Khosla refers to an innovation architec-
ture which he calls an “innovation ecosystem at work,” solving large problems by har-
nessing the power of ideas fueled by entrepreneurial energy of scientists, technolo-
gists, and entrepreneurs – very bright people working on solving a problem. Khosla’s 
innovation architecture is often to be characterized as a VC-based spin-out (RBSUs) 
with experienced managers (“professional managers”; Figure I.118) from almost the 
point of firm’s foundation (A.1.1.5). 
Building the resource base in such an NTBF is driven essentially by connecting 
founder/management team experience and strategy – and execution. Fast growth in 
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the number of employees often leads to issues of coordination as an important re-
source. 
Shrader and Siegel [2007] assessed the role of human capital (Table I.8) in the growth 
and development of new technology-based ventures via an analysis of a large sample 
of publicly traded, technology-based new ventures using information available on ini-
tial public offerings (IPOs) in IPO prospectuses. They suggest that the fit between 
strategy and team experience is a key determinant of the long-term performance of 
these high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. 
In particular Shrader and Siegel [2007] found that experience with previous startups 
helped ventures pursuing broad strategies (for instance, numerous customers, seg-
ments and products) achieving higher sales growth. As expected, marketing experi-
ence was shown to be highly significantly related to the pursuit of marketing-based 
differentiation. 
Their findings provide also striking evidence of a clear and consistent fit between team 
backgrounds and competitive strategy among their sample. More specifically, they be-
lieve that specialized experience in functional areas relates to the strategies pursued 
by a new venture. 
5.3 Some Concluding Remarks 
When we embarked a journey following a purpose to outline the not-well and not ade-
quately explored territory we have observed that Applied General Systems Theory 
(GST) and its principles and approaches provide a framework to tackle technology en-
trepreneurship which is characterized by high complexity in terms of numbers of vari-
ables and parameters that determine the developments of new technology ventures. 
GST as an all embracing framework allowed a consistent, context-sensitive explora-
tion and treatment of the subject to increase understanding and explanation. Here, we 
targeted rationalization to differentiate “reasons why” versus “reasons for thinking 
that.” However, presented claims and propositions remain partly tentative. But many 
tentative propositions were driven to the point that will allow or induce, respectively, 
further inquiries. 
For technology entrepreneurship rather than leveling off differences by methods that 
enforce compatibility of what does not fit human activities in various contexts the em-
phasis was on sources of variations which conventional theories and approaches dis-
miss as random. Variations were studied to reveal patterns of structure and dynamics 
within the variation (“Variations on a Theme”; A.1.6). 
We think our APPROACH is a response to Schumpeter’s [1939:44] criticism of re-
search based on only aggregate data: 
“It keeps analysis on the surface of things and prevents it from penetrating into the 
industrial processes below, which are what really matters. It invites a mechanistic and 
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formalistic treatment of few isolated contour lines and attributes to aggregates a life of 
their own and a causal significance that they do not possess.” 
We did not neglect the entrepreneurs’ personalities and the important role of individual 
entrepreneurs or founders in a “team system.” And we did not neglect the time span 
the entrepreneurs are active in requiring detailed knowledge about related constella-
tions of technologies, markets, industries and national economies. This is expressed 
by William Hewlett, one of the founders of HP (Hewlett – Packard, founded in 1939): 
“As I talk about the start of the company, it is important to remember that both 
Dave {Packard} and I {William Hewlett} were products of the Great Depres-
sion.” [Hewlett] 
First steps have been presented to handle development and growth of NTBFs. Focus-
ing on growth states of firms and equations of state give up the idea that data can be 
forced into a one-size-fits-all model. Concepts and regularities in firms’ evolutions 
were presented, some require refinement, but more regularity await discovery. 
We did not just observe! We filtered and organized “observable” data, information and 
facts – whether from the literature or own observations. And epistemologically follow-
ing Einstein that “it is the theory that decides what we can observe” we introduced 
“The Bracket Model of New Technology Venture Development” and emphasized ex-
pectations rather than predictions. The Bracket Model deals with processes of change 
paying equal attention to expected observations and events and to exceptional events 
or phenomena. 
Finally, we do not claim to have developed a standard or a direction for further schol-
arly inquiry. We – with a strong background of natural sciences – made a suggestion 
how to approach the exciting real world issues of human activities leading to economic 
change based on changes of technology and utilization of new scientific results. 
Concerning the comparative approach in this book, apart from basic inter-cultural and 
socio-economic differences, technology entrepreneurship in Germany and the US is 
generically closest for privately held or controlled new firms. 
It is very different for VC-based startups which is largely related to the fundamentally 
different financial systems, in particular, based on availability of a gigantic amount of 
“loose money” in the US due to the dollar still being the world’s reserve currency and 
the Federal Reserve being in a position that the world’s economic, financial and policy 
systems accept the Fed to print as much dollars as the US is perceived to need. 
Hence, how VC-based startup emerge and develop in the US cannot be compared 
and be a general model for Germany’s VC-based startups. In particular, the level of 
related technology speculation is negligible in Germany compared to that in the US. 
The German national innovation and entrepreneurship system has emergeed with 
high systemic performance due to a rather organized, smooth and strong interplay of 
the Science & Technology, Economic, Financial and Policy Systems. 
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12. Jack Welsh: Clausewitz in Business. 
http://www.clausewitz.com/business/index.htm; on the Clauswitz Homepage 
http://www.clausewitz.com/index.htm (last access 10/1/2009). 
13. Magnetfeldtechnik Resonanz GmbH: http://www.deutscher-
gruenderpreis.de/resonanz (last access 10/13/2009). 
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31. In Germany (Austria and Switzerland) a “habilitation” (leading to the degree Dr. 
habil.) is usually one prerequisite to become a professor in a science discipline at 
a university. 
32: Inc. is a monthly US magazine written for the people who run growing compa-
nies. The magazine publishes an annual list of the 500 (and also 5000) fastest-
growing private companies in the US, the “Inc. 500” list. 
33: German High-Tech Gründerfonds: conditions – requires founder’s own 
contributions (up to 20 percent); up to €500,000 in a first round of funding, 
purchases 15% shares with a nominal value and provides a subordinated 
shareholder loan. In addition, the Fund keeps a further €500,000 for follow-on 
financing. The loan has a term of 7 years.  
http://www.high-tech-gruenderfonds.de/finanzierung/finanzierungskonditionen/. 
34: SBA: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Business_Administration (last access 
6/23/2011). 
35: Venture Capital: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venture_capital; 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risikokapital (last access 6/23/2011). 
36: Limited Partnership (LP): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limited_partnership; 
General Partnership (GP): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_partnership (last 
access 6/23/2011). 
GP is similar to the German GbR (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Recht). GbR is the 
basic form of partnership based on an agreement (or  contract) of at least two 
persons intending to achieve a common goal. For any liabilities of the partnership 
the partners are liable personally and with all their wealth and assets. Liability 
cannot be limited in principle. 
37: Penny stocks: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penny_stock 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pink_Sheets. 
Pink Quote, informally known as the Pink Sheets, is an electronic quotation 
system operated by Pink OTC Markets that displays quotes from broker-dealers 
for many over-the-counter (OTC) securities. These securities tend to be inactively 
traded stocks, including penny stocks and those with a narrow geographic 
interest. 
38. Locus of control: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locus_of_control (last access 
6/27/2011). 
39. August Horch: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audi, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Horch; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audi; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Horch. 
40. Volition: the capability of conscious choice and decision and intention; an act of 
will. 
41. Samuel Moore “Sam” Walton: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Walton; 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/77/walmart.html. 
42. The Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory: http://www.kaicentre.com/ (last access 
6/29/2011); The Myers & Brigg Foundation: http://www.myersbriggs.org/ (last 
access 6/29/2011) 
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43. Gedanken experiment: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gedanken_experiment. 
(physics) A hypothetical (“thought”) experiment which is possible in principle and 
is analyzed (but not performed) to test some hypothesis. Also known as thought 
experiment. 
44. “dm” and Götz Werner”: Blocked careers or business ideas as the origin of 
entrepreneurship is all over. For instance, in Germany Götz Werner was 
employed with a large drugstore organization. In Germany a drugstore is a retail 
store featuring basically no drugs and medicines, but miscellaneous items for the 
home, such as household and baby care, personal care and cosmetics, hygiene 
and cleaning products, food additives and nutraceutials etc. After a 
reorganization of the sales unit he suggested to introduce the concept of a 
discount drugstore chain combined with competent advising services. This idea 
was rejected and, after leaving his employer, he founded in 1973 his own 
discount drugstore called “dm-drogerie markt GmbH + Co. KG” (dm is Drogerie 
Markt in German) as the kernel of the currently leading German discount 
drugstore chain. For 2009/2010 revenues were €5,6 billion with ca. 30 percent 
outside Germany and ca. 36,000 employees. 
ttp://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6tz_Werner. 
45. Group dynamics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_dynamics (last access 
7/4/2011). 
46. Ernst Werner von Siemens: 
http://www.ask.com/wiki/Werner_von_Siemens?qsrc=3044; Johann Georg 
Halske: http://www.ask.com/wiki/Johann_Georg_Halske?qsrc=3044. 
Johann Georg Halske (1814 – 1890) was a German master mechanic who 
started his own workshop in Berlin in 1844, which he ran together with his partner 
F. M. Böttcher. 
In 1847 Halske co-founded the Siemens & Halske Telegraph Construction 
Company together with Werner von Siemens (1816– 1892). Siemens took over 
the role of the developer, Halske focused on finishing and production of the 
telegraphs. Halske was particularly involved in the construction and design of 
electrical equipment such as the press which enabled wires to be insulated with a 
seamless coat of gutta-percha, the pointer telegraph and the morse telegraph 
and measuring instruments. In 1867 he withdrew from the company. 
Siemens left school without finishing his education, but joined the Prussian army 
to undertake training in engineering, in mathematics, physics, chemistry and 
ballistics. He is known world-wide for his advances in various technologies, and 
chose to work on perfecting technologies that had already been established. 
47. Enercon GmbH: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enercon; 
http://www.windsofchange.dk/WOC-usaturb.php (last access 7/12/2011). 
48. Theoria – expectation: Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theoria; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(process); http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/theory; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expectation_(epistemic). 
49. Best practice: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_practice. 
50. Bootlegging: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootleg. 
51. Idea: http://www.merriam-webster.com/netdict/idea. 
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52. ConnectU.com lawsuit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Facebook. 
53. Electric vehicles: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_vehicle; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car; http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elektroauto; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Jamais_Contente (last access 7/19/2011). 
54. Gestalt: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gestalt_psychology. 
55. Clarence Birdseye: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarence_Birdseye, 
http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/birdseye.html, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/maney/2004-07-14-
frozen_x.htm. 
56. Drucker Quotes: http://www.1-famous-quotes.com/quote/927861. 
57. First-Mover Advantage: Encyclopedia of Management, 
http://www.enotes.com/management-encyclopedia/first-mover-advantage (last 
access 7/24/2011); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-mover_advantage. 
58. Kondratiev waves: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kondratiev_wave. 
59. Environmental Entrepreneurs: http://www.e2.org/. 
60. Lux Research: THE CLEANTECH REPORT™. 
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/cleantech.php; CleanTech Group: Cleantech 
definition. http://cleantech.com/about/cleantechdefinition.cfm (last access 
5/18/2010). 
61. Orphan drug: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orphan_drug. 
62. Switching cost: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switching_barriers. 
63. Critical success factor (CSF): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_success_factor. 
64. SWOT analysis: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis. 
65. Screwdriver: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screwdriver (last access 9/6/2011). 
66. Technology trajectory: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_trajectory. 
67. Paradigm: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradigm. 
68. Hybrid power plant: 
https://www.enertrag.com/projektentwicklung/hybridkraftwerk.html, 
https://www.enertrag.com/download/prospekt/hybridkraftwerk_kurzinfo_090417.p
df. 
69. Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massively_multiplayer_online_game; 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massively_Multiplayer_Online_Role-Playing_Game; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MUD. 
70. Widget application: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_widget. 
71. AAA game: The gaming press tends to use AAA to mean a really high quality 
game. Marketing folks will use it to refer solely to the advertising budget (i.e. the 
actual quality of the game is irrelevant). Producers usually will use it to mean 
both (i.e. is high quality and has a big marketing budget). 
 References and Notes 929 
72. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generally_Accepted_Accounting_Principles; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generally_Accepted_Accounting_Principles_(United_
States). 
73. Ambiguity: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity. 
74. Scenario: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scenario. 
75. Currency Volatility: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=120.EXR.M.USD.EUR.SP
00.A (last access 12/2/2011). 
76. William Shockley: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Shockley. 
77. Intel: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel. 
78. Fairchild Semiconductor: http://www.fairchildsemi.com/company/history/. 
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age 3.1%) reflecting a situation in 1987/1986. The firms represent 14 industry 
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characterize states of the young firms in terms of age and organizational fea-
tures. Other variables were defined as follows. 
 Structural form, or basis of organization, was self reported by respondents based 
on brief descriptions and coded as follows: simple structure, 1; by function, 2; by 
divisions, 3; and other, 4. 
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 Entrepreneur, Company and Market Cases 
 
A.1.1 The Biofuels Bubble and the Related Outburst of 
Entrepreneurship and Intrapreneurship 
In the new century industrialized countries ran into a biofuels boom by demanding am-
bitious renewable-fuel targets set by policy and legislation (“mandates”). For instance, 
biofuels were to provide 5.75 percent of Europe’s transport power by 2010 and 10 per-
cent by 2020. US Federal fuel standards increased the volume of renewable fuel re-
quired to be blended into gasoline from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 
2022. (Box I.1). 
In essence, the biofuels market has been created by policy and, together with other 
effects, became the origin of a boom. It is a policy-driven market (Table I.15). The fol-
lowing biofuel bubble effect is particularly striking for the US, though structurally simi-
lar events can be observed around the world including Germany. 
Public policy has not only stimulated increased public funding of research and devel-
opment but stimulated also huge private investment. Governmental grants, subsidies 
and loan guarantees as well as private investment were swamping universities and 
public research institutions. Government spurred also with grants the construction of 
new biofuel plants, and also with big per-gallon subsidies. Furthermore, dynamics was 
generated by hordes of startups and their quest for venture capital financing (Figure 
I.34). It was estimated that in the US blending mandates alone would provide over $33 
billion in tax credits to the biofuels industry from 2009 through 2013 [Davis and 
Russell 2009]. 
Contrary to an investment in a software or Internet company, for a “research-to-
manufacturing” startup one has to finance heavy in investments upfront in large scale 
plants and product introduction will take years. Thus for VCs the favorite business 
model is to get an industrial partner (corporate venturing) on board prior to the capital 
intensive investment stage and who eventually will take over the company years later. 
The current description and discussion of entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship in 
biofuels will focus on the period 2000 – 2008/2009 and looks at significant develop-
ments after the Great Recession in 2007–2009. Concerning new technology ventures 
there are two fundamental orientations related to technology and type of NTBF: 
1. The thermochemical and catalytic routes are preferentially followed by engi-
neering-type firms, often with well experienced founders (“veterans”) and 
often further developing a century old technology; 
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2. The biotechnology and bioengineering route is preferentially followed by 
research-based startups (RBSUs). 
A.1.1.1 The Origins and the Drivers 
The starting situation around 2000 for an industry was focused on first generation bio-
fuels. It was characterized by a core of some well established food firms, giant to 
small, engaged in sugar, corn or soybeans and “corn ethanol” and vegetable oils-
based biodiesel taking advantage from the big incentive-driven opportunities. That let 
farmers shift to crops to meet growing demand for vegetable-based fuels (biodiesel) 
and sugar-based fuels (bioethanol – corn ethanol). And farmers who bought shares in 
nearby ethanol facilities became wealthy, thanks to corn prices increasing by 65 per-
cent in just two years, and the skyrocketing value of existing ethanol plants. 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) expected in 2004 that ethanol could eventually 
supply 30 percent or more of US transportation fuel needs [Ritter 2004]. For instance, 
in the US it took ten years from 1980 to 1990 to increase the volume of corn ethanol 
for fuel five-fold (1980: 175 – 1990: 900 mio. gallons) [RFA]. But from 2000 (1,630 
mio.) to 2008, with billions of dollars flooding into new facilities, the absolute volume 
shot up to 9,000 mio. gallons based on an ever increasing number of new plants or 
capacity extensions of existing plants. 
Also food and agricultural giants like Archer Daniels Midland (AMD) and Cargill in the 
US (both large suppliers of bioethanol and biodiesel) or Südzucker in Germany 
[Runge 2006:188] which is Europe’s largest producer of sugar and sugar products 
jumped onto the band-wagon now called bioethanol. ADM, the largest US (and global) 
grain processor, then got 25 percent of its operating profit from biofuels, including both 
ethanol and biodiesel, and its shares were being increasingly seen as an energy, as 
well as an agriculture, play [Scully 2007]. 
 In 2007 ethanol production accounted for about 20 percent of the US corn crop 
[Scully 2007]. Similarly, in Europe in 2002, 2003 and 2004 biodiesel production rose 
already by a 30-35 percent rate. But there was a 65 percent record growth in 2005 
over 2004. And production of biodiesel in Europe jumped 54 percent in 2006 to 4.89 
million tons (about 1.5 billion gallons), up from 3.184 million tons (about 961 million 
gallons) in 2005 [Green Car Congress 2007a]. Total EU27 biodiesel production for 
2008 was over 7.7 million metric tons, an increase, but significantly reduced growth 
rate in relation to previous ones, of 35.7 percent from the 2007 figures [European 
Biodiesel Board 2009]. 
In that line chemical giants like the German BASF and DuPont or Monsanto in the US 
which for decades have produced agricultural chemicals for plant and crop protection 
(pesticides, insecticides etc.) or genetically modified seeds to achieve resistance 
against pests entered the scene. For instance, BASF formed joint ventures with 
Monsanto [Mandary 2007] and partnered with the Brazilian Sugarcane Technology 
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Center (CTC) [Sugarcaneblog 2009] to develop genetically modified corn, soybean or 
sugarcane to increase crop yields. And additionally in 2007 BASF started together 
with DBE Deutsche Bioenergie AG to build a biodiesel plant [UFOP 2007]. 
As crude-oil prices continually rose, the arguments for alternative fuel sources grew 
stronger. With global oil prices shooting up from $40-50 per barrel by September 2004 
to achieve $77 in July 2006 and, finally to peak at $147 by July 2008, public and 
private investments was flooding into the development of biofuel technology and 
facilities to produce it – just to counteract the exploding energy cost and the dawning 
end of the petro-oil age. 125 
The sky-high energy prices induced some far-reaching effects centering on the deep 
belief, short- to medium-term, biofuels to become an economically competitive power 
alternative to petro-fuel [Scully 2007]. And, furthermore, there was corroboration by a 
related success story for bioethanol. In the mid-1970s the world had been hit by two 
oil price explosions, caused by production restraints in OPEC countries, and oil prices 
soared from a few cents per gallon to a couple of dollars per gallon. Through initiation 
by a governmental program Brazil strove to have so-called flex-fuel cars which run on 
ethanol. 
In 2003 flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) appeared on the market which have engine 
systems that are able to run with a mix of gasoline and ethanol. Currently all major 
automotive firms of the world manufacture these FFVs for use in Brazil. And a growing 
fleet of new-generation (flex-fuel) cars can run on straight ethanol. Ethanol accounts 
for more than 50 percent of the whole consumption of light car fuels in the country 
[Seraphim 2009]. 
In the late 1990s, Brazil dropped its alcohol subsidies and now made biofuel so com-
petitive that (in 2005) it could trump gasoline at $25 a barrel [Theil 2005]. Brazil, which 
produces 7 billion gallons of ethanol per year, has 15 million ethanol-based or flex-fuel 
cars [Lane 2009c]. 
It is interesting to note that in the US a fuel blend called E85, which is 85 percent etha-
nol and 15 percent gasoline, is being made available in many states. For instance, in 
California, there were more than 300,000 flex-fuel vehicles in 2006 that were designed 
to use E85, but because the E85 distribution system has not developed as fast as the 
vehicle fleet, most are operating on gasoline [UC Davis 2006]. Globally, General 
Motors produced more than 5 million flex-fuel vehicles by 2009. In the US alone, there 
were more than 3.5 million GM flex-fuel cars and trucks on the road: For the 2010 
model year, there were seventeen E85-capable flex-fuel vehicles from the Chevrolet, 
Cadillac, Buick and GMC brands [Coskata 2009.]. 
Since around 2004 too much loose cash has found its way into biofuels as a special 
area of the big policy-driven market of renewable energy (Figure I.34). Expectations 
grew dramatically. Many people in the venture capital industry were betting huge 
amounts of money on the sector. And they expected to make a 10-to-1 return [Das 
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2009]. “There are so many people that this almost feels like the oil land rush of the 
mid-1800s” in the US” [Langreth 2008]. 
Venture capitalists backing clean technology entrepreneurs sensed that opportunity, in 
particular, with regard to second generation biofuels. And entrepreneurship was ad-
ditionally associated with a number of “me too” firms’ foundation. In 2006 in the US 
already 48 new ethanol plants and eight expansions of existing plants were under 
construction [Reisch 2006]. And there may have been the dream that someone is 
going to be the next Exxon of biofuels. 
Basically, however, there is not enough suitable land for corn growing to make a sig-
nificant dent in America’s voracious energy needs. Even if every bushel of US corn, 
wheat, rice and soybean were used to produce ethanol, it was estimated that it would 
only cover about 4 percent of US energy needs on a net basis [Wasik 2007]. Yet that 
did not stop ethanol investors or a wave of irrational exuberance from Wall Street to 
Brazil. Venture capital investment in biofuels increased from less than $1 million in 
2004 to $20.5 million in 2005 [Startup Life 2007] and in 2007 venture capitalists 
poured $637 million into biofuels. 
As part of the 2005 Energy Act, the US Department of Energy granted six cellulosic 
facilities special financing of up to $385 million to help build their first production facili-
ties that, in aggregate, should reach 130 million gallons per year [Stack et al. 2007]. 
For 2008, VCs poured $680.2 million into US biofuels, including $437 million for 
cellulosic ethanol, $175.9 million in microalgae, $42 million in butanol and 25.3 million 
into systems and infrastructure providers [Oilgae Blog 2009]. 
The rapid capitalization and concentration of power within the biofuels industry was 
extreme. Behind the scenes giant oil, chemical, agricultural, auto corporations and 
large enzymes and genetic engineering companies were forming partnerships and 
joint ventures, and they were consolidating the research, production, processing and 
distribution chains of food and fuel systems under one industrial roof. 
The names of giants then showing up in the game included Shell, BP, Chevron, and at 
last ExxonMobil, ADM, Cargill, BASF, Bayer, DuPont, Dow Chemical, Monsanto, 
Syngenta, VW, Daimler, Ford and General Motors and large enzyme companies like 
Danish Novozymes and Danisco (with its US subsidiary Genecor; Danisco A/S was 
recently acquired by DuPont) and the US firm Diversa [Runge 2006:872-873]. Biofuels 
was estimated to “be a $150 billion industry” [Langreth 2008]. But, “the industry is still 
pretty much a government creation.” [Carey 2009] 
When farm products were increasingly being converted to biofuels, the offered bio-
fuels do act like energy products. As corn and other crops become increasingly impor-
tant raw materials for biofuels, the companies that make and process them were start-
ing to act more like energy companies. 
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But, the most powerful players to enter the scene was “Big Oil,” not just because of 
the issues of oil supply and prices, but the perceived danger to loose control of the 
multi-trillion-dollar transportation fuel industry (cars, trucks, trains, ships and airplanes) 
not just to food and agricultural industries, but also to electricity providers through the 
push to electrocars – also initiated by governments. Royal Dutch Shell, BP and 
chemical giant DuPont were leading the industry’s heavy counterattack (Table I.83) – 
though experts said biofuels will not replace all petroleum-derived gasoline or diesel. 
Instead, biofuels will only extend fossil fuel supplies. 
For instance, Royal Dutch Shell, Europe’s second biggest energy group, formed a 
$12bn joint venture with Cosan, the big Brazilian sugarcane processor, that will bring 
together the operations of sugar, ethanol and the distribution and marketing of fuels in 
Brazil. The joint venture will be the world’s largest bioenergy operation. Both partners 
will contribute retail stations and fuel retail stations and establish a network of ca. 
4,500 retail sites. Shell’s deal followed that of BP, its closest European rival, which 
saw BP providing half the $1bn investment in two ethanol plants being prepared by 
Tropical BioEnergia, a venture it entered with Grupo Maeda, a Brazilian agribusiness 
group, and Santelisa Vale, a Brazilian sugar and ethanol producer [Hoyes 2010]. 
There is a bewildering array of technologies for biofuels (Figure I.184), pushed by 
startups and NTBFs which are often spin-outs from universities and public research 
institutes and funded by governmental grants and subsidies as well as venture capital. 
After second generation biofuels (bioalcohols) the next biobased input for biofuels 
turned to algae (“third generation biofuel,” Figure I.34). 
Following these developments the “heavyweights” from oil were hedging their bets 
taking fundamental ethical, technical and commercial disadvantages of first generation 
biofuels into account (Box I.1) and established differentiated strategies relying often 
on genetically modified objects (GMOs) and genetic engineering or chemical and pro-
cess engineering to transform non food-related input into biofuels. As their innovation 
strategies corporate investors have been drawn to invest in or acquire biofuels compa-
nies that fit neatly into their value chains or long-term strategies. But also giant auto-
motive firms, such as VW, Daimler and General Motors, entered the scene in a cor-
responding move (Table I.83). 
Already in 2005 [Theil] the question was: “will biofuels be able to take hold without tax 
credits and subsidies, especially if oil prices head downward? Then there is the poli-
tics of global trade.” By mid of 2008 the biofuel bubble began to burst, at least with re-
spect to agricultural first generation biofuels. Those who bet exclusively on bioethanol 
often suffered the same fate as those investors who took the plunge on the Internet 
dot.com companies around 2000. Awareness spread that the goals lawmakers set for 
the biodiesel and ethanol industry are in serious jeopardy. 
However, misaligned political incentives are not sufficient to explain the bubble (and 
its burst). The Great Recession with its global credit crisis, a glut of capacity, lower oil 
 940 Appendix A 
prices by crushed fuel demand and delayed government rules changes on fuel mixes 
(blending mandates postponed) were threatening the viability of biodiesel and second-
generation fuels derived from feedstocks other than food. Low oil prices had a numb-
ing effect on consumers and their interest in this area. 
“Ethanol, the largest biofuel sector, was also in financial trouble, although longstand-
ing government support will likely protect it to a certain degree.” Plans were lagging for 
a new generation of factories that were supposed to produce ethanol from substances 
like wood chips and crop waste, overcoming the drawbacks of corn ethanol. But that 
nascent branch of the industry conceded it has virtually no chance of meeting political 
production mandates that kick in soon [Theil 2005]. 
Many biodiesel companies started operating in the red. Even ethanol producers, 
which have enjoyed government subsidies and growing federal requirements to blend 
it into gasoline, were operating at a loss over 2008. Numerous established producers 
in the US filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy-court protection. By mid of 2009 two-thirds 
of US biodiesel production capacity were sitting unused. 
GreenHunter Energy Inc., operator of the largest US biodiesel refinery, stopped pro-
duction and in June 2009 said it may have to sell its Houston plant, only a year after 
politicians presided over its opening. GreenHunter’s business model hinged on selling 
to a government-guaranteed buyer [Carey 2009]. 
Until the mandate kicked in, GreenHunter and other biodiesel makers counted on ex-
porting their output to Europe, a much bigger user of diesel. GreenHunter opened in 
June 2008 as oil prices skyrocketed. By then, soybean oil prices were soaring, too. 
Dozens of other new biodiesel plants, which make a diesel substitute from vegetable 
oils and animal fats, stopped operating because biodiesel production was no longer 
economical. The European Union dealt the final blow when it slapped a tariff on US 
biodiesel, killing what had been the industry’s main sales outlet [Davis and Russell 
2009]. 
Furthermore, the shift in power to Big Oil was already showing effects in the traditional 
corn ethanol business in 2008, where low prices led to the idling of more than 20 
percent of capacity. VeraSun Energy, one of the largest US ethanol companies, filed 
for Chapter 11 (bankruptcy) in October 2008 [Carey 2009]. 
The situation in 2009: “The ethanol industry is on its back despite the billions of dollars 
they have gotten in taxpayer assistance, and a guaranteed market.” There were over-
capacities due to reduction in blending and/or production mandates. It was estimated 
that of the 150 ethanol companies and 180 plants in the US, 10 or more companies 
have shut down 24 plants during the last quarter of 2008. That idled about 2 billion 
gallons out of 12.5 billion gallons of annual production capacity. Furthermore, it was 
estimated that a dozen more companies were in distress [Krauss 2009]. 
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And there was consolidation. As ethanol producers teeter on the brink of bankruptcy – 
slammed by high corn prices and low gasoline demand – larger refiners were looking 
for opportunities to buy their assets on the cheap. For instance, Valero Energy bought 
seven of VeraSun Industries’ ethanol plants. VeraSun owned 16 biorefineries with the 
total capacity to produce 1.4 billion gallons of ethanol annually, or about 13.0 percent 
of the total US capacity [Ackerman 2009]. 
As a typical response to such difficulties of a policy-driven market interference by the 
corn ethanol industry association occurred and requested a change of the blending 
mandate in favor of corn ethanol, in the US from E10 to E15 [Wald 2009a]. 
In Germany, the Federal Environment Ministry announced plans to reduce the biofuels 
target by 2020, because of “changes in circumstance.” The German blending target 
was 6.25 percent in 2009, and the government said that lifting the E10 mandate 
(blending 10 percent of biofuel into conventional gasoline) in the market meant that 
the 2009 quote would have to be lowered to 5 percent. 
Already by mid of 2008 27 percent of German oilseed mills had shut down production 
entirely and 36 percent were running on less than 50 percent of capacity. In Germany, 
the biodiesel industry was additionally facing a new extinction threat as federal gov-
ernment carried forward with its plan to increase biodiesel taxes by 40 percent. The 
tax hike, from 15 Euro cents to 21 cents per liter, was part of a based increase of 
green fuel taxes until they are the same as conventional fuel taxes. A previous tax 
hike removed the price advantage of biodiesel over conventional diesel and resulted 
in a massive decline in biodiesel output. All this became finally effective in 2009. 
Increasing the blending proportion from 5 to 6.25 percent was postponed to 2011 
[Biofuels Digest 2008]. Correspondingly, in the US in 2009 biodiesel plants started to 
be idled due to the expiration of the biodiesel tax credit. 
One often hears “explanations” for the tough times for biofuel startups during the 
Great Recession, for instance: 
“We are closing doors. We are a victim of the economy,” said a venture capi-
talist at Polaris Venture Partners, which invested in the algae firm GreenFuel 
[Kanellos 2009b], but the point is: 
we are going to be hearing “victim of the economy” every time one of these 
“hypesters” runs out of money. It is the convenient excuse [Rapier 2009b]. 
In the end biofuel carcasses were everywhere and it was an open question in how far 
governmental stimulus programs in CleanTech to ease the Great Recession will help 
survival of biofuel firms which came under scrutiny with regard to new studies on 
greenhouse gas emissions by second generation biofuels (Box I.1) [Carey 2009]. 
But irrespective of the mass of “biofuel firm deaths” there was an emerging algae bio-
fuel boom with a lot of startups – as third generation biofuels based on algae obvious-
ly could be a response to lifting greenhouse gas emissions by second generation bio-
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fuels (A.1.1.4). Over the 2004-2010 period a large horde of biofuel startups exposed 
very many smart ideas. But “the winners likely will be Shell, BP, DuPont, and other 
majors” [Carey 2009] and ExxonMobile. 
Finally and, in particular, with regard to “energy independence” of a country, one has 
to consider biofuels in the context of the overall “energy mix,” the various contributions 
of the different energy sources of a country. And for the US there is an indication that 
this will change, at least for the medium term markedly. There was an orientation in 
the US from oil-based fuels and coal towards natural gas [Gelsi 2009; LeVine and 
Ashton 2009]. 
In the US, but also Australia, massive natural-gas discoveries heralded a big shift in 
the energy landscape of the US – for power supply, heating, the petrochemical indus-
try and also transportation fuel. After an era of declining production, the US is now 
swimming in natural gas. And 98 percent of the natural gas consumed in the US is 
produced in North America [Casselman 2009]. This will finally have effects on peo-
ple’s attitudes and behavior and thus on the biofuels scene. Furthermore, the dis-
tribution (via ships, railroads or trucks) of natural gas as “liquefied natural gas” (LNG) 
will induce a changed economy [Runge 2006:124]. 
And there is another key factor which may have an influence on biofuels policy. After, 
in early 2010 the US government provided several drilling permissions for oil in the 
Gulf of Mexico, the “Deepwater Horizon catastrophe” occurred which put drilling on 
hold and thus affected “energy independence” efforts of the US. Offshore drilling has 
been put forward by the Obama administration as one prong of a multi-prong ap-
proach to ending the foreign oil dependence. The Transocean Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig related to oil giant BP as the operator exploded, sank and masses of oil were 
leaking from the well. It triggered the worst oil spill in US history and seriously dam-
aged the economy and the environment of the Gulf States. According to Obama “BP 
is responsible for this leak. BP will be paying the bill.” 
The Deepwater Horizon environmental catastrophe in the US was assumed to may 
exert an influence on societal attitudes and new political initiatives with regard to 
boosting renewable energy and, in particular, biofuels. 
As a summary, the jumping-off situation for the biofuel bubble and the policy-driven 
market is described in Box I.1 and its structural layout is illustrated in Figure I.34. Its 
discussion requires a systems approach and, for entrepreneurship and intrapreneur-
ship, an emphasis on the related value system and approaches to problem-solving of 
technical and commercial as well as cost issues. In the following we shall not discuss 
the issue whether sufficient land, for instance, in the US or Germany, is available to 
meet the quantitative requirements or mandates set by policy. 
Companies, NTBFs and startups had to adapt themselves also to different legislation 
and the rest of realities of the sector, such as second and third generation biofuels, 
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hybrids, prices of raw materials and petro-oil prices, margins and the increase in fuel 
demand in China and India. 
Last but not least, companies will have to deal with governmental initiatives, incen-
tives, subsidies and pressure which should guarantee energy security throughout di-
versification and local production. Finally, according to venture capitalist Vinod Khosla 
[2008a], “if a technology doesn’t meet the ‘Chindia test’ – meaning that it is cheaper 
than the current status quo in China and India – then it is not a viable, scalable, and 
cost-effective long-term alternative. Anything that will uproot the global reliance on oil 
or coal must be less expensive; else it will never gain traction in the global market-
place.” 
Only the companies able to face those challenges will survive. The key factors 
to determine failure or success for these companies are – apart from concur-
rence and balance with food crops for biofuels, their ability to guarantee their 
raw materials, their collection, storage and distribution management as well 
as their cost efficient conversion to energy/power sources and the energy 
storage and their fit into existing or currently built energy distribution systems, 
and the approval of legislation in favor of biofuels to reduce CO2 emissions – 
in short, the value system of the transportation fuel segment and related tech-
nical and commercial hurdles (Figure I.171). 
Interpreting the Chindia test as measure of price of products based on the same or a 
generic technology, also the policy-driven boom/bust developments of photovoltaic 
and solar cells markets, the Chindia effect and the Great Recession encountered 
extreme problems for once “shining” NTBFs in Germany and the US (ch. 4.3.5.2). 
A.1.1.2 The Technologies and Products’ Situation 
Ultimate goals of the biofuels key players are either commercial large-scale production 
of biofuels and distribution into the transportation fuel market segments defined rough-
ly by type of vehicle, usage for short- or long-distance transportation and the power 
source of the vehicles (Figure I.171) or to provide a platform for “biorefineries” [Runge 
2006:849-873] targeting production of biobased fuel and additional biobased materials 
(“co-products”, A.1.1.6). The essential classes of biofuel products comprise  
 Biodiesel, where its production process may also provide glycerin (also 
named glycerol) and special biosolvents 
 Bioethanol, first- and second-generation ethanol (also called corn and cellu-
losic ethanol), which can be used also for solvents or other basic chemicals 
 Biobutanol, which can be used as a full replacement of (at least) petro-fuel for 
cars and simultaneously can be used for an important solvent or intermediate 
for the chemical industry and is currently produced by petrochemical proc-
esses 
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 Biogasoline, which is a mixture of hydrocarbon molecules like those produced 
at a petroleum refinery and can be used as gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel in 
blending with or as a replacement of petro-fuel. 
Some comparisons and differentiators of bioethanol, biobutanol and biogasoline are 
given in Table I.82. Here, in particular, for the butanol case it must be considered that 
(branched chain) isobutanol has even better energy efficiency as a transportation fuel 
than normal (straight chain) n-butanol. 
Even though the commercial opportunity appears vast, the constraints within which 
biofuel producers must operate are extremely tight (Figure I.171). The biofuel industry 
is essentially characterized by competition related to 
 End-products as well as application areas (where biobutanol additionally is 
overlaid by an n-butanol versus isobutanol or mixture of isomeric butanols 
competition), 
 Corresponding production technologies and raw materials input, as expressed 
in the corn ethanol versus cellulosic ethanol positions and the types of bio-
mass (various plant and waste-related biomass versus algae), 
 Access to financial and human resources, 
 The market segments, financial and political power of players and 
 Corresponding political interferences in the policy-driven market through legis-
lative, subsidizing and national protection measures which may affect the vari-
ous types of products and the financial resources allocated to them differently. 
For instance, in the US there is not only a quantitative setting for the overall biofuels 
market, but even a “supplier constraint” in terms of type of biofuels. The Energy Inde-
pendence and Security Act of 2007 mandates the use of 36 billion gallons of biofuels 
by 2022. Some 15 billion of those gallons must come from corn-based ethanol. The 
rest falls under the category of “advanced biofuels.” Within the latter category, 16 
billion gallons of the mandate were reserved for fuels derived from cellulosic biomass, 
such as wood chips, straw and wheat. One billion gallons must be biomass-based die-
sel [Gillies 2008]. 
The emphasis on corn-ethanol and corn as an input reflects a country-specific feature 
for directions of innovation and entrepreneurship by the country’s “natural resources” 
[Runge 2006:287]. Discussing entrepreneurship in biofuels in a global context one has 
to consider the relevance of national resources. This is for the US farmland, corn, soy-
bean and cereals resources and the related economy of the US “Corn Belt” – and 
political implications – and forests’ wood [Runge 2006:287]. Sugar as a natural re-
sources has been discussed above for Brazil. 
This means, national advantages in natural resources and traditional industries can be 
fused with related competencies in broad technological fields and thus provide the 
basis for technological advantages in new product fields and often new and strong 
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and innovative companies. As a corollary, this situation often induces strong political 
effects of the particular industry through lobbying on the federal and state level. 
With respect to end-use of transportation biofuels innovative and entrepreneurial ac-
tivities are also to a large extent country-specific. For instance, considering cars in the 
US there is a preference for gasoline combustion engines and little use of Diesel en-
gines and gas-powered engines. With regard to blending with bioethanol there is no 
broad use of FFVs, partly due to lacking infrastructure, whereas in Brazil FFVs domi-
nate. Also for gas-powered engines infrastructure is lacking in the US. But in Europe 
and particularly Germany Diesel engines are broadly used and even gas-powered 
cars can rely on a relatively well distributed infrastructure. 
 
Figure I.171: The biofuels industry: The segments and technical and commercial 
hurdles for the race across the value system. 
Concerning input (raw material and intermediates) in terms of the above discussions 
one might assume that the least expensive and most energy dense feedstock would 
be used to increase return on investment? No, it is not only the challenges to think 
about the logistics of the feedstock, but to consider the cost components and their 
mutual balances in the overall system. In tackling the competition with petro-fuel one 
must carefully weigh all the costs before settling on a business model. 
Think of all your inputs including transportation, costs for equipment and operations, 
process design (for instance, recycling energy from other parts of the process), needs 
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for license-in technologies, ultimate products and co-products etc. And, finally, know 
what the competition can offer in terms of price, quantity and quality. Furthermore, try 
to use the current fuel infrastructure. The problem is that British Petroleum and Exxon 
and Shell might not agree with the “newcomer.” These have to ask themselves: Who 
owns the infrastructure, and can we cooperate with them, with or without a govern-
ment role? 
The input-to-output path in Figure I.171 can essentially be broken down into the steps 
from raw material to output of a firm’s value chain (Figure I.7) and involves the scale-
up process displayed in Figure I.8. Relating a particular raw material basis to be “har-
vested” (dry or wet) from a given area of land (“point of collection” of a particular re-
gion) to the economic effects of the produced biobased transportation fuel (Figure 
I.171) provides an expression (Equation I.20) which makes “Land Productivity of 
Biomass/Waste” proportional to the key performance measures of the agricul-
ture/”farming,” biofuels and automotive industries. 
Equation I.20: 
 
With regard to the overall goals of saving energy and reducing CO2 emission one has 
also to consider, where both, farm and conversion yields, contribute through these ef-
ficiencies to the overall energy and climate balances. The target would be to compete 
with cost of $85-$100 per barrel mineral oil without public subsidies. Hence, consid-
erations of the following kind may be associated with intentions to start a biofuels firm. 
Our operating costs are lower than more traditional technologies, and as our 
technology is realizing higher yields and utilizing biomass more efficiently it 
can economically take biomass from a wider radius and capture economies of 
scale with larger production capacities. We can compete with $85-$100 min-
eral oil (unsubsidized cost between $2 and $3 per gallon). We can make that 
possible through use of 100-ton railroad cars of biomass instead of using 
trucks because we have a compression technology for biomass to make rail 
cost effective. 
As production and distribution of first-generation biofuels can follow largely estab-
lished input provision, production processes and other “beaten tracks” (no technical 
hurdles, “normal” commercial conditions, but acceptance and ethical issues discussed 
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in Box I.1) the value system given in Figure I.171 will only focus on second- and third-
generation biofuels with a number of hurdles to be overcome – and on the plenty of 
technical opportunities and myriad solutions to problems for entrepreneurship and 
intrapreneurship. 
From a general economic point of view biofuels may just represent a major compo-
nent for a “biorefinery” concept embedded in the concept of a “biobased economy” 
[Runge 2006:565-570, 578-585, 849-873]. In so far, any economic activities related to 
biofuels can view biofuels as a dedicated segment of transportation fuels or as a part 
of the broader concept of a biorefinery. 
In line with the last “hierarchy” in the US within the biomass program there is a 
“Recovery Act – Demonstration of Integrated Biorefinery Operations” which provides 
funding opportunities also for biofuels. 97 A number of biofuels startups to be dis-
cussed below achieved financing via the biofuels mandate or DOE funded biorefine-
ries (for instance, BlueFire Ethanol, Range Fuels, Mascoma, Verenium Biofuels 
Corporation). 
As a conclusion, biofuels are proving expensive in terms of upfront capital. Disregard-
ing end-product competition or substitutive potential, respectively, between types of 
biofuels among each other (Table I.82) and with respect to petrofuels, the economy of 
biofuels production for NTBFs and other involved firms is determined by local cost 
minima along the value system from “raw material” to “output” (Figure I.171, Equation 
I.20). The final metrics is “capital cost per gallon (liter) capacity.” 
Local minima depend on the following major parameters: 
 Feedstock: Type of biomass or waste, respectively (plant- and waste-based 
versus aquatic biomass like algae), cost of feedstock when cost of input in-
creases due to increased demand for biofuel production; 
 Cost of planting, growing, harvesting/collecting the biomass where the loca-
tion plays a role (national or international; for instance, BioMCN (Table I.87), 
GBL (Table I.95), BP/Verenium-Vercipia (Table I.84), Amyris (Table I.99); 
 Transportation, storage and pre-treatment of the biomass (Bioliq, Figure 
I.173); 
 The fundamental process cost – thermochemical, bioengineering, or biother-
mal “hybrid” process – with various cost reduction options, such as utilizing 
known overall processes (Fischer-Tropsch syngas, Figure I.174), utilizing 
lego-type existing technologies (BlueFire, ZeaChem – Table I.86,Table I.88.), 
genetically modified microbes or enzymes to increase yield/output or finding 
the “best” naturally occurring objects for fermentation, particular process step 
energy efficiency; 
 Increasing process efficiencies by various means, such as energy efficiency 
by processing intermediates and co-products which can be fed back into the 
process, minimizing water use; 
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 Separation and purification of end-products which again means issues of 
energy efficiencies (Cobalt, Table I.96); 
 Co-financing biofuels production by simultaneous co-manufacturing market-
able products, the “biorefinery model.” 
Moreover, continuous R&D is needed to improve conversion yields and also engineer-
ing has to follow a continuous improvement process to increase process efficiency. 
According to Figure I.171 in the end biofuels for transportation addresses the issues of 
blending petro-fuels with biofuels or replacing petro-gasoline. Therefore, it is important 
to be aware of players and ownerships in the current petroleum value system. The oil 
industry supply chain (Figure I.172) comprises upstream crude oil exploration and pro-
duction, and downstream refined products manufacturing.  
Refining can be associated with oil firms. However, there are also independent oil re-
finers. These oil refiners can also serve as blenders, for instance, blending gasoline 
with additives like octane boosters or with biofuels – bioethanol or biodiesel. 
This is followed by Wholesale product distribution from refineries (blenders) to primary 
distribution terminals and Retail delivery to final customers (end-users) with the auto-
motive industry interfering technically and government politically with the refin-
ery/blending stage. Figure I.172 depicts the sectors of the petroleum industry and 
shows that the oil industry is largely integrated across the whole value system. 
 
Figure I.172: The petroleum (oil industry) supply chain. 
Generic Factors Triggering the Current Biofuels Orientation 
The actual biofuel focus and related innovative and entrepreneurial activities occured 
as an additional peak of a progression cascading for more than one hundred years 
and triggered by parameters which are induced by comparable events or initiatives, 
respectively.  
The current situation exhibits some sort of “déjà vu” when Germany strove for syn-
thetic fuel during the 1920-1940 period [Runge 2006:271-272]. In comparison to 
previous ones the current step of the cascade is enforced essentially by four addi-
tional factors: 
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 Societal “green” attitudes in developed societies and climate change issues 
inducing political actions; 
 The “decentralization megatrend” (in particular, for energy); 
 The new biotechnological options of genetic modifications of microorganisms 
(and plants); 
 Additional (specific) financing options for technology and entrepreneurship in 
the biofuels sector by the venture capital industry. 
The current main political drivers for the biofuel industry in Europe and particularly the 
US are: 
1. Fight climate change, use environmentally friendly, “renewable” energy, re-
duce the “carbon footprint,” which is the total amount of greenhouse gases 
produced to directly and indirectly support human activities, usually expressed 
in equivalent tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
2. Dramatically reduce, or even end, dependency on foreign petro-oil; in the US 
the focus is to reduce dependency on imported petro-oil, Germany looks at 
changing its power mix in favor of “renewable energy sources” (RESs). 
3. Spur the creation of a domestic bioindustry emphasizing concepts of a bio-
based economy and biorefineries. A special origin of this direction is the wide-
spread belief that petro-oil oil supply will cease “soon.” 
The new biotechnology options for biofuels occurred in line with scientific/technical 
progress for the bio-agricultural field. On the other hand, the second and third drivers 
are interwoven. These drivers initiated corresponding technical innovations in Ger-
many and the US which are still the basis for current biofuel developments. What has 
changed essentially is the variability of the raw material input. 
For Germany, immediately before World War I and then until the WWII for aggression 
self-sufficiency (“autarky”) became a characteristics of national security policy. Areas 
of interest were formulated as interests to the national administration and the military, 
many of them being chemical areas for civilian and military purposes: hydrogenation 
of coal (synthetic fuel), more efficiency for use of German coal, fertilizers, artificial fi-
bers, synthetic rubber, fermentation technology to release Germany from imports of 
alcohol etc. Striving for self-sufficiency peaked just before and during the two world 
wars. 
Additionally, over the past 150 years, geologists and other scientists have regularly 
predicted that the world’s oil reserves would run dry within a few years. Particularly, in 
1922 the US Geological Survey predicted that the US only has energy oil supply to 
last 20 years which spurred innovation and cooperation activities in and between Ger-
man and US firms [Runge 2006: 424, 564-565]. 
Currently, there is again a public discussion when oil fields will dry up, that global oil 
production is about to peak (“peak oil”) and that there is an absolute end of cheap oil 
mainly by ever increasing demand from China and India. The bioindustry orientation 
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occurred parallel with the 1920s “oil issue” in terms of the “Chemurgy Movement” in 
the US, which can be seen as a bottom-up entrepreneurial approach, and the German 
plant-based “Ersatzstoff”-approach which was largely driven by government [Runge 
2006:565-566]. 
Generally, in Germany (and the US) the emphasis was on the involvement of huge 
companies with the financial power to master the challenge for synthetic fuel and 
rubber [Runge 2006:270-272]. Rubber brings in aspects of the current “biorefinery” 
concept. The German synthetic rubber “BUNA S” was produced in Germany and the 
US. But, in both countries governmental guarantees for price and sales quantities 
were needed. In the US additionally governmental financing of related plants were 
necessary to start large-scale industrial production on BUNA S. 
In this context, industry and academia interactions and “technology transfer” in the US 
for developing the synthetic rubber between DuPont and the University of Notre Dame 
is notable. Notre Dame’s most famous effort in technology transfer was Father Julius 
Nieuwland’s groundbreaking work with polymerized-2-chloro-1,3-butadiene, which led 
to two patents and the development of Neoprene in 1931 by the DuPont chemical 
company. That particular bit of “intellectual property” was very good fortune for the 
Notre Dame University – some $2 million when the royalty payments ceased in 1948 
[Streb 2002, Runge 2006:272, 692]. 
The 1973 first oil crisis started when the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries or the OPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus 
Egypt, Syria and Tunisia) proclaimed an oil embargo “in response to the U.S. decision 
to re-supply the Israeli military” during the Yom Kippur War. It lasted until March 1974. 
For the most part, industrialized economies relied on crude oil, and OPEC was their 
predominant supplier. With the US actions seen as initiating the oil embargo, the long-
term possibility of embargo-related high oil prices, disrupted supply and recession 
occurred. Correspondingly, in the industrial countries there was a strong movement to 
become independent from OPEC oil. 
Due to expensive oil the energy crisis led to greater interest in renewable 
energy and spurred university and other publicly funded research in solar 
power and wind power. It also led to greater pressure to exploit North Ameri-
can oil sources, and increased the West’s dependence on coal and nuclear 
power. Notably, already at that time, the Brazilian government implemented a 
very large project called “Proálcool” (pro-alcohol) that ultimately led to blend 
gasoline with ethanol for automotive fuel (for FFVs). This project, which pro-
duces ethanol from sugar cane, continues and has reduced oil imports and 
decreased the price of fuel [Seraphim 2009]. 
The 1973 “oil price shock,” along with the 1973–1974 stock market crash, has been 
regarded as the first event since the Great Depression to have a persistent economic 
effect. The second (1979) oil price crisis in the US occurred in the wake of the Iranian 
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Revolution. In 1980, following the Iraqi invasion of Iran, oil production in Iran nearly 
stopped, and Iraq’s oil production was severely cut as well. However, after 1980, oil 
prices began a six-year decline that culminated with a 46 percent price drop in 1986. 
This was due to reduced demand and over-production, which caused OPEC to lose its 
unity. 
In 1979 US President Jimmy Carter outlined his plans to reduce oil imports 
and improve energy efficiency in his “Crisis of Confidence” speech. Acting as 
an example he had already installed solar power panels on the roof of the 
White House and a wood-burning stove in the living quarters. 98 
Correspondingly, again several governmental research programs, initiatives and pilot 
projects started worldwide with regard to “renewable energy,” adding hydrogen and 
algae options (see below). 
Around 2000 the idea of a “biobased economy” emerged with the “biorefinery” as a 
central concept [Runge 2006:849-873]. Not only biofuels, but many other CleanTech 
areas occurred in the spot, such as photovoltaic (PV; solar cells) and solarthermics 
(solar thermal energy), fuel cells and batteries, and wind turbines (ch. 4.3.5.2). And 
related innovative and entrepreneurial activities relied considerably on governments 
and further developments and refinements on several decades old or century old 
scientific insights and technologies. 
A.1.1.3 Intrapreneurship and Entrepreneurship in 
Biofuels: The Biomass-to-Biofuels Boom 
For biofuels for the transportation sector the economic realities for startups show up 
as an exertion of power and resources as well as the streamlined utilization of finan-
cial and infrastructural resources of incumbents. Apart from corporate-internal activi-
ties, the theme is innovation of (mostly) giant companies by means of interrelating to 
NTBFs and other firms (Table I.83; Figure I.41, Figure I.51) following rather common 
New Business Development (NBD) approaches given below [Runge 2006:722-730]. 
 Corporate sponsorship and funding of external basic and applied research in 
universities and public research organizations; 
 Joint research and/or development alliances (JRAs, JDAs) with startups and 
NTBFs; special cooperation by which big firm will receive R&D samples from 
NTBFs for tests; 
 Joint ventures with related firms or investing directly or indirectly in startups 
through “corporate venturing,” preferentially in startups/NTBFs in a later stage 
of development (ch. 1.2.7.2); on the other hand, interrelated NTBFs have 
access to the resources of the firm’s stakeholders, for instance, get help, ad-
vice and consulting for process and plant engineering and biofuel analytics 
(cf. Shell, BP); 
 License-in from startups and NTBFs; 
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 “Cherry picking” (picking “winners”) from the masses of early- and late-stage 
startups in the world fitting their current value chain and long-term strategy 
rather than doing  own research and intrapreneurship; 
 Utilizing the firms’ capabilities to tap to their advantages into the various finan-
cial resources and other aids of policy to fuel inventions and technology deve-
lopments. 
Some of the giant firms had already technical/commercial footsteps in biofuels. For 
instance, Shell and BP had already large mix-in of ethanol and experiences in proc-
essing and plant engineering; Dupont synthesized successfully the alcohol 1,3-pro-
panediol by fermentation. 
From Table I.83 and further related text one may extract the following specifics con-
cerning intrapreneurship of giant companies from the oil, chemical and automotive in-
dustries in biofuels. 
 There is pronounced sponsoring/funding of universities and public research 
organizations by BP, DuPont and Chevron. BP, for instance, provided $500 
million over ten years to establish a dedicated biosciences energy research 
laboratory attached to a major academic center in the US; the Energy Bio-
sciences Institute (EBI) is led by Berkeley and with Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
There are numerous alliances and cooperations of oil and chemical giant firms with in-
vestments in startups and “later-stage” NTBFs to tackle different technologies and/or 
developments targeting different steps of the value system (Figure I.171). 
Shell was said to have over 70 research alliances in biofuels [Kanellos 2009a]. And 
also large firms that were around 20 years in corn ethanol like privately held US firm 
Poet LLC set up alliances to enter cellulosic ethanol. Poet had a network of 26 plants 
in seven US states producing ca. 1.25 billion gallons of ethanol annually (revenues of 
$4 billion in 2008). 
 JVs and other forms of alliances show also up for oil/chemical giants with 
other large firms. 
For instance, there are the DuPont’s connections with Genencor (a unit of 
Denmark’s Danisco, now belonging to DuPont) and Poet LLC emphasizing 
cellulosic ethanol and also Shell’s connections with the Canadian firm Iogen in 
cellulosic ethanol [Runge 2006:858; Gold 2009]. 
Poet’s research discovered an enzyme and designed a process that allows 
converting the starch from corn kernels into sugar and fermenting it without 
using heat. The process for cellulosic ethanol, which Poet commissioned to 
Danish industrial biotech giant Novozymes to develop, shall reduce energy 
consumption and increase its yield of ethanol in the fermented mix [Dolan 
2008]. 
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 By 2008 a new emphasis on algae emerged as a raw material for biofuels 
(biogasoline and biodiesel). 
In particular, its late entry into biofuels suggests that ExxonMobile bets on 
photosynthetic algae to be a viable, long-term candidate raw material for vari-
ous types of biofuels. BP seemed to give it a try and also Shell and DuPont. 
And chemical giant Dow Chemical planned an algae biofuels pilot. The joint 
project with the firm Algenol (A.1.4, Figure I.179) should test a process to turn 
CO2 into ethanol [Voith 2009a]. 
 It seemed that Shell’s “biogasoline” (“normal gasoline” and diesel) versus 
DuPont/BP’s cellulosic ethanol and biobutanol (and biodiesel) emerges as the 
heavyweight fight for the future of the gas tank. 
Recently, French oil giant Total also joined the biobutanol option [Gold 2009a] 
through an investment in the startup Gevo, Inc. (Table I.99) 
 Automotive companies “synchronized” their developments with developments 
in biofuels through investments in selected NTBFs. 
For instance, not only Shell had stakes in the German firm CHOREN Tech-
nologies, but also the German automotive giants VW and Daimler had ones 
[Runge 2006:254-255; Kempkens 2009]. Correspondingly, Mascoma (Table 
I.99) snagged $100 million in funding from General Motors (GM), Marathon 
Oil and other investors plus millions more in government grants, and aimed to 
produce cellulosic ethanol from wood chips using genetically engineered bac-
teria [Langreth 2008]. 
GM and Coskata (Table I.99) said their partnership will enable them to work together 
on ethanol research and development, as well as to build the infrastructure needed to 
commercialize the biofuel. GM said it will utilize the fuel from the demonstration facil-
ity, and will also provide some of its carbon-based waste, like old tires, as a feedstock 
for Coskata [Fehrenbacher 2008]. And Virent Energy’s investor Honda was testing 
Virent’s fuels in engines [LaMonica 2009]. 
The JV of Chevron with Weyerhaeuser (Catchlight Energy) was remarkable in that the 
JV would study “not only the technology, but also the commercial implications of 
creating a viable business. It should devise a sustainable business model “from the 
forest lands to the fuel.” That involves harvesting timber, transporting it, breaking 
technological ground to process it into biofuel, and finding ways of transporting and 
distributing the fuel [González 2008]. 
The BP/DuPont partnership, Butamax Advanced Biofuels, should focus on developing 
a technology program to produce biobutanol from many different types of feedstock 
and was expected to license the technology to produce biobutanol to other biofuel 
producers. It would work closely with Kingston Research Ltd., another JV between BP 
and DuPont. Kingston Research would be constructing a biobutanol demonstration 
plant in the UK. [Lane 2009h; Lane 2009i]. Biobutanol can be blended with any fuel – 
gasoline, diesel or ethanol – or can be used as a bio-alternative to chemicals. 
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Butamax can be characterized (business model, strategy; status 2009) as follows 
[Anonymus 2008; Lane 2009h]: 
 Develop and commercialize biobutanol targeting advanced metabolic path-
ways for 1-butanol as well as other higher octane biobutanol isomers; 
develop biocatalysts to produce 1-butanol as well as 2-butanol and iso-
butanol – the higher octane biobutanol isomers that are of increased interest 
and utility from a fuels perspective (“high octane biobutanol”), 
develop a genetically-modified microbe, or “ultimate bug,” as the catalyst for 
new technology to significantly improve the conversion ratio in processing 
feedstock into biobutanol, boosting fuel yield and concentration [Chase 2006]; 
have a strong intellectual property position in the butanol areas of greatest 
interest through patents covering the higher octane isomers as well as the 
previously announced 1-butanol patents; 
 Not only improve the bio-process to produce commercial volumes of biobu-
tanol, but also pursue an integrated commercialization strategy that incorpo-
rates building pilot and commercial scale facilities, a complete fuel evaluation, 
and a full environmental life cycle analysis, 
work with fuel blenders and distributors globally to introduce biobutanol into 
the fuels market; 
 License the technology to produce biobutanol to other biofuel producers; 
 Deliver by 2010 a superior biobutanol manufacturing process with economics 
equivalent to ethanol and commercially produce biobutanol in 2013 [Lane 
2009h]. 
Three other (new) ventures, advanced in their routes towards commercial production 
and working on butanol-based solutions, are in the US, ButylFuel (below text), Cobalt 
Biofuels (Table I.96) and Gevo (Table I.99) and in the UK Green Biologics (Table 
I.95). 
“Cellulosic ethanol,” as opposed to sugar or starch-based (corn) ethanol, broadens the 
choice of feedstock without impacting food supplies. But bioethanol – whether from 
corn or new sources – runs into something called the “blending wall.” Right now much 
of the gasoline in the US (and Germany) contains 10 percent ethanol (E10), which 
works fine in today’s cars and trucks. However, automakers worry that higher levels 
will damage engine components. So they will void the warranties of most vehicles 
running on richer ethanol blends. But there is more (Table I.82), if performance of 
different biofuels is compared [Kiplinger Washington Editors 2007]. 
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Table I.82: Comparing the biofuels bioethanol, biobutanol, biogasoline and their fit 
with existing infrastructure and vehicle compatibility. 
Properties, 
Features 
Bioethanol 
(EtOH) 
Biobutanol 
(BuOH) 
Biogasoline 
Energy Efficiency; 
Mileage Efficiency 
70 percent of the 
mileage of petro-
gasoline (“hydro-
carbons”) 
88 percent of the 
mileage of petro-
gasoline; 
lower vapor pres-
sure – less volatile 
(than EtOH), more 
comparable oc-
tane number with 
petro-gasoline, 
especially if also 
isobutanol is in 
place 
Comparable with 
petro-gasoline, 
has ca. 50 percent 
more BTUs 
(British thermal 
units) per gallon 
than EtOH does 
Water content Attracts water, 
separating EtOH 
from water in the 
production is 
energy-intense 
Does not attract 
water like EtOH, 
can be transported 
in existing pipe-
lines and is less 
sensitive to colder 
temperatures. 
Negligible 
Other Features  Very important 
chemical solvent 
and intermediate 
 
Blending with 
Petro-Gasoline 
Restricted blend-
ing with petro-
gasoline: 
“Blending Wall” 
E10 (max. 10%)  
Blending with 
petro-gasoline (in 
higher concentra-
tion than EtOH) or 
replacing (100%) 
To any extent; 
replacing petro-
gasoline 
Transportation, 
Fuel Station 
Infrastructure 
Need for separate 
ethanol infrastruc-
ture; damage (cor-
rosion) by high 
water content 
(trucks, trains, 
barges and pipe-
lines) 
Can be trans-
ported in existing 
pipelines and is 
less sensitive to 
colder tempera-
tures. 
Compatible with 
existing petro-
leum-based infra-
structure 
 956 Appendix A 
Table I.82, continued. 
Performance in 
Vehicles 
Needed “flux fuel 
vehicles” (E85); 
damages “normal” 
combustion en-
gines 
No need to retrofit 
vehicles; shown 
that cars can run 
on pure biobutanol 
Compatible with 
existing vehicle 
(combustion 
engine) operation 
The data in this table reveal one central issues of biofuels legislation. It is bioethanol 
and biodiesel oriented. But what is more serious is the fact that usually governmental 
incentives and tax credits are done on a volume (per-gallon) basis. In essence, in the 
US ethanol is getting an unusually large credit, considering that it got ca. 20 percent 
less energy per gallon than biobutanol and more than 50 percent less than biogaso-
line. Although large volumes of cellulosic ethanol may be used in the coming decade 
and beyond, its long-term technical feasibility has been questioned because of its low 
energy density. 
To put the level of development of biofuels into perspective with regard to have a full 
commercial large-scale plant (Figure I.171) consider Iogen Energy partnering with 
Royal Dutch Shell on a demonstration-scale cellulosic ethanol plant that sold its output 
in 2009 at a single station in Ottawa, Canada. Emphasizing the demand side, the 
plant produced about 40,000 liters a month (10,560 gallons). By way of comparison, 
Canada drank 30.2 million gallons of gasoline every day in 2008 and the US guzzled 
377.6 million gallons daily. In 2008 in the US ca. 140 billion liters were consumed, in 
Germany 45 billion liters [Seidler 2009]. 
In 2009 some new firms already were building – or contemplating building – industrial 
scale facilities, for instance, CHOREN Industries in Germany (below text) or Verenium 
(Table I.84) in the US [Gold 2009a]. 
Scaling-up (Figure I.8) to produce biofuels on a commercial scale is the tricky part for 
related startups or NTBFs. That has been the hard part for all of the cellulosic ethanol 
startups. But it was the big oil companies that were perceived to may help these 
companies eventually reach commercial scale. 
Key intrapreneurial and innovative activities of oil and chemical giants in biofuels dur-
ing the period 2005-2009 are summarized in Table I.83. 
One business model for startups for rapidly expanding to commercial-scale operations 
focuses on collaborations being formed between biofuel startups and “Big Energy” 
which are comparable to the partnerships formed between biotech startups and big 
pharmaceutical companies. For US Codexis the Shell deal reflects a desire to apply 
its biotechnology to markets beyond pharmaceuticals. Alan Shaw (then CEO of 
Codexis) said Codexis will soon be forming a new business to further its efforts in the 
bioindustrial field [McCoy 2006]. 
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Shell’s deal with microbe/enzyme producer Codexis strikes at the heart of the big 
challenges standing in the way of biofuel’s coming of age: How to economically turn 
starches into sugars. Once cellulosic material like wheat stalks and corn stovers are 
broken down, they can be fermented just like corn and turned into ethanol. The pro-
blem so far has been finding a way to cheaply, quickly, and massively break down 
huge amounts of agricultural or municipal waste and having microorganisms that con-
vert efficiently not only C6, but also C5 sugars into ethanol. Basically, converting bio-
mass to biofuels requires breakthrough developments in three areas: 
 chemical preparation of the cellulosic biomass (pre-treatment) and separation 
of the cellulose and hemicellulose parts from the lignin, 
 conversion of pretreated cellulosic biomass to fermentable sugars (degrading 
the chemical bonds of the cellulose/hemicellulose) by combinations of en-
zymes (saccharification), 
 and the development of novel microorganisms to ferment the sugars to 
ethanol or other fuels (fermentation). 
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The investment of BP in Verenium (Table I.84; itself created from Celulol and Diversa; 
Table I.99) and finally in their JV, Vercipia Biofuels, emerged as an exemplary bio-
engineering-oriented route of a biofuel innovation path of a large (giant) company 
(Table I.83, Table I.84): Starting with corporate venturing and ending with acquiring 
the whole ligno-cellulosic biofuels business of Verenium which is now run under the 
name BP Biofuels Highlands. Main features and innovative characteristics of 
Verenium are given in Table I.84, additional details for Verenium are found with Lane 
[2009g]. 
Table I.84: Verenium targeted by BP focusing on its biofuels business. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major Funding CEO, Other Executives, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection 
Verenium 
Corporation, 
Cambridge, MA 
Formed in 2007 by a 
merger of Diversa 
and Celulol (Table 
I.99). 
Headquartered in 
Cambridge, MA, has 
research and opera-
tions facilities in San 
Diego, CA; 
Jennings, LA 
(Verenium Biofuels, 
LLC) and 
Gainesville, FL. 
Organizational 
Units: 
Biofuels Business, 
Specialty Enzyme 
Business, 
R&D 
(complementary 
components of bio-
fuels). 
Markets Served: 
Biofuels, Industrial 
Processes, Health & 
Nutrition 
Annual Revenues 
and Losses 
As of March 31, 2007 
had cash, cash-equi-
valents and short-
term investments on 
hand of ca. $125.5M; 
together with approxi-
mately $20M [Childs 
2007]. 
 
In 2008, the Jennings 
Facility was selected 
for an award under a 
$240M federal pro-
gram, operated by 
the US Department of 
Energy, to support 
the development of 
up to nine small-scale 
biorefineries in the 
US. 
 
BP’s $112.5 million 
total investment is 
one of the largest by 
an oil major in an 
advanced biofuels 
company, BP has 
invested an additional 
$22.5M in Verenium 
and formed a joint 
venture Vercipia  
[Lane 2009a]. 
BP put up $90M to 
Carlos A. Riva President and CEO; Riva joined 
Celunol as CEO in 2006, prior to joining 
Celunol, from 2003 to 2005;  Riva served as 
Executive Director of Amec PLC, a major global 
construction and engineering company based 
in UK; from 1995 to 2003;  Riva served as CEO 
of InterGen, a joint venture between Shell and 
Bechtel that developed more than 18,000 
megawatts of electric generating capacity; 
William H. Baum Executive VP Business 
Development since 2007 after the merger of 
Diversa Corporation and Celunol Corporation; 
joined Diversa in 1997 as VP Sales and 
Marketing, then Senior VP Business Develop-
ment and to Executive VP Chemical, Agri-
culture, and Industrial Enzymes Business; 
Gregory Powers Executive VP, Research and 
Development with Verenium since 2008; before  
joining Verenium, Dr. Powers was VP of Global 
Engineering at United Technologies Corpora-
tion’s Carrier Division, (responsible for all 
engineering activity and strategy development 
supporting core innovation for the company), 
held various positions with the General Electric 
Company; 
Janet Roemer Executive VP Specialty 
Enzymes Business Unit; prior to joining 
Verenium, Ms. Roemer held several positions 
with BP Group, e.g. chief executive of a $1.7 
billion North American chemical business; 
Has a substantial intellectual property position, 
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($, mio.): 
 
2008: 57, (26) 
2009: 49, (15) 
2010: 52, (14) 
2011: 61, (6.5) 
(FORM 10-K 
(Annual Report of 
03/05/2012) 
 
For Vercipia: 
Net losses: 
$10,353,177 (2009), 
$6,251,816 (2008) 
[Vercipia 2010] 
develop “low-cost, 
environmentally 
sound cellulosic 
ethanol production 
facilities in the US.” 
Through a second 
deal, BP agreed to 
provide additionally 
$45 mil. and to form a 
JV with Verenium for 
construction of a 
cellulosic ethanol pro-
duction plant near 
Tampa, FL., 
estimated to cost 
close to $400M; the 
JV has sought federal 
loan guarantees to 
cover 80 percent of 
that pricetag 
[Bigelow 2009a] 
including more than 250 issued patents and 
more than 350 patent applications, as of March 
2009 [Lane 2009g], 
in September 2010, Verenium completed a sale 
of its ligno-cellulosic biofuels business to BP, 
refocusing the company on its historical 
strength in enzyme development 
(FORM 10-K Annual Report of 03/05/2012). 
Technology, Goals 
Business Model: 
Rely on 
alliances/JV; 
Has a strong IP po-
sition (patents), and 
holds exclusive 
rights to commer-
cialize University of 
Florida technology 
for cellulosic ethanol 
production 
License-out and 
technology transfer 
Biomass from 
nearby sources 
Announced plans to 
build first commer-
cial cellulosic etha-
nol plant in 
Highlands County, 
Florida, with a target 
Emphasis on cellulosic ethanol; 
Verenium is a vertically-integrated firm in the biofuels industry through 
the combination of assets, technologies and personnel.  
Verenium claims to be the only company to offer fully integrated, end-to-
end capabilities in pre-treatment, novel enzyme development, fermenta-
tion, engineering and project development [Childs 2007], “full range of 
‘field-to-pump’ capabilities,” 
has combination of enzyme discovery and enzyme evolution platforms. 
Enables conversion of nearly all of the sugars found in cellulosic bio-
mass, including both five-carbon and six-carbon sugars, 
Uses a combination of microorganisms and specialty enzymes to con-
vert up to 95% of available sugars in biomass feedstocks into fuel 
ethanol. 
The Jennings 1.4 million gallons-per-year (MGY) demonstration plant 
will draw on locally grown sugarcane bagasse and specially bred energy 
cane; 
in 2009 optimizing its 1.4 million-gallon-per-year demonstration-scale 
facility. 
Verenium has established the Jennings site as a permanent cellulosic 
ethanol “Center of Excellence,” where future plant operators will be 
trained for roles in other commercial sites; 
the Jennings technology was transferred to BP’s plants in Brazil after 
operations commenced at the US facility [Lane 2009c]. 
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capacity of up to 36 
mil. gallons per year 
(MGY) 
In addition, the Company’s process technology has been licensed by 
Tokyo-based Marubeni Corp. and Tsukishima Kikai Co., Ltd. and has 
been incorporated into BioEthanol Japan’s 1.4 million liter-per-year 
cellulosic ethanol plant in Osaka, Japan; 
Verenium and Marubeni are continuing to advance the commercializa-
tion of cellulosic ethanol projects utilizing Verenium’s proprietary tech-
nology in Asia with the opening of a three million-liter-per-year plant in 
Saraburi, Thailand 
Verenium’s goal: from a cost standpoint to be producing ethanol that is 
competitive with (today’s) grain ethanol (~$2/gal) [Lane 2009g]. 
Business Model Biofuels [Lane 2009g]: 
Develop integrated solutions for the emerging cellulosic ethanol industry 
for use in production facilities that the firm owns and operates, indivi-
dually or jointly with partners, as well as those of third-party licensees; 
develop novel, high-performance enzymes and to advance technology 
and process development capabilities, together with BP, at the pilot and 
demonstration-scale plants in Jennings, Louisiana, and the first planned 
commercial facility in Highlands County, Florida (36 MGY facility is ex-
pected to begin commercial production in 2012);  
exploit opportunities in the developing market for the production of cellu-
losic ethanol; 
incorporate scientific and engineering skills into the production facilities; 
achieve increased product sales and profit margins to support the future 
growth and profitability of the firm’s portfolio of products sold directly by 
Verenium and by partners. 
The BP/Verenium JV Vercipia Biofuels JV planned the first commercial-
scale cellulosic ethanol facility in Highlands County, Florida and ex-
pected to break ground on that site in 2010. The estimated construction 
cost for this 36 million gallon-per-year facility is between $250 and $300 
million. Production from this plant was expected to begin in 2012 [BP 
2009]. 
Another cost estimate: the project will cost close to $400 million, and the 
joint venture has sought federal loan guarantees to cover 80 percent of 
that pricetag [Bigelow 2009a; BP 2009]. 
Verenium will pursue distribution, research, marketing or production 
partnerships or alliances 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference;  
firm’s status: early 2010. 
Shell’s approach to biogasoline and biodiesel for transportation is essentially reflected 
by the interconnections with the German CHOREN Industries and Virent Energy 
Systems (Table I.85) and with HR BioPetroleum (Table I.89) focusing on biogasoline 
(including biodiesel). 
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Table I.85: Virent Energy Systems as a target of Shell regarding biogasoline and 
hydrogen. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major Funding CEO, Other Executives, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection 
Virent Energy 
Systems, Inc. 
Madison, WI 
(2002) 
 
Founded by Dr. 
Randy Cortright and 
Prof. James 
Dumesic to commer-
cialize the Aqueous 
Phase Reforming 
(APR) process, a 
technology the two 
invented and pat-
ented while at the 
University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
Started as Virent 
Energy Systems 
LLC. 
Employees: 
2003: 5 
2004: 12 
2007: 54 
2008: 68 
2009: 75. 
Revenues: 
2007: $4M (top line) 
2008: $11M 
[Gillies 2009]. 
 
Having received 
prestigious govern-
ment and industry 
recognition, Virent 
will seek to manu-
facture, and not just 
license technology, 
2003: wins a com-
petitive Advanced 
Technology Program 
(ATP) grant. 
2004: grants awarded 
by the US Depart-
ment of Energy to fur-
ther advance Virent’s 
hydrogen research; 
$2.2M in Federal 
funding, $550k in 
State funding, and 
raised $300k of pri-
vate equity seed 
money. 
2006: $2M grant from 
the US Department of 
Agriculture and 
Department of 
Energy for develop-
ment of converting 
glycerol (co-product 
of biodiesel produc-
tion) into renewable 
propylene glycol. 
2007: $11M in federal 
funding including a 
second Advanced 
Technology Program 
grant from the 
National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology. 
2007: raised over 
$30M in equity fi-
nancing. 
By 2009: raised 
about $70M, some 
Lee Edwards President & CEO; Edwards 
brings 25 years of global energy leadership and 
petroleum industry experience to Virent; was 
President and CEO of BP Solar, a global solar 
technology provider; Edwards held a range of 
executive positions; 
Eric Apfelbach President and CEO; 
was replaced in 2008 by a person “likely to 
have experience in energy markets” (Edwards). 
Dr. Randy Cortright Founder & Chief Technical 
Officer; 
is experienced in the field of catalytic process-
ing of biomass-derived feedstock into chemi-
cals and fuels, is the co-inventor of Aqueous 
Phase Reforming (APR), the innovative path-
way to biofuels and bioproducts used by the 
BioForming® technology platform. 
His background includes research and develop-
ment, process design, start-up, and operations 
of large scale industrial catalytic processes at 
UOP LLC, a provider of petroleum and petro-
chemical process technologies. 
After leaving UOP, Dr. Cortright earned his 
PhD in Chemical Engineering, from the 
University of Wisconsin. In academia, he spe-
cialized in catalytic systems for the clean manu-
facturing of fuels and petrochemicals. He holds 
seven issued patents. 
2008: Virent owns or holds the exclusive rights 
to 17 pending or issued patents in the US and 
41 pending or issued patents in other countries; 
6 issued US patents, 2 US patent applications, 
and 25 foreign patent and patent applications 
are the subject of exclusive and irrevocable li-
censes from the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation (WARF). 
Virent is the only source for liquid conversion of 
sugar-based feedstock into hydrogen and 
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boils down to “con-
tinuous improve-
ment.” 
In March 2010 
Virent and Shell 
started up a demon-
stration plant at its 
facilities in Madison, 
Wisconsin, as part 
of the development 
deal that Virent and 
Shell started in 
2008. 
$40M from corporate 
investors and govern-
ment grants and 
$30M in venture capi-
tal arms of Honda, 
Cargill and other 
companies; 
expected to raise $25 
million to $40 million 
[Gardner 2009, 
LaMonica 2009] 
alkanes. Hydrogen is also a key interest of 
Shell. 
Technology, Goals 
Technology demar-
cation point in terms 
of cost competitive-
ness: crude oil will 
remain above the 
$60 per barrel mark. 
Business Model: 
Biorefinery orienta-
tion for own produc-
tion; 
technology licens-
ing; 
retrofitting existing 
ethanol plants to 
Virent’s process. 
Partnering with 
major energy (Shell) 
and agricultural 
(Cargill – supply 
chain) companies; 
is building a 10,000 
gallon per year 
plant, to build a 100 
million gallon per 
year plant by 2015 
[Gardner 2009]. 
Started to commercialize the Aqueous Phase Reforming (APR) process 
by which hydrogen is generated from sugar. Technology has evolved 
into the BioForming™ process, which enables the production of renew-
able products: 
Liquid Biofuels (“biogasoline”) 
Chemicals (e.g. propylene glycol) 
Fuel Gases (hydrogen – H2) 
The BioForming™ process is thermochemical. 
2006: expanding the BioForming technology to convert plant sugars into 
hydrocarbon molecules (“biogasoline”). Virent’s BioForming platform 
technology employs low temperature aqueous-phase reforming and 
solid state catalyst (rather than microbes) to convert plant sugars into 
hydrocarbon molecules. Focuses on catalyst composition, reactor de-
sign, and reaction conditions. 
The BioForming process can economically utilize many types of bio-
mass and carbohydrates from cellulosic and biomass-derived feedstock: 
Glycerol (also named glycerin; by-product of biodiesel production from 
vegetable or animal oil); 
Glucose and Sucrose (from sugar crops);  
Starches (glucose containing polysaccharides); 
Long-chained glucose contained in cellulose (plant cell walls); 
C5 and C6 sugars, such as xylose, arabinose, and glucose contained in 
hemicellulose (part of the protective covering around cellulose). 
Is already processing mixed sugar streams. 
Looked at what is a long-term, sustainable way to get biomass feed-
stock into the process. Thinks sugarcane and the plant that the sugar 
cane comes from are going to be the cheapest, most scalable feedstock 
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on a global basis for quite a while. 
Virent’s pitch is explicitly anti-ethanol. 
Around a quarter of existing ethanol production capacity is of the wet 
mill type which could be converted to low temperature catalytic 
BioForming technology for biogasoline production at significantly lower 
capital costs than would be needed for new Virent plants. 
Hopes to license its fuel process [Gardner 2009]; 
is building its own full-scale production refinery to reap maximum margin 
from end products and gain a direct feedback loop for improvement of 
its process. 
Finally, in 2007 Shell Hydrogen LLC and Virent set up a five-year joint 
development agreement to develop further and commercialize Virent’s 
BioForming technology platform for hydrogen production (worldwide 
market for distributed and centralized hydrogen is estimated at approxi-
mately 45 million tons each year) [Shell 2007]. 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference;  firm’s status: end of 2009; 
for more information cf. “Virent-Story-Through-2011.pdf” provided on its Web site. 
Virent’s business model is not focused on biofuels alone, but emphasizes a “biorefin-
ery model” which is directed toward biofuels, biochemicals and biomaterials [Runge 
2006:849-866] and adds a specialty (fuel cell grade) hydrogen gas which finds also 
applications in semiconductor manufacturing, ammonia production or in gas chroma-
tography analytics (as a carrier gas). Correspondingly, Virent has a joint agreement 
with Shell Hydrogen, a subsidiary of Shell Oil Co., to produce hydrogen from renew-
able glycerol and sugar-based products [Vanden Plas 2007].  
The development of Virent’s BioForming® technology platform is supported through 
strategic partners including Cargill, Coca-Cola, Honda and Shell, as well as 80 em-
ployees (by 2013) based in Madison, Wisconsin. Virent recently signed agreements 
with the Coca-Cola Company to provide the technology and biobased chemical 
Paraxylene to create 100 percent plant-based, renewable PlantBottle® packaging. 
The company has received several grants from the US Departments of Commerce, 
Energy and Agriculture and has been recognized with many honors, including the 
World Economic Forum Technology Pioneer award and the EPA’s Presidential Green 
Chemistry Challenge Award.  
The fundamental process Virent is relying on is one hundred years old and was devel-
oped in Germany. In the early 1900s, research on the extraction of chemicals and 
energy from coal in Germany was focused on two primary approaches [Runge 
2006:424-425]. 
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• Direct liquefaction under pressure by converting coal into liquids with the help 
of hydrogen and heavy oils (Bergius process; Coal-to-Liquids, CtL), and 
• Indirect liquefaction by first gasifying coal and then converting the resulting 
gas into liquids through the process of the Fischer-Tropsch (FT) synthesis 
(Gas-to-Liquids (GtL)). The process converts a mixture of carbon monoxide 
(CO) and hydrogen (H2) called “synthesis gas” (“syngas”) to liquid hydro-
carbons using, for instance, iron and cobalt catalysts. A special, currently very 
economic route of the GtL process uses natural gas. 
Over time the FT process has been subjected continuously to modifications, became 
an established technology and is still applied on a large scale. Currently, two compa-
nies have commercialized their FT technology, Shell (in Malaysia) and Sasol (several 
plants in South Africa), using natural gas and coal as feedstock to produce the syn-
gas, respectively. In South Africa CtL is used on a large scale to produce automotive 
fuels from coal. 
In the US Bioconversion Technology, LLC, (BCT) founded in 2003 and essentially led 
by Robert E. “Bud” Klepper and Kenneth L. Klepper, started with an emphasis on 
gasification (“anaerobic thermal conversion”). Bud Klepper was the inventor (and 
patent holder) of a gasification process capable of processing 25-35 tons per day of 
coal to synthesis gas. Bud Klepper’s engineering company generated syngas from 
coal, coal slurry, coal fines, but also other biomass feedstock. The gasification tech-
nology is called the Klepper Pyrolytic Steam Reforming Gasifier (PSRG) with a Staged 
Temperature Reaction Process (STRP). A separate Klepper Ethanol Reactor catalyti-
cally converts syngas into ethanol. 
According to a comparative evaluation of such systems the Klepper system has the 
highest energy efficiency of any system and the highest syngas energy content of any 
thermochemical biomass conversion system that has been developed for biomass 
inputs of less than 1,000 tons/day [Green Car Congress 2005; Green Car Congress 
2007b]. BCT created revenues by licensing its technology globally. 
BCT was later transformed into Kergy, Inc. and then Range Fuels by Khosla Ventures, 
LLC (Table I.99). And the BCT original thermal converter was upgraded to a so-called 
K2 modular system [Rapier 2006; Schuetzle et al. 2007]. Obviously, Kergy also looked 
to “optimize an existing and a novel catalyst or catalyst combinations for the conver-
sion of syngas to alcohols.” [Reisch 2006] 
Gasification of biomass to produce biofuels as a well known approach for more than 
twenty years is just a capital-intensive process that has the problem of competing 
against lower cost (but unsustainable) gasification options [NNFCC 2009, Schuetzle et 
al. 2007; Rapier 2006]. 
Similarly to the CtL process, and in line with current biofuel efforts, Bergius also suc-
ceeded in 1930 in Germany to convert wood into cellulose and treating the biomass 
with hydrochloric acid to get (biobased) synthetic sugar via saccharification and fer-
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mentation. The product was similar to beet sugar in taste and application. And in 1938 
building a plant was started that should become operational in 1939 to convert 
400,000 m3 of wood per year into sugar [Runge 2006:566]. 
The Israel-based recent startup HCL CleanTech (now named Verdia, Table I.99) 
acknowledges Bergius when they wrote on their Web site: “Innovative HCL Recovery 
Process Revolutionizes the 1930 Bergius Technology for Converting Cellulosic 
Materials into Fermentable Sugars.” HCL CleanTech “has developed a proprietary full 
HCL (hydrochloric acid) recovery process, which makes an old, industrially-proven 
German cellulosic to fermentable sugars and ethanol process economically very 
attractive.” 
Similarly in the US, Arkenol/BlueFire further developed the acid hydrolysis process 
(here with concentrated sulfuric acid) [BlueFire Ethanol 2004, Klann 2007] to make it 
economically viable through the use of new technology like flash fermentation and 
membrane distillation and purification, modern control methods, and newer materials 
of construction and focusing on a special type of biomass. 
BlueFire Ethanol Fuels (Table I.86) follows a “veterans approach” and biorefinery ori-
entation [Runge 2006:849-866] with a management team of people having 25+ years 
of experience in project finance, technology commercialization and project develop-
ment. BlueFire’s biorefineries will be located near markets with high demand for 
ethanol and will use locally available biomass. It is a cellulose-to-ethanol company 
with demonstrated production of ethanol from urban trash (post-sorted municipal solid 
waste – MSW), rice and wheat straws, wood waste and other agricultural residues. By 
weight, post-sorted MSW is more than 70 percent cellulose. 
Bluefire’s favorite input is municipal waste, because it can build its refineries on land-
fills, cutting feedstock transportation costs and using methane emitted from decom-
posing waste to help the plant generate 70 percent of its own electricity. 
The BlueFire process licensed from Arkenol uses naturally-occurring yeast, which has 
been specifically cultured by a proprietary method to ferment mixed (C6 and C5) 
sugars (actually, NREL developed rec. Z. mobilis (licensed by BlueFire) and S. 
cereviscae yeast) to produce ethanol at 95 percent [BlueFire 2004]). 
Arkenol can license its technology to qualified entities for their own project develop-
ment. However, Arkenol prefers to offer more than just a license. With its team 
members, Arkenol can provide turnkey engineering, procurement, construction, and 
operations services. Arkenol will work with developers around the world to license its 
technology and on an individual project, a corporate or a regional basis. Notably, 
BlueFire and Arkenol share the same president and CEO (Table I.86). 
Decision-making and action in new biofuels firms is often by a management 
team with members providing large “science, technology, management and 
policy experiences and connections.” 
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An entrepreneurial “veterans approach” can often be assumed to be founded 
and run by an “old boys network,” which is an exclusive informal network link-
ing members of a social class or profession or organization in order to provide 
connections and information and favors (especially in business or politics), 
often indicated by current or past affiliations to the same organization. 
Table I.86: BlueFire Ethanol Fuels showing an engineering-type approach to innova-
tion and entrepreneurship. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major 
Funding 
CEO, Other Executives, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection and Position 
BlueFire 
Ethanol Fuels, 
Inc.  
Irvine, CA 
(2006) 
New name: 
BlueFire 
Renewables, Inc 
An over-the-
counter (OCT) 
publicly traded 
stock company. 
Revenues 
(from consulting, 
DOE Grant/ 
Reimbursement, 
in 2009 selling 
ethanol to 
Solazyme, Inc.): 
2007: $49,000, 
2008: $1.075 
mil., 
2009: $4.32 mil. 
2010: $669k 
[Wikinvest 2009]. 
Employees 
2008: 12 
[CI 2009], 
2011: 6 full time 
employees and 
three part time 
employees. 
2007: Securities 
Purchase 
Agreement, 
Quercus Trust 
acquired shares 
of common 
stock and war-
rants for total 
proceeds of 
$15M, strategic 
investment 
(Quercus Trust 
shares of voting 
common stock 
34.4%); 
2007:  
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
provides grant 
of $40M for the 
first of two 
stages of its 
second US com-
mercial ethanol 
production using 
cellulosic 
wastes diverted 
from landfills in 
Southern 
California (ca. 
17 million gal-
lons per year); 
has been invited 
Experienced Management Team specializing in project 
finance, technology commercialization and project 
development: 
Arnold R. Klann – Chairman - President – CEO; CEO for 
BlueFire Ethanol, Arkenol, Inc., and ARK Energy; prior 
to founding ARK Energy, he launched three businesses 
and managed complex teams for project development 
and operation; 
Arkenol is a technology and project development com-
pany; 
ca. 30 years experience in corporate management, 
project finance, engineering, design, construction, start-
up, environmental permitting, driving force behind the 
research and development effort leading to the commer-
cialization of the Arkenol technology; 
BS (electrical engineering); (shares of voting common 
stock 49%); 
John E. Cuzens – SVP CTO; has been with ARK Energy 
and Arkenol and is the co-inventor of seven of Arkenol’s 
eight US foundation patents for the conversion of cellu-
losic materials into fermentable sugar products using a 
modified strong acid hydrolysis process, experience of 
20+ years of project management, experience punctu-
ated frequently with engineering or R&D management 
assignments; B.S. Chemical Engineering; (shares of 
voting common stock 6.1%) 
Necy Sumait – SVP – Director; Senior Vice President for 
BlueFire Ethanol and for Arkenol, Inc., background in the 
development of energy projects from inception through 
financial closing, commissioning, and operations. She 
has broad experience in siting, regulatory compliance, 
governmental and community relations and legislative 
affairs (of federal, state and local agencies); (shares of 
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Business plan 
developed in 
conjunction with 
Booz Allen 
Hamilton, in par-
ticular, use waste 
to produce etha-
nol and put the 
production near 
to end users. 
to submit a for-
mal application 
for a DOE loan 
guarantee to as-
sist in the fi-
nancing of etha-
nol production 
facilities; 
approved for 
California 
Energy Com-
mission Grant of 
$1M 
2009: 
DOE increased 
funding to 
$81.1M for 
Phase II con-
struction of the 
cellulosic etha-
nol biorefinery 
planned for 
Fulton, MS, in 
addition to the 
previously an-
nounced Phase 
I funding of ca. 
$7M for de-
velopment of the 
Fulton plant 
(goal 19 mil. 
gallons) 
[Wikinvest 
2009]; 
has received a 
$3.8 mil. reim-
bursement from 
the US DOE to 
be used for pre-
construction 
activities for its 
second planned 
biorefinery in 
Fulton, MS. 
 NOTE: In Dec. 
2013 the firm 
voting common stock 6.2%) 
William Davis – VP Project Management; 30+ years of 
experience; he has served as advisor to the Governor of 
California for energy conservation and renewable energy 
policy; additionally he has worked for several Fortune 
500 companies managing their energy development ac-
tivities. 
Notably: 
William A. Farone – Technical Advisor for Arkenol, Inc.; 
30+ years of technical research experience in the alter-
native energy, chemical and biotechnology industries, 
managed the Arkenol Technology Center focusing on 
the development of new chemical technology and bio-
technology, and  the optimization of existing chemical 
processes. Dr. Farone is the chief scientist and technical 
expert for all equipment application, feedstock process-
ing and product development activities at the Arkenol 
Acid Hydrolysis Pilot Plant and co-inventor of Arkenol’s 
US foundation patents for the conversion of cellulosic 
materials into fermentable sugar products. 
BlueFire Ethanol Inc. has formed a technology develop-
ment services agreement with William Farone. Farone is 
president and CEO of Applied Power Concepts Inc. 
(APC), a producer of higher-value sugar-based chemi-
cals. Under the new agreement, Farone and Applied 
Power Concepts Inc. will work with BlueFire to continue 
advancement of the technology. BlueFire will conduct 
development work at the APC facility [Austin 2009]. 
Staff and majority shareholders have been involved in 
technology development since 1992 as Arkenol. 
Research and development work completed, patent 
protections in place, pilot-scale process successfully 
completed, bioethanol commercial plant projects cur-
rently in various stages of development. 
Bluefire is the exclusive North American licensee of 
“Arkenol Technology,” may also utilize certain biorefinery 
related rights, assets, work-product, intellectual property 
and other know-how related to nineteen ethanol project 
opportunities originally developed by ARK Energy; 
from 1994-2000, a test pilot biorefinery plant was built 
and operated by Arkenol in Orange (CA) to test the 
effectiveness of the Arkenol Technology; results fed into 
another test pilot biorefinery plant in Izumi, Japan, built 
 978 Appendix A 
got notice from 
the DOE indicat-
ing that the DOE 
would no longer 
provide funding 
under the firm’s 
DOE grant for 
developing  its 
cellulosic waste 
facility in Fulton, 
due to inability 
to comply with 
certain deadl-
ines for inform-
ing the DOE on 
future financing 
the Fulton 
Project a) 
and operated by engineering firm JGC Corporation 
(Arkenol retained the rights to the Arkenol Technology 
while the operations of the facility were controlled by 
JGC); 
in 2002 JGC was awarded a contract by the New Energy 
and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) of the Japanese Government for the implemen-
tation and commercialization of cellulosic ethanol pro-
duction technology; the Izumi facility enabled to verify 
Arkenol’s technology as being commercially viable via 
an unrelated third party, setting the stage for the rollout 
of this technology in the US; 
design and engineering of BlueFire’s facilities in North 
America by established engineering firms can rely on 
use the Arkenol Technology and utilize JGC’s operations 
knowledge [SEC 2009, BlueFire Ethanol 2004]; JGC 
exclusive licensee for SE Asia 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Vision: 
Build/ develop 
biorefineries 
focused initially 
on bioethanol; 
Mission: 
Become a world-
class producer 
and supplier of 
renewable liquid 
fuels by the pro-
duction of 
ethanol from 
opportunistic 
sources; 
 
Create a 
business that de-
velops and owns 
state-of-the-art 
ethanol bio-
refineries that are 
the lowest cost 
producers of 
ethanol. 
The process [Klann 2007:6] is cellulose/hemicellulose to mixed sugars us-
ing Arkenol’s concentrated (sulfuric) acid hydrolysis to provide ethanol and 
open routes to other biobased products, such as biobutanol, to become a 
biorefinery. 
It is an incremental innovation (“improvement”) of an old technology devel-
oped in Germany in 1930 (“Bergius process”) centered on input selection 
and plant and process engineering. 
Claimed: The only cellulose-to-ethanol company worldwide with demon-
strated production of ethanol from urban trash (post-sorted MSW), but also 
rice and wheat straws, wood waste and other agricultural residues; 
Bluefire can use the landfill to power its refining process; combined with the 
use of lignin, a by-product from the Arkenol process; the capture of methane 
from a nearby landfill allows Bluefire’s refineries to be 70% self-powered. 
Strategy: 
Equity and debt funding for the BlueFire projects will be done on the project 
level, not the Corporate level, which means little or no dilution to current 
shareholders [Klann 2007]. 
Targeting specific geographic areas with the highest demand for ethanol 
fuels (e.g. California) and available feedstock supply; BlueFire will be pro-
ject lead and equity owner in projects utilizing their technology; 
 
Bluefire positions its production facilities right on landfills, in order to exploit 
certain cost advantages: input is from municipal waste cuts feedstock trans-
portation costs and can use methane emitted from decomposing waste to 
help the plant generate 70% of its own electricity [Wikinvest 2009]; 
as a broad spectrum of biomass can be used for the process, targeted re-
gions are large urban areas where waste disposal is a problem and landfill 
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Projections of 20 
biorefineries to 
be in commercial 
production within 
the next 7 years 
in North America. 
disposal alternatives are important and areas adjacent to National Forests 
where there is a pressing (and long-term) need to dispose of dead or 
diseased vegetation. 
The plan is, concurrent with the development of its own facilities, to deploy 
the technology, form associations with a group of companies selected on 
the basis of well-defined criteria (Joint Venture Development Partnerships 
with qualified and experienced regional developers throughout the US and 
Canada); that is the desire to create a portfolio of strategic partnerships. 
BlueFire’s product selling revenue orientation has materialized by an alli-
ance with algal biofuel company Solazyme, Inc. (Table I.90) which pur-
chases and tests BlueFire sugars. Solazyme directly feeds the algae sugar 
rather than relying on light [Wellsphere 2009]. 
Risk, Risk 
Mitigation 
Bluefire competes with many other biofuels manufacturers, though its 
closest competitors are cellulosic (and corn) ethanol companies. Targeting 
a biorefinery model would allow lifting dependency on just one offering in 
the future – bioethanol – through downstream processing. 
BlueFire is well beyond the research and development stage of its business 
plan and the technology has been in actual production for over five years in 
NEDO’s pilot plant in Japan. 
Without government grants Bluefire’s facilities would have no hope of being 
profitable, illustrating the company’s dependence on government aid to be 
feasible and legislative support to achieve profitability: 
Federal and state governmental funding to build its refinery helps to offset 
the hefty installation cost of $5.00 per gallon for a 55 million gallon per year 
facility. Without such funding, it would be very difficult for Bluefire to make 
ethanol cost-competitive with other fuels, much less turn a profit [Wikinvest 
2009]. 
According to BlueFire’s plan sub $1.00/gal production costs are feasible for 
facility 2 through 20 [Klann 2007]. 
Further risk mitigation would require a shift in the auto industry to accommo-
date for higher blending (cf. the E15 thrust) and/or to build the missing infra-
structure for still relatively few FFVs in the US that would allow E85. 
“Bluefire is Dependent on Legislative Support to Achieve Profitability.” 
[Wikinvest 2009] 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: end of 2009; 
a) cf. also Jim Lane’s article “Being solid and liquid: The screwy, upside-down world of 
renewable fuels financing” in Biofuels Digest of Oct. 6, 2013. 
By the end of November 2011, BlueFire Renewables formed a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, SucreSource, LLC, that will manufacture cellulosic sugars from biomass and 
will use BlueFire’s patented Arkenol Acid Hydrolysis Technology. SucreSource will 
capitalize on BlueFire’s existing process design packages, providing either a 34,000 
tons per year or 163,000 tons per year source of cellulosic sugars. 
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SucreSource was riding a wave shifting the paradigm for energy sources and was 
created to meet the market’s increasing demand for cellulosic sugars not just for 
biofuels, but also for bioplastic and specialty chemical markets (A.1.1.6). BlueFire 
claims to be the only cellulose-to-fuel company worldwide with demonstrated produc-
tion of biofuels from urban trash (post-sorted MSW), rice and wheat straws, wood 
waste and other agricultural residues. BlueFire received an increase to its Grant 
totaling $88 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in December 
of 2009 [Lane 2011h]. 
SucreSource is actively pursuing partnership opportunities to deploy the technology. 
Early in 2012 SucreSource signed agreements with GS Caltex – a joint venture 
between GS Holdings and Chevron, and a leading Korea-based petroleum company 
to build a cellulose-to-sugar plant in Korea. 
The facility will process 2 tons of construction and demolition debris per day into cel-
lulosic sugar, which will be converted into a high value chemical by GS Caltex’s pro-
prietary technology. The facility will be owned and operated by GS Caltex with 
SucreSource providing the process design package, equipment procurement and 
technical and engineering support. If the initial facility is validated, SucreSource will 
work with GS Caltex to develop and build larger commercial scale facilities in Korea 
and throughout the world [Green Car Congress 2012]. 
If in the well established Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process syngas is obtained from bio-
mass, the process is referred to as a BtL (Biomass-to-Liquid) which has been devel-
oped and was utilized by CHOREN Industries GmbH in Germany to produce SunFuel 
für Otto engines und SunDiesel® for Diesel engines [Runge 2006:254-255], the last 
one being used as a blend in Shell’s premium “V Power Diesel” fuel in Germany and 
Austria. CHOREN, founded in 1998, ultimately acted as a holding. 
The biomass spectrum for BtL includes wood chips from forest timber or from rapid 
turnover plantations, straw briquettes, energy, crops or recycled wood (from houses). 
According to its Web-site CHOREN became a group with several subsidiaries. The 
number of employees of the CHOREN Group was around 300. Some subsidiaries 
were already profitable in 2009, but overall CHOREN remained in the red (Capital 
employed: > €180M with €100M invested in the Beta-Plant). 
Revenues for 2007 of more than €4M were reported [Lachmann 2007]. About 20 
percent of the Beta-Plant investment was by the federal government and local state 
government [Wuttke 2008]. As an LLC CHOREN had eight partners including two 
corporate investors (automotive firms VW and Daimler) with minority stakes and a 
private businessman with a majority stake [Lachmann 2007]. The key founder Bodo 
Wolf left CHOREN as a partner in 2008, but stayed connected as a consultant to the 
firm [Wuttke 2008]. Shell Deutschland Oil GmbH had sold its shares in CHOREN 
Industries GmbH to all the remaining CHOREN shareholders. 
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By 2009 CHOREN produced 15,000 tons/year biodiesel (ca. 4.8 million gallons) and 
planed for a €800 million plant for 200,000 tons/a (“Sigma-Plant”) which would corre-
spond to 0.7 percent of the then demand of diesel fuel in Germany where diesel is 
much more used for cars than in the US. However, the prerequisite for building was 
that after 2015 in Germany biofuels continue to get a tax exempt [Kempkens 2009]. 
Simultaneously, there was a European research project OPTFUEL comprising Euro-
pean car manufacturers and led by VW (with a minority stake in CHOREN) to drive 
large-scale production of 2nd generation biofuels which will be based on CHOREN’s 
Carbo-V®-process. A part of the research funds would be used for the development of 
economically and ecologically viable concepts for supplying a large-scale plant with 
biomass (cf. Figure I.173), such as CHOREN’s Sigma-Plant. 
Apart from own production, product selling and licensing CHOREN’s business (reve-
nue) model was based on its proprietary Carbo-V gasification process and on engi-
neering core competence which includes a wide range of services for design, installa-
tion and operation for Carbo-V biomass combined heat and power plants in line with 
the common service offerings of an engineering company, specializing in mechanical 
engineering and plant engineering – similar to BlueFire’s offerings. 
 Concept development for the construction of industrial-scale production units 
including or integration of the process into existing energy supply configura-
tions 
 Advice to and support of companies in organizing biomass supply concepts 
and the relevant processing technology, or even organization of the complete 
biomass management, including the securing of long-term raw material provi-
sion as main supplier  
 Process engineering design for the project  
 Permit engineering for the entire plant  
 Basic and detail engineering for the Carbo-V section  
 Design, construction, delivery and installation of the main process equipment  
 Assistance during installation, start-up and commissioning, training of operat-
ing personnel  
 Technology transfer. 
In 2010 CHOREN and the French group CNIM (Constructions Industrielles de la 
Méditerranée SA) signed an EPC agreement (engineering, procurement and construc-
tion). The agreement covered the design and construction of a synthesis gas produc-
tion facility using biomass feedstocks, whereas CHOREN provides extensive engi-
neering and other technical services [CHOREN 2010]. 
For CHOREN about half of the production cost resulted from type and procurement of 
biomass (Figure I.171, Figure I.173). A strategic option would be production in coun-
tries where biomass is cheaper. The other alternative, type of biomass, can be related 
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to the technical bottleneck of the process: The actually used biomass provides too 
little hydrogen to the syngas of the FT process [Lachmann 2007]. 
Correspondingly, in November 2009 CHOREN USA LLC reported on a two-year bio-
energy cooperative project with the energy crop company Ceres, Inc. which was 
funded in part by a grant from the US Department of Energy and Agriculture. Ceres 
would evaluate the composition of a broad range of switchgrass and willow plants, 
and provide biomass samples to CHOREN for thermochemical processing. 
The results should be used to identify the most relevant compositional traits and later, 
to select the plants and traits that improve conversion and maximize fuel yields. Addi-
tionally, it was said that CHOREN USA will use the results of the work to help the 
company selecting its initial US project site. But generally, the C/H proportion from 
biomass is inferior to that from fossil energy sources. This suggests adding hydrogen 
from other renewable sources which would give Virent’s process a flavor. Further 
questions for the gasification of biomass were the use of dry versus wet biomass and 
consistency of the biomass composition. 
Whether it is cosmetics, chemicals or other applications, for the relevant natu-
ral product, such as chitosan (cf. Heppe Medical Chitosan GmbH, ch. 2.1.2.4) 
or here biomass using “biological” (“renewable”) stuff as raw material, inter-
mediate or other input for technical processes, the composition of the natural, 
renewable material and also the material’s composition consistency, which 
may be sourced from different regions and/or at different seasons, are crucial 
for technical processes and may interfere with scale-up efforts and quality and 
purity requirements. 
Among other factors, the above issues were also reasons why CHOREN went bank-
rupt in Germany by mid of 2011. Most of the 290 employees lost their jobs [Rapier 
2011; Reuter 2011]. In early 2012 the giant German engineering conglomerate Linde 
(Linde Engineering Dresden) took over the biomass business of CHOREN saving in 
Germany 65 jobs [DAPD 2012] and took over the Carbo-V® Technology. More details 
are given by Rapier [2011]: 
In 2009, the author dealing with what happened to CHOREN [Rapier 2011] accepted 
a job as Chief Technology Officer for the man who was at that time the largest share-
holder of CHOREN (which was not his only investment). Both persons shared a belief 
that oil prices are inevitably headed much higher, and in that case they both believed 
the CHOREN process would be ultimately economically viable. 
In 2009 CHOREN started commissioning the gasification section for its process. That 
was the beginning of a long process of running for a period of time, and then shutting 
down and making adjustments. One of the biggest challenges with the gasification 
was that there was no blueprint; nobody had run a gasifier like this at this scale on a 
biomass feedstock. Hence, the plant had to work through many new technological 
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challenges, and with a staff of 290 employees, the time it took to work through the 
issues was costly. 
As CHOREN had elected to forgo government funding, private investors have borne 
the development costs over the past few years. Several of those investors – including 
Shell – exited at various points due to the time and cost it was taking to work out the 
technical issues. Ultimately, the largest shareholder was largely funding the ongoing 
operations of CHOREN from his pocket. 
While the plant made good progress, commissioning took far longer than expected. 
Rapier had in fact warned that it would take at least a year to start up the plant once it 
was mechanically complete, but it was taking even longer than expected. It finally got 
to the point that all investors decided to stop funding development, because all of the 
technical bugs had not been worked out. It was not that there were any technical 
show-stoppers, it was just that the timing of how long it would take to work through the 
issues was uncertain. 
CHOREN Industries and its four engineering-oriented founders, in particular, Bodo 
Wolf, provide a representative case for a rise of entrepreneurial spirit and private ini-
tiative in 1990 almost immediately after the Berlin Wall was teared down and the for-
mer German Democratic Republic (GDR) ceased to exist. 
The four persons immediately initiated self-employyment by setting up an engineering 
office [Ahrens 2005] which developed into CHOREN Technologies GmbH. The team 
started in the biofuels field years before it became a huge wave, with a pilot plant 
(“Alpha”) to test their Carbo-V process in 1998 and a pilot production plant (“Beta”) in 
2003. Bodo Wolf, after having left CHOREN in 2008, acted as an angel investor for 
the German startup SunCoal GmbH (B.2) which focuses on BtC – Biomass-to-Coal. 
With regard to the FT (GtL) and CtL processes the first to benefit from them was Ger-
many during World War II. Germany, rich in hard and brown coal, built enormous 
liquefaction plants. After the war, the GDR, to secure its resources, operated the Ger-
man Fuel Institute (DBI), a center for coal processing in the mining town of Freiberg. 
After the German Reunification the DBI left behind a group of highly specialized scien-
tists and engineers who were highly specialized in a field abandoned by the West 
(after oil-based industries took over coal-based ones) that offered a key to a more 
efficient way of using biomass. The key persons of the DBI were the engineer Bodo 
Wolf, Eckard Dinjus (see below) and Bernd Meyer, each of them having their own 
technological approach to the field. 
Dinjus became professor and head of a “BtL Division” (later Institute for Chemical 
Engineering - Division of Physicochemical Processes) at the Karlruhe Research Cen-
ter (Forschunszentrum Karlsruhe – FZK, a German National Research Center; now 
part of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology – KIT). Meyer became a director at the 
Technical University of Freiberg. The two professors would rather see more research 
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done on BtL before it makes the transition to general industrial use. Indeed, when they 
testified as experts at an official hearing, they advised the government against provid-
ing CHOREN with loan guarantees [Wüst 2007]. 
This particular constellation for the BtL-case represents a further example of the key 
issues of technology transfer, namely that effective technology transfer of complex 
industrial processes depends highly on “people transfer,” knowledge and experience 
(know how) bound to people (“subject matter expert” – SME – providing “tacit techno-
logy”), as has been shown by several historic cases. 
 Manufacturing of porcelain in the 1700s: after defeating Saxony in a war, win-
ner Prussia transferred many of the Meissen (near Dresden, Saxony) work-
men of the porcelain production site to Berlin and Berlin afterwards became a 
famous competitive manufactory [Runge 2006:405]. 
 In 1927 US Standard Oil (now ExxonMobil) and German I.G. Farben (see 
[Runge 2006:271-272]) agreed to cooperate technically in the further de-
velopment of synthetic oil and fuel by coal liquefaction via the Bergius process 
[Runge 2006:424]. Standard Oil and I.G. Farben set up the “Joint American 
Study Company” (JASCO) to work on synthetic oil. JASCO should push com-
mercialization of technologies. Therefore, both partners sent scientific and 
technical employees as the “carriers of people-based knowledge” into 
JASCO. 
After WW II captured German scientists continued to work on synthetic fuels 
in the US. 
 The biggest corresponding know-how and technology transfer occurred in the 
20th century after WW II when the US and Soviet Union each caught the top 
100+ German scientists and engineers who developed the V2 missiles or the 
world’s first jet fighter, the Messerschmidt 262 jet, and moved them to their re-
spective countries. No such technologies existed in the world outside Ger-
many and the German specialists rebuilt the missiles and jets to educate and 
train Americans or Russians in the technologies [Runge 2006:405]. And 
German scientists transferred to the USSR also contributed to building the 
Russian atomic bomb (ch. 2.1.2.8). 
Collecting biomass and getting enough of it in one place to make a difference is a key 
problem in the biomass world. “Trucking costs can become exorbitant. You want to 
preprocess it at the farm and then ship a high-density, high-energy intermediate to 
processing plants.” [Jonietz 2007] 
Focusing particularly on the issues of economical collection, procurement and trans-
portation, the first part of the biofuel value system (Figure I.173), Dinjus of the KIT 
developed a BtL process called “Bioliq,” through stepwise projects together with the 
engineering firm Lurgi GmbH (now a subsidiary of Air Liquide) as an industry partner. 
By November 2009 the third of four steps for a pilot plant had been funded with €11 
million by the German federal and related state governments. Bioliq aims at the pro-
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duction of biofuels (and industrial chemicals like propylene, ethylene or acrylic acid; 
Figure I.174) via the FT and methanol/dimethylether (DME) route [Runge 2006:851-
852, 858]. In May 2011 there was the topping-out ceremony for the related €60 million 
Bioliq plant. 
 
Figure I.173: The KIT – Lurgi Biofuel BtL Project Bioliq emphasizing the input – bio-
mass collection and transportation and proportions of overall production cost. 
The overall systems-oriented project focuses on the necessary infrastructure for raw 
material (straw) collection through a decentralized stepwise approach. Raw material is 
collected and transported over short distances (less than 25 km) to mini-plants. Here a 
“fast pyrolysis” converts the biomass to a mixture of an “oil” and a “coke” which are 
combined into a suspension. 
This “slurry” (“biosyncrude”) is of such a “high energy density” that its transportation to 
the actual BtL plant is economically viable. The BtL plant then provides “syngas” 
which can be further processed [Dinjus et al. 2008]. Transportation of biomass beyond 
short distances would quickly cost more BTUs (British thermal units) than the biomass 
fuel would yield. Having or building an infrastructure to collect and store the biomass, 
hence, is the serious cost concern. 
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Systems thinking concerning biofuels and biomass and “commercially successful” 
entry into the transportation area brings about further considerations – the economics 
will change upon success of the biofuels firms. 
Rising biofuel production, or the burning of biomass to generate electricity, will 
drive up demand and prices for the raw material, just as production of corn 
ethanol helped raise the price of that crop. Biomass is cheap right now be-
cause no one wants it. As firms want it, it will become more expensive. 
Furthermore, and more important, the laws of supply and demand mean that 
replacing a significant amount of (petro-)gasoline with biofuels would drasti-
cally lower the demand for gasoline. That, in turn, would cause the price of 
gasoline to plunge, making biofuels less competitive. 
The only notable activities concerning cellulosic ethanol in Germany are observed for 
Süd-Chemie (Box I.3) which was recently acquired by Swiss specialty chemicals firm 
Clariant. It is a company with €1.225 billion sales (in 2010; employs some 6,500 
people) operating on a worldwide scale. Its business units, Functional Materials and 
Catalysis & Energy, offer products and technical solutions for numerous industrial 
sectors to facilitate effective use of resources in customer value chains. The Catalysts 
Division offers solutions for the chemical, petrochemical and refinery industries, for 
energy storage and hydrogen production, as well as off-gas purification 
In 2009 Süd-Chemie opened a pilot plant at the firm’s Research Center in Munich 
supported by the Bavarian Minister of Economics, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Technology and the EU to produce bioethanol from lignocellulosic biomass. The pilot 
plant will be using cereal straw to manufacture up to two tons of bioethanol fuel 
annually. 
The process developed by Süd-Chemie and German gases and engineering giant 
Linde allows biofuels, such as ethanol, to be extracted from biomass, for instance 
wheat straw or maize (corn) straw, with the aid of enzymes created using biotechno-
logical methods. The partners in this alliance offer complementary competencies. 
Whereas Süd-Chemie´s expertise lies in the sectors of biocatalysis and bioprocess 
engineering, Linde’s subsidiary, Linde-KCA-Dresden, offers extensive experience in 
implementing chemical and biotechnological processes on a commercial scale [Süd-
Chemie 2009] – and now owns also the rests of CHOREN and its Carbo-V® Tech-
nology. 
Süd-Chemie´s sunliquid® process uses not only the cellulose contained in plants, but 
also the so-called hemicellulose. Both can be converted into ethanol, making it possi-
ble to increase ethanol production by up to fifty percent compared with conventional 
technology. 
Planned for 2012 a large-scale demonstration plant was started by mid of 2010, lo-
cated in the immediate vicinity of the new Bavarian BioCampus in Straubing, that will 
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produce up to 2,000 metric tons per year (670,000 US gallons) of bioethanol fuel from 
agricultural waste, such as wheat straw or maize (corn) straw, bagasse from sugar 
cane or so-called energy crops [Süd-Chemie 2010]. 
In July 2012 Clariant inaugurated the new cellulosic ethanol pilot. The plant – the big-
gest of its kind in Germany – will start producing produce around 1,000 tons/year of 
cellulosic ethanol, using around 4,500 tons/year of locally sourced agricultural waste 
as a feedstock. Clariant said studies show Germany potentially has around 22 million 
tons of straw that could be used for energy production without compromising essential 
soil regeneration, which would be sufficient to cover around 25 percent of Germany’s 
current gasoline requirements. 
Süd-Chemie´s demonstration plant will represent a scaled-down version of the entire 
integrated manufacturing process. The total project had a volume of altogether €28 
million ($35 million) and comprised an investment volume of some €16 million and ac-
companying research projects amounting to approximately €12 million. These and 
additional related research projects were subsidized by the Bavarian State Govern-
ment and Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) with 
approximately €5 million respectively [Süd-Chemie 2010]. The pilot plant represents 
the interim stage necessary prior to erecting production plants with annual capacities 
of 50,000–150,000 tons of bioethanol. 
The current situation at Süd-Chemie shows that CAPEX (capital expenditures) is radi-
cally lower than for other bioethanol plants. Their system is designed to ultimately cost 
less than $100 million for a 20 million gallons (60,000 ton) plant, and is expected to 
have OPEX (operating expenditures) that is competitive with first generation (corn) 
ethanol. The company is on the road transforming the economics of cellulosic ethanol, 
to compete at parity with gasoline and was expected to commence licensing in 2012 
[Lane 2012p]. 
According to Süd-Chemie and its Unique Selling Proposition (USP) “We are one of the 
few companies worldwide that have process development and enzyme development 
under one roof. We are independent from enzyme supply, because we make our own 
during the process itself, using only a small fraction of pretreated feedstock. We have 
optimized enzymes for feedstock and operating conditions.” “We will deliver the com-
plete technology.” “The basic engineering package, also include all biotech software, 
microorganisms for producing enzymes, downstream processing, for producing the 
ethanol, and also help with the start up.” [Lane 2012p] 
Summarizing some aspects of innovation and intrapreneurship in biofuels considered 
so far the following emerges. 
Research, innovation and commercialization progress in the biofuels area re-
quire tremendous capital investments. Startups and NTBFs might have the 
technology, but they lack the capital to build the (pilot and demonstration) 
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plants and other infrastructure required to fully prove it. Hence, they need very 
strong partners and giant oil (and automotive) firms play a key role. 
Federal and state governments play a very important role for financial support 
in terms of tax credits, subsidies, and research support (grants and coopera-
tion with public research organizations; Figure I.34). 
But, looking at oil firms as partners, one must be aware of Big Oil’s contribu-
tion into perspective. For instance, for ExxonMobil, the world’s largest publicly 
traded oil company, the biofuels investment (in a $600 million partnership with 
biotech company Synthetic Genomics Inc. [Lux Research 2007] over five to 
six years!) is tiny compared with its spending to find new supplies of crude oil 
and natural gas [Porretto 2009]. Capital spending of a giant oil company is 
$20 – $30 billion per year. Exxon Mobil made $142 million in profit each day 
of 2008. Correspondingly, the financial risk of the investments for these firms 
does not weight very strongly. 
It seems that concerning performance data of ethanol (Table I.82), its carbon 
footprint (Box I.1) and “without a Shift in the Auto Industry, Cellulosic Ethanol 
is No More Than a Good Idea.” [Wikinvest 2009] 
In short, assessments of biofuels’ roles referring to Shell Chief Executive Officer Peter 
Voser turned to the statements that advanced biofuels will not be in widespread use 
until about 2020 and that it would take “quite a number of years” before there is a 
commercially proven plant. The company has also been forced to acknowledge that it 
has been over-optimistic about when these ventures will start to pay off [Crooks 2009]. 
In line with this statement corporate and capital investors were plagued by promises of 
startups/NTBFs concerning the start date of production by commercial plants which 
deviate by years from reality. For instance, the following projections were made during 
the 2007-2009 period on commercial production or generating notable revenues: 
 Cobalt Biofuels (Table I.96), founded 2006, planned: a $25 million GPY plant 
for 2012; for 2015 jumpstart revenue in the chemicals market; claim to first 
commercial sales of biobutanol in 2011 and “multiple facilities” by 2014; 
according to its recent fact sheet: Demo-scale plant expected to be opera-
tional in 2011; 1.5 million GPY facility operational in 2012; 
 LS9, Inc. (Table I.99) founded in 2005, would not reach commercial produc-
tion levels until 2013; 
 Solazyme (Table I.90), founded in 2003, would be at parity with $80 oil by 
2012/13. 
But often there are associated other concerns with statements about the time of entry 
into large-scale production, for instance, with regard to Range Fuels [Rapier 2010] 
and Coskata [Admin 2011a] (Table I.99). 
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For Range Fuels Rapier [2010] provided firstly common wisdom and advice. Learn to 
be conservative with claims, because failing to deliver can have far-reaching impacts. 
Plus, a pattern of over-promising and under-delivering will ultimately destroy your 
credibility, and thus your ability to get anything done. 
He then secondly turned to “Range Fuels: Years of Broken Promises.” And he pre-
sented a timeline from October 2006 to February 2010 to show the remarkable 
evolution of their “progress” that has gone largely unreported and emphasized the 
“highlights.” 
The key point is that in May 2009, while Range Fuels stopped issuing so many press 
releases, replaced CEO Mitch Mandich was quoted in the New York Times admitting 
that “the soup’s not quite cooked yet.” 
The known amount of money by 2010 that has been poured into this firm (Table I.99) 
– beyond Khosla and company’s initial investment – is $158 million in VC money, $76 
million of DOE money in 2007 to finance the Georgia plant, $80 million from the USDA 
(a loan guarantee of $80 million, and that allowed the company to secure an $80 mil-
lion bond in 2010 to fund the plant’s construction in 2010), and $6 million from the 
state of Georgia. Further, they asked for more DOE money, but were turned down. 
That turned out to be more than $320 million to build 4 million gallons of methanol 
capacity. 
Rapier [2010] could refer to and cite a US EPA report: 
“As for the Range Fuels plant, construction of phase one in Soperton, GA, is about 
85% complete, with start-up planned for mid-2010. However, there have been some 
changes to the scope of the project that will limit the amount of cellulosic biofuel that 
can be produced in 2010. The initial capacity has been reduced from 10 to 4 million 
gallons per year. In addition, since they plan to start up the plant using a methanol 
catalyst they are not expected to produce qualifying renewable fuel in 2010. During 
phase two of their project, currently slated for mid-2012, Range plans to expand 
production at the Soperton plant and transition from a methanol to a mixed alcohol 
catalyst. This will allow for a greater alcohol production potential as well as a greater 
cellulosic biofuel production potential.” (Emphases added) 
And Rapier concluded: “So taxpayers funded a 40 MGY wood-based ethanol plant 
and they are instead getting a 4 MGY wood-based methanol plant.” 
In line with this, in 2011 Bud Klepper, who is not only Range Fuels’ technical advisor 
but also the original founder of the company that became Range Fuels, announced 
that Range Fuels is laying off most of its employees at its plant near Soperton, Ga, 
after it makes a single batch of ethanol, and the company will shut down the plant 
while it tackles technical problems and raises more money [Wang 2011]. 
Some remarkable conclusions of R. Rapier [2010] were as follows. 
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 Range Fuels’ “people had been in the habit of promising the moon to secure 
ever more funding.” 
 Investors seem to proceed “how Silicon Valley innovates.” “The thing is, the 
energy industry is full of very smart people who went to the same schools the 
people in Silicon Valley attended.” 
 Failure tars an entire renewable industry as being hopelessly unrealistic. 
A similar situation in different context can be described for Coskata (Table I.99), 
founded in 2006. In 2010/2011 biofuel companies, many without revenues or com-
mercial products, continued to shoot for IPOs. Filing for an IPO in the industrial bio-
tech boom, which began with a successful listing on the NASDAQ by Codexis in 2010 
was followed by IPOs of Amyris, Gevo, KiOR (all in Table I.99) and Solazyme (Table 
I.90). Then, PetroAlgae, Mascoma (Table I.99),  BioAmber and Genomatica (A.1.1.6) 
have also filed S-1 registrations for proposed IPOs, as did Coskata (Table I.99) in 
December 2011 when it looked for a $100 million IPO. 
In 2010 Coskata lost $28.7 million while recording $250K in revenues and $23.3 mil-
lion for the nine months ended September 30, 2011. They expected these losses to 
continue for the foreseeable future. A recent summary of its S-1 registration culmi-
nated in a revealing overview entitled “The Risks, Translated from SEC-speak.” 
[Admin 2011] Below are some cited examples of that exercise concerning credibility, 
execution and delivery. 
In SECSpeak: In English 
“In place of the plasma gasifier that we used at 
our Lighthouse facility, we expect to integrate an 
indirect biomass gasifier with our syngas clean-
ing technology, which have never been tested 
together for fuels production. While biomass 
gasifiers are a proven technology, they have 
only been used commercially on a limited basis 
and have experienced operational reliability 
issues.” 
Uh, we didn’t actually use our 
proposed gasification ma-
chine, a/k/a/ Old Unreliable, 
because in the demonstration 
that we did, we decided to 
demonstrate something else. 
 
(a/k/a = also known as) 
“We have entered into an MOU with a lender for 
$87.9 million of debt financing to fund a portion 
of the cost of constructing Phase I of our 
planned Flagship facility. We have also received 
a conditional commitment from the USDA relat-
ing to a 90% guarantee of such debt financ-
ing…The process for finalizing the definitive 
documentation with the lender and the USDA 
may take longer than expected or may not 
happen at all.” 
(MOU: Memorandum Of Understanding) 
Your investment dollars may 
become, er, marooned (i.e 
“into the Valley of Death rode 
the six hundred”), if we don’t 
close this loan. 
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“A disruption in our supply chain for components 
of our proprietary nutrient package could materi-
ally disrupt or impair our ability to produce re-
newable fuels and chemicals.” 
If Rumplestilskin the Magic 
Coskata Microorganism 
doesn’t get his vitamins, he 
won’t spin our straw into 
gold. 
“Although we currently intend to use the net pro-
ceeds from this offering in the manner described 
in “Use of Proceeds,” we will have broad discre-
tion in the application of the net proceeds.” 
If we spend all this money 
on, say, golf memberships, 
the only ethanol we’ll see will 
be at the 19th Hole. 
Overall one can say that opinions about the developments and future of biofuels are 
split reduced to the question “Advanced Biofuels: pipedream or solid investment?” 
[Bomgardner 2011b]. 
The industry partly blamed the credit crisis (Great Recession) for its slow pace, but 
acknowledged that getting the conversion techniques to work is the biggest problem 
[Wald 2009b]: 
 “It’s certainly turned out to be more complicated technically than people 
thought it would be,” said Brian Foody, the president and chief executive of 
Iogen (working with Shell). 
 BP America also acknowledged slow progress in its company’s joint venture 
with Verenium, in Louisiana. “We aren’t seeing fundamental technology is-
sues; it’s more a matter of optimizing the engineering of the pots and pans we 
use to do the cooking, so to speak.” 
Experiences of the average duration of scale-up from the laboratory to a high-volume 
commercial plant from the chemical industry could be used as an indicator for esti-
mating that time. Scale-up after laboratory work for the polymers/plastics area (poly-
ethylene, Nylon or Perlon, Kevlar, Biomax/Ecoflex) by thermochemical processes took 
6 – 8 years [Runge 2006:655] and probably more than 10 years for bioengineering 
processes. Evonik Industries (previously Degussa) reported 13 years for an industrial 
biocatalytic process [Runge 2006:577]. 
A model for the biofuels industry following the thermochemical path could be the Izumi 
Biorefinery (a US/Japan cooperation, in operation since 2002 in Japan) which uses 
Arkenol’s concentrated acid hydrolysis technology for the conversion of biomass to 
ethanol. It took 9 years from completion of base technology developments to deploy-
ment, 12 years from ideas and R&D to “demo” deployment [BlueFire Ethanol 2004]. 
As engineers know, scale-up proceeds in a series of steps, and the scale-up between 
steps can range from a factor of, say, 10x in the case of a conservative play, to as 
much as 150x in a single step. 
Correspondingly, cellulosic ethanol production has not grown as fast as the industry or 
the federal US government had hoped it would. An investment firm predicted that 
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cellulosic ethanol companies will be able to supply only 28.5 million gallons by 2010, 
short of the federal government’s 100 million gallon goal [St. John 2009]. The industry 
acknowledged that it will make a few million gallons of the advanced fuel in 2010, at 
most, and could fall even further behind the 2011 quota, 250 million gallons [Wald 
2009b]. 
Shell’s emphasis on its core competency with regard to the process engineering and 
particularly the FT-process and the large variety the intermediate syngas provides to 
produce other commercial industrial products on a large scale referring to existing, 
proven sub-processes (Figure I.174) represents a strong directional effect for the 
realities of the future of bioethanol. 
Specifically, Shell demonstrated the world’s first commercial passenger flight powered 
by a fuel made from natural gas [Quatar Airlines 2009] after developing and producing 
jet fuel using a 50-50 blend of synthetic GtL kerosene (“GTL Jet Fuel.”) and con-
ventional oil-based kerosene fuel. 
 
Figure I.174: Syngas routes to selected high value products and applications (DME = 
dimethylether, MTBE = Methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether, a gasoline additive – “octane-
booster”). 
The flight was the latest step in over two years of scientific work carried out by a 
consortium consisting of Airbus, Qatar Airways, Qatar Petroleum, Qatar Science & 
Technology Park, Rolls-Royce, Shell and WOQOD. Much of this work was being 
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undertaken at the Qatar Science & Technology Park in Doha. Shell and Quatar 
Petroleum started building a commercial plant (project Pearl) which should open in 
2012 and deliver 1 million tons/a of GTL Jet Fuel. 
The simplest alcohol (bio)methanol can also be used as a chemical building block for 
a range of future-oriented biobased products, including bio-MTBE, bio-DME, bio-
hydrogen and synthetic biofuels (synthetic hydrocarbons). Furthermore, biomethanol 
can represent the input for so-called “Direct Methanol Fuel Cells” (DMFCs), as offered 
successfully by German NTBF Smart Fuel Cell AG (now SFC Energy AG) [Runge 
2006:328-335, 623]. 
Europe and particularly Germany, has a very long history of synthetic methanol. Cur-
rently it is produced, for instance, through pyrolysis via syngas (Figure I.174). The first 
patent to produce methanol via syngas was granted to the chemical giant BASF in 
1913; its first large-scale commercial plant started production in 1923 99. 
For centuries, methanol was first produced from pyrolysis of wood, leading to its com-
mon English name of wood alcohol or wood spirit (in German Holzspiritus or Holz-
geist). Today, China is the largest producer and consumer of methanol in the world. 
And in 2008 it utilized 3 million tons of methanol (of a total of 45 million tons con-
sumed worldwide) as a fuel blend. 126 Methanol usage in China for other products is: 
formaldehyde (38 percent), MTBE (20 percent), acetic acid (11percent), fuel use (4 
percent), other uses (27 percent) [Engeler 2008]. 
In China (contrary to the US or Germany) methanol has been approved in 2009 for 
use as a motor vehicle fuel and as a renewable fuel for transportation. Like ethanol in 
Brazil and the US, China now permits methanol to be added to pure gasoline so that it 
can make up to 85 percent of the mixture for use in flex fuel cars (FFVs). As the US 
has E85, China has M85. However, among alcohols as biofuels methanol has the 
lowest energy content and stoichiometric air fuel ratio meaning that fuel consumption 
(on a volume or mass basis) will be higher than other alcohol or hydrocarbon fuels 
(Table I.82). 
Similar to the US, to become (more) independent from crude oil imports, China pro-
motes biomethanol as a biofuel – and also biobutanol (cf. Green Biologics, Table I.95) 
[Blanco 2009]. In the 1980s in Germany there was a large field test of M15 and M85 
fuels sponsored by a German ministry which involved more than 1,000 vehicles and 
all German automotive firms, the mineral oil industry and many research institutes. 126 
But there was no significant follow-up. 126 
More importantly, for biomethanol entrepreneurs, methanol plays a key role as an al-
ternative to petroleum feedstock for the petrochemical industry (MtO, Figure I.174), 
which brings in the names of chemical giants like German BASF and US Dow Chemi-
cal. In particular, there is a strong emphasis on methanol-to-ethylene (MtE) and 
methanol-to-propylene (MtP) (Figure I.174) processes. Also here China plays a lead-
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ing role [Heathcote and Fryer 2008]. And recently already the concept of a “methanol 
economy” has been put forward [Bullis 2006]. 
Based on gasification of largely municipal waste to syngas the primary focus of the 
Canadian firm Enerkem  (headquartered in Montreal) is the commercial production of 
cellulosic ethanol. However, its three step process first requires the production of 
methanol as a chemical building block for the production of ethanol (Figure I.174). 
Enerkem can sell its methanol as an end-product, or use it as a key intermediate to 
produce other renewable chemicals. 
Enerkem announced in 2012 the initial production of cellulosic ethanol from waste 
materials at its demonstration facility in Westbury, Québec. Its technology has been 
developed and tested during the past 11 years. Enerkem has already produced cellu-
losic ethanol at its smaller scale pilot laboratory facility. The newly installed equipment 
for the conversion of Enerkem’s methanol into cellulosic ethanol is now used in 
combination with the larger methanol equipment already in operation at Westbury 
[SpecialChem 2012]. 
With Europe’s strong orientation towards biodiesel as a biofuel and its by-product 
glycerin as a cheap raw material it was almost natural that entrepreneurial ideas are 
generated around glycerin as a basis for biofuels and other biobased feedstock mate-
rials following a biorefinery approach as a commercialization model. 
And, indeed, in the Netherlands Bio-Methanol Chemie Nederland BV (BioMCN) intro-
duced a glycerin-to-syngas process to produce biomethanol (Table I.87). It is a typical 
engineering, biorefinery approach to entrepreneurship of founders with profound ex-
perience in business and technology (“veterans approach”) taking advantage from 
pre-work of an industrial partnership. 
Table I.87: BioMCN showing an engineering-type approach to innovation and entre-
preneurship. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major 
Funding 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection and Position 
Bio Methanol 
Chemie 
Nederland BV 
(BioMCN), 
Delfzijl, The 
Netherlands 
(Nov. 2006) 
BioMCN claimed 
to be the first 
company in the 
Main share-
holder: the 
European 
private equity 
firm Waterland; 
remaining 
shares owned 
by management 
and some of the 
original foun-
ders, the Japa-
Rob Voncken CEO; 
before joining BioMCN fulfilled several positions at Dutch 
chemical firm DSM in the areas of business develop-
ment, marketing & sales, general management; was re-
sponsible for the management of several outsourcing, 
divestment and acquisition projects; 
Siebolt Doorn, co-founder; 
inventor of the BioMCN technology and co-founder of 
BioMCN 
[Ecofys 2006] 
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world to produce 
and sell industrial 
quantities of bio-
methanol and the 
largest 2nd gen-
eration biofuels 
producer in the 
world. 
Employees: 
2009: 80 
 
Sales (in €): 
2007: 101 mio. 
(net profit €5.7 
mio.), 
2008: 85 mio. 
(Net loss 12.9 
mio.); 
Capex 2007: 
€3.4 mio. 
Capex 2008: €26 
mil., majority on 
the construction 
of the com-
mercial bio-
methanol plant 
[BioMCN 2008; 
BioMCN 2009]. 
Since March 
2008 producing 
biomethanol in a 
20,000 tons pilot 
plant; 
 
in July 2009 suc-
cessful start-up 
of a 200,000 tons 
per year bio-
methanol plant. 
October 2008: 
winner of the 
European Re-
sponsible Care 
Award 
nese chemical 
firm Teijin and 
Dutch invest-
ment company 
NOM 
[BioMCN 2009]; 
in 2009 received 
from Waterland 
€39M to fund 
the expansion of 
the facility to 
double produc-
tion capacity to 
400,000 tons by 
2010  
[Lopez 2009]. 
EOS Demo 
(Energie 
Onderzoek 
Subsidies - 
Energy Re-
search Subsidy) 
and IBB-
subsidies 
(Innovatieve 
BioBrand-
stoffen) granted 
total investment 
subsidies for an 
amount of 
€.8.2M; first 
amount of 
€0,7M received 
in 2008; 
in October 2007 
extra financing 
facility of in total 
€30M on top of 
existing subordi-
nated loan 
(€10M) already 
granted in 2006. 
Paul Hamm, co-founder; 
co-initiator of the consortium and temporary CEO of 
BioMethanol Chemie Holding 
[Ecofys 2006; Van Zanten 2007]. 
Foundation approach (Figure): 
technology veterans sharing previous firm affiliations 
and serial entrepreneurs; 
a quasi management buyout (MBO); 
team acquired a natural gas-to-methanol plant with two 
lines of 330,000 tons per year capacity jointly owned by 
Dutch firms DSM, Akzo Nobel, and Dynea (Figure) and 
retrofitted the existing lines; 
November 2006 – The new owner of the methanol plant 
is BioMethanol Chemie Holding (BV), a consortium of 
Econcern, NOM, Oakinvest,. S. Doorn and P. Hamm. 
Fundamental European patent (EP1897851) repre-
sented an improvement of a known glycerin-to-syngas 
process, where liquid glycerol droplets – in a stream of 
inert gas or steam – are introduced into a catalyst bed; 
leads to significant carbon deposition on the catalyst and 
catalyst deactivation; 
the improvement is that glycerin is not introduced into 
the catalyst bed as a liquid, but is fed to the catalyst bed 
as a vapor, together with the necessary amount of 
steam this results in significantly diminished carbon 
deposition on the catalyst. 
Figure: BioMCN foundation and founders’ 
interconnections. 
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Technology, 
Goals, Strategy  
The innovative and patent-protected process converts crude glycerin, a 
residue from biodiesel production, into biomethanol via syngas (“glycerin-to-
syngas”). 
The key steps of the process: purifying crude glycerin and then converting it 
into bio-syngas. Syngas is sent to a methanol converter to produce crude 
biomethanol, the crude biomethanol is purified by distillation. 
Continuous improvement of the process on lab scale and pilot plant scale, 
e.g. regeneration procedure to remove carbon from the catalyst. 
By using biomass instead of natural gas as a feedstock means supplying 
the market with a “green” product that has a higher market value. Flex fuel 
cars can run on any mixture from 100% gasoline up to 85% bio-methanol 
(M85). 
Actually, it was a retrofitting approach: BioMCN acquired in 2006 a natural 
gas-to-methanol plant. 
Methanol to be used as a feedstock in the sense of a biorefinery approach 
for downstream producing, for instance, formaldehyde or acetic acid. 
Even though Delfzijl is located in the very North of The Netherlands, it can 
be considered an ideal location due to excellent road, rail and water links. 
Also, 15% of Dutch chemicals are produced in Delfzijl. 
The global methanol market was believed to be around 35 – 38.000 kt of 
which some 20 – 25% is sold in Europe [BioMCN 2009]. Business focus 
was mainly on Europe as the primary market for BioMCN. In Europe 
BioMCN claims to have a market share of 5% in the existing methanol 
markets. 
Commercialization/revenue model: 
owner-operator, 
BioMCN will spend several years concentrating on the production of bio-
methanol from glycerin “We are aiming to expand into biorefining but that is 
a long-term concept which will not be realized for 10 years.” [Headline News 
2009] It is assumed that most of the revenues currently come from selling 
biomethanol as an input for the petro-gasoline octane booster MTBE (to oil 
companies for blending with petro-gasoline). 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: early 2010. 
BioMCN showed healthy further development. In 2011 BioMCN and the Investment 
and Development Agency of North Netherlands (NOM) have, together with Visser & 
Smit Hanab and German giants Linde and Siemens, formed a consortium to build a 
large scale biomass refinery. This refinery will be built next to the biofuel plant that 
BioMCN opened in Delfzijl in 2010. This consortium asked the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I) for a subsidy. The proposed refinery will be 
the largest of its kind. The biomass refinery can process approximately 1.5 million tons 
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of residual wood, which will yield more than 500 million liters of second generation bio-
methanol [BioMCN 2011]. 
In line with the historic production of methanol from pyrolysis from wood (via syngas) 
also acetic acid (as a key component of “wood vinegar” – Holzessig in German) can 
be obtained from wood pyrolysis. 99, 126 This leads almost directly to ZeaChem, Inc.’s 
biofuel process. 
Whereas the bioengineering route usually converts (C6 sugars or C6 and C5 sugars) 
to bioethanol or biobutanol, Zeachem’s bioengineering patented process relies on 
lignin separation and converts the fermentable sugars into acetate (ethyl acetate, 
which is the ethanol ester of acetic acid; CH3CO-OC2H5) and then gasifies the 
remainder, tough lignin and all other, into hydrogen before mixing the two streams in a 
reaction called “hydrogenolysis” (a chemical reaction whereby a carbon-carbon or 
carbon-heteroatom single bond is cleaved or undergoes “lysis” by hydrogen) to 
produce ethanol. 
There are two remarkable points: 1) a big refinery rather than oil company appears as 
an investor; and 2) ZeaChem Inc. did not invent anything. “There’s no new bugs, no 
new equipment. We’re taking things that already exist.” [Verser 2009] A Lego-type 
process is followed; only commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are used, no 
unproven technology. 
The lessons from ZeaChem entrepreneurship is the focus on people (team), building 
on experience (what you can do best), timing and persistence. There is a very struc-
tured engineering-type approach to financing and risk mitigation. And, as in case of 
BioMCN, the human component comprises a people’s network of shared company af-
filiations which brings in trust and stability. 
Table I.88: Zeachem showing an engineering-type approach to innovation and entre-
preneurship using only proven technology. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major 
Funding 
CEO, Other Executives, Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection 
ZeaChem, Inc.  
Lakewood, CO 
(2002); 
Incorporated in 
2002, founded 
1998 – “Two 
guys in a pickup” 
[Verser 2009]. 
Headquarter in 
Lakewood, (CO) 
Funding to-
gether with profit 
from service 
contracts and 
grant funding 
$34M Series B 
(2008), several 
VCs and Valero 
Energy Corp., 
the largest pe-
According to its EPC services Burns & McDonnell 
ZeaChem has 30 employees, half of whom work in the 
ZeaChem R&D facility in Menlo Park, Calif., where 
scientists and engineers conduct laboratory-scale 
research to prove the theoretical chemical viability of 
each step of manufacturing. 
 
Figure 1: ZeaChem Management Team – experienced 
persons (“veterans”} with interpersonal relationships (and 
co-working). 
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and R&D labora-
tory facility in 
Menlo Park (CA). 
2009 employee 
number: 25 
[Verser 2009] 
 
Series A 
financing for 
proved out tech-
nology at lab 
scale, 
Series B 
financing for 
demo plant 
troleum refiner 
in the US; 
$6M Series A 
(2006). 
$25M grant from 
the US Depart-
ment of Energy 
(DOE) as sup-
port for con-
struction of the 
first cellulosic 
biorefinery with 
capacity of 
250,000 gals 
per year (GPY); 
should be online 
by the end of 
2010; 
more DOE 
grants (e.g. no. 
DE-FG36-
03GO13010 of 
2002/2003) 
 
Unique balance of knowledge and experience in plant 
engineering, refining, biological, chemical and ethanol 
process. 
Strong backgrounds regarding business management, 
project and capital deployment, chemicals/energy pro-
duction and risk management 
Numerous process patents mainly by T. Eggeman and D. 
Verser 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Addresses exist-
ing deep mar-
kets; 
Flexible product 
platform, bio-
ethanol just one 
product; 
Bioerefinery-ap-
proach: 
Start with ethanol 
and C2 platform, 
expand to C3 
chain (Figure 
I.174); 
Use known mi-
crobes, equip-
“We do not depend on any new scientific input ... they all have been done at 
very large scale.” [Verser 2008] 
Claims: The patented process they utilize offers the highest yield at the 
lowest costs, with the lowest fossil carbon footprint of any known biorefining 
method. 
ZeaChem uses naturally occurring bacteria, an acetogen, in its fermentation 
process. There is no genetic modification to the bacteria. 
A key strategy for ZeaChem is to co-locate its biorefineries with dedicated 
energy crops. 
Contracted with Greenwood Resources of Oregon to supply hybrid poplar 
trees for their feedstock (integrating the process with the forestry industry), a 
tree farm with a radius of five miles, that is about 50,000 acres, and that 
would supply one ethanol plant of roughly 100 million gallons (per year); 
will begin construction of its Oregon demo facility by the end of 2009. 
Has selected CH2M HILL as the Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
(EPC) contractor for its first biorefinery. 
ZeaChem’s technology is a parallel hybrid system of gasification and 
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ment, processes; 
Focus on man-
agement team 
with execution on 
technical and 
commercial level; 
Have strategic 
support; 
Recurrency: 
Expand techno-
logy into other 
products and re-
peat; 
Maintain the op-
tion of awarding 
direct licenses to 
qualified parties. 
ZeaChem has a 
number of poten-
tial business 
segments that 
will necessarily 
involve strategic 
partners 
fermentation: a Lego-type “hybrid” fermentation esterification hydrogenolysis 
process. 
(“indirect” ethanol fermentation and chemically high efficient, well established 
hydrogenolysis) – current products and future C2-platform products. 
A differentiator: ZeaChem’s ability to produce a range of cellulosic biobased 
products to serve a variety of market sectors; produce many chemicals and 
fuels within various carbon chain product groups; 
production facilities will be capable of producing the products that will yield 
the best margin – should market conditions change, a ZeaChem facility will 
have the option of changing the products produced. 
Figure 2: The ZeaChem Proceess. 
 
Revenue Model: 
1. Able to produce ethanol at <$1/gal 
2. License technology for early plants, 
3. Sell products, and monetize markets and geographies. 
Moving forward by combinations: 
1. Strategic investors. 
2. Government support 
Partnerships: 
Strategic – Valero Energy Corp. (acts also as investor), 
Feedstock: Greenwood, 
VC: such as MDV. 
Reduce risk by alliances along entire value chain 
Feedstock supply, 
Technology (successful demo plant for core technology, warrantees from 
 1000 Appendix A 
non-core technology vendors) 
Risk Mitigation: 
[Imbler 2009] 
Bottom-Line: 
Have more mo-
ney than you 
need 
Once technology 
established, 
utilize traditional 
project finance 
Risk Mitigation Strategy 
Demo. Capital 
Cost 
Freeze design; provide explicit project definition 
Scale-up Establish clear performance goals for each level 
of scale-up; design for process flexibility 
Integration Use Lego block deployment if possible to mini-
mize potential of integration issues 
Technology Keep plant #1 based on known technology and 
processes where possible (remember risks are 
multiplicative) 
Engineering Use experienced knowledgeable EPC, but 
maintain tight supervision on daily basis 
Operations Evaluate partnering with experienced operator 
Economics Fix feedstock costs and sellout production from 
plant to 3rd party credit worthy entity 
Funding Ensure business has adequate funding access-
ing a variety of different sources 
 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: early 2010. 
Zeachem’s “indirect” ethanol fermentation which combines a thermochemical and a 
bioengineering (fermentation) approach to bioethanol corresponds to a “hybrid” pro-
cess based on syngas as schematically outlined in Figure I.175. 
By the end of 2011 ZeaChem launched its 250,000 gallon per year core process, at 
their Boardman, Oregon, biorefinery. “‘We came in on schedule and significantly 
under budget,” reflected ZeaChem CEO Jim Imbler. “We had a guaranteed maximum 
price, but in this case we received a rebate check. One of our long-term VCs said to 
me I’ve seen a lot of things, but I have never seen a check come back.” “It came 
down, we think, to the choice we made to use known processes, known vendors.” 
ZeaChem integrates feedstock from a portion of GTFF’s residual fiber with local agri-
cultural residue suppliers to achieve feedstock costs 50 percent less compared to 
Brazilian sugar cane and 80 percent less, compared to corn based processes [Lane 
2012l]. 
In Colorado, Zeachem has received a conditional commitment for a $232.5 million 
loan guarantee from the US Department of Agriculture’s 9003 Biorefinery Assistance 
Program [Biofuels Digest 2012]. Development of the first commercial biorefinery is 
already underway. The facility is expected to have capacity of 25 million or more GPY, 
and is expected to be competitive, upon completion, with $50 oil, with a targeted $1.96 
operating cost per gallon. Its first commercial plant will be located adjacent to 
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ZeaChem’s 250,000 GPY integrated demonstration biorefinery in Boardman, which is 
a logistics and transportation hub for the Columbia River system through the Port of 
Morrow and is projected to be operational by late 2014. Under the conditional commit-
ment, ZeaChem must meet specified conditions before the 60 percent loan guarantee 
can be completed, and must also source the loan. Silicon Valley Bank was the bank of 
record for the project. 
 
Figure I.175: Flow diagram of the thermochemical and a “linear hybrid” approach to 
bioalcohols. 
The total project cost for the 25 million gallon per year biorefinery is estimated to be 
$390.5 million, and the remainder of the project cost shall be covered through equity 
contributions by ZeaChem and its investment group [Biofuels Digest 2012]. 
The news of ZeaChem’s startup came at a time of significant blow-back for the cellu-
losic biofuels movement and sector, after the US EPA waived down the scheduled 
500 million gallon mandate for cellulosic ethanol, first proposed back in 2007 when the 
current Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was developed, down to 10.45 million gal-
lons for 2012. 
The overall mandates for 2012, under the Renewable Fuel Standard, are as follows 
expressed in ethanol-equivalent gallons (actual volumes in parentheses) 
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 Biomass-based diesel: 1.5 billion gallons (1.0 bil. gal) 
 Advanced biofuels: 2.0 billion gallons (1.3–1.5 bil. gal) 
 Cellulosic biofuels: 10.45 million gallons (8.65 mio. gal) 
 Renewable fuels: 15.2 billion gallons (14.5–14.7 bil. gal). 
A.1.1.4 The Special Algae-to-Biofuels Boom 
As for the biomass-to-biofuel movement the same occurs for the third-generation bio-
fuels. For the emerged boom of algae-to-biofuels, “everything new was old again.” In 
the US the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) in Golden (CO) led a $25 million 
study of algae from 1978 to 1996, before money dried up and government research 
shifted to ethanol [Gold 2009b; DOE 2009]. DOE canceled the program in 1996, say-
ing the process could not be made cost-competitive with petroleum refining [Voith 
2009b]. Similar research programs and experiments were persued in Germany, also 
with no promising results and corresponding endings. 
Furthermore, all kinds of research avenues were explored, but when the funding 
shriveled during later years, knowledge, experts and know-how were lost. Programs 
that started during the late 1970s and early 1980s were stopped in the years of low 
energy prices that followed. In the US, now, there was all this biofuel work going on, 
and they are all going back to that public domain research. In the context of the biofuel 
boom interest in algae-based biofuels also exploded and venture capital and corpo-
rate money flowed also into this field. It is estimated that over 75 percent of the 
companies who had algal aspirations in the1980s and 1990s no longer exist [Rapier 
2009c]. 
A notable difference to bioalcohols and biogasoline, however, is that past efforts with 
algae focused essentially on research rather than development and demonstration 
[Pienkos 2008; Pienkos and Darzins 2009]. The 18 years of research at the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) yielded a lot of knowledge, but it resulted in 
nothing resembling a commercial product or process. In the best-case scenario, when 
all is said and done, algal biofuel could cost $50 per barrel. But that will not happen 
anytime soon, and it could take a decade [Madrigal 2009; 2007]. 
There are about 30,000 species of algae. “100 are well known and between 15 and 20 
are used for production.” [Robinson 2009]. Hence, there is plenty of scope for compe-
tition. But the diversity of algae also meant that there is scope to produce niche algae 
for different conditions. And it is unlikely that there will be a single type of algae that 
work well in the cold climates, the tropics, salt and fresh water. 
Furthermore, there is no parallel agricultural enterprise equivalent for cultivating algae 
at a similar scale. “We don’t have the infrastructure yet to grow literally thousands of 
acres, maybe millions of acres of algae,” NREL’s researcher Darzins said. In short, 
the science of algae cultivation (algaeculture), agronomy-for-algae, does not exist. 
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“Algae growers” are still learning how to protect their fragile crop from predators and 
invasive species. 
It was thus clear that a significant basic science and applied engineering R&D effort 
including a rigorous techno-economic and life-cycle analysis (LCA) will be required to 
fully realize the vision and potential of algae [DOE 2009]. In this regard, a recent 
publication [Lardon 2009] reported algal biofuels would not have a positive energy 
balance; in other words, you had have to put more energy in than you would get out. 
Algae constitute single-celled or simple multi-cellular photosynthetic organisms. They 
produce their own food by using energy from sunlight to synthesize complex mole-
cules from carbon dioxide and water – both in sea and fresh water. Algae range in 
size from microscopic organisms to giant seaweeds some hundred meters in length 
(micro- versus macro-algae). They contain chlorophyll and other pigments which give 
them a variety of colors. They manufacture their food by photosynthesis (Figure 
I.177). Inside their mushy cells, algae contain up to 50 percent vegetable-oil-like lipids 
by dry cell weight. Genetic engineering claims it can tailor the oil composition, pro-
ductivity, and other traits of the algae. 
Algae are very interesting: they created the oxygen (Figure I.178) in our at-
mosphere, and also oil, both essential as a basis of our existence. 
The close connections of algae to petro-oil are as follows. “Geologists view crude oil 
and natural gas as the product of compression and heating of ancient organic ma-
terials (i.e. kerogen) over geological time. Today’s oil formed from the preserved 
remains of prehistoric zooplankton and algae, which had settled to a sea or lake 
bottom in large quantities under anoxic conditions. Over geological time the organic 
matter mixed with mud, and was buried under heavy layers of sediment resulting in 
high levels of heat and pressure (known as diagenesis). This caused the organic 
matter to chemically change, first into a waxy material known as kerogen which is 
found in various oil shales around the world, and then with more heat into liquid and 
gaseous hydrocarbons in a process known as catagenesis.” 100 
In principle, for biofuels algae offer many advantages over traditional oilseed crops, 
such as corn, soybeans or rapeseed.  
 Better Yield: 
Algae yield far more oil than traditional oil seeds. Up to 50 percent of an 
algae’s body weight is comprised of oil, whereas oil-palm trees – currently the 
largest producer of oil to make biofuels – yields approximately 20 percent of 
their weight in oil. Although many different parts of plants may yield oil, in ac-
tual commercial practice oil is extracted primarily from the seeds of oilseed 
plants. 
The draw is that algae have the potential to produce up to ten times more oil 
per acre than traditional biofuel crops such as oil palm [Waltz 2009b]. 
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 Rapid Growth: 
Algae grow up to 15 times faster than oilseed crops grown on land. According 
to a rule of thumb, bacteria will divide once an hour and algae once every day. 
 Better Use of Land: 
Algae can be grown in marginal lands in places away from the farmlands and 
forests, thus minimizing potential stresses to our food chain and ecosystems. 
 Reduced Pollution: 
Algae can reduce pollution by utilizing via photosynthesis large amounts of 
potentially harmful CO2 from industrial emissions to grow rapidly. 
 Frequent Harvests: 
Daily harvesting diminishes the risk of crop failures in comparison to terrestrial 
plants. 
 Algae may produce directly bioethanol (sugars to ethanol, Figure I.178) or 
other fuels by fermentation. 
Algae provide carbohydrates, proteins, and lipid oils, essentially triglycerides (Figure 
I.178) which may be converted to fatty acid methyl esters (FAMEs) and biodiesel. 
Considerable research has focused on using algae for the production of hydrogen gas 
(H2, Table I.92). As a target for commercialization and production of biofuels the algae 
focus so far was on the following: 
 Food and feed applications: after extracting the algae oil the remaining pro-
tein-rich algae biomass can used for food and feed; 
 Nutritional additives and fine chemicals: fine chemicals for pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics or, for instance, astaxanthin pigments as adding color to the 
flesh of farmed fish or as antioxidants. Fatty output that makes algae a cos-
metic ingredient can also be used for biodiesel. Nutritional and health care 
additives are produced as capsules, tablets and correlative; 
food- and probably also cosmetics-related products may encounter accep-
tance issues in various societies if genetically modified objects are used 
 Sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2): CO2 is absorbed by algae, CO2 is the 
feed for algae (Figure I.177) 
 Raw material for biogas plants: algae biomass can serve as a raw material for 
power generation in combined heat and power (CHP) plants; anaerobic diges-
tion is a series of processes in which microorganisms break down biodegrad-
able material in the absence of oxygen, here to biogas. 
For most of these applications rather than open cultivation ponds (or algae enclosed 
in plastic tubes) that are exposed to the sun closed photobioreactor systems with 
various layouts and shapes are used. This prevents any exposure to heavy metal 
contamination or dust, sand or microbiological contaminations (voracious microbes 
that feed on algae “like a pack of jackals at a buffet”) and guarantees consistent and 
reliable supply of algae. Their use in health care requires the products to be free from 
pesticides and herbicides. 
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Bioreactors allow controlling the growth of algae through feeding and control of algae 
exposure to radiation. 
The below Figure I.176 illustrates qualitatively the market value of the various algae 
products in relation to their market volumes or anticipated volumes, respectively, for a 
state of commercial scale offerings of biofuels. However, it must be considered that 
increasing value is or may be associated with increasing concern about genetically 
modified objects as components of the products. For the highest value offerings it will 
be the consumer (of a particular society) who decides upon the purchase. High value 
products can fetch high prices, but some of these markets already have strong 
players. 
Cultivating algae in open ponds or other open systems may encounter similar pro-
blems as agriculture do, namely the weather in terms of variations in temperature and 
sunshine as well as wind or storm which may bring dirt, dust and pollution to the al-
gae. 
With regard to biofuels, how to grow algae cheaply on a large scale is one of the big-
gest challenges facing the industry. When cultivating algae difficulties may be encoun-
tered when trying to scale-up. In large numbers, the organisms sometimes crowd one 
another out and emit toxic waste that halts the production process. That means, even 
if you can do it in a test tube, getting the same kind of quality on a large scale could be 
an issue. 
 
Figure I.176: The algae value ladder for different offerings. 
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Also related to crowding in open ponds there is the issue of the necessary radiation 
exposure (from sun light above): In a crowded algal assembly only the layers nearest 
to the surface will get sufficient light (“self-shading”) which limits productivity. 
Finally, one approach for NTBFs targeting biofuels from algae would be to focus also 
on the high value-low volume part of algae (Figure I.176) as co-products that can be 
an additional source of revenue and can improve the overall economics of a biofuel 
process. 
To overcome the problems of scale, cost and price competitiveness with petro-oil 
companies will be working with a different combination of inputs, conversion methods, 
extraction techniques, and outputs (Figure I.177). Algae have been sampled from lo-
cal sources, extreme environments, and genetics labs. They are grown in sunlight and 
in the dark, in high-tech tanks (bioreactors) and low-tech ponds. 
 
Figure I.177: Algal biomass output streams based on (sun) light and carbon dioxide 
(CO2) from the atmosphere or a nearby CO2-emitting plant as algae feed and major 
products and applications. 
Today, there is no commercially viable algae approach to biofuels. Production costs 
need to come down by about a factor of 10. For instance, when the algae first must be 
harvested, the open-pond method gets expensive and a cost-effective dewatering pro-
cess must be put into place. On the other hand there is a capital cost ladder as-
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sociated with lowest cost for open ponds, then closed ponds and highest capital costs 
with closed photobioreactors. 
It was estimated in 2009 that the best process and strategy will take three to five years 
to reach commercialization [Voith 2009b]. According to NREL researcher Darzin it will 
take at least five or ten years before anyone finds a way to produce commercial quan-
tities [Wheeler 2009]. 
Algae as a biomass input exhibits generally a broad versatility depending upon 
whether algae oil or whole algae is used for further processing. It is also possible to 
use algae as input for a gasification route to biofuels (Figure I.175). Biogas produced 
from algae contains essentially methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide. And when 
methane is used for power generation a closed loop for CO2 is generated (Figure 
I.177). 
Algae grow in freshwater or seawater (salt water). During its growth they produce 
freshwater (2 gallons of seawater to make 1 gallon fresh water) according to Figure 
I.178. 
In the context of bioethanol, it is interesting to note that cyanobacteria, formerly called 
blue-green algae, also produce ethanol which is the basis for the entrepreneurial 
operations of Algenol Biofuels (Table I.91). Genetic manipulation transformed each 
cell into a small “ethanol factory. 
There are notable firms, one being an NTBF, which are successfully active in the high 
value nutritional additives and fine chemicals algae business. In the US (in Kailua 
Kona, Hawaii) there is Cyanotech Corp., incorporated in Nevada in 1983, with Com-
mon Stock trading on the NASDAQ Capital Market. Cyanotech (revenues $13.9 mio. 
in 2009, $17.0 mio. in 2011) claims to be the world’s largest producer of natural 
Astaxanthin for human consumption. 
  
Figure I.178: How algae produce directly bioethanol: Direct To Ethanol® technology 
(Source – Right: [Woods 2009a; Ahlm 2012:2]). 
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In Germany, BlueBioTech GmbH [Runge 2006:577], founded in 2000, is rather suc-
cessful in commercializing algae as food additives and for functional food and cosme-
tics. It specializes in research, development, production and sales of microalgae as 
well as natural dietary supplements, feed additives and aquaculture feed. It also pro-
vides custom manufacturing services. Further directions target co-operation with in-
dustrial partners to develop and produce microalgae and/or extracts, for instance, as 
active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). It sells branded food additives (BluBio® 
brand) to consumers in capsules, tablets and correlative directly via its Web shop or 
through common distribution channels. 
BlueBioTech GmbH has a group structure. In 2002 BlueBioTech International GmbH 
was founded as a hub for marketing and distribution activities with partners around the 
globe. It has several locations in Germany. Particularly, R&D is located in Germany as 
well as plants for processing algae powders. 
BlueBioTech appeared as the sole manufacturer, with German expertise and tech-
nology, of microalgae in China. The capacities of the facilities in Germany were not 
large enough to fulfill the great market demand. Therefore, BlueBioTech International 
produces larger amounts of powders of Spirulina and Chlorella (the names of the most 
important microalgae species) through a joint venture in China on a Chinese sun is-
land. Here there is no farming or industry. “The climatic conditions at the certified 
algae farm are excellent. The water, in which the algae grow, comes from a depth of 
120 meters. It can’t be any purer!” Currently, ca. 400 metric tons are produced per 
year. 
As a private firm (LLC) BlueBioTech keeps a low level about their revenues. It is 
known that the firm expected revenues of €5 million in 2003 and the founder con-
firmed €6 million. Hence, one would estimate revenues of €10 to €15 million in sales 
for 2009. 
Concerning algae for biofuels and the role of startups and Big Oil a situation emerged 
similar to that for biomass-to-biofuels: We see alliances of startups or NTBFs with 
giant oil companies, such as Shell, ExxonMobile or Chevron, or chemical giants 
DuPont (Table I.83) and Dow Chemical or with other large companies. Others active 
in the algae-biofuels industry said ExxonMobile’s investment validated the sector. 
The oil industry’s view is reflected by ExxonMobile’s view of the area, as expressed by 
a vice president at ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Co. (Emil Jacobs, italics 
added): 
“Growing algae does not rely on fresh water and arable land otherwise used 
for food production. And lastly, algae have the potential to produce large vol-
umes of oils that can be processed in existing refineries to manufacture fuels 
that are compatible with existing transportation technology and infrastructure.” 
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“This is not going to be easy, and there are no guarantees of success.” The 
project (with SGI; Table I.83) involves three critical steps: identifying algae 
strains that can produce suitable types of oil quickly and at low costs, deter-
mining the best way to grow the algae and developing systems to harvest 
enough for commercial purposes [Porretto 2009]. 
“We pulled together a pretty high-powered team (“think tank approach”) to 
look at alternative energy sources and we looked at all biofuels.” After ex-
amining for ability to scale-up “meaningfully,” technical challenges, environ-
mental impact and economics, ExxonMobil arrived at algae, Jacobs said 
[Lemos-Stein 2009]. 
Also Chevron seemed to think that algae will provide the biofuel of the future 
[Scheffler 2009]. Similar to ExxonMobile, also Dow Chemical made excessive due 
diligence [Woods 2009a] before it announced plans to build together with Algenol 
Biofuels a $50 million pilot plant at Dow’s huge industry complex in Freeport that will 
test Algenol’s technology on a large scale. 
The project was focused with regard to several important implications. It could point 
the way to a more sustainable path for making ethanol. It also could help determine 
the feasibility of using biofuels not just to power cars, but to produce common building 
block chemicals (Figure I.174) currently derived from fossil fuels. This means it 
emphasizes the biorefinery concept (Table I.91). 
Royal Dutch Shell established a joint venture in 2007 with HR BioPetroleum to build a 
pilot facility for growing marine algae and producing algal oils that can, in turn, be 
used to make biofuels. HR BioPetroleum Inc., incorporated in the State of Delaware 
and headquartered in the State of Hawaii, is a developer of large-scale microalgae 
production technology. It is a University of Hawaii, School of Ocean and Earth Science 
and Technology based company. 102 It offers algae products, such as algae oil, bio-
diesel, and animal feed proteins; carbohydrates for the production of ethanol and pe-
troleum-based products; and military jet fuel. The joint venture was called Cellana LLC 
and Shell took the majority share. 
Cellana sees itself possibly best positioned in the race to algae biofuels. As for cellu-
losic alcohols, to be of any significance, algae technology needs to be scaled-up. Any 
aspiring algae company needs to find a route to mass markets. One route is to do this 
with a global partner, big enough to handle the technology risk. For an algae company 
to be attractive for a large partner (or, to attract funding from any other source), it 
needs to have the right competences, and have structured and solid programs as part 
of its business plan (Table I.89). 
Cellana should construct an algae-oil production facility to produce feedstock for bio-
diesel. The 3 MGY pilot plant was next to the Maui Electric power plant at Maalaea 
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(Hawaii) on the Kona coast of Hawaii Island. It would make the Maui Electric plant’s 
CO2 emissions as feedstock for the algae [Lane 2008]. 
Assuming everything occurs successfully as planned the first phase of the commercial 
facility was envisioned to be in operation by 2011. The site, leased from the Natural 
Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority (NELHA) 101 , is near existing commercial algae 
enterprises, primarily serving the pharmaceutical and nutrition industries. The facility 
would grow only non-modified, marine microalgae species in open-air ponds using 
proprietary technology.  
An academic research program supported the project, screening natural microalgae 
species to determine which ones produce the highest yields and the most vegetable 
oil. The program included scientists from the Universities of Hawaii, Southern 
Mississippi and Dalhousie, in Nova Scotia, Canada. This demonstration plant would 
be an important test of the technology and critically of commercial viability. 102 
Table I.89: Innovation architecture and business plan components for the Shell – HR 
Biopetroleum joint venture Cellana, LLC. *) 
Professional, experienced 
management 
(“veterans approach”) 
Edward T. Shonsey, CEO and Director, HR 
BioPetroleum, Inc. served e.g. as Executive VP, 
Internal Development of Verenium Corp. and as 
its Interim CEO and also CFO; also President 
and CEO of Syngenta Seeds Inc. 
C. Barry Raleigh co-founded HR Biopetroleum, 
Inc. in 2004; served as its Chairman and Presi-
dent; he is an experienced manager of large 
research organizations. 
Top (experienced) algae scientists 
(“veterans approach”) 
Technology has been validated in pro-
duction of algae oil and antioxi-
dants/carotenoids such as asta-
xanthan, at pilot operation located in 
Kona. 
Over a period of several years, Dr. 
Mark Huntley, CSO and a co-founder 
of HR Biopetroleum has utilized a 
proprietary two-stage algae cultivation 
system at this site; he overcame a 
number of key challenges – namely, 
open-pond contamination and low 
productivity. 
Mark Huntley Chief Science Officer, co-founded 
HR Biopetroleum, Inc. in 2004, is a thought-
leader in marine biological sciences generally 
and algae cultivation technologies specifically; 
has been active in algae-related research and 
development for more than 20 years; held re-
search faculty positions at both the Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography and the University 
of Hawaii. 
Huntley held also a senior management role for 
10 years in a special program; 
as an entrepreneurial CEO he took Aquasearch 
Inc., a marine biotechnology company focused 
on the production of astaxanthan and other 
value-added products from cultivated marine 
microalgae, from startup to a public market 
valuation of $200 million in four years; is skilled 
at organizing interdisciplinary R&D programs. 
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Algae production experience 
The key advancement made by 
Huntley and his co-inventor, Redalje, 
was to couple the continuous, large-
scale production of a pure culture of 
algae in the sterile, controlled photo-
bioreactors with the larger-capacity 
open ponds used for large-scale 
production 
Dr. Donald Redalje co-founder and Member of 
Scientific & Technical Team, co-founded HR 
BioPetroleum Inc. and served as a Member of 
its Scientific & Technical Team; is a leading 
expert in microalgae physiology and biochemis-
try; 
He holds numerous patents in the area of 
marine biotechnology and is a co-inventor of 
the ALDUO™ process. 
Structured programs Strain selection, cultivation development, 
extraction, scale-up, product development 
Strong partners: 
a) Scientific and b) commercial 
a) Cellana has an academic research program 
including scientists from the Universities of 
Hawaii, Southern Mississippi and Dalhousie, in 
Nova Scotia, Canada 
b) capacity to take technology risk, professional 
execution, professional culture (Shell) 
Location, pilot facility, 
Proximity to scientific and commercial 
partners 
Will make the nearby Maui Electric 
Powerplant’s CO2 emissions as feedstock for 
the algae; 
the “Kona Demonstration Facility” (KDF) on the 
Kona coast of Hawaii Island was leased by 
Cellana from the Natural Energy Laboratory of 
Hawaii Authority (NELHA); was also near exist-
ing commercial algae enterprises, primarily 
serving the pharmaceutical and nutrition Indus-
tries. 
CO2 feed for algae Access and permits to operate, piping etc. from 
Maui Electric plant to the adjacent algae facility; 
non-modified, marine microalgae species in 
open-air ponds 
Sales contracts Vegetable oil and protein/carbohydrates 
Commercial roll-out plan ? 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference. 
However, as observed for German CHOREN, in 2011 Shell withdrew from the project 
set up according to best practice and endowed with many resources (cf. also the 
approach of venture capitalist Vinod Khosla; Table I.98). H R BioPetroleum acquired 
Shell’s shareholding in Cellana in January 2011; HRBP became the sole owner of 
Cellana, including its six-acre demonstration facility in Kona, Hawaii. Shell provided an 
undisclosed amount of short-term funding for Cellana during the transition. In 2011, it 
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was one of the most advanced operational demonstration facilities among algae-to-
biofuel organizations and companies in the US. 
The envisioned first phase of the commercial facility to be operational by 2011 did not 
materialize. Still in the research and development stage, the company had been work-
ing toward developing a commercial facility on Maui by 2013. Obviously, there again 
was the issue of scaling-up. But, the focus on breeding and growing only non-
modified, marine microalgae species and strain selection introduced another obstacle. 
HRBP commented: “We will continue to operate Cellana’s Kona demonstration facility 
and to continuously improve the economics for growing marine algae using HRBP’s 
patented process.” “Based on HRBP’s and Cellana’s results to date, we believe this 
technology holds great potential for the economical production of algae and algae-
derived products for applications within the aquaculture and animal feed markets, as 
well as for the production of algal oil for conversion into biofuels.” [Cocke 2011; Algae 
Industry Magazine 2011] 
Biofuels Entrepreneurship Related to Algae  
in the US and Germany 
In 2009 in the US there were about 100 startups [Voith 2009b] and worldwide there 
were an estimated 200 algae companies [Waltz 2009]. In this technologically highly 
risky field the American GreenFuel Technologies was the first high profile algal con-
cern to go under, but it would not be the last. The prominent startup GreenFuel, which 
grew out of Harvard University and MIT research (founded in 2001, staff of 50 in early 
2009 [Kanellos 2009b]), went bust early in 2009 after blowing through $70 million 
[Madrigal 2009]. 
Greenfuel raised millions of dollars for R&D, had a bioreactor development arrange-
ment with the German firm IGV (Institut für Getreideverarbeitung) [Schibilsky 2008] 
and landed a high-profile deal in Spain to erect test facilities for an algae farm project. 
The multi-year deal in Spain was worth $92 million to build greenhouses that grow 
algae, which can be harvested for vegetable oil to make biodiesel or to make animal 
feed. The project developer was Spain’s Aurantia; the algae would be fed sunlight and 
carbon dioxide from the Holcim cement plant near Jerez, Spain. 
Processing was in vertical thin-film algae-solar bioreactors. Getting the whole thing to 
run smoothly, though, was tougher than expected. The company also found its system 
would cost more than twice its target [Kanellos 2009b]. 
The week GreenFuel folded, the DOE awarded an Arizona utility $70.6 million to 
scale-up the firm’s technology [Waltz 2009]. Additionally, Mark Edwards cited by 
Rapier [2009c] also argued that GreenFuel made “some serious mistakes in executing 
strategy.” “We are a victim of the economy,” said (a representative of) a VC company 
which invested in Greenfuel. 
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However, the company had also been chronically saddled with delays and technical 
problems. In 2007, a project to grow algae in an Arizona greenhouse went awry when 
the algae grew faster than they could be harvested and died off [Rapier 2009b]. In 
retrospect GreenFuel’s claims were viewed so overblown that they “became a joke” 
[Waltz 2009a]. 
And generally, there was much suspicion about the claims of algae startups, with re-
gard to their technological development state, prediction of time when fully commer-
cializing their technology and particularly with regard to numbers of quantities of bio-
fuel (gal/ac/yr) to be obtained from land. And it was also questioned in how far data 
obtained on the lab scale will also be valid for large scale production. 
Finally, several analyses pointed out algae firms’ claims of productivity to violate va-
rious physical laws. Near-term technologies may allow algae to produce up to 6,000 
gallons of oil per acre per year. “If you really push the limits, then maybe 10,000 gal-
lons per acre,” commented a researcher at a National Laboratory. “This figure could 
improve with advances in cultivation, species selection, breeding and genetic modifi-
cation, but only to a certain extent. The laws of thermodynamics and the limits of pho-
tosynthetic efficiencies just won’t allow it.” “When you see 20,000 or beyond – that’s 
total bologna.” Yet there are companies claiming they can make up to 100,000 
gal/ac/yr, and raking in tens of millions in investment based on those promises. 
There was a broad opinion that “only a handful of companies are really serious.” 
[Rapier 2009; Waltz 2009b] Wesoff [2009] presented the citations: 1) “As soon as I 
see an article touting algae’s production of oil per unit area over terrestrial plants – I 
know the author(s) are clueless about the financial economics of algae fuel process-
ing.”; 2) “Bottom line – in our opinion the reality of economically viable algae fuel pro-
duction is still quite a few years in the future – unless someone finds a truly novel 
short cut through the Laws of Thermodynamics and basic economics.” 
Correspondingly, there is a serious credibility issue for most of the numerous algae 
startups entering the scene and adding to the “algae bubble.” “Most algae-to-fuel com-
panies refuse to reveal much information about their technologies, which has led to 
more skepticism.” [Waltz 2009b] 
Hence, one of the basic prerequisite to start an algae firm is to get credibility, 
for instance, by corporate venturing of big firms in the startup or research or 
development alliance agreements with big firms, public research institutes or 
universities, and creating an advisory board with scientists with high reputa-
tion. 
After a proof-of-concept in the (research) laboratory in many cases the development 
status of algal startups is demonstration on the level of a Feasibility Assessment Unit 
(FAU). 
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In the US Solazyme which established an alliance with Chevron (Table I.83) was the 
first NTBF entered the algae biofuel field in 2003, after which the algae field has at-
tracted many entrants. As Virent Energy Systems (Table I.85) Solazyme has its tech-
nological roots in hydrogen (H2) generation. This occurred while the “Zeitgeist” of “The 
Hydrogen Economy” [Runge 2006:325] was in full swing. 
With its growing investor population and grant acquisitions, strategic partnerships, and 
a varied product line (not wholly focused on biofuels) based on its platform techno-
logy, Solazyme was assumed to be able to weather future storms. Solazyme not only 
created biofuels for the transportation industry, but was experimenting with ways to 
tailor its processes and products for the cosmetic and food and feed industries (Figure 
I.176). 
By the end of 2009, Solazyme has produced only limited quantities of biofuels, in-
cluding several hundred thousand liters to the US military, which is seeking to promote 
alternatives to conventional fuels and it focused on the high margin areas of the algae 
business (Table I.90). 
Table I.90: Solazyme’s approach to biofuels and additionally high value products us-
ing algae. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major 
Funding 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection and Position 
Solazyme, Inc. 
South San 
Francisco (CA) 
(2003) 
A renewable oil 
and bioproducts 
company utilizing 
innovative algal 
biotechnology 
Employees: 
2006: >20, 
[Wilson 2007], 
2007: 33 
[ZoomInfo 2008], 
2008: 45 (late ‘08 
60) [Melendez 
2009], 
2009: 65 
[Melendez 2009]. 
[CrunchBase 
2009b] 
Latest round 
$7M Series C,  
brings the total 
funds to $76M; 
will be used for 
commercializa-
tion of its tech-
nology; 
Solazyme ad-
ded $12M in an 
interim round 
standing at 
$57M [Lemos-
Stein 2009] 
$45.4M, 8/27/08 
(?) 
Total Invest-
ment: 
Jonathan Wolfson CEO and co-founder; overseeing the 
management team and strategic direction of the com-
pany; 
held a variety of positions in finance, business, and law; 
was a co-founder and President and Chief Operating 
Officer of InvestorTree, a financial software and ASP 
services firm; 
also worked as an investment banker for Morgan 
Stanley, in the M&A department of Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver & Jacobson, and also as a business/legal ana-
lyst; he holds J.D. (Juris Doctor) and MBA degrees. 
Harrison Dillon is the President, CTO and co-founder; 
overseeing technology strategy, intellectual property and 
legal affairs; he is trained in the field of microbial genet-
ics, formerly managed the biotechnology patent portfolio 
of the University of Utah in the University’s Technology 
Transfer Office. Dr. Dillon received a J.D. 
Arthur Grossman is the Chief of Genetics at Solazyme. 
Dr. Grossman is a world renowned scientist and has 
spent over twenty-five years in microalgal research. 
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Revenues: 
2007: $2.6M 
[ZoomInfo 2008]. 
When doubled 
the size of the 
firm (from 25 to 
52 employees) in 
7 months devel-
oped a human 
capital manage-
ment plan and 
changed organi-
zation was nec-
essary (“10 – 25 
- 150” rule, Table 
I.72) 
[ZoomInfo 2008; 
Yatedo]. 
$11.6M Series 
D (06/2009), 
$45.4M Series 
C (8/2008), 
$10M Series B 
(03/2007) 
(cf. also [Crunch 
Base 2009b] 
$5M Debt fund-
ing (09/2007) 
2004: Harris & 
Harris Group, 
Inc. invested 
$310,000 as 
part of a larger 
funding round 
[Harris & Harris 
2005]. 
2009: received a 
$21.8M federal 
grant from US 
DOE to build its 
first integrated 
biorefinery in 
rural Riverside 
(PA); located on 
the site of 
Cherokee 
Pharmaceuti-
cals’ existing 
commercial 
biomanufactur-
ing facility 
(make diesel 
from sawdust 
and cooking oil 
from food-fac-
tory waste; 
on an industrial 
scale), 
Solazyme will 
add $3.9M; 
goal: to prove 
this (refining) 
can be an in-
Currently, he shares his time between Solazyme and the 
Carnegie Institution/Stanford University where he is a 
Senior Staff Scientist at Carnegie and a Professor at 
Stanford; 
overseeing of current R&D projects and the develop-
ment of strategies for initiating and implementing new 
projects. 
Prior to becoming a member of the management team, 
Dr. Grossman was the Chairman of Solazyme’s 
Scientific Advisory Board and has been a key part of the 
R&D team since 2004. 
Jurgen Dominik is the SVP of Process Development; 
most recently, Mr. Dominik was senior vice president of 
global operations for CP Kelco focusing on manufactur-
ing, logistics, capital spending, and process research. 
Mr. Dominik brings over 30 years of experience in tech-
nology, manufacturing, research and development, and 
international management. His duties included the man-
agement of design, construction, startup, and operation 
of large-scale fermentation facilities and natural product 
extraction manufacturing plants. 
Peter Licari is the Senior Vice President of Research 
and Development at Solazyme. 
Dr. Licari has over 20 years experience in biochemical 
engineering and bioprocessing, most recently as a 
Senior Vice President at Kosan Biosciences, Inc. where 
his responsibilities included development and manufac-
turing operations; he served also as Senior Scientist at 
BASF Bioresearch Corporation, responsible for fermen-
tation process development. In 2005 he obtained an 
MBA degree. 
David Brinkmann VP of Manufacturing, has over 30 
years of technical, operations, and leadership experi-
ence in the bioprocess industry. 
Mr. Brinkmann came to Solazyme from CP Kelco, where 
he spent ten years managing all operational aspects of a 
large biotechnology pilot plant and semiworks that pro-
vided process R&D and manufacturing support pro-
grams, such as productivity improvement, cost reduce-
tion, and new product development. 
David Isaacs SVP of Government Relations of Sola-
zyme, is responsible for formulating and executing the 
company’s government strategy at the federal and state 
level. 
In this capacity, he is working to advance the company’s 
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dustrial method, 
not just an ex-
periment 
[DiStefano 
2009]; 
two contracts 
with the US 
Navy, one worth 
$200,000 to 
supply 1,500 
gallons of jet 
fuel in 2010; 
another sepa-
rate contract 
worth $8.5 mil. 
to research, de-
velop and de-
liver 20,000 gal-
lons algae de-
rived fuel for use 
in Navy ships 
[DiStefano 
2009; Nagappan 
2009]. 
Both grants 
used for learn-
ing to scale-up 
2007: 
received a $2M 
grant from the 
National 
Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology to 
develop a sub-
stitute for crude 
oil based on 
algae 
[Bullis 2008a]. 
priorities on funding opportunities, legislation, regulatory 
matters, and policy, particularly with regard to the 
Congress, the Departments of Defense and Energy, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and key states (cf. 
also BluefFire, Table I.86). 
Solazyme believes in intellectual property and in-
licensed technology; has issued patents and more than 
20 (published) patent applications. 
The founders Dillon and Wolfson met on their first day of 
college back in the 1980s; wanted to start a company 
together but had only a vague notion of what to do. 
Dillon went into biotechnology and ultimately also be-
came a patent attorney. Wolfson got a law degree and 
an MBA and went into finance [Kanellos 2008]. 
Foundation of the company in Dillon’s garage in 2003 
[DiStefano 2009]. 
Originally focused on hydrogen (H2) production by GM 
algae [Kanellos 2008] (Dillon granted patent US 
7135290 “Methods and compositions for evolving hydro-
genase genes”). 
When the two first sought funds, most venture capital 
firms were intrigued by their idea, but did not know how 
to position the company in their portfolio. Ultimately, 
investors shuttled the two to the partners who handled 
pharma deals [Kanellos 2008]. 
“We’re developing a production platform (and) are look-
ing for commercialization partners.” 
It doubled its lab and office space to 7,000 square feet 
and increased head count from 20. Wolfson said 
Solazyme had narrowed its initial algal library from “the 
low thousands” to five or six strains [Wilson 2007]. 
Patented process: maximize triglyceride production 
through fermentation (US Patent 2008/0124756 A1) 
[Waltz 2009b]. 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy  
Solazyme uses synthetic biology [Waltz 2009b] for the renewable produc-
tion of biofuels, industrial oleochemicals, and health and wellness ingre-
dients. 
Self-Description: 
It modifies microalgae to produce tailored triglyceride oils that can be re-
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fined into biodiesel in the same facilities that refine petroleum. They produce 
crude oil, which can be turned into anything that is made from oil. They ge-
netically engineer the cells’ ability to handle different feedstock, as well as 
the structure of the oil produced. 
It is not photosynthetic. Some algae naturally produce oil more effectively 
when fed biomass in the dark – an adaptive mechanism that allows them to 
survive in the event that sunlight is blocked for extended periods. Solazyme 
enhances this ability. It feeds its algae various cellulosic and other waste 
materials rather than CO2 and sunlight. Some algae produce polysaccha-
rides from biomass, instead of oils. Solazyme uses synthetic biology also to 
modify these, as well, and some may be commercialized. 
The company uses different strains of algae to produce different types of oil. 
The process also has significant advantages. First, keeping the algae in the 
dark causes them to produce more oil than they do in the light. That is be-
cause while their photosynthetic processes are inactive, other metabolic 
processes that convert sugar into oil become active. 
Just as important, feeding algae sugar makes it possible to grow them in 
concentrations that are orders of magnitude higher than when they are 
grown in ponds. 
Solazyme uses traditional industrial fermentation equipment [Voith 2009b]. 
Solazyme is the only microbial biofuel company to produce an oil-based 
fuel, Soladiesel®. Solazyme said it produced thousands of gallons of fuel 
from algae that was tested to meet strict ASTM international standards for 
jet fuel. Solazyme has already road-tested its diesel fuel for thousands of 
miles in unmodified cars. 
Co-founder Dillon said the company is about 24 to 36 months away from 
hitting its target manufacturing cost of $2 to $3 a gallon, or $40 to $80 a 
barrel [AP 2009b]. 
Feed wood chips, switchgrass, waste glycerin (cf. BioMCN, Table I.87) to 
algae in a process where the algae will convert that biomass into crude oil, 
which “can be used to make” diesel fuel, jet fuel, high-nutrition edible oil like 
olive oil, or plastics. 
As Solazyme can convert sugars directly into oils without photosynthesis 
this allows the organisms to be grown in fermentation tanks, which reduces 
the costs of a still-expensive process. 
Solazyme is not only focused on scale-up, production and road testing of a 
variety of advanced biofuels, but simultaneously diversifies its platform into 
other products and markets. 
It develops products across distinct market segments, leveraging algae’s 
unique oil and material production capabilities: 
- Fuels 
- Chemicals, 
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- Nutritionals (Human + Animal Nutrition), e.g. selling the non-oil 
  biomass for animal feed, 
- Health Sciences (Cosmetics + Nutraceuticals). 
Solazyme is interested in developing collaborative R&D and commercializa-
tion relationships, working with partners to develop and commercialize new 
or improved processes and products in its target markets (e.g. Chevron, 
BlueFire, Imperium Renewables, Inc.) 
The US Navy agreed to pay for 22,000 gallons of Solazyme jet fuel and ship 
fuel for delivery in 2010 [DiStefano 2009]. 
B&D Nutritional Ingredients (B&D) has formed a strategic partnership with 
Solazyme Health Sciences whereby B&D will promote and distribute 
Solazyme Golden Chlorella {algae} products for the functional foods and 
dietary supplement markets [Neutraceuticals World 2009]. 
In 2010, the Company launched its products, the Golden Chlorella line of 
dietary supplements. In March 2011, the Company launched its Algenist 
brand for the luxury skin care market through marketing and distribution 
arrangements with Sephora S.A. (Sephora International), Sephora USA, 
Inc. and QVC, Inc. 
In 2010, Solazyme and Roquette, the global starch and starch-derivatives 
company headquartered in France, formed Solazyme Roquette Nutritionals, 
a joint venture bringing to market an entirely new line of microalgae-based 
food ingredients. 103 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: early 2010. 
Indeed, Solazyme has positioned itself first and foremost as a “renewable oils” com-
pany, as a producer of sustainable triglyceride oils that can be used to replace or en-
hance oils derived from petroleum, animal fats, and plants. According to Figure I.176 
fuels actually stand at the bottom of the company’s target markets when considering 
the concept of profit margins. 
Correspondingly, in April 2012 Solazyme announced an agreement with Bunge Global 
Innovation to build a factory in Brazil that would make triglyceride oils for both chemi-
cal and fuel products. Under the joint venture, whose financial terms were not dis-
closed, the factory would rise next to Bunge’s Moema sugarcane mill and have an 
annual capacity of 100,000 metric tons of oil. It would start production in the second 
half of 2013, making oils for fuel as well as additives for soaps, detergents and plas-
tics [Cardwell 2012]. 
In February 2011, Solazyme entered into a joint development agreement with The 
Dow Chemical Company to jointly develop and commercialize non-vegetable, 
microbe-based oils and related products like those for dielectric insulating fluids and 
other industrial applications. In March 2011, the company entered into an agreement 
to purchase a development and commercial production facility with multiple 128,000-
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liter fermenters, and an annual oil production capacity of over 2,000,000 liters (1,820 
metric tons) located in Peoria, Illinois for $11.5 million [Riddell 2012]. 
In March 2011 Solazyme filed for a $100 million IPO. Solazyme had found little sup-
port over the last year when it comes to Wall Street. The company, which priced its 
initially well-received IPO at $18/share, managed to raise $227 million that year. In 
doing so, it raised a sum of capital that has thus far been projected to be adequate to 
sustain the company until it becomes cash flow positive. But, by May 23, 2012 the 
closing price was $9.72, a 46 percent discount to its IPO price (ca. $11 end of 2013). 
The market and its analysts continued to express doubts over the advanced biofuels 
industry [Bomgardner 2011d; Quon 2012]. 
The company had raised $128 million in venture capital since its founding in 2002. In 
its Annual Report 2011 (US SEC Form 10K) Solazyme reported revenues of $38 
million for 2010 and a net loss of $16.3 million and $39 million for 2011 and a net loss 
of $53.9 million. However, a breakdown of total revenues (2011) reveals that there are 
only $12 million in reveues from selling products or licenses: 
Research and development programs $26.793 mio. 
Product revenue  $7.173 mio. 
License fees  $5.000 mio. 
This is – after almost nine years of existence – an amount obtained also by the algae 
firms Cyanotech Corp in the US and German BlueBiotech GmbH mentioned above. 
Particularly with regard to nutritional and cosmetics aspects one can expect Solazyme 
to encounter difficulties in selling its products in certain areas of the world, particularly 
Europe, due to the use of genetically modified objects for production. 
The promise of using algae to make biofuels – a dream scientists have chased for de-
cades – might have seemed particularly welcome in a time of stubbornly high oil and 
gasoline prices. But the path to commercial-scale production has been circuitous. 
Algenol Biofuels (Table I.91) with its proprietary Direct to EthanolTM process is the only 
bioethanol producing algae company. Furthermore, rather than harvesting the algae 
as such for post-processing of algae’s “biomass deliverables” the “algae” are utilized 
“like getting the milk rather than killing the cow” [Woods 2009a; Woods 2009b]. 
It actually uses cyanobacteria (formerly known as blue-green algae). Cyanobacteria 
have been isolated from various habitats both from freshwater and marine systems. 
Since cyanobacteria show an impressive variation in physiological properties a collec-
tion of cyanobacteria from various habitats also provides an excellent platform for ex-
perimentally selecting suitable strains. 
The organisms produce some ethanol naturally, but Algenol has patents to selectively 
breed and genetically manipulate them to pump out more. In essence, each cell acts 
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as a tiny ethanol factory (Figure I.178).The Algenol process consumes CO2, which 
means biologic sequestration and generates photolytically sugar which is fermented 
intracellularly into ethanol. The outstanding feature of this technology is that it funda-
mentally uses carbon dioxide as its source to make ethanol. However, some types of 
cyanobacteria are responsible for so-called “algae blooms” through explosive growths 
and some cyanobacterial blooms are toxic. Some common bloom-forming species 
produce potent toxins that can even be lethal. 
Algenol is privately funded and was not seeking outside investment during the stages 
of development and primary commercialization. Algenol’s ongoing financing needs 
continued to be financed privately through the initial commercialization phase but 
Algenol continued to investigate the optimal funding opportunities including licensing 
fees and royalty payments, partnering arrangements, government financial support 
and government land access for facilities. In the US, in particular, Algenol planned to 
seek federal, state and local assistance to bring US facilities online [Gelsi 2008]. 
Algenol works directly and indirectly with a number of collaborators and (small to 
large) companies in the US and Germany to further develop and commercialize its 
existing technology. It reported to have 100 employees and consultants (40 Ph.D.’s) in 
early 2010 and biological laboratories in Baltimore, Maryland and Germany [Woods 
2009b]. This makes Algenol’s entrepreneurial constellation rather complex concerning 
other involved companies, intellectual property rights (IPRs), scientific advisors and 
R&D arrangements, credibility build-up as well as strategic partnerships with large 
firms and financing through federal and county agencies. 
Apart from its own research efforts in Baltimore and cooperation in the US Algenol 
organized massive R&D support in Germany (Figure I.179; Box I.25). Algenol was 
getting help from experts at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of 
Maryland Biotechnology Institute. Frank Robb, a professor at UMBI’s Center for 
Marine Biotechnology, had been contracted by the company to help with its research. 
Joseph Katz, a professor of mechanical engineering at Hopkins, signed on as a 
consultant, in part to help design the “bioreactors” in which the blue-green algae are to 
grow [Wheeler 2009]. 
As outlined for BioMCN (Table I.87) and ZeaChem (Table I.88) Figure I.179 exhibits 
Relationship Mapping. This is a method of visualizing, describing, and analyzing all 
the individual and organizational relationships of an existing firm, may be also pro-
spective business partners, by establishing a dynamic “map.” This map provides 
background on the target company by showing direct, indirect, and business and 
social relations among individuals within the organization and of the company as a 
whole. 
Networking of NTBFs discussed so far, hence, reflects a special relational mapping 
restricted to organizational relationships for a particular time span. 
Figure I.179 is an illustration of what is described in detail in Table I.91 and Box I.25. 
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Figure I.179: Algenol’s encapsulated web of firms, R&D and financial resources, part-
nerships as well as persons (by 2009/2010). 
Table I.91: Algenol Biofuels and its path to bioethanol directly from algae. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection and Position 
Algenol 
Biofuels, Inc. 
Bonita Springs 
(FL) 
(2006) 
Administrative 
offices in Bonita 
Springs, but a 
laboratory in 
Baltimore (MD) 
with ca. 15 com-
pany scientists 
and technicians 
Paul Woods CEO, co-founder and co-inventor of Algenol’s basic techno-
logy; 
when working as a student in Canada in genetics at Western Ontario 
University in 1984, Paul Woods discovered a method for producing etha-
nol from cyanobacteria (blue-green algae); related patents with Prof. John 
Coleman (now Algenol’s CSO) as a co-inventor are assigned to the firm 
Enol Energy, Inc. (Figure I.179); 
The split of IPR between a firm owned by a person to just exploit these in 
another startup is also observed for BlueFire (Table I.86). 
Wood’s invention did not appear to have much commercial promise until 
the early 2000s. Meanwhile, he started a couple natural gas businesses in 
Canada and US. He started his business career in 1989 at Alliance Gas 
Management, which completed an IPO in 1997. He built the firm, raised 
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[Wheeler 2009]. 
 
Major Funding: 
Some $70M in 
private backing 
[Gelsi 2008; 
Wesoff 2009], 
invested by P. 
Wood personally 
and a few part-
ners [Wheeler 
2009] 
2010: 
Lee County (FL) 
approved a 
contract with 
Algenol, a $10M 
grant to build a 
facility during the 
next two years 
[CNN 2010] 
Algenol got a 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
grant for up to 
$25M, or no 
more than half 
the cost of a $50 
million facility at 
a Dow Chemical 
plant. 
$80 million in capital, and sold the business in 1999. 
In 1997 he founded United Gas Management Inc. in the US. But the natu-
ral gas marketing company he launched wound up in bankruptcy and was 
sold in 2000. He said he retired after that, until launching Algenol [Wheeler 
2009]. 
In March 2006 Woods formed Algenol along with Craig Smith and Ed 
Legere armed with patents, several test facilities around the world and, 
according to the literature, some $70 million in private backing [Gelsi 
2008]. He and his partners started Algenol Biofuels Inc. to commercialize 
the process “algae-to-ethanol” on an industrial scale. More on the back-
ground of Algenol’s foundation and the associated foundation of Cyano 
Biofuels GmbH (Figure I.179) in Germany is described in Box I.25. 
Craig Smith, MD Executive VP COO and co-founder; from 1993 to 2004 
Dr. Smith served as Chairman, President and CEO of Guilford Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., a publicly held biopharmaceutical company that he co-
founded in 1993; from 1988 to 1992 Dr. Smith was a VP and Senior VP of 
another publicly held biotechnology company; from 1975 to 1988 he 
served on the faculty of the Department of Medicine at The Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine; 
has served on several corporate and charitable boards and is still a mem-
ber of the Johns Hopkins Alliance for Science. 
Edward Legere, MBA Executive VP and CFO and co-founder; he has over 
18 years experience in the biotechnology industry as a consultant and ac-
tive business manager and has over ten years of public company experi-
ence in the role of member of the Board of Directors; he has also served 
as the President and CEO of the publicly traded biotechnology company 
Peregrine Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
John Coleman, Ph.D. CSO and co-inventor, was the Vice-Principal 
(Research and Graduate Studies) at the University of Toronto 
Scarborough, and a Professor in the Department of Cell and Systems on 
the St. George campus of the University of Toronto prior to joining Algenol. 
He was Chair of the Department of Botany from 1998 to 2004 and played 
a primary role in the formation of the new Department of Cell and Systems 
Biology in 2006. 
Dr. Coleman’s research interests and experience lie in the fields of mo-
lecular biology and biochemistry of photosynthetic carbon metabolism in 
higher plants and cyanobacteria. 
Initial proof of science for Algenol’s technology was generated by Dr. 
Coleman at the University of Toronto between 1989 and 1999. Since then, 
the process has been refined to allow algae to tolerate high heat, high 
salinity, and the alcohol levels present in ethanol production. 
The key basic patents for Algenol’s technology are those assigned to 
Woods and Coleman (and a third inventor) given in Figure I.179. 
 Appendix A 1023 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Business Model: 
Owner-operator 
and partner for 
bioalcohol 
production from 
algae; 
Expand into 
“green carbon” 
building block 
monomers (bio-
refinery model), 
such as ethylene 
or propylene 
(from ethanol); 
Look also into 
biobutanol 
production 
[Woods 2009c] 
Licensing 
business 
 
Revenue (2010): 
$3.1 mio. 
(according to 
Wikipedia) 
Employees: 120 
Using a patented metabolically enhanced cyanobacteria, or blue-green 
algae, to directly synthesize ethanol – one of the few, if only, companies 
working with direct production of this algae; blue-green algae, since they 
also use photosynthesis – sunlight – to convert nutrients and carbon 
dioxide into fuel. 
Algenol estimated that its technology can produce 10,000–12,000 
gal/ac/yr of ethanol in the near term. This has been questioned based on a 
simple calculation which would make it hard to believe those yields will 
make Algenol’s biorreactors economical [Waltz 2009b]. 
So far, Algenol claims its test facilities have yielded 6,000 gallons of 
ethanol per acre per year, with yields expected to grow to 10,000 gallons 
of ethanol per year. 
The metabolically enhanced algae are resistant to high temperature, high 
salinity, and high ethanol levels; they do not produce human toxins. 
Algenol’s “Direct-to-Ethanol” process gathers ethanol produced by algae 
without destroying the algae and without the necessity of refining oil into 
biodiesel. This method, if viable and scalable, seems to have huge poten-
tial cost and embedded-energy advantages. “Ethanol is almost infinitely 
mobile in a cell, and essentially leaks out into the bioreactor after synthe-
sis,” Coleman said. “Through some various condensation steps we collect 
it.” [Hamilton 2009] The algae strains are genetically modified – and that 
might be a hard sell in the US [Wesoff 2009] and elswhere. 
The production plants will need vast tracts of land for row upon row of 
algae-filled bioreactors (filled with sea water), but the company is targeting 
desert or arid lands; so no usable farmland will be taken out of cultivation. 
The ethanol-making process will yield fresh water as a by-product (Figure 
I.178) which could be used to irrigate nearby lands. [Wheeler 2009] 
Algenol had licensed its technology to Biofields of Lomas de Chapultepec, 
Mexico (for more than $100 million [Donner 2011]). Biofields said it has 
committed $850 million to building the industrial-scale ethanol facility on 
102,000 acres in the Sonora Desert. As the algae grow, Algenol will tap 
into carbon dioxide from a nearby power plant and funnel it into the tanks. 
By 2012 Biofields’ subsidiary Sonora Fields S.A.P.I. de C.V. intended to 
produce a whopping one billion gallons of ethanol per year. 
Much of the ethanol shall be transported by ship to Mexican oil refineries 
nearby to be blended into gasoline [Waltz 2009b; Gelsi 2008]. The Mexi-
can company secured an exclusive license for the Algenol technology until 
2013 when the company expected to reach its 250 MGY target. It will be 
run by a former Mobil Oil senior construction executive. According to CNN 
for expansion, by the end of 2009, Biofields had invested $30 million in the 
project, which is reporting yields of 6,900 gallons per acre at the Sonora 
site [Lane 2010b]. 
As displayed in Figure I.179, by December 2009 Algenol got a Department 
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of Energy (DOE) $25M grant (approximate half of the estimated cost of a 
$50 million facility) to install a photobioreactor-based algae-to-ethanol de-
monstration plant at a Dow Chemical site in Freeport, Texas [Voith 2009; 
Wesoff 2009; Hamilton 2009]. The rest of the capital would be provided by 
Algenol, which would also own and operate the plant. Dow would contri-
bute 25 acres of land, the CO2 supply and technical expertise. Dow’s 
chemists and engineers would help design a process that can scale-up for 
commercialization [Voith 2009a]. 
In Algenol’s case, the photobioreactors are simply plastic covered troughs 
housing a mixture of saltwater, algae, nutrients, and CO2; plastic material 
will be supplied by Dow [Wesoff 2009]. 
The initial target production was up to 140 gallons of algae fuel per day, or 
51,000 gallons per year at a yield of 2,120 gallons per acre [Lane 2010n]. 
Dow would also help develop advanced plastic films for covering the bio-
reactors. But fuel-quality ethanol must be distilled from the bioreactor con-
densate, which is a major focus for the pilot plant. For this process Algenol 
will use advanced membrane technology and separations, a Dow compe-
tency, that are more energy efficient [Voith 2009a]. Dow would also assist 
with process engineering [Hamilton 2009]. 
The $25 million Energy Department grant to help fund the Algenol Dow 
plant designed to produce 100,000 gallons of ethanol a year at a target 
cost of $1-$1.25 per gallon will be associated by continued research by 
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and Georgia Tech 
[Clanton 2009]. 
The Algenol-Dow experiment could have several important implications. It 
points the way to a more sustainable path for making ethanol as a biofuel, 
but also producing common building block chemicals now derived from 
fossil fuels (such as ethylene). 
With regard to process engineering Algenol followed also a further route 
(outside Dow). By the end of 2009 Algenol and the German Linde Group, 
an internationally leading gases and engineering company, have agreed to 
collaborate in a joint development project in order to identify the optimum 
management of carbon dioxide (CO2) and oxygen (O2) for Algenol’s algae 
and photobioreactor technology. The cooperation will aim the companies 
to join forces to develop cost-efficient technologies that capture, store, 
transport and supply CO2 for Algenol’s proprietary process for the produc-
tion of biofuels. 
In 2008 Algenol Biofuels and Codon Devices announced that the compa-
nies have entered into a multi-year partnership utilizing Codon’s proprie-
tary BioLOGICTM protein engineering platform. 
A key strength of Algenol is: “Exceptional group of partners from industry 
and academia, some are announced publicly, some surprises are in 
store…” [Lane 2009c]. Some of this is discussed Box I.25. 
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As Algenol sought to seek federal, state and local assistance to bring US 
facilities on line [Gelsi 2008], Algenol accompanied technical advances 
with Current Policy Initiatives [Woods 2009b]. 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: end of 2009. 
It is interesting to note that the other US chemical giant, DuPont, concentrates on 
macro-algae to produce biobutanol (Table I.83). 
Box I.25: Algenol Biofuels as a catalyst for helping to found and use Cyano 
Biofuels GmbH in Germany as an “external” R&D resource. 
When Algenol founder Paul Wood re-assed the commercial promise of his early 
algae-to-ethanol invention during the emergence of the “algae boom” of the early 
2000s he turned to Germany, in particular to Cyano Biotech GmbH co-founded by Dr. 
Dan Kramer (with two additional co-founders) in 2004 in Berlin, Germany. As he has 
been occupied by research of natural products delivered by bacteria the foundation 
idea of Dan Kramer was to investigate the little studied potential of cyanobacteria to 
produce natural products, particularly those that have application in or for pharmaceu-
ticals, utilizing genetic optimization. 
Cyano Biotech GmbH was created as a spin-out from the Institute of Biology of 
Humboldt-University, Berlin, with the aim to commercially exploit the results of 20 
years of R&D in the field of cyanobacteria generated by the group of Prof. Dr. Thomas 
Börner (Dept. of Genetics), in particular, by metabolic engineering. On the basis of 
“incubation options” (“Gründerlabor”) and special “seed fundings” and grants by 
German ministries and Berlin authorities during the first three years Cyano Biotech 
utilized the university laboratories and facilities [BMWi]. By the end of 2007 Cyano 
Biotech GmbH moved to own facilities in the Technology Park Adlershof/Berlin. 
During the pre-startup phase, prior to foundation, Dan Kramer performed a feasibility 
study 122, including a proof-of-concept, in cooperation with an industrial partner in 
Potsdam adjacent to Berlin with respect to the commercial opportunity of cyanobac-
teria as a source for biologically active compounds [BMWi]. There is high evidence 
that this firm in Potsdam is AnalytiCon Discovery GmbH (an R&D spin-out of 
AnalytiCon AG) and is currently a cooperation partner of Cyano Biotech. With cur-
rently 60 employees it is one of the leading companies in research and development 
of products made from natural materials for the pharmaceutical, food, and cosmetics 
industries. AnalytiCon Discovery claims to be leading worldwide with libraries 
(MEGAbolite, NatDiverseTM) of natural product small molecules as screening com-
pounds to accelerate natural product based drug research. 
After two years the feasibility study was completed and also a business plan finalized. 
Dan Kramer acting as managing director looked for two technology-oriented co-
founders, one being a specialist in natural products research, the other in cyanobacte-
ria and bio-active compounds. After the “seed phase” financing of Cyano Biotech was 
by a special governmental support program comprising a public subsidy and equity 
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stake by a governmental equity investment organization for NTBFs (tbg – Technologie 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft). Based on his experience as project leader Dan Kramer 
grasped the essentials of “professional management” by a “learning-by-doing” ap-
proach; accounting and controlling activities for the firm were outsourced [Bowie]. 
Cyano Biotech, (with 8+ employees in 2008  [Bowie]), is one of the few firms, if not the 
only one, in the world that identifies and characterizes natural products by screening 
cyanobacteria (“drug discovery”). It optimizes derived related bioactive compounds 
regarding pharmacological needs employing combinatorial biosynthesis to generate 
novel lead compounds (or “active pharmaceutical ingredients”) for the pharmaceutical 
industry. A part of the natural products was sold as extracts from bacteria. But another 
firm was planned to commercialize the isolated natural products itself [Technology 
Park Adlershof 2008]. In 2010 Cyano Biotech had revenue of €276,000 (according to 
the German Creditreform – Firmenwissen Database). 
Cyano Biotech’s business is aligned with the diverse microalgae-based products and 
applications in the pharma, agrochemical, food and cosmetics industry as well as in 
regard to the sustainable production of raw materials, CO2 sequestration and waste 
water sanitation. 
Equally important for the assessment of the entrepreneurship is the fact that, within 
ca. 80 miles, Humboldt-University in Berlin is at a center of various cyanobacteria 
R&D (Figure I.179) and commercialization activities for more than 20 years which 
covers other research universities, public research institutes and private firms involved 
in cyanobacteria commercialization. This constellation appears formally as a part of 
the general biotechnology “Competence Cluster Berlin-Brandenburg” which has ad-
ditional links to other related areas in Germany and Austria. For instance, a scientific 
advisor from the Austrian Academy of Science runs simultaneously a cyanobacteria 
project with Cyano Biotech. 
By subject and by (spatial) proximity Cyano Biotech’s leaders can be assumed to 
have had links to people in a related “joint project” (in German Verbundprojekt) of the 
cluster. A “Verbundprojekt” is a special German approach to technical innovation (ch. 
1.2.6). It is a systemic interconnection tied together by a common explicit goal (and 
achievable result) through coordination and control and assigning different 
contributing sub-projects to different elements (organizations) of a related value sys-
tem. 
This project was the “Hydrogen from Microalgae: With Cell and Reactor Design to 
Economic Production” project (HydroMicPro; Table I.92) funded by a €2.1M grant of 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and conducted jointly by 
universities, research institutions and enterprises. The notion microalgae comprises 
essentially also cyanobacteria. 
HydroMicPro targeted developing an inexpensive, highly efficient production process 
with optimized biology and process technology, which is suited for the mass produc-
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tion of hydrogen. It focused on the photobioreactor, gas separation by membrane 
processes, biological sensor technology for cellular oxygen, biotechnological optimiza-
tion of algae, and systems integration and was led and coordinated by the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology (KIT). It included also practical field tests [Knuber-Knost 2009]. 
A tempting offer from America (Paul Woods to Dan Kramer of Cyano Biotech) marked 
the birth and catalysis for further development of Cyano Biofuels GmbH. Decades of 
research and commercialization activities and competence in and around Berlin con-
centrating on cyanobacteria obviously attracted Paul Woods [Technology Park 
Adlershof 2009]. 
Paul Wood’s idea to further develop and commercialize his discovered method for 
producing ethanol from cyanobacteria led him look for partners to assess his ap-
proach for feasibility (cf. below Perkin case; A.1.2). And linked to the available com-
petence the order for the feasibility study was addressed to Berlin. 
According to Dan Kramer the promising results initiated foundation of a second firm in 
April 2007 (“Unsere Untersuchungen haben so gute Ergebnisse geliefert, dass wir im 
April 2007 eine zweite Firma gegründet haben,” said Kramer) [Viering 2009] Together 
with a colleague (Dr. Heike Enke) Dan Kramer founded Cyano Biofuels GmbH, again 
as a spin-out of Humboldt University. Cyano Biofuels with about 40 employees in 
2009 [Seidler 2009, Martin 2009] and more than 30 scientists [Humboldt Innovation 
2009] succeeded in making the cyanobacteria produce preferentially ethanol rather 
than sugar by a proprietary process. 
The formal setup of Cyano Biofuels as an LLC (GmbH) involved legally several 
partners (Figure I.179) – from Cyano Biotech and from Algenol Biofuels GmbH. Ac-
cording to an official legal documentation (“Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger”) Algenol 
Biofuels GmbH was a one-man-firm of Paul Woods without any employees. Algenol 
Biofuels Inc, Bonita Springs, FL, USA is the full owner of Algenol Biofuels GmbH. Ad-
ditionally Algenol Biofuels Switzerland played a role (Figure I.179). 
Concerning genetic engineering of cyanobacteria, the rod-shaped bacterium Zymomo-
nas mobilis for making Mexican agave tequila turned out to be three to four times as 
efficient as local beer yeasts when applied to the plants. Correspondingly Cyano 
Biofuels took the gene for the enzyme pyruvate decarboxylase (Figure I.178) out of 
the tequila tribe and implanted it into the genome of cyanobacteria [Donner 2011]. 
In the US using corn for biofuels reached 3,700 liters per hectare per year. Under 
ideal laboratory conditions researchers of Cyano Biofuels in Berlin claimed to have 
achieved 112,000 liters. And in November 2011, a pilot plant with 3,000 tubes as 
bioreactors was announced to be built in Texas [Donner 2011]. 
In essence Cyano Biofuels is a research and development firm for biofuels and build-
ing block chemicals utilizing optimized cyanobacteria to be channeled into industrial 
scale production via a direct process [Humboldt Innovation 2009]. The vision and the 
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mission of Cyano Biofuels embraces knowledge and know-how transfer from a uni-
versity into business, development and optimization of cyanobacteria for the produc-
tion of biofuels (currently bioethanol). 
Some key challenges on the route to commercialization of algae-to-ethanol not tack-
led by Cyano Biofuels include design of massive pipeline systems to bring seawater to 
the algae, cleanliness for the large scale growing and processing units to avoid other 
bacteria to overcome the cyanobacteria in the bioreactors and separation of ethanol 
[Seidler 2009]. 
In 2010 Cyano Biofuels was acquired by Algenol Biofuels and is now a member of the 
Algenol Group. Algenol LLC, Bonita Springs, Florida, held previously a minority 
position in Cyano Biofuels. According to an official legal document (“Elektronischer 
Bundesanzeiger”) the minority stake was 40 percent which was transferred to Algenol 
Biofuels Switzerland GmbH. 
Growth of Cyano Biofuels in terms of number of employees was: 
2011 ca. 50 employees [Donner 2011], 2010 ca. 40 employees, 2009 33 employees, 
2008 24 employees (the last figures from “Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger”). 
The Institute of Biology of Humboldt-University, Berlin (Dept. of Genetics), is not only 
the connection between the startups Cyano Biotech and Cyano Biofuels (via the co-
founder Dan Kramer). It has two working groups dealing with the production of bio-
fuels or hydrogen by cyanobacteria providing simultaneously the connection to the 
joint project HydroMicPro (Table I.92). 
Furthermore, it participates in the FORSYS (Research Units for Systems Biology in 
Germany) research project funded Germany-wide by the Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research (BMBF) with € 45 millions until the end of 2011. The co-founder of 
Cyano Biofuels acts here as the project coordinator (Figure I.179) for the FORSYS 
sub-project “Systems Biology of Cyanobacterial Biofuel Production.” This sub-project 
is supported by a €1M grant from the BMBF [Kramer 2007; Glocalist 2008]. 
When Cyano Biofuels was taken over by Algenol Biofuels Paul Wood characterized 
the situation as follows (Humboldt Innovation, Mar. 23, 2011): 
“The Greater Berlin is known for its diverse and high-profile research on microalgae 
and a perfect place to attract research talent for Algenol. We want to support Cyano 
Biofuels' networking with German universities and further believe that generate new 
ideas and technologies emerge.” 
An overall position of a joint project or “joint R&D project”, respectively in the German 
industry development approach, such as HydroMicPro, is shown in Figure I.40 in rela-
tion to a structural value system. Furthermore, there is a planned connection to the 
Enertrag AG hybrid power plant project combining wind, hydrogen and biogas (Figure 
I.104) located also in the German competence region for algae. 
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Table I.92: Example of a “Verbundprojekt” in Germany (“Hydrogen from Microalgae” – 
HydroMicPro) to illustrate its systemic character. 
Organization, Partners Sub-Project Goal 
Professor Clemens Posten KIT 
Institute of Life Science 
Engineering (Karlsruhe) 
Coordination: 
Expected result: prototype reactor that allows an economi-
cally efficient hydrogen production by microalgae. 
Next steps for large plants: 
Automation of the plant, optimization of service life, and 
mass production of materials (microstructurization of mem-
branes and coating of transparent materials). 
KIT Microalgae Working Group; 
KIT’s Engler-Bunte Institute 
(from Chemical and Process 
Engineering Department) 
Develop an optically structured photobioreactor 
(first enlarge the inner surfaces of the reactor); 
Photobioreactor: 
First step, a high amount of biomass shall be produced. 
Such high amounts will also be needed for producing other 
valuable materials from algae in the future. 
Second step, the system will be optimized for hydrogen 
production. 
University of Bielefeld Identification and biotechnological optimization of the algae 
for biomass and H2 production in the photobioreactors. 
Organization, Partners Sub-Project Goal 
Max Planck Institute for 
Molecular Plant Physiology 
(MPI), Potsdam (adjacent to 
Berlin) 
Focus on the regulation and control of cell-internal oxygen 
concentration and develop a sensor based on transgenic 
and physiological/biochemical processes 
University of Potsdam (adjacent 
to Berlin) 
Develop a method to measure cell-internal oxygen 
concentration. 
Ehrfeld Mikrotechnik BTS GmbH 
(EMB), Wendelsheim 
Provide experience gained from using a micro photobio-
reactor and elaborate the concept of the production plant. 
IGV (Institut für Getreideverar-
beitung) GmbH, Nuthetal (near 
Berlin) 
Contribute experience from the use of a thin-film reactor; 
assess the new process under close-to-practice field con-
ditions. 
(IGV will be described later) 
OHB-System AG, Bremen 
(ch. 2.1.2.4; [Bläske and 
Kiani-Kreß 2010]) 
Connect the bioreactor system for hydrogen production 
to energy-transforming systems; 
in addition, evaluate adaptation of the system to space 
applications. 
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Table I.92, continued. 
The KIT Institute for Technology 
Assessment and Systems 
Analysis (ITAS) 
Evaluate the potential contributions of HydroMicPro tech-
nology to sustainable hydrogen supply; 
identify the ecological and socioeconomic “hot spots” of the 
technology; 
feedback: based on the results, processes for hydrogen 
production from microalgae will be improved and appropri-
ate applications in the energy system identified. 
Another algae startup in the US, Sapphire Energy, Inc. (Table I.93), is not only notable 
with regard to the huge amount of invested capital, but how it positioned itself: “We’re 
an energy company,” “and, really, who we are competing with is big oil and gas.” 
[Schwartz 2010]. The founders express competitive antagonism (Table I.32). 
During the process of setting up Sapphire founder and serial entrepreneur Jason Pyle 
was also in contact with Big Oil: “We’ve had conversations with all six of the largest oil 
companies in the world.” [Bigelow 2008] Morrison [2008] characterized this situation 
from a different perspective: One of the distinguishing factors of algae startups is that 
they tend to dream, and talk, rather large, and Sapphire is no exception. Like other 
companies, however, its algae have yet to be proven at commercial scales. 
The origins of Sapphire began in 2006 as a handful of venture capital leaders began 
looking for the right technology. Typically, the innovator who develops a new techno-
logy looks for the right venture capital firms to provide funding for the idea. Pyle said 
his discussions began with Kristina Burow, a chemist-turned-partner at Arch Venture 
Partners, biotech CEO Nathaniel David and scientist Mike Mendez. “We started ana-
lyzing different kinds of biofuel deals and technologies and asking ourselves what’s 
great about this and what’s not,” Pyle said (emphases added). 
After determining that their best prospect was to become a producer of gasoline and 
diesel fuels Pyle said they set out to identify the best green technologies for making it. 
They found what they were looking for in the research of Stephen Mayfield, an algae 
biologist at The Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, and Steven Briggs, a professor 
of cell and developmental biology at UC San Diego. The founders and their scientific 
collaborators officially launched Sapphire in May 2007 [Bigelow 2008]. 
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Table I.93: Sapphire’s approach of serial entrepreneurs to algae-based biofuels 
following opportunity identification and assessing technical and financing options. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection and Position 
Sapphire 
Energy, Inc. 
San Diego (CA) 
(2007) 
Headquarter and 
primary research 
labs in San 
Diego, CA, 
engineering and 
project manage-
ment, Orange 
County (CA), a 
research and 
development 
complex in Las 
Cruces, New 
Mexico; 
to build a 300-
acre full size 
open-pond algae 
farm demonstra-
tion project in 
Luna County, 
New Mexico by 
the end of 2010 
(Intgrated Algal 
Bio-Refinery). 
Employees: 
2008: ca. 80 
[Bigelow 2008], 
2009 ca. 120 
[Bigelow 2009b]. 
Major Funding: 
$100M million in 
a second venture 
round [Bigelow 
2008] 
Jason Pyle, MD, PhD CEO and co-founder, also on the Board of Directors; 
was formerly CTO and co-founder of Epoc, Inc., a privately held medical 
engineering company. Dr. Pyle holds an appointment as adjunct professor 
of bioengineering at Vanderbilt University where he has worked to develop 
cross-disciplinary programs of biological and engineering research. 
As the co-founder and CTO of Pria Diagnostics, Dr. Pyle was named Inno-
vator of the Year (2006) by Frost and Sullivan. 
Dr. Pyle holds numerous pending and issued patents in the engineering 
and biological sciences. In addition to his broad technical abilities, Dr. Pyle 
has established numerous corporate partnerships between small technical 
companies and some of the world’s largest corporations. 
Cynthia J. Warner President; brings more than 27 years of experience in 
the energy, refining and transportation industries. A chemical engineer by 
training and one of the very few senior women in the oil and gas industry, 
Ms. Warner served as an executive with energy industry giants British 
Petroleum, Amoco Oil Company and UOP. Warner left her post as Group 
Vice President of Global Refining for BP. 
At Sapphire Energy, Ms. Warner is tasked with driving the company’s ini-
tiative to transition technology trials and research into commercial-scale 
crude oil operations. She is a featured leader in the 2008 book “Becoming 
a Resonant Leader: Develop Your Emotional Intelligence” (Harvard Busi-
ness School Press). 
Mike Mendez VP Technology; has held a number of top industry positions 
at the forefront of the molecular biology revolution. In addition to serving 
as Director of Bioengineering at GenWay, Mr. Mendez was also associate 
director of Exploratory Research at Syrrx, Inc. (presently Takeda Pharma-
ceuticals). There he established a new department that focused on novel 
platforms for over-expression, purification, and crystallization of membrane 
proteins. Mr. Mendez co-founded and led the technical program at 
MemRx, a structural biology company. He has served as a genetic con-
sultant and scientific adviser for numerous biotech and academic institu-
tions; he is also the founder and principal scientist of Gryffin Consulting, 
Inc., a genetic engineering consulting firm specializing in the areas of gene 
therapy and antibody and membrane protein production. 
Tim Zenk VP Corporate Affairs; has spent much of his career shaping 
public policy – in helping leaders become better leaders and the public 
become more educated about key issues impacting the nation and the 
globe. 
He is known nationally for his political acumen, particularly regarding his 
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$50M first large 
venture funding. 
(5/28/2008) 
[CrunchBase 
2009c]; 
for construction 
of the Algal Bio-
Refinery in New 
Mexico. Sapphire 
received a $50M 
demonstration-
scale grant from 
the DOE and a 
$54.5M DOE 
Loan Guarantee 
[Lane 2009k] 
work on key campaigns ranging from gubernatorial (governor-related) to 
congressional to presidential. His global work for the Clinton/Gore admini-
stration has left him with professional and life experiences that will last 
forever. His passion for legacy energy solutions is top on his agenda. Tim 
Zenk had worked on projects with some of the Sapphire investors pre-
viously [Schwartz 2010]. 
Stephen Mayfield, PhD co-founder, Chairman Scientific Advisory Board; 
is Director of the San Diego Center for Algae Biotechnology (SDCAB), and 
the John Dove Isaacs Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of 
California San Diego. Formerly a Professor of Cell Biology, and Associate 
Dean of the graduate school at The Scripps Research Institute (TSRI), Dr. 
Mayfield has worked on the molecular genetics of green algae for over 25 
years. His research focuses on understanding gene expression in the 
green algae; he is a leading expert on the genetics of algae. He set also 
the stage for the use of algae as a platform for therapeutic protein produc-
tion, including the expression of human monoclonal antibodies. These 
studies resulted in the founding of Rincon Pharmaceutical. 
Nathaniel David, PhD co-founder, ARCH Ventures; teaming with ARCH in 
2009, Dr. David was building new companies that create disruptive tech-
nologies to address global-scale problems. Co-founder of Sapphire 
Energy and formerly CSO and co-founder of Kythera, he is also co-
founder of Syrrx (acquired by Takeda for $270 million in 2005) and 
Achaogen. 
Dr. David has demonstrated experience creating and growing innovative 
biotechnology companies. He was named one of the Top 100 innovators 
in the world under 35 (2002) by the MIT Technology Review. He holds 
numerous pending and issued patents in fields such as nanovolume crys-
tallography, antibiotic resistance, and aesthetic medicine. 
Kristina Burow co-founder, a Principal, ARCH Venture Partners, joining 
the firm in 2004; is primarily focused on companies in the life sciences and 
materials sciences. Ms. Burow joined ARCH from the Novartis BioVenture 
Fund in San Diego where she was involved in numerous investments in 
the life science sector. 
She was a co-inventor of key technology platforms that formed the core of 
Kalypsys, a GNF spin-off company. Ms. Burow holds an MBA. from the 
University of Chicago, an MA in Chemistry from Columbia University, and 
a BS in Chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley. 
Sapphire Energy originated from a debate between three friends, Jason 
Pyle; Kristina Burow and Nathaniel David: “Why is the biofuel industry 
spending so much time and energy to manufacture ethanol – a fundamen-
tally inferior fuel?” 
In the end a biofuel company was envisioned with the goal to be the 
world’s leading producer of renewable “petrochemical” products. 
“To produce a droplet of gasoline” from algae to show their possibilities to 
investors launched a cascade of funds which has allowed the founders, at 
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latest count, upwards of $200 million of running room to get their algae 
biofuel approach up to scale. Backers include Bill Gates’ venture capital 
wing, Cascade Investments, and the US Department of Energy. 
Sapphire has invested more than any other private or public entity ever in 
the business of turning algae into an industrial crop and something that 
can be considered a true drop-in replacement fuel [Schwartz 2010]. 
As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and through the 
biorefinery assistance program in the 2008 Farm Bill, Sapphire has part-
nered with both the US DOE and the USDA to build a next-generation 
algal biorefinery. 
Sapphire is also collaborating with scientists from the Department of 
Energy’s Joint Genome Institute; University of California, San Diego; The 
Scripps Research Institute; University of Tulsa; and San Diego Center for 
Algal Biotechnology. 
The ambition of the founders of Sapphire is: not just to replace a small 
fraction of the oil use in the US, but the algae that Sapphire is working on 
could replace all of it. 
And founder Pyle believed that there will be many winners in the algal 
biofuel space. “In a trillion dollar market, it’s hard to believe in a winner 
take all strategy.” [Morrison 2008] 
Sapphire has over 230 patents or applications spanning the entire algae-
to-fuel process [Lane 2009k] – from genetically engineering algae to maxi-
mize the production of biological oils to extracting the oils, which constitute 
the “green crude” that can be refined into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. 
Part of the IP stems from Rincon Pharmaceuticals founded by Mayfield to 
begin commercializing his research on algae as vehicles in which to pro-
duce biotech drugs. Rincon was acquired by Sapphire in 2008 [Gellene 
2009] 
Sapphire Energy is supported by a syndicate of investors led by co-
founder ARCH Venture Partners; along with The Wellcome Trust; 
Microsoft founder Bill Gates’ Cascade Investment, LLC; and Venrock, the 
fund of the Rockefeller family. 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Business Model: 
Develop techno-
logy and operate 
along the entire 
pond-to-pump 
value system – 
except refining. 
Focus on manu-
Sapphire produces so-called “green crude” (that exhibits many of the 
same molecules that are in petro-crudes from the ground) which can be 
refined into “normal” fuels – gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. These meet 
ASTM standards and are compatible with the existing petroleum infra-
structure. 
Sapphire said its technology is “carbon neutral” because its algae absorbs 
as much carbon dioxide as a car releases when its fueled by renewable 
gasoline.  
When on its Web site referring to “Green Crude Production,” Sapphire tells 
us that “the world needs a radical new solution.” Sapphire works with 
multiple strains, based on geography, climate, what is available naturally, 
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facturing in-
frastructure 
compliant green 
crude that fits 
with the fuel 
transport and 
distribution 
systems we use 
today. 
In line with a bio-
refinery approach 
focus on concen-
trating on the 
best co-products 
to produce for 
sales. 
Claim: not to use 
genetically modi-
fied organisms. 
and what can be manipulated. Acccording to Sapphire it does not develop 
genetically modified organisms, but selective breeding. Using high 
throughput screening (HTS) Sapphire said it looks at 8,000 strains every 
single day and is just entering the pre-commercial demonstration phase 
[Schwartz 2010]. 
Sapphire plans to use non-potable water like agricultural runoff and salt 
water and locate its biorefinery in the desert. As algea grow in brackish 
water scientists are evaluating how different species of algae react to 
variations in salinity, pH, temperature, humidity, and other factors. 
HTS helps accelerated identification of the strains that are best-suited to 
produce lipids under any given condition. 
Stephen Mayfield (a Sapphire co-founder and scientific advisor) would 
require pumping CO2 into the desert. Just how this would work without 
carbon dioxide escaping into the atmosphere is not clear, but Sapphire 
officials say it is one of many issues the company must address as it 
develops its 100-acre pilot facility near Las Cruces, NM [Bigelow 2009b]. 
But, in 2008 the founder Pyle said “we use genetic engineering, directed 
evolution, synthetic biology and (agricultural) breeding” and specifically 
that does not include fermentation. And with regard to the process in 
which algae “directly converts sunlight and carbon dioxide into hydrocar-
bon products,” Pyle said “all of our systems are photosynthetic.” [Bigelow 
2008] 
According to Waltz [2009b] experts said some of their organisms are ge-
netically engineered, but the company has not yet publicly confirmed this. 
Sapphire is also collaborating with scientists from the Department of 
Energy’s Joint Genome Institute; University of California, San Diego; The 
Scripps Research Institute; University of Tulsa; and San Diego Center for 
Algal Biotechnology. 
Sapphire claims: “We don’t have any questions about whether the tech-
nology works. The only question is about the cost of production.” [Bigelow 
2008] Sapphire’s concept calls for creating enormous “algae farms” 
throughout the desert lands of the southwestern United States [Bigelow 
2008]. 
Sapphire is focused on the entire “pond to pump” value system. It will do 
everything but refining which will be done by a partner, Dynamic Fuels, in 
Louisiana. The algae and processes developed are field tested at a New 
Mexico research and development center where all the processes – from 
biology to cultivation to harvest and extraction – can be performed at a 
pilot scale. [Lane 2009k; Schwartz 2010].  
Sapphire’s position: “We’re an energy company,” “and, “really, who we are 
competing with is big oil and gas.” There might be a distribution deal with 
Big Oil (e.g. Shell), but not being acquired by Big Oil. 
There are large amounts of biomass left over from the process. In line with 
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its “Algal Bio-Refinery” approach Sapphire studied to figure out what are 
the best co-products to produce, and it will probably deliver these to others 
that take the material and do something with it [Schwartz 2010]. 
During 2008/2009 Sapphire’s products were used for first commercial air-
line test flights using algae-based, drop-in replacement fuel and a first 
vehicle to cross the US fueled by a blend of algae-based gasoline in an 
unmodified engine. 
Within 3 years Sapphire Energy expected to be nearing completion of a 
demonstration and test facility and well on its way to producing 1 million 
gallons of diesel and jet fuel per year over the next 5 years. 
By 2018, Sapphire expected to grow this to 100 million and by 2025 1 bil-
lion gallons of diesel and jet fuel per year and to be able to produce green 
crude at $60 – $80 per barrel [Lane 2009k]. 
Sapphire is pro-actively lobbying; it wants to cooperate on policy, wants to 
cooperate making sure there is a playing field that allows everybody to 
compete. As a prerequisite for the development of the (transportation) 
biofuel industry, Sapphire assumes that there has to be a price on carbon 
and to have cap and trade. In this line Sapphire is also heading up the 
task force appointed by New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a former 
Energy Secretary in the Clinton Cabinet, who has visions of New Mexico’s 
leadership in renewable energy [Schwartz 2010]. 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s status: end of 2009. 
Sapphire had been moving quickly to build a 300-acre algae farm as a large-scale 
demonstration of its process for making algae oils which was planned to be completed 
by the end of 2010 (Table I.93). In 2012 the US government supplied over $100 
million of the investments, including a $50 million Recovery Act grant designed in part 
to spur job creation. Sapphire is a major beneficiary of the US government – in line 
with its strategy concerning public policy and execution by implementation of a VP 
Corporate Affairs (Table I.93). 
Sapphire’s rapid expansion raised the question of whether it is scaling-up its techno-
logy too soon. Some of its ideas for reducing the cost of algae fuels appeared at too 
early a stage to be implemented at the new farm. The new funding will allow Sapphire 
to finish building its algae farm near the small town of Columbus, New Mexico; a 100-
acre segment of the farm has already been finished. When the whole project is 
complete, planned by 2014, Sapphire would have the capacity to produce about 1.5 
million gallons of algae crude oil, which can be shipped to refineries to make chemi-
cals and fuels such as diesel and gasoline [Bullis 2012a]. 
According to its Web site in April 2012 Sapphire Energy said co-founder Jason Pyle 
has stepped down as chief executive officer of the startup company that has raised 
then close to $350 million to develop algae as a viable biofuel alternative to crude oil 
to become a member of the Board. Founding CEOs do not often walk away from start-
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ups that have amassed a $1 billion valuation and that have drawn nationwide attention 
for developing potentially transformational technology. As usual there is an official 
reason for such a step and a hidden one. 
Bullis [2012a] assessed the current situation of Sapphire rather detailed. Knowing 
when to move technologies out of the lab and into large-scale demonstrations is a 
perennial challenge for energy startups. According to some experts, Range Fuels (ch. 
A.1.1.3; Table I.99), founded to produce ethanol from wood chips, foundered because 
it built a large-scale plant too soon, before the bugs had been worked out of its 
technology at a smaller scale. As a result, the plant did not work well enough to be 
economical (cf. also CHOREN Technologies, A.1.1.3). 
“Sapphire hopes to lower the cost of producing algae fuels by changing every part of 
the production process. That includes increasing the quality and the amount of oil pro-
duced, reducing the cost of building ponds, and developing low-cost ways to harvest 
the oil.” Sapphire is working with Munich-based Linde Group to develop a low-cost 
way to supply the algae with carbon dioxide, which is a key to high productivity. Linde 
has developed systems for supplying greenhouses with carbon dioxide from a refin-
ery. “The company aims to have a product that is competitive with oil priced at $85 per 
barrel, and it expects to meet this goal once it reaches full-scale production in about 
six years.” 
When complete, the new 300-acre algae farm project is expected to produce about 
100 barrels of algae crude per day, or 35,000 a year. Sapphire Energy’s vice 
president of corporate affairs Tim Zenk said the process will not be commercially 
viable without the economies of scale that will come with much, much bigger farms – 
1,000 to 5,000 acres. 
Achieving these cost targets will require significant innovation. In 2011 studies 
from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) concluded that 
algae-based diesel made by scaling up existing algae technologies would cost 
several times as much as conventional diesel. According to one of the stud-
ies, it would cost about $9.84 per gallon to make algae diesel, as opposed to 
$2.60 per gallon for petro-diesel, at January 2011 costs. 
Phil Pienkos, a research scientist at NREL, said that Sapphire is doing a number of 
good things to reduce costs. Yet he said making algae fuels competitive will be a 
challenge. “It takes a certain amount of faith that there is going to be a business 
there,” he said. 
Furthermore, experts agree that non-fuel markets can be profitable for Solazyme and 
other algae firms, but they warn that investors will be impatient to access the multi-
billion-dollar fuel market. That may set the industry up for failure, because it will be 
many years – if ever – before algae can be cost-competitive with petroleum 
[Bomgardner 2011d]. 
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One aspect with all the above discussed algae startups, Cellana/HR Biopetroleum, 
Solazyme, Algenol Biofuels and Sapphire Energy, is the strong  focus on policy initia-
tives and lobbying for governmental financial and legislative support, specifically 
through politically experienced firm representatives. In case of algae it is not surprising 
that, apart from the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), in the US also the Department of Defense is a target for seeking support for 
activities in algae, particularly, with regard to the algae-to-military jet-fuel production 
process [Gaithwaite 2009]. 
For entrepreneurs in biofuels, the potential payoff is obviously big enough that 
it is worth hiring appropriate persons and spending time and money away 
from firms’ sites to take the risk that the administration and authorities will not 
pick their technologies. Success in the capital simultaneously increases the 
firms’ credibilities and facilitates to win funds from venture capital. 
Whereas innovative and entrepreneurial activities have the same key targets in the 
US and Germany regarding plant-based biomass or waste, biofuels, reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions and lifting/reducing petro-oil dependencies, things are different for 
aquatic biomass (algae). 
Basically, the US “owns sunshine” for certain areas or states, respectively, as a natu-
ral resource, as are coal, petroleum or forests/wood [Runge 2006:287]. This means, 
national advantages in natural resources and traditional industries can be fused with 
related competencies in broad technological fields thus providing the basis for tech-
nological directions and advantages in new product fields and often new and strong 
and innovative companies. 
In Germany activities with algae are generally held back to a certain degree 
by the all over on average low duration (and strength) of sunshine, at least 
with regard to open pond or outdoor settings. Hence, related innovation and 
entrepreneurial activities which are also supported by governmental programs 
emphasize closed photoreactors, greenhouses and algae feeding, light, tem-
perature control and mass transfer (algae; CO2 in, oxygen (O2) out) and an 
engineering approach to optimize relevant process parameters. 
Furthermore, due to stronger societal attitudes against GMOs, in Germany, 
more than in the US, bioengineering routes are only rarely followed by start-
ups, but the focus is on breeding and cultivating naturally occurring algae. 
There are some visions in Germany to install huge bioreactors with sea water and 
algae at the Mediterranium, in which CO2 from power plants are converted to biomass 
[Anonymus 2007b] similar to the constellation now being established by Sapphire in 
New Mexico or Algenol and Biofields in Mexico (Table I.91).  
Disregarding the above described exceptional startup Cyano Biofuels, rather than fol-
lowing strongly the fuels/energy route, in Germany algae activities including those of 
NTBFs, focus largely on higher value products from algae (Figure I.176) and carbon 
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dioxide sequestration. Due to “cap and trade” legislation in Germany (as also reques-
ted for the US, for instance, by Sapphire (Table I.93)) carbon sequestration works as 
an incentive for firms because trading and selling from created CO2 emission permits 
will lead to financial revenues. 
The current general view is that algae are only an option as an energy source in com-
bination with high value algae products. In Germany’s largest algae farm (near Klötze) 
with an annual production of 60 tons biomass per hectare (2.47 acres) utilizing the in-
gredients is the priority. And everything that cannot be extracted and sold at a high 
price will be converted to animal or fish feed and sold at competitive prices. Also ex-
perts from large German power companies, such as RWE, share the general view: 
“currently we exclude large energetic exploitation {of algae}” [Müller-Jung 2010]. 
Correspondingly, compared to the US level, there are relatively little entrepreneurial 
activities with algae in Germany. On the other hand, its giant power suppliers E.ON, 
RWE and EnBW or their respective subsidiaries run or have run several pilot projects 
targeting carbon dioxide sequestration requirements by transferring flue gas contain-
ing CO2 of their power plants into algae and to algae fuel producers – for instance, in 
cooperation with the NTBFs BlueBioTech GmbH (mentioned above), Novagreen 
Projektmanagement GmbH or Subitec GmbH and federal or state financial support 
(Table I.94). 
There is also considerable research in Germany with regard to producing biogas, 
consisting essentially of methane (ca. 65 percent) and carbon dioxide (ca. 30 percent) 
from algae as a biofuel for cars, trucks and busses. A conversion of algae into biogas 
that then will be burned in a closed loop process (Figure I.177) would capture CO2 
permanently from the air! 
Table I.94: Algal pilot projects of German power suppliers concerning carbon dioxide 
sequestration and producing high value algae products involving NTBFs. 
Power Supplier and Project Partners Details 
RWE Power 
[RWE 2009a; RWE 2009b]  
With: (Federal) Research Center Jülich, 
Jacobs University Bremen , 
NTBF Phytolutions GmbH (a spin-out of the 
Jacobs University Bremen). 
at: RWE Power’s Coal Innovation Center, 
at its Niederaussem power plant site. 
Partial financing is envisioned via selling 
CO2 emission permits. 
Operational since 2008, 
Goal: optimize the whole process from 
algae cultivation to end product; produce 
60 – 100 tons of biomass per hectare and 
year  
Tests: 
different types of algae and reactors for 
energy efficiency, 
photobioreators (outdoor) without green-
house, 
other applications, such as biofuel and 
building material; 
inquire into hydrothermal carbonization 
(HTC), also for opening a new field of 
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project end 2011. 
The pilot plant covers 600 m2 (148 acres) 
(can be extended to 1,000 m2) 
Process details: 
A suspension of microalgae from sea water 
is mixed with flue gas and transferred into a 
photobioreactor in a greenhouse. 
Currently patented vertical column photo-
bioreactors (transparent plastic hoses fixed 
in V-form) from Novagreen are used; shall 
be replaced by “endless hoses.” 
chemistry and development of new mate-
rials. 
Results so far: 
The plant produces up to 6,000 kg (dry) 
algae mass and binds 12,000 kg CO2; a 
high value product has been obtained. 
RWE Power [RWE 2010] 
With: German biotech firm Brain AG 
at: RWE Power’s Coal Innovation Center, 
at its Niederaussem power plant site 
Biotech firm Brain provides innovative en-
zymes and synthesis routes and pathways. 
Its comprehensive “natural toolbox” shall 
allow synthetic biology to produce inno-
vative microorganisms that are able to 
capture more CO2 from a lignite-fired 
power station 
Goal: convert carbon dioxide into microbial 
biomass or biomolecules –  joint research 
alliance between RWE Power and BRAIN 
AG using “designer microorganisms” 
in search of biotechnological solutions to 
CO2 conversion and developing further in-
telligent uses. 
Applications to be explored include building 
and isolation materials and the production 
of fine and specialty chemicals. 
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG 
[EnBW 2008]. 
With: NTBF Subitec GmbH (founded in 
2000; a spin-out of the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Interfacial Engineering and Biotechno-
logy (IGB) in Stuttgart 
at: Eutingen, a biogas plant; running and 
cultivation a system for microalgae with 
CO2 feeding from a (block) combined heat 
and power (CHP) plant 
EnBW acts as a project client, Subitec as 
the owner and operator of the pilot plant 
Goal: carbon dioxide sequestration by 
algae; focus on efficiency of CO2 binding. 
Subitec’s business model: 
provide its patented thin channel airlift and 
forced flow photobioreactors and develop 
and operate pilot plants of various dimen-
sions and develop concepts for utilizing and 
post-processing algae related biomass 
[Ripplinger 2009]; 
 
the pilot plants will sometimes be con-
structed at the company’s own expense, 
and sometimes on behalf of customers or 
cooperation partners. 
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Table I.94, continued. 
E.ON Hanse 
[E.ON 2008; Anonymus (2007b] 
At: a natural gas storage facility at 
Hamburg-Reitbrook; 
provides flue gas from a CHP 
Sponsors together with the city of Hamburg 
run the project TERM (Technology for the 
Exploitation of the Resource Macroalgae) 
of several universities from northern 
Germany and NTBF Subitec. 
E.ON adds a researcher and several tech-
nicians; who research together with Subitec 
as a partner; 
E.ON provides technology, logistics, infra-
structure and research services and an 
area of 1 hectare to TERM and Subitec. 
SSC Strategic Science Consult GmbH 
coordinates and leads the project. 
Goal: planning, construction and technical 
assistance for the operation of a cultivation 
system for microalgae; 
E.ON and Subitec add reactors for cultivat-
ing algae and develop these further; 
Operation is in an open air outdoor (no 
greenhouse); 
Project cost: €2.2M; Hamburg’s contribu-
tion €0.5M [Anonymus 2007b] 
R&D focus: 
 Optimizing bioreactor technology for 
optimal growth and high efficiency for 
converting primary energy (day light) 
into biomass, 
 Optimize microalgae on the species 
level, biomass composition and physiol-
ogy, 
 Automate the plant, to facilitate indus-
trial production. 
E.ON Ruhrgas [Böttcher, C. 2006] 
With: IUB (International University of 
Bremen) and BlueBioTech GmbH is 
working on research and development 
A project “Biofixing of Greenhouse Gases 
with Microalgae Biotechnology” (2005-
2007) was funded by E.ON 
Goal: produce biodiesel and animal feed 
from flue gas and marine microalgae using 
a small greenhouse with a 150 l photobio-
reactor. 
Using carbon dioxide emissions from an 
E.ON Ruhrgas 350 MW coal-fired power 
plant in Bremen supported by the state 
(city) of Bremen was a basis of the 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Project 
(GGMP) [Golon 2006] 
4 micro-photobioreactors were connected 
to the flue gas from the power plant. 
Project partner: 
Jacobs University Bremen 
BlueBioTech GmbH 
Novagreen. 
Goals: 
Experimental micro-facility to test the toler-
ance of microalgae to the flue gas  
 Test facility, establishing proof of 
principle 
 Planning and construction of pilot plant 
with a capacity of 500 tons CO2/year 
 Planning and construction of plant to 
treat 15,000 tons CO2/year 
Status/results: 
microalgae removed CO2 (and NOx) from 
flue gases and recycled it in form of 
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With sales of the CO2 emission permits 
cost of the plant and fuel production are 
envisioned to be covered 
biomass and derived products; 
no negative effect of flue gas on the 
production of microalgae; concentrations of 
pollutants were significantly below the 
values accepted for animal feed 
The innovative/entrepreneurial approaches in Table I.92 as well as Table I.94 reveal 
that governmental/public funding and grants in Germany are provided preferentially to 
defined technical projects with partners from industry (large firms and NTBFs) and 
public research organizations (universities and/or federal/state research centers) with 
a systemic orientation whereas in the US the focus is often on individual firms (large 
or small). 
Another topic of interest in the context of algae as biomass (RWE Power) is “hydro-
thermal carbonization” (HTC) which was developed by the Max Planck Institute of 
Colloids and Interfaces in Potsdam/Germany. It is a new variation of biomass conver-
sion. 
In contrast to other biomass carbonization techniques that require dry biomass, the 
HTC process is a highly efficient “wet’“ process that avoids complicated drying 
schemes and costly isolation procedures (biomass + water +catalyst+ pressure in the 
absence of air) to produce carbonaceous materials (“biocoal”). This would also apply 
to wet biomass from algae. The method – “pressure cooking biomass till it boils dry” – 
is relatively inexpensive, widely applicable and quickly scalable and can produce 
clean energy in the form of gas or oil along with a “biocoal” powder. And it opens a 
new field of chemistry and development of new materials, such as nanotubes. 104 
A German NTBF founded in 2007 to exploit HTC technology is Suncoal Industries 
GmbH (B.2). 
Apart from BlueBioTech GmbH in Germany there are two algae-oriented NTBFs parti-
cularly notable, NOVA green Projektmanagement GmbH (also written as Novagreen; 
Table I.94) and IGV GmbH (Institut für Getreideverarbeitung; The Institute for Cereal 
Processing Ltd.; Table I.92). Novagreen has its root in horticultural engineering (pro-
ject management!); IGV originated with food and nutrition engineering, but then also 
added algae-related biotechnology as a key area of activities. 
Novagreen was founded in 2004 by an engineer (Rudolf Cordes) and Dr. Theodor 
Fahrendorf, with more than twenty years of (industrial) experiences in plant physiol-
ogy, biochemistry and biotechnology. Novagreen originated with the firm Agrinova 
Projektmanagement GmbH, which was established by Cordes in 1997. Agrinova is 
active in cultivating and breeding fruit and vegetables. Agrinova focuses on “secon-
dary plant ingredients” which are marketed as food additive with protection capacity 
against cancer. Hence, Novagreen can be seen as a spin-off complementing horti-
culture by algae-oriented aquaculture. 
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Agrinova does not only breed backcrossings to still more primitives to get more sub-
stantial varieties which are closer to the wild-type related varieties. It develops also 
advanced harvesting technology and processing know-how. The company isolates 
and extracts raw and finished materials and supplies raw materials and pharmaceuti-
cal intermediates for the manufacturing industry. Its mechanical engineering branch 
develops prototypes and machines to harvest, for instance, cabbage more softly 
directly in the field. Agrinova sells its product directly via its Web online (“Agrinova-
Shop”) and supports its marketing by public presentations about the health supporting 
roles of their products. 
T. Fahrendorf joined Agrinova in 2005 to lead the science direction of the firm (CSO). 
Cordes and Fahrendorf became partners and managing directors of Novagreen 
GmbH (LLC) which focuses on algae and could rely on development systems set up 
already in 1998 by Cordes which were subjected to continuous improvements. 
[Agrinova]. 
According to its Web site Novagreen is a developer and provider of novel bioreactors 
for the production of microalgae in a closed environment. Simultaneously Novagreen 
is a producer of selected bulk microalgae and ingredients using these bioreactors for 
the food, cosmetics, and pharmaceutical industry. 
The bioreactors are adapted to producing different types of algae – and for freshwater 
or sea water. Novagreen’s patented production platform using a unique three-layer 
film “tubing system” (“hoses”) can be implemented in almost any standard greenhouse 
facility worldwide to fit existing infrastructure. It offers also a power (heat) concept for 
connecting to an existing biogas plant utilizing the waste heat of a combined heat and 
power (CHP) plant, to reduce carbon dioxide (Figure I.177). 
Hence, Novagreen may provide new streams of revenue for the agro industry, particu-
larly horticulture. Production takes place in a closed and controlled environment that 
guarantees the high quality distributors and consumers are looking for (high quality 
certified microalgal products). Novagreen uses pre-existing, well established horti-
cultural production systems, distribution and marketing channels. Novagreen is intro-
ducing production of microalgae as an integral part of modern horticulture. 
Novagreen pursues R&D activities, usually in cooperation with other firms (Table I.94) 
via projects subsidized by policy. For instance, for optimization, in its laboratory all the 
species of algae are matched to the carbon dioxide sources as well as their intended 
use. 
Microalgae can also be used for production of recombinant proteins. Novagreen is 
planning the production of antibodies and vaccines for the veterinary market. For 2012 
it planned to establish a production system for heterologous antibodies and vaccines 
in transgenic microalgae. Since 2008, preliminary tests were run in cooperation with 
European and American institutions [Daniel Meier Medienteam 2010]. 
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According to the Creditreform/Firmenwissen database Novagreen had revenues of 
€310,000 in 2010. It is not clear whether this corresponds to sales of offerings. One 
can assume that there is additionally a large hidden contribution of project capital at-
tributed to Novagreen. Furthermore, apart from the two founders, the GmbH (LLC) 
has a third partner who may contribute equity. Moreover, it is not obvious in how far 
Novagreen and Agrinova are run as financially independent firms. 
In the sense of an engineering-type firm technical offerings by Novagreen include 
[Fahrendorf 2008]: 
 Developing algae-bioreactors and production plants for algae up to 100 hec-
tares 
 Power concepts for biogas plants 
 V- and H-reactors 
 Foil tunnels 
 Harvesting and processing technology (pumps, driers) 
 Production of algae for various purposes 
 Precursors for pharmaceuticals 
 Reference proteins 
 Transgenic algae 
 Commercialization (marketing) of the customers’ algae. 
Services covers: 
 Consulting, concepts for utilizing heat, assessments 
 Tailored solution that guarantee an optimal utilization of heat 
 Construction of plants 
 Management, central laboratory and analytics 
 Approval and commercialization of the algae. 
In 2010 Novagreen’s demonstration greenhouse with production of algae was coupled 
for the first time to a biogas plant. With its self-developed, proprietary cascade system 
it was tested under which conditions algae show best growth and bind the most car-
bon dioxide of the biogas. The greenhouse is covered with photovoltaic glass panels 
and will produce die 630 Kilowatt-Peak (KWp) electricity per hour. The light transmit-
ted to the algae in the photobioreactors suffices to generate 80 metric tons of biomass 
per hectare. Additionally the demonstration setup was used for trial with algae that 
produce essential omega-3-fatty acids which is interesting for the animal feed industry 
as a fishmeal replacement [Daniel Meier Medienteam 2010]. 
DTB – Deutsche Biogas AG, a German NTBF in renewable energy – produces and 
sells electricity and heat from biogas plants, which it designs, builds, and operates in 
partnership with farmers. In 2011 it started am algae program together with 
Novagreen. The aim of the common project was to test Novagreen technology, and 
further develop and optimize the technology. Here, the waste heat from the biogas 
plant is used for the operation of the greenhouse and thus integrated into the value 
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chain. With the help of the algal and special cultures carbon dioxide from the exhaust 
gases of the related CHP will be “stripped,” so that the production of biomethane is not 
only CO2-neutral, but has reduced CO2 [DTB 2011]. 
Previous discussions related the German IGV GmbH (Institut für Getreideverarbei-
tung; The Institute for Cereal Processing Ltd.) to the US startup Greenfuel Technolo-
gies founded in 2001 as a cooperation partner regarding biofuel from algae (ch. 
2.1.2.8; A.1.1.3). However, IGV represents also one prototypical case of necessity 
entrepreneurship enforced by the re-organization of the industry and the science and 
technology system of the former socialistic German Democratic Republic (GDR – in 
German DDR – occupied by the USSR) after the German Re-Unification around 1990. 
Due to the devastation of Germany after World War II and particularly the lack of re-
sources in its Eastern part and lack of money for imports the GDR followed often the 
technological paths of Nazi Germany to become self-sufficient (autarky) concentrating 
on optimizing what is available and the focusing on the notion “Ersatz” which is “sub-
stitute,” such as “Ersatz-Holz-Zucker” (synthetic sugar from wood) [Runge 2006:270-
272, 566] (cf. above CHOREN Industries and Bioliq – Figure I.173). 
IGV addresses necessity entrepreneurship of employees of a state-owned research 
institute in the former GDR, located in the German state Brandenburg rather close to 
Berlin. The privatization of IGV corresponded formally and regarding the result to a 
management buyout (MBO; ch. 2.1.2.4), but there was a legally complicated process 
behind it as for a public research institute or firm the “normal” approaches to an MBO 
did not apply in the capitalistic Federal Republic of Germany. 
IGV was founded in GDR in 1960 in Brandenburg which is a state with a dominant 
food industry. Ca. 50 percent of Brandenburg’s area was and is used for agriculture. 
And also after the German Re-Unification, the food industry with a turnover of 
€2,402.5 million (in 2004) remained the industry showing the highest overall revenues. 
It was set up as a practice-oriented research institute for the milling, bakery and food 
industry. 
Furthermore, its location in Nuthetal near Brandenburg’s capital (and Berlin) provided 
an environment with universities and non-university research institutes for food sci-
ence and nutrition. And for decades the IGV was a leader of the food industry and in 
processing of vegetable raw materials in the GDR. 
When the IGV added biotechnology to its main fields of research Prof. Dr. Otto Pulz 
became the leader of biotechnology in 1975. Since 1981 he was engaged in biotech-
nology of algae, particularly focusing on design and construction of photobioreactors, 
on active ingredients and raw materials for cosmetics [succidia]. That means he 
started during the first “algae wave,” in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Another important person of IGV was Peter Kretschmer who is a passionate scientist 
(“Ich bin eben ein leidenschaftlicher Wissenschaftler”) [Steyer 2007]. In 2010 the 
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engineer P. Kretschmer was promoted with a doctoral degree by the Technical 
University of Berlin at the age of 72 [Meuser 2011]. He was seen as “the Gyro 
Gearloose of the GDR-food industry” (“Peter Kretschmer war der Daniel Düsentrieb 
der DDR-Lebensmittelindustrie.”) 
Dipl.-Ing. Peter Kretschmer (in 2012 74 years old and still the managing director of the 
new IGV) had a research focus on bread and bakery and he became a world re-
nowned expert in this field. Also apprenticeship for people in the bakery industry was 
established and provided by the IGV under his supervision. 
Basically, Kretschmer had to respond to the command of the GDR government: “Re-
duce the time of our women to stay in the kitchen” (“Verkürzen Sie unseren Frauen 
die Zeit in der Küche.”). Even if this aimed officially at improving the life balance of 
women between family, children and profession and career, actually the GDR was is 
heavy need of more people to have its industry grow [Steyer 2007]. 
As described by Meuser [2011], after the German Re-Unification, “The German Treu-
hand Agency” was leading the re-organization of the socialistic economy, industry and 
research organizations of the former GDR. In 1990 IGV got the legal status of a lim-
ited liability company (LLC – GmbH) and the Treuhand became its single owner. The 
Treuhand wanted to eliminate the existing IGV and laying off ca. 180 employees. 
As a consequence, there was a massive layoff of employees and in 1990 Peter 
Kretschmer became managing director supposed to be able to lead IGV into the 
market environment. All IGV employees were aware that the IGV could only survive 
focusing on its core competencies. This orientation was appreciated by the German 
Science Board which acts as a consultant for the Federal Government. 
In 1991, after a careful assessment, the German Science Board suggested to keep 
the IGV with all its research priorities. Many options were explored to transfer IGV 
ownership of the Treuhand into a State custody. However, after all the options had 
turned out to be negative, only privatization remained as a solution. 
Since an additional objective of IGV’s future was the preservation of the autonomy 
and independence, in 1994 an MBO occurred with retaining the LLC-structure in 
which Dipl.-Ing. Peter Kretschmer, Dr. Helmut Barnitzke and Prof. Dr. Otto Pulz were 
partners [Meuser 2011]. Later H. Barnitzke changed into the Supervisory Board of the 
firm, and P. Kretschmer became managing director and Prof. Pulz a representative. 
IGV now is a private and independent applied research institute with key competen-
cies in food processing, biotechnology and processing of biomass materials with cur-
rently about 100 employees. The proportion of people with a scientific or engineering 
education and technical employees (masters, chemically-technical assistants and 
laboratory technicians) is about 4 to 1. 
The focus of the competence and research spectrum is on production and process in-
novations, their efficient development, commercialization and technology transfer to 
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small and medium-sized enterprises in food processing and related areas. The scien-
tific and technical services include the operation of an accredited testing laboratory. 
Sales and distribution of IGV’s offerings take place worldwide [BMWi 2011]: 
 Ca. 30 percent of the orders are captured in the state of Brandenburg or 
Berlin. 
 Ca. 60 percent of the orders are requested by medium-sized or large firms in 
Germany or the EU. 
Since 2002 there is a close cooperation of IGV with the University of Applied Sciences 
of Lausitz (in German Fachhochschule) concerning phototrophic biotechnology whose 
major theme is algae. In 2006 this cooperation was formalized and contractually ex-
tended. In particular, it included establishing phototrophic biotechnology as a field of 
education and research and having Prof. Pulz of IGV as a visiting professor to hold 
lectures [Witzmann 2006]. 
Common research fields focused on 
 Building a unique collection of microalgae species (after four years the col-
lection had  more than 250 originals – an invaluable genetic potential); 
 Search for species-specific active substances (an example is to develop a 
special line of cosmetics); 
 CO2 sequestration and climate protection (Table I.92). 
A similar approach of necessity entrepreneurship out of a large research institute of 
the Academy of Science in Berlin-Adlershof (in the GDR-part of Berlin) induced by the 
German Re-Unification is observed for ASCA GmbH (Angewandte Synthesechemie 
Adlershof GmbH), active in the area of fine chemicals and active pharmaceutical in-
gredients. It acts as a private research institute focusing essentially on contract re-
search. As the IGV also ASCA financed its early life and survival by special grants 
which were established by German state and federal governments and the EU to 
support the transition of the socialistic system of the former GDR into the Nippon-
Rhineland capitalism (ch. 1.2.4) of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
And looking also at the below discussed case of “Bioprodukte Prof. Steinberg 
Produktions- und Vertriebs GmbH & Co KG” one realizes that independence 
and determining one’s own destiny (Table I.39) are very strong drivers for 
entrepreneurship demonstrated by people who were living in a society where 
both aspects were suppressed and became founders when the restrictions 
were lifted. 
IGV now exhibits healthy growth. Total revenues of IGV amounted to €6.52 million in 
2010, €4.70 million were achieved by selling to the market and €1.83 million were ob-
tained by grants related to projects financed by the public (German state and federal 
governments as well as the European Union). Currently growth in revenues is almost 
determined by sales to industry. While the proportion at 2002 was 50:50 (each ca. 
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€2.15 million), the contribution from grants stayed almost constant at ca. €1.8 million. 
For instance, the proportion for 2007 was €4 million to €1.4 million [IGV 2011]. 
Looking at algae IGV developed plants for breeding and harvesting algae in closed 
systems focusing on photobioreactors. Since the middle of the last century microalgae 
have been produced in open ponds, mainly in South East Asia and the US. These 
ponds are about 15 cm deep and are stirred at one or more points. In 1995 a 
technique was developed in Germany for cultivating microalgae which centered on a 
closed system of glass tubes, rather than a “continuous aquarium,” to expose the 
algae to maximum light. 
Cultivation of algae in glass tubes has considerable advantages over cultivation in 
ponds, particularly for high value products (Figure I.176): 
1. Light can reach the algae from all sides through the glass tube; they are ex-
posed to maximum light and can grow well. There are no areas which are de-
ficient in light such as those occurring in the deeper layers of ponds. 
2. All the environmental factors which are important for healthy growth of algae, 
such as pH, temperature and carbon dioxide supply, can be controlled and 
adjusted to the optimal setting. 
3. External uncontrollable influences, such as rainwater, dust, insects, waterfowl 
and their droppings, blue-green algae etc., can be eliminated. And this differ-
ence in quality can be measured, for example, in terms of heavy metal and 
toxin contamination. 
4. There is no evaporation of water over a large area. 
5. Only a fraction of the space taken up by a pond system is required. 
Over the years IGV built up much experience in using algae for food and nutrition, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and animal feed. But, for a long time, Pulz had also the 
idea that one could use the microalgae for the production of biofuels using particularly 
the type Chlorella vulgaris and to use carbon dioxide generated by power plants or 
exhaust gases generated by particular manufacturing plants. Already in 1996 Otto Pilz 
cultivated Chlorella in plate reactors for biodiesel. 
The related techniques were implemented at a lime burning plant in cooperation with 
the German conglomerate Preussag AG which at that time (until 2000) was focusing 
on exploitation of mineral resources and their processing, for instance, mining of coal, 
metal ores, potash and rock salt and limestone. Back in 1996/1997 Prof. Karl-
Hermann Steinberg of Preussag AG (1995 – 1999 Director of Innovation, Preussag 
AG Hannover responsible for microalgal research, etc.) was also considering the 
question of how carbon dioxide emissions from power stations, for example, could be 
put to good use. 
Together with the holder of a patent for algae-breeding IGV developed the Preussag 
algae manufacturing plant. That is, the production plant and the method of cultivation 
were protected by patents. Construction of a microalgae production plant began in 
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Klötze in 1999 (in the German state Sachsen-Anhalt; see below). One year later the 
first algae of the Chlorella vulgaris species were already being cultivated in this unique 
facility, the first of its kind in the world. However, the low petro-oil price forced 
Preussag as the owner/operator of the algae production plant to give up after four 
years. 
Prof. Pulz continued to complete Europe’s largest microalgae production plant. It pro-
duced 130 metric tons of algae per year. The system of production halls contained 
500 km of arm-width glass tubes filled with green water and meandering through the 
halls. The water is mixed with a starter culture; then the tiny organisms multiply with 
the help of light and carbon dioxide. At the end of the plant a large centrifuge con-
centrates the liquid to a thick green grits, which is dried. The result is purest 
microalgae – packed into bags as a fine greenish powder. The powder is used as an 
additive to food or cosmetics [Schürmann 2007; Schibilsky 2008]. 
In the meantime, IGV’s researchers developed a so-called 3D-matrix system in which 
to grow two to three times as many microalgae as in the conventional, essentially lin-
ear photobioreactors made of glass tubes. Here, microalgae grow in geometric struc-
tures. The novelty was that the distribution of algae is in three dimensions, as the light 
is distributed, and thus light and algae are constantly in contact. Thus, one achieves a 
better photosynthetic performance and highest yield. If sunlight is not sufficient 
energy-saving light bulbs will support providing necessary light intensity [Schibilsky 
2008]. 
US startup Greenfuel Technologies took notice of this new type of reactor which led to 
development cooperation with IGV. For instance, a stepwise process of feeding the 
algae was found to be important. At first, the algae are still supplied with everything 
needed for rapid growth. Then the food intake is reduced. And the algae react to the 
sudden shortage by converting up to 70 percent of their weight into oil, which can be 
processed into biodiesel [Schürmann 2007; Schibilsky 2008]. However, not related to 
technical shortcomings, a number of other factors ultimately led to the bankruptcy of 
Greenfuel as described in previous chapters (ch. 2.1.2.8; A.1.1.3). 
One lesson learned concerning algae is that so far technology has not reached its 
goal and  “under the present price situation a large-area production of microalgae for 
energy under Central European climatic conditions is not realistic.” [Schibilsky 2008] 
The IGV/Preussag cooperation in Klötze gave rise to a further technology entrepre-
neurship case of a former citizen of the GDR involving the Preussag partner of IGV, in 
particular, Prof. Karl-Hermann Steinberg, and the marketing of algae under the 
Algomed® brand. When Preussag stepped out of the algae project in 1999 Prof. 
Steinberg founded the firm “Bioprodukte Prof. Steinberg GmbH” (BPS) to organize 
distribution and selling of algae products [Zentner 2004]. 
Also in 1999 the “algae-patent” was licensed to a startup “Ökologische Produkte 
Altmark GmbH” (ÖPA) and the algal production plant was finalized in Klötze. It was 
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claimed that nowhere else in the world algae are produced with such high standards 
of purity and quality. But in 2001 ÖPA went bankrupt. 105 Steinberg attributed commer-
cial difficulties to the termination of production after less than one and a half years in 
charge. Due to excess capacity and a more expensive building the company became 
uneconomical [Voigt 2008] 
Prof. Dr. Karl-Hermann Steinberg (born in 1941), growing up in the former GDR, 
graduated in chemistry (Dr.) at the Merseburg Technical University and became full 
professor of chemical engineering, Leipzig University in 1991. Further steps in his life 
included 106 
1989 – 1990: Deputy Minister of heavy industry of the GDR, environmental protection 
department; 
1990: Minister for environmental protection, nature conservation, energy and reactor 
safety in the “de Maizière government” of the former GDR; 
1991: Joined Noell GmbH, Würzburg (Germany), in essence a subsidiary of Preussag 
AG and active in various fields, such as systems and mechanical engineering, steel 
construction and machinery, energy and environmental technology, process engineer-
ing and services; 
1995 – 1999 Director of Innovation, Preussag AG Hannover. 
In 2004 insolvency assets of ÖPA were taken over by Prof. Steinberg’s firm assisted 
by a group of private investors to form “Bioprodukte Prof. Steinberg Produktions- und 
Vertriebs GmbH & Co KG.” The facility was partially rebuilt, renovated and modern-
ized and production of microalgae was launched within a new constellation. The next 
year the laboratory was extended, an extensive collection of algal strains was built up 
and a scale-up line established to produce and sell ALGOMED® products, for in-
stance, also via its online shop or pharmacies [Zentner 2004; Voigt 2008] 105. 
“We had to invest nearly €4.5 million to build technology anew and eliminate the dam-
age caused by the long shutdown,” said Steinberg [Voigt 2008] For his investments 
Prof. Steinberg could get a loan guarantee of the State of Sachsen-Anhalt for €1.2 mil-
lion [Lieske 2004] – and it can be assumed that his political experiences and network-
ing had paid off. 
With 17 employees in 2008 sales of the business went up. In 2006, revenues from 
sold algae in many different forms were almost €1 million; one year later sales climbed 
to €1.2 million euros and for 2008 Steinberg expected to reach €1.5 million. 60 per-
cent of the products were exported. Customers from Switzerland, France and even 
Malaysia were on the list [Voigt 2008]. 
But, since January 2008, the company belongs to the French group Roquette Frères, 
which is Europe’s biggest starch producer [Voigt 2008] – and since October 2008 
Steinberg worked as an external consultant. 106 The new firm’s name is Roquette 
Klötze GmbH & Co. KG. 
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In line with the German firms Novagreen, “Bioprodukte Prof. Steinberg Produktions- 
und Vertriebs GmbH & Co KG” and the private research institute IGV the US firm Solix 
BiofuelsTM (now Solix BioSystems) with its AGSTM Technology (Algae Growth System) 
cultivates oil-rich microalgae in a controlled environment. It is involved in the produc-
tion of a “biocrude” (algae oil), “green” diesel (jet fuel and biodiesel), methane, 
chemical intermediates, feed and other important products. Actually Solix, head-
quartered in Ft. Collins, Colorado and founded in 2006, aims to build a commercially 
viable alternative to petroleum-based fuels and chemicals. It is a university spin-out 
transformed into a VC-based startup with currently a “veterans” management team. 
According to research done by the Laboratory for Algae Research & Biotechnology, 
closed system photobioreactors, like Solix’s AGSTM Technology, have seven times the 
biomass productivity of open pond systems. 
Solix Biofuels was founded by private entrepreneurs Jim Sears and Doug Henston 
(then CEO), Colorado State professor Bryan Wilson (then CTO), and Colorado State 
University (CSU) itself. Working to refine and scale Sears’ original bioreactor design, 
the group has called on the resources of CSU’s Engine and Energy Conversion 
Laboratory in constructing a working prototype of a closed-tank bioreactor [Madrigal 
2007]. 
By August 2006 a first generation prototype had been built, tested, and analyzed, and 
a second generation prototype was launched. Furthermore, Solix housed at Colorado 
State University, has spent a year sorting through 40 strains of algae collected from 
around the world. The startup sought for the best strains and best environment for the 
organisms [Procter 2008; Narvaes Wilmsen 2006]. 
Now Solix Biofuels’ AGS algal production system is designed to enable the industri-
alization of algae at scales suitable for large volumetric production of biocrude in vol-
umes. At the center of the AGSTM Technology is Solix Biofuels’ proprietary photobio-
reactors. The photobioreactor contains closed chambers rather than tube systems as 
used by its German counterparts. The technology circulates algae within the chamber 
using controlled turbulence in order to maximize exposure of algae to light and thus 
algae growth by photosynthesis. More details of the technology are given in The 
Energy Blog [2006]. 
Solix provides essential technology for industrial algae production. Apart from acting 
as a producer it offers also its system as an integrated, flexible algae growth system 
addressing various capacities utilizing Solix’s proprietary, floating photobioreactor 
panels (LumianTM panels) to provide a high productivity growth environment for the 
outdoor cultivation and evaluation of algae species. 
Funding steps according to CrunchBase were: 
 $16M in Series B funding (3/28/2011)  
 $2M in Venture Round funding (1/4/2010)  
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 $2.5M in Venture Round funding (11/23/2009)  
 $500k in Venture Round funding (11/6/2009)  
 $6.3M in Series A funding (7/2/2009)  
 $10.5M in Series A funding (11/12/2008). 
Solix converts the algae biomass it produces at its Demonstration Plant with peak 
production capacity of 3,000 gallons per acre per year of algal oil into biocrude oil 
using its proprietary extraction process that removes the triglycerides from the bio-
mass (algae oil, Figure I.177) [Ritch 2010]. Solix is also offering the residual biomass 
that remains after the triglycerides have been extracted. This biomass is rich in protein 
and carbohydrates and has potential as a source for various food ingredients or as an 
animal feed or for aquaculture. It is also rich in other products including amino acids, 
carotenes and antioxidants. 
Solix Biofuels’ demonstration facility is located at Coyote Gulch in southwestern 
Colorado. This large-scale facility complements the pilot facility in Fort Collins, 
Colorado. The demonstration facility is located on land provided by its partner, the 
Southern Ute Alternative Energy Fund. It is using waste water generated during coal-
bed methane production thus reducing the need for fresh water. 
In 2010 Solix was in talks with potential partners interested in building, owning and 
operating plants using Solix’s technology to produce algal oil and downstream pro-
ducts [Ritch 2010]. In the same year Solix signed an agreement to investigate the use 
of algae for the German firm BASF, the world’s largest chemical company. For BASF 
the emphasis is on commitment to generate growth from industrial biotechnology and 
on algae representing an addition to BASF’s technology portfolio as they offer the po-
tential to produce a number of specialty chemicals and products. 
A.1.1.5 Structuring Entrepreneurship in Biofuels 
Previous sub-chapters have largely focused on the large firms’ intrapreneurial ap-
proach to biofuels involving NTBFs in the field or a technical/engineering approach 
following an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) project for scaling-up 
to commercialization (Figure I.180). Without much own research the last approach 
concentrates on process and plant engineering. Additionally, it focuses on 
 Improving and modifying existing, proven technologies and exploiting what-
ever is available or purchasable, such as using Lego-type commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) components, retrofitting existing plants etc.; 
 Managing and execution by “technology veterans” with large experience in the 
(technical) field and a related management team with long and broad mana-
gerial and project leading experiences in the oil industry or related industries 
and connected by previous common affiliations and presently common inter-
ests; moreover, the veterans approach has emerged often from “old boys net-
works”; 
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 Having managers or persons, respectively, with experience in government re-
lationships (grants, funding, permits etc.) to play an important role in the man-
agement team. 
In an RD&D scale-up process as depicted in Figure I.180 this approach steps in es-
sentially at the “Initial System Prototype” phase. 
On the other hand, there are startups (often RBSUs) which have to do much research 
and start from scratch in the process (“Research”) which later have to add engineering 
competencies for scale-up (“Demonstration & Development”). This characterizes the 
proceedings as a scientific/engineering approach. 
In particular, with regard to the “veterans” aspect it is to be noted that new firms’ foun-
dation was done often by serial entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the examples of 
Sapphire (Table I.93) (and later Coskata, Table I.99) exhibit a pro-active role of 
venture capital for foundation. 
Given the myriad of technological options, innovation approaches and financing op-
tions by private and public organizations the “acid test,” the rigorous or crucial ap-
praisal to start a biofuel firm, is the comparison of the startup’s production cost versus 
the petro-fuel production cost or oil price, respectively. Startups usually flag their 
(competitive) position by the price (in $ or € per gallon/liter) they would have to charge 
for their biofuel. 
For RBSUs considering a scale-up approach from research and lab to a large-scale 
commercial plant one issue is whether a corresponding calculation done for a lab or 
pilot plant setting is also valid for the large-scale manufacturing setting. Still, most 
biofuel NTBFs will have to prove they can deliver on those low prices at full-scale 
commercial production. 
However, the basis of the individual calculations is mostly not compatible due to in-
transparency of the underlying components and assumptions. For instance, the price 
per gallon may be calculated as cost of production minus revenue from co-products, 
and assuming particular feedstock cost (type of feedstock, dry or wet?) and their 
process energy cost which may refer totally to natural gas cost or even may contain 
energy delivery through a side-chain of their biofuel process. 
Comparing the RD&D process for biofuels (Figure I.180) for a policy-driven market 
with the common value chain (Figure I.7) of technology-based firms one observes that 
marketing plays a minor or even negligible role. 
Right now there are many products and technologies out there and no dominant de-
sign, and startups are trying to choose from these and make decisions about. But one 
cannot be sure that the best technology will win. It may be that the best management 
team or the best marketing team will make it or the realities of the market will decide 
otherwise. 
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Figure I.180: The RD&D staged path of innovation for biofuels. 
Pamela Contag [2008a] of Cobalt Biofuels (Table I.96) and focusing on biobutanol de-
scribes entrepreneurship in biofuels in the US as follows (author’s emphases and 
additions in braces): “If public financial support does not dry {in the US and also 
Germany}, there is a good startup funding base (via grants) for new biofuel firms. 
However, the plant-and waste-based base biofuel business is essentially squeezed 
between two commodities: the biomass feedstock of the agriculture community (or 
municipal communities) and the oil industry.” “Although this represents an opportunity 
for a lot of people, it is a very unpredictable place to be, and it is very high risk.” 
“The price of oil determines how investors think about the adoption rate of biofuels. 
Technology development around biofuels resides in the hands of people with a rela-
tively short-term view. Biofuel projects take huge amounts of capital to get to commer-
cialization. There is a hurdle, because my first commercial-scale plant will be first in 
kind. It’s very difficult to put a finance package around a first-in-kind technology.” 
And Rick Wilson of Cobalt Biofuels added [NewNet]: “If you develop a technology, you 
have to build your first plant to prove to the world you can do it and for that you require 
an investor with deep pockets, which are definitely lacking in this space. The venture 
investors like to develop the technology, while “project finance” investors enjoy fund-
ing after the technology is proven commercially, but there remains a grey zone in the 
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middle where someone is needed to step up and provide the capital for the first plant, 
and it’s a big number.” 
Concerning the industry, for the biofuel race in the world ca. 350 companies, from 
startups to oil and chemical giants, are developing second- and third generation bio-
fuels using a bewildering array of technologies [ISEE] on the laboratory scale and very 
many pilot and demonstration plants are operating or are under construction. 
Every year Biofuels Digest publishes (on the Web) a list with the “50 Hottest Compa-
nies in Bioenergy.” However, replacing mineral oil with biofuels is a tough business. 
The competition is intense. It is a multimillion-dollar question of how to translate a 
beaker of success to global scale. It is estimated that, even as the industry develops, 
many of the companies – probably most – will not survive. 
Basically, converting biomass to biofuels requires breakthrough developments in the 
production orientation in any type of process (Figure I.171): 
 Thermochemical, 
 Bioengineering/biotechnological or 
 “Hybrid” (“biothermal”) approaches relying and combining thermochemical 
and bioengineering sub-processes. 
A research roadmap for biofuels of the US Department of Energy [DOE 2006] may be 
a guideline for entrepreneurs (and venture capitalists) to put their corresponding ideas 
and opportunity identifications into perspective, whether they are from the US or 
Europe. Though this roadmap acknowledges the validity and public support options 
for other technologies and type of biofuel, there is a strong focus on the bioengineer-
ing approach and particularly (bio)ethanol. This means, there is an implicit effect that 
may direct entrepreneurial ideas toward the explicitly expressed goals and related 
routes. 
Indeed, in the US the majority of biofuel startups follow the bioengineering and bio-
technology route (Figure I.171) using microbes/bacteria, yeast or enzymes to convert 
(various forms of) sugar into alcohols (bioethanol or biobutanol). But when biomass is 
broken down into sugars, it still contains substances such as lignin that can poison 
other microorganisms. In most processes, lignin has to be separated from the sugars 
to keep the microorganisms healthy. On the other hand, the tolerance of the algae to 
lignin, however, makes it possible to skip this step, which can reduce costs [Bullis 
2008a]. 
For a bioengineering or biothermal process naturally occurring species can be used or 
genetically modified objects (GMOs) – “designer microbes” – focusing on several ap-
proaches, methods and processes (Figure I.181). 
Being proteins enzymes participate in cellular metabolic processes with the ability to 
enhance the rate of reaction between biomolecules. They thus represent biocatalysts 
(for “industrial biotechnology”) which may perform the same functions as “chemocata-
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lysts [Runge 2006:165-169, 571-583]. Both are related as generic technologies (Table 
I.12). 
Yeast is a microorganism of the type of single-celled fungus and used as an agent in 
baking and in brewing beer and is responsible for the conversion of sugars in must to 
alcohol (“alcoholic fermentation”). Usually chemical process and plant engineers of the 
world love chemocatalytic processes and, as you can control the yield and scale, 
make a plant or refinery easier from different (and the least expensive) feedstock. 
 
Figure I.181: Bioengineering approaches to convert biomass including algae to bio-
fuels. 
Irrespective of the particular bioengineering approach each company has a fundamen-
tal decision to make: whether to engineer a biofuel-producing capability into a well-
known, robust industrial organism or to engineer industrial fitness and other necessary 
attributes into an organism that is a natural producer of the molecule of interest. 
Generally, with regard to cost minimization an issue of production economy is in how 
far production can use proven, purchasable and integratable sub-processes or com-
ponents. Correspondingly, a question for a bioengineering approach is whether to de-
velop microbes/enzymes in house or purchasing them (for instance, the US firm KL 
Energy purchases enzymes from the big Danish enzyme company Novozymes). 
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A further idea is to replace the need for enzymes, which are often expensive, with a 
mixed culture of bacteria. The availability of cost-effective enzymes for breaking down 
cellulose will be critical for the success of the second generation biofuels field. But hy-
drolysis of cellulose and hemicellulose requires about 20 distinct enzymes that are 
normally provided by commercial suppliers, such as Novozymes (Denmark) or the 
Genencor subsidiary of Danish Danisco (no owned by DuPont). But the hydrolysis 
process can also result in the production of by-products, including acids, ketones and 
aldehydes, which can inhibit the growth of cells as well as the secreted enzymes. 
Working and experimenting with microbes or enzymes always opens a way for seren-
dipity. For instance, Mark Emalfarb, founder of Dyadic International Inc, just wanted a 
better enzyme to soften blue jeans. The search led him to a new fungus from Russia, 
and then to a serendipitous mutation that turned the organism into a biofactory capa-
ble of churning out vast amounts of enzymes that can give denim (the fabric for jeans) 
a prized lived-in look. “By accident, we came by the world’s most prolific fungus,” he 
said [Anonymus 2006a]. Actually, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he hired Russian 
scientists and took the fungus to the US. 108 
With technical hurdles abound there may be also societal, attitudinal (acceptance) 
hurdles with bioengineered biofuels. Genetically modified crops have met generally 
with stiffer resistance from a public in Europe that has labeled such crops as “Franken 
foods” [Mandaro 2007] and a similar attitude may extend into the biofuels area. In par-
ticular, in the US, “the food versus fuel” debate was bad press for biofuels and the 
“Frankenalgae” debate would be even worse.” [Wesoff 2009] 
More on Bioalcohols: Rerun of Biobutanol 
Using naturally occurring microbes is not only practiced since ages to ferment sugar to 
ethanol. Since 1916, it is known that microbes, such as Clostridium acetobutylicum, 
can ferment sugar to produce a mixture of acetone, butanol, and ethanol in large 
volumes – by the ‘“ABE process” exploited mainly for its acetone during the First 
World War. The butanol was a by-product of this fermentation (twice as much butanol 
was produced). Yet microbial breweries were discarded by the 1980s in favor of a 
cheaper petrochemical route, via the reaction of carbon monoxide and hydrogen (from 
syngas) with propylene. Currently, there have emerged several startups following the 
ABE route [Kiplinger Washington Editors 2007]. 
For instance, over years, David Ramey in the US, founder of the engineering and con-
sulting firm Environmental Energy, Inc., then ButylFuels, LLC, has further developed 
and patented the original ABE process that makes the fermentation process more 
economically viable and competitive (by a continuous two stage anaerobic fermenta-
tion process without significant amounts of acetone or ethanol). In particular, he dem-
onstrated to the public that there is an alcohol made from corn (butanol) that can re-
place petro-gasoline totally (Table I.82). In 2005 he ran a conventional unmodified  
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“2 Buick Park Avenue” car with no modifications across the US with 24 miles per 
gallon on butanol. 
ButylFuel was supported by several federal and state grants ($0.6 mio. by US Depart-
ment of Energy Small Business Technology Transfer Program [Wilder 2004]) 109 Then, 
for collaboration with Dr. S.T. Yang at the Ohio State University, he obtained a $1 mil-
lion dollar grant through the SBA’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) pro-
gram to research, develop and commercialize butanol fermentation. 
In particular, the project was to develop novel engineered Clostridia strains for fermen-
tation to economically produce butanol as a biofuel from sugars derived from starchy 
and lignocellulosic biomass [Ramey 2007]. ButylFuel was planning to market its 
biobutanol as a solvent first, and then market it as a fuel in the future. Generally, it is 
assumed that existing bioethanol plants can cost-effectively be retrofitted to biobutanol 
production. 
David Ramey (of ButylFuel) is a veteran in biobutanol. He started around 1990 when 
he asked himself “Why Not Butanol in the 1970s.” He noted that (in the US) “people 
are surprised to learn that it hasn’t been firmly on the radar screen as an alternative 
fuel. On the other hand, butanol was on the alternative fuels map three decades ago. 
We had a choice to subsidize either ethanol or butanol and we went with ethanol.” 
Then, Ramey’s butanol was produced by his own patented process, and for his pio-
neering efforts to bring this organically derived fuel to market, he was recognized as 
the “1996 Technologist of the Year” by the Ohio Academy of Science [Ramey 2007]. 
Though by all criteria biobutanol is a much better biofuel than bioethanol 
(Table I.82) policy driven by the agricultural corn-lobby attributed the lion’s 
share of support to bioethanol. 
But by 2012 ethanol producers began switching to biobutanol and chemicals [Admin 
2012; Bevill 2012]. Longer term, butanol is a superior “drop in” biofuel and can directly 
replace gasoline as a fuel. It is a superior blend stock as well, and can be blended 
with diesel as well as other biofuels, such as biodiesel, ethanol and isobutanol. The 
blend stock opportunity for butanol exceeds $80 billion per year. Butanol also has the 
potential to be upgraded to aviation jet fuel, a $50 billion market driven by increasing 
global interest in reduction of carbon emissions. 
For ethanol producers, it is the path of least resistance in getting around the ethanol 
blend wall. For the high priests developing the new technologies and magic bugs, it is 
an opportunity to partner with companies that have feedstock, infrastructure, 90 per-
cent of the required steel in the ground, and existing markets for co-products. [Admin 
2012]. In monetary terms it was estimated that butanol has a high value of £900 
(ca.$1,500 in 2012) per ton compared with the £300 per ton price of ethanol. 
The production principles of butanol according to an ABE-process from agricultural 
residues is the same as that of cellulosic ethanol. It involves four steps: 1) pretreat-
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ment, which opens the cell wall structure and removes lignin; 2) hydrolysis of hemi-
cellulose and cellulose into simple hexose (C6) and pentose (C5) sugars using en-
zymes; 3) fermentation of simple sugars into butanol using a microbe; and 4) recovery 
of the butanol. 
However, there is an inherent paradox in the microbial fermentation of butanol: 
Butanol-producing bacteria produce the enzymes that convert simple sugars into the 
alcohol, but butanol itself is toxic to those same bugs. This butanol inhibition (once its 
concentration rises above about 2 percent) results in a lower alcohol concentration in 
the fermentation broth, which leads to lower yields of butanol and higher recovery 
costs. These are challenges that surface when even highly pure feedstock is used 
[Ebert 2008; Van Noorden 2008]. 
To grasp the related opportunity, butanol production is generally in search for input 
substrates, which are not only economical on the lab level, but also on the production 
level. The major barrier to butanol production has been the high cost of the conven-
tional starch fermentation process. US ButylFuel was already on the route to improve 
butanol yield through ABE fermentation by genetically manipulating related microbes. 
But, in 2012, ButylFuel with 4,000 ft² lab and office space in Ohio and 40 employees, 
many of whom have advanced degrees in microbiology, biochemistry or biochemical 
engineering, merged with the UK startup Green Biologics Ltd. (GBL; Table I.95). 
GBL’s strengths in biobutanol technology were seen to complement ButylFuel’s 
strengths in the design, build and operation of large scale bioprocessing facilities, par-
ticularly in the US market. Post-merger, the combined entity is claimed to be a global 
leader in biobutanol and other C4 chemicals, with skills and assets spanning micro-
biology and metabolic engineering through advanced fermentation and commercial 
production scale [GBL 2012]. 
The key butanol players divide neatly a pair of producers pursuing essentially isobu-
tanol – Gevo (Table I.99 and Butamax (Table I.83, a BP-DuPont JV) – and two 
pursuing n-butanol, Green Biologics and Cobalt Biofuels (Table I.96). 
In the UK since 2003 the startup Green Biologics Ltd. (GBL) pursued optimization and 
“re-commercialization” of the n-butanol fermentation process aiming for a two- to 
three-fold reduction in cost (Table I.95). GBL focuses on thermophilic microbes and 
thermostable enzymes. These are robust, faster, more effective and cheaper than 
conventional microbes operating at ambient temperatures. GBL also looked into input 
options (feedstock) and directed their market orientation towards India and particularly 
China taking the same view as BioMCN for biomethanol (cf. Table I.87) – and recently 
also towards the US. 
Green Biologics is pursuing a model in which it and an ethanol producer will co-invest 
in a project, and both earn off the increased revenue flow from the sale of biobutanol 
into higher-value markets. Green Biologics offers the sales and marketing for n-
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butanol. Payback was expected to be within three years for an ethanol plant partner 
[Admin 2012]. 
Table I.95: Pursuing biobutanol as a biofuel and C4 chemicals and derivatives by 
Green Biologics. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
Major 
Funding 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection 
Green 
Biologics, Ltd. – 
GBL 
Abingdon, UK 
(2003) 
Vision: Become 
the world’s lead-
ing supplier of 
advanced fer-
mentation tech-
niques for con-
version of ligno-
cellulosic plant 
material to re-
newable biofuels 
and chemicals. 
Employees: 
2003: 4, 
2004: 6, 
plus access to 
Georgia 
University 
scientists 
 
2007: 13 
[VentureBeat], 
2008: 20 
[Guardian 2008], 
2009: 25. 
 
Revenues: 
2003: £160,000 
[Koenig 2005] 
2008: £700,000 – 
forecasted 
By 2012 GBL 
has raised over 
$15 million in 
equity financing 
from angel in-
vestors and ven-
ture capital 
firms. 
Launched a 
£6.5M (ca. 
$10M) round 
(Series B) to 
close in April 
2010 [Lux 
Research 2009] 
2009: 
completed 
round with Hong 
Kong invest-
ment group 
Morningside (its 
Dr Gerald Chan 
joining GBL’s 
board). 
2008: 
£3.5M (ca. 
$6.33M) 
fundraising 
round 
2007: 
£1.58M (ca. 
$3.2M) 
completed 
Awarded 
£560,000 (ca. 
Sean Sutcliffe CEO since 2008, came from Biofuels 
Corporation Trading Ltd, which operates one of Europe’s 
largest biodiesel plants, where he has been CEO since 
2005; worked for BG Group plc for 14 years in a variety of 
roles spanning operations, business development and 
strategy, most recently as Executive Vice President with 
responsibility for Corporate Development and New Busi-
nesses; 
he is a Chartered Mechanical Engineer with an Engineer-
ing degree from Cambridge University. 
Dr. Edward Green founder and CSO, gained PhD in Bio-
chemical Engineering in 1993 from the University of 
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology 
(UMIST); 
after 5 years in academia in 1998 joined Agrol Ltd., a UK 
startup where he established a multi-disciplinary team 
that developed a high temperature ethanol process; 
has delivered technical improvements in microbial fer-
mentation processes for biofuel production over the past 
17 years contributing to numerous scientific publications 
and patents. 
Fergal O’Brien VP Commercial Operations; 
a Biochemist with 25 years experience in the Biotechno-
logy/Fine Chemical Industry; held positions in R&D, 
operations, business development and senior manage-
ment for a number of UK-based companies including 
Celltech, Enzymatix, Chiroscience, Chirotech and Dow 
Pharmaceuticals; 
was CEO of Warwick Effect Polymers Ltd from 2004-6 
and joined GBL from his own Business Development 
Consultancy where he has focused on assisting SME’s. 
GBL utilizes closely connected “Advisors”: 
Robert Rickman, Feedstock Advisor 
Steve Vaux, Feedstock Advisor 
Dr. Martin, Comberbach Bioprocess Consultant 
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[pipeline 2008]. 
Estimated 
$150,000 annual 
burn per em-
ployee [Lux 
Research 2009]. 
Funding mode: 
equity, grant aid 
from central and 
local govern-
ment, contract 
services. 
$1.1M), with 
£250,000 (ca. 
$500,000) from 
the Department 
of Trade and 
Industry-led 
Technology 
Program and 
£310,000 
($610,000) from 
shareholder in-
vestors and 
business angels 
£250,000 grant 
awarded to GBL 
and EKB 
2005: 
First funding 
round, £63,000 
(primarily busi-
ness angel in-
vestors in the 
community) 
Professor, David Jones Scientific Advisor. 
 
GBL Technology Strengths and/or Differentiator: 
A unique collection of thermophilic microorganisms; 
a comprehensive and searchable database for the culture 
collection (library of organisms includes over 120 
Clostridia strains and over 800 thermophilic organisms 
used for high temperature processes); 
unique access to large-scale fermentation at the Univer-
sity of Georgia; 
advanced separation process. 
In-house IP covers microbe and fermentation processes 
as well as solvent recovery, but some overlap exists with 
other fermentation technologies; 
their patented biobutanol: Butafuel™. 
GBL has wide ranging portfolio of proprietary technology 
relating to ABE fermentation using Clostridia organisms 
as biocatalysts. 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Goal: to produce 
a wide range of 
C4 chemicals 
and derivatives, 
including C4 bio-
fuels 
The technology 
and IP estate in-
cludes ligno-
cellulosic proc-
essing which al-
lows utilizing 
both C5 and C6 
sugars to extract 
much higher 
energy content 
than processing 
sugar and starch 
alone. 
The company has a biorefinery approach, but focuses on the production 
of only n-butanol (not isobutanol) on the basis of ABE fermentation; fol-
lows genetic manipulation of microbes to improve butanol yield;  
they optimize and “re-commercialize” the butanol fermentation; 
although cheaper feedstock decreases major costs, energy expenditure 
required for solvent recovery is a major challenge that has to be resolved; 
GBL aims to retrofit (grain) ethanol plants; considers also co-products 
(acetone and ethanol of ABE process); 
process (Figure) aiming for a two- to three-fold reduction in cost. 
To circumvent “butanol toxicity” claims to have developed “solvent toler-
ant” strains; 
has a microbial platform technology based on a unique and proprietary 
collection of heat resistant microorganisms (thermophiles) and thermo-
stable enzymes that operate at higher temperatures than other industrial 
microorganisms; 
metabolic engineering is used to generate a second generation of Indus-
trial thermophiles (Figure). 
GBL’s microbial platform technology provides flexibility across a “range of 
different feedstock” due to its options to use different microbial species and 
strains for specific feedstock; 
microbial strains and cocktails are tailored for wide variety of feedstock 
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Business model: 
License techno-
logy (focus on 
“upgrading” 
biobutanol 
plants); 
provide consul-
tancy,  contract 
services and 
contract re-
search; 
solution provider 
(integrated tech-
nology provision 
participation in 
production as-
sets); 
focus on China 
and India as key 
markets (US 
added recently) 
Services: 
High throughput 
screens for ther-
mophiles and 
thermostable en-
zymes; 
microbial expres-
sion systems in 
robust hosts; 
metabolic path-
way engineering 
to improve pro-
duct yield and 
other strain char-
acteristics; 
fermentation 
process develop-
ment to improve 
both yield and 
productivity. 
fermentation; yet process remains unproven at large scale. 
Using its library of thermophiles and thermostable enzymes GBL has isolated 
a cocktail of thermophilic microorganisms for the rapid enzymatic hydrolysis 
and release of fermentable sugars from biomass. The company planned to 
integrate this patented hydrolysis technology with a proprietary butanol 
fermentation process. 
Partners with EKB Technology (specialist in process technology) to develop 
the advanced fermentation process for butanol with improved yields. EKB 
aims to create new and highly configurable platform technologies that com-
bine advances in bioreactor technologies and previously separate down-
stream process technologies into a single step; 
also suited to chemical syntheses that utilize fermentation technologies and 
biocatalysts. 
Ultimate GBL process: continuous fermentation, advanced separation proc-
ess. 
Develops also advanced and renewable fermentation technologies for con-
version of biomass to higher value chemicals and biofuels; solving problems 
in both existing and emerging markets for fuel and bulk chemical manufac-
ture as well as environmental waste treatment. 
Equipped at GBL’s Milton Park headquarters with a 300 liter pilot plant and a 
140 liter pilot plant allowed producing small amounts for thermophile fermen-
tation testing and new patent developments, provides also confidence to 
GBL’s feedstock partners. 
The most significant emerging opportunities for GBL are in China. “China is a 
key market for Green Biologics.” The focus is introducing its improved tech-
nology to their plants to radically reduce the cost of local biobutanol produc-
tion. 
Green Biologics works directly with commercial butanol producers at scale 
(300 m3 to 400 m3 fermentation volume) by licensing its microbial technolo-
gy and process solutions; working with several butanol producers in China, 
due to the accessibility to existing plants and large market for butanol. 
It expects to reach commercial production there, with an estimated capacity 
of 30,000 tons/year; this serves simultaneously to rapidly demonstrate the 
GBL technology to potential clients around the world. 
it is also working with sugar and ethanol producers in India, due to accessibil-
ity there of cheaper feedstock, and converting sugar ethanol plants into bu-
tanol plants. 
Ties to China are broadly developed, from the Hong Kong investor 
Morningside to appointing Intelligent Sensor Systems (ISS) as its commercial 
representative in China to support GBL in exploiting the rapidly expanding 
commercial opportunities for its technology and services to Chinese bio-
chemical and biofuel producers and appointing Professor Zhihao Sun as a 
Scientific Advisor. 
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In 2008 GBL and the Energy Research Institute, Shandong Academy of 
Sciences and Green Biologics (SDERI) of Jinan, China. established a techni-
cal collaboration agreement on the production of biobutanol; involved transfer 
of GBL’s technology into a purpose built pilot facility at SDERI’s research 
center; serves GBL as a local commercial demonstrator and supporter of 
marketing of GBL technology to Chinese biobutanol producers; 
also in 2008 an agreement between GBL and Laxmi Organic Industries to 
develop and construct a commercial scale demonstrator for biobutanol in 
India; the demonstrator plant was expected to produce 1,000 tons of butanol 
a year starting in 2010, the biobutanol plant will run on molasses produced 
by the Indian sugarcane industry. 
The £3.5 million ($6.33 million) fund raising was intended to roll out GBL’s 
renewable chemicals technology. In 2005 GBL developed, for instance, a 
novel solvent system to remove chewing gum waste from pavements. 
The company estimated a total fuel butanol market size of £3 billion growing 
at 4% per year. 
Figure: GBL’s bioengineering approaches to biobutanol. 
 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; 
firm’s status: early 2010 and selected relevant additions till 2012. 
In the US one of GBL’s close competitors is Cobalt Biofuels (Table I.96) which ad-
dresses cost reduction through three processes or areas, respectively: 1) strain de-
velopment, 2) reaction management and 3) vapor compression distillation (VCD) as a 
separations technology that removes alcohol from the fermentation steep. Cobalt 
brought down the overall cost of production through a systemic approach involving the 
three key sub-processes or areas rather than focusing on just one or another sub-
process. In contrast to GBL, which already created revenues in 2008 by contract 
services and consulting, Cobalt Biofuels did not seem to generate revenues (that far). 
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Table I.96: Pursuing biobutanol as a biofuel and for C4 chemicals and derivatives by 
Cobalt Biofuels *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Remarks 
CEO, Other Executives, Foundation, 
Key Researchers; 
Technology Protection 
Cobalt Biofuels, 
Inc. 
Mountain View, 
(CA) 
(2006) 
 
Employees: 
2008: 25 
(Oct. 20, 2008) 
[Contag 2008b]; 
2010: 40 
[Stroud 2010]. 
 
Biobutanol 
Scale-Up Plan: 
35,000 gallons 
per year pilot in 
2009, 
2.5 mil. GPY pre-
commercial in 
2010 
25 mil. GPY plant 
in 2012 
 
2015: jumpstart 
revenue in the 
chemicals market 
[Contag 2008b]. 
Major Funding 
In 2011 raised a 
new $20 million 
Series D venture 
round 
$25M (10/2008) 
Series C, to 
Dr. Pamela Contag CTO and founder (President and CEO Cobalt 2005-
2008); serial entrepreneur, prior to founding Cobalt Biofuels, founded 
Xenogen Corp. in 1995 and served as President and concurrently as CEO of 
Xenogen Biosciences. Xenogen Corp. went public in 2004; sold it as it 
merged with CaliperLS in 2006. 
Pamela Contag is a representative of a “stage-oriented entrepreneur” 
founding and leading a new firm to a particular state of development and 
then handing over to professional management (ch. 2.1.2.6). 
With more than 25 years of microbiology research experience, Contag has 
widely published in the field of non-invasive molecular and cellular imaging. 
She received her PhD in Microbiology at the University of Minnesota Medical 
School in 1989; since December 2008 she has been a director of Delcath 
Systems. 
“I generally invent and develop technology and then take on investors who 
ultimately direct the company. I put all my energy into the demonstration of 
the technology and business model,” Pamela Contag said [Ainsworth 2008]. 
Hence, after having raised $25M she withdrew to CTO to hand over com-
mercialization to investors and a professional management. 
Dr. Rick Wilson CEO; over twenty years of global energy commercial and 
technology experience, recently including VP of British Petroleum’s Global 
Derivatives Chemicals business unit, background in process engineering and 
broad executive experience in the fuels and chemical industries; 
received an MBA from the University of Chicago Graduate School of Busi-
ness and a PhD in Chemical Engineering from Lehigh University, where he 
focused on energy efficiency. During his seventeen years at BP/Amoco, Dr. 
Wilson held a variety of technical, trading and executive positions and was 
also responsible for BP’s $3.5 billion petrochemical business, ultimately spun 
out as Ineos. 
Mark Dinello SVP Engineering; extensive experience in the chemicals and 
refining industry; during his 30-year career with BP/Amoco Dinello held a 
variety of senior positions in engineering, procurement, construction, and 
management, for chemical and refining operations worldwide. 
He earned a BS Degree in Chemical Engineering from the Pennsylvania 
State University and an MBA from The University of Chicago. Prior to joining 
Cobalt, Mark founded and served as President and Senior Consultant of Plan 
B Consulting Inc. 
At Cobalt, he will be responsible for capital projects, operations, engineering, 
and company health, safety and environmental policy and practice. 
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expand from lab 
scale production 
to pilot facility – 
capacity of 
35,000 gallons of 
fuel per year, 
2007: $12M 
Series B; 
2006: $1M 
Series A. 
Opened up its 
first pilot plant in 
2010 
[Fehrenbacher 
2010]. 
David Walther, PhD: Director Engineering; has over ten years of experience 
directing research teams focused on developing and implementing microsys-
tems in the areas of biosensing, power and energy; he was granted Excep-
tional PI status for several US Government, State of California and Industry 
Sponsored Research Grants. 
Hendrik Meerman, PhD: Director Bioprocessing; is an acknowledged expert 
in fermentation technology and bioprocess development, possessing a keen 
understanding of microbial physiology.  Prior to joining Cobalt, Dr. Meerman 
served for over ten years in process development at Genencor International, 
where he was responsible for developing and transferring several scalable 
processes that quickly moved product concepts from the bench to commer-
cial manufacture. 
Cobalt and, in particular Pamela Contag and her husband Christopher as in-
ventors, and their university and Xenogen, have proprietary technologies in 
microbial physiology, strain development and fermentation. 
It is interesting to note that Cobalt sought professional services to establish 
its communication and media strategy. 
Cobalt Biofuels asked Ecofusion, a strategic communications and media 
company, to build an identity, a story, and a public relations platform to 
spread the word about biobutanol and the range of solutions the company 
will develop in the future. After constructing and delivering a new biofuel 
brand and message systems Ecofusion implemented a third phase of the 
communications strategy; planning and managing a press and media rollout 
for major milestones in the company’s early development [Ecofusion] 
Technology, 
Goals, Strategy 
Business model: 
Very low cost 
producer/owner 
incl. low cost 
feedstock and 
process effi-
ciency; 
 
Be determined 
by a project-by-
project basis; 
 
Sell co-products 
into the chemical 
solvent market, 
then butanol (pri-
marily as a sub-
stitute for 
Cobalt follows the ABE-process to produce normal butanol (not isobutanol) 
with modified Clostridium microorganisms thus increasing the amount of 
butanol produced to decrease cost. 
Generally some other factors are also seen as important (Figure): mainly the 
consumption of energy and the consumption of water. 
To reduce energy the company has licensed a new technology, called vapor 
compression distillation (VCD), for separating the butanol and water; 
traditional butanol separation (distillation) accounts for 40-70% of total pro-
duction energy [Contag 2008b]. 
VCD removes alcohol from the fermentation steep using one-half the energy 
required for typical separation techniques [Fehrenbacher 2010]. 
To reduce water use, the company has turned to proprietary water purifica-
tion and recycling systems; the company has further increased butanol pro-
duction by engineering a bioreactor [Bullis 2008b]. 
Additionally, it is said [Lane 2010m] that residual “lignin is passed to the 
onsite boiler and generates sufficient power to serve the needs of the bio-
refinery, with significant excess power exported to the grid.” 
One of Cobalt Biofuels’ key advances is a technique for genetically engineer-
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gasoline); 
See to become a 
licensor; 
Assess how to 
grasp opportuni-
ties overseas. 
ing strains of Clostridium so that they produce a luminescent protein when-
ever they produce butanol; 
“When the Clostridium are happy and producing butanol, they’re also produc-
ing light,” Contag said. When they are paired with light detectors, the com-
pany can quickly sort through new strains of the bacteria, as well as tailor 
their environment, to increase production [Bullis 2008b]. 
Their patented reaction management technology – production monitoring 
technology – maintains their continuous fermentation process at peak pro-
duction rates and an optimal concentration of butanol in the steep, for ex-
tended periods of time. It is this bioreactor technology that forms the basis of 
the production process. 
Cobalt does not do genetic engineering but accelerates the evolution of the 
bugs to produce more product at higher concentrations by conditioning them 
to adapt; 
is focused on putting waste biomass to good use [NewNet] and can tailor its 
microbes for different regionally available feedstock, optimizing its process 
for deployment anywhere [Fehrenbacher 2010]. 
But it can also use more traditional feedstock including corn and sorghum; 
this means Cobalt can site their facilities in a wide range of geographies and 
use the feedstock available locally. 
The focus is on DOE-favored, low-cost feedstock with high hemicelluloses 
content, 
- Wood pulp, 
- Sugar beets and beet processing by-products, 
- Energy crops, forage or sweet sorghum [Contac 2008b], 
  in particular, forest waste 
  and mill residues. 
In 2010 Cobalt announced a breakthrough in producing biobutanol from 
beetle-killed lodgepole pine feedstock. 
They claimed to be able to scale-up to a commercial facility within the next 
two years, (first commercial sales of biobutanol in 2011) and “multiple facili-
ties” by 2014 [Fehrenbacher 2010]. 
Has a strategic partnership with EPC firm Fluor Corp., with a strategy of de-
signing low-cost plants [Lane 2010m]; 
engineering and construction giant Fluor Corporation should bring its techno-
logy to commercial scale. 
Fluor would provide engineering consulting, advise Cobalt on how to scale 
up, put together a design package for Cobalt’s future plant, and execute the 
construction part of the project [Stroud 2010]. 
Cobalt intends to position butanol as a high value chemical or fuel additive; 
the plan is to sell into the chemical solvent market at pre-commercial stage 
[Contag 2008b]; can offer also a small amount of acetone; 
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and as Cobalt scales up production, it plans to sell the butanol as a substitute 
for gasoline [Bullis 2008b]. 
The interrelation how Cobalt brought down the cost through three processes 
or areas, respectively, is illustrated in the Figure. 
Figure: Cobalt’s systemic approach to three key processes for biobutanol. 
 
Strain Development: developed proprietary, high-throughput processes for 
identifying and engineering the optimal microbial strains for converting a 
given plant material (a range of feedstocks). 
Reaction Management: the patented reaction management technology 
poises the continuous fermentation process at peak production rates for 
extended periods of time. This increases productivity and ensures optimum 
feedstock utilization (creating sensor production strains using biolumines-
cence; real-time monitoring allows avoiding poising of fermentation). 
Vapor Compression Distillation (VCD): patented fluid separations technology 
removes alcohol from the fermentation steep using approximately one-half 
the energy required compared to typical separation techniques; has the ad-
ditional advantage of drastically reducing water usage (recycling the VCD-
purified water back into the production process). 
Cobalt was looking early for opportunities overseas, though the company had 
not been ready to discuss them [Wang 2008]. 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; firm’s state: early 2010. 
By the end of 2011 Cobalt Technologies appointed as chairman and CEO Bob Mayer 
replacing Rick Wilson. Most recently Bob Mayer was CEO of Genencor [Admin 
2011b]. And currently there are additionally some new faces in Cobalt’s executive 
team. That means, after five years of existence Cobalt’s founder/leadership team has 
been almost completely changed. 
Over the 2011/2012 period a lot of demonstrations occurred by Cobalt regarding its 
various sub-processes. In 2012 Cobalt has successfully demonstrated one of its 
advanced biocatalysts in partnership with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL). It completed multiple fermentation campaigns in a 9,000 liter fermenter, ex-
ceeding the target yield and other performance metrics for a commercial scale facility. 
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The demonstration showed the biocatalyst’s ability to convert non-food based sub-
strates into renewable n-butanol and resulted in high sugar conversion and high yields 
of butanol. “Ultimately, we’re showing performance is achievable at commercial scale 
across our technology platform,” said Bob Mayer, CEO of Cobalt Technologies. 
The advanced (non-GMO) biocatalyst fermentation demonstration confirmed that the 
Cobalt process to produce renewable butanol could be 40-60 percent less expensive 
than production of petroleum-based butanol using the traditional oxo-alcohol process. 
While Cobalt’s technology is claimed to have the ability to perform on a continuous 
basis, this testing was conducted using batch processes to fully demonstrate the flexi-
bility of the technology to meet the needs of potential customers and partners. The 
butanol produced during this demonstration will be sent to several customers for pro-
duct certification (cf. this approach with that of Perkin, Table I.100; A.1.2). 
Concerning sub-processes on the road to commercialization, as reported on its Web 
site as news, in March 2012 Cobalt’s dilute acid hydrolysis pretreatment process 
(Figure I.171, Figure I.185), which extracts sugars from lignocellulosic biomass, was 
validated on woody biomass, bagasse and agricultural residues. 
Cobalt conducted the testing in the Andritz pulp and paper mill demonstration facility. 
Andritz is a supplier of technologies, equipment and plants for the pulp and paper 
industry. The test runs processed up to 20 bone-dry tons of biomass per day. This 
milestone also marked the first phase of Cobalt’s partnership with specialty chemical 
company Rhodia in Brazil to develop bio n-butanol refineries throughout Latin America 
utilizing bagasse as a feedstock. 
Cobalt and Rhodia intend in the medium term the construction of multiple biorefineries 
co-located with sugar mills, firstly in Brazil to demonstrate Cobalt’s technology on local 
and competitive feedstock. Subsequently, the proven technology shall be extended to 
other Latin American countries. 
Furthermore, the US Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) 
awarded a manufacturing contract to global specialty chemical firm and catalyst sup-
plier Albemarle Corp. (in February 2012) to complete its first biojet fuel production run 
based on biobased n-butanol provided by Cobalt Technologies. For this production 
run, Albemarle will utilize NAWCWD alcohol-to-jet (ATJ) fuel technology to convert 
Cobalt’s biobased n-butanol into biojet fuel at its Baton Rouge, La. processing facility. 
The resulting jet fuel should be tested by the NAWCWD as a continuing process for 
military certification through the Department of Defense. According to Cobalt this 
underpins two main objectives set out by the firm. “First, it basically helps us scale up 
and derisk the catalyst.” “The second thing this relationship really does for us is that it 
allows us an avenue and platform to actually generate quantities of fuel required for 
certification, both military and commercial.” 
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And there was another important aspect of the collaboration with Albemarle that ex-
tends beyond exclusively jet fuel production; it provides exploiting other chemical 
derivatives of n-butanol. NAWCWD’s ATJ technology is capable of converting n-
butanol into other high-value platform chemicals like 1-butene. For example, the proc-
ess allows Cobalt to produce butadiene using the 1-butene pathway from n-butanol as 
the starting point. Butadiene is a valuable industrial chemical used typically for the 
production of synthetic rubber (A.1.1.6; Box I.26). With regard to 1-butene, Cobalt 
addresses directly what Gevo (Table I.99) is doing on the basis of bio-isobutanol. 
Cobalt Technologies as well as Gevo reveal a shift of biobutanol producers putting the 
emphasis on a biorefinery aspect with the main stream of revenues being generated 
by biobased chemicals (cf. A.1.1.6): 
Biofuels (butanol) + chemical co-products (butanol compounds) → 
Chemical products (butanol derivatives + chemical intermediates for platform 
chemicals, plastics, and rubber) + biofuel (butanol for blending or butanol as a 
replacement for petro-gasoline) 
The challenge and constraint for entering the biofuels race is delivering technology, 
which enables cost-efficient production. Cost efficiency means biofuel that can com-
pete with oil at around $80/barrel. 
Many industry participants appear to be focused on large volume production facilities 
(“owner/producer model”) that are highly dependent on significant quantities of bio-
mass feedstock gathered (and transported costly) from long distances. People have to 
be broad-minded about what is out and what is in (technology intelligence!). Structur-
ing technical hurdles according to the biofuels value system (Figure I.171) simultane-
ous provides startup opportunities in terms of solving associated problems. 
The very fundamental problem is growing enough green plant material or harvesting 
or having enough cellulosic residuals or usable waste. The first hurdle for everyone in 
the game may be characterized by the questions: how are we going to grow and/or 
collect, transport, store, and pretreat, if applicable, the biomass for processing; which 
kind of biomass; is it wet or dry? 
Furthermore, an inherent issue of processing biomass is consistency. The fluctuation 
in feed material composition and quality that ensures success in the real world is usu-
ally far from laboratory-controlled conditions. Processes that work well in the lab often 
run into problems when scaled up to commercial size. For instance, Iogen (Table I.83) 
found that enzymes that effectively convert pure wheat straw to sugars fail when faced 
with 1,000-pound bales laced with dirt, soil, dead mice, and stones [Carey 2009]. 
In general, it has often turned out that when a cheaper biomass substrate is used for a 
bioengineering process, additional microbial inhibitors are generated during the pre-
treatment process. Raw material for second-generation bioalcohols and biogasoline 
are listed in Table I.97. 
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Table I.97: Selected raw material for biofuels 
 Agricultural residues: like corn stover or cobs or cornstalks (stalks that remain after the 
corn has been harvested), straw (from cereals), bagasse (the fibrous residue remain-
ing after sugarcane or sorghum stalks are crushed to extract their juice); 
 Municipal waste: paper trash and pulp, other municipal garbage, municipal solid waste 
(MSW); 
 Residues from forestry, wood processing or “recycled” wood (for instance, from 
houses), construction and demolition wood waste, timber harvesting residues, wood 
chips (for instance, KL Energy Corp. using Ponderosa pines), sawdust, Cobalt 
Technologies also tried beetle-killed lodgepole pine feedstock); 
 Highly productive (“energy-rich”) existing or cultivated grasses and trees: switchgrass, 
eucalyptus and hybrid poplar; 
 Carbon-based waste, like old tires. 
 
This raw material for second-generation bioalcohols and biogasoline is associated 
with a number of issues concerning the most efficient raw material or by-products ge-
nerated by a particular process. For instance, for its two-step thermochemical process 
the NTBF Range Fuels (Table I.99) reported that “over 10,000 hours of testing has 
been completed on over 30 different non-food feedstocks with varying moisture con-
tents and sizes, including wood waste, olive pits, and more.” 107 
Sugars found in wood in the form of lignocelluloses are not naturally well digested by 
microorganisms which convert biomass into usable raw materials. First these complex 
sugars have to be released and broken down into digestible units. This process often 
gives rise to harmful by-products, including furans, which can have a strong inhibiting 
effect on the fermentation process. 
However, reminding ourselves of the heavy localization of corn ethanol plants in the 
US “Corn Belt” and the role of lobbyists from the related states in pushing special 
focus on corn ethanol in legislation, it may be that the technology development for 
second-generation bioalcohols and biogasoline will exhibit considerable “path depend-
ency” in terms of corn alcohol versus lignocellulosic alcohol or raw materials’ availabil-
ity for input rather than performance (and perhaps even price). 
And thinking of bioengineering methods there are still some doubts: “It is not yet clear 
whether a fully synthetic genome will ever be deployed in a live production environ-
ment. A fully synthetic microorganism may not have the robustness which is needed 
for large-scale industrial bioprocesses.” [Sheridan 2009] 
Tackling the issue of procurement of biomass for processing and production (input for 
conversion) is approached by startups and NTBFs in various fashions depending on 
whether the emphasis is on biofuels for transportation or biorefinery: When we are 
talking about full-scale production and biofuels we speak of thousands of tons of 
biomass per day, per biorefinery. On the other hand there would be a sub-1,000 ton 
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per day input for biobased chemicals or the smaller scales for fine chemicals or nutra-
ceuticals. 
There are a number of factors which may drive input selection. Criteria may refer to 
 Offering destination: where to sell the products, and probably co-products, 
most profitable (product localization. market localization; California represents 
ca. 20 percent of the US ethanol consumption) 
 Input localization: where input is plentiful and cheap and in sufficient proximity 
to the production plant(s) to minimize transportation and storage cost, ad-
dressed for Brazil by BP/Verenium JV Vercipia (Table I.83, Table I.84), 
Cobalt/Rhodia (Table I.96), and Amyris (Table I.99) 
 Input-output efficiency: localization selection for the production plant, which 
means focusing on biomass input where it is cheap and where there is a huge 
existing market for the biofuel, such as ethanol in Brazil, many autos in 
California; FFVs in Brazil. 
 Legislation localization: China, for GBL E85 of biobutanol (Table I.95), 
biomethanol for BioMCN (Table I.87). 
Issues of localization of input have been tackled by the German Bioliq approach 
(Figure I.173). In this sense, for instance, Range Fuels’ model (Table I.99) required to 
“bring systems to sources where biomass is most plentiful, instead of having to 
transport biomass to a central processing site. This reduces transportation costs and 
related transportation fuel consumption.” 107 
Coskata’s model (Table I.99) based on sugarcane bagasse biomass was explicit in 
this regard. “To generate 100 million gallons in this model, Coskata will need 1 million 
tons, or 900,000 tons of biomass. That will require 15,000 hectares, or 37,000 acres. 
That’s 51 square miles, or the area within 4 miles of a 100 million gallon refinery. A 
mighty plantation, but not long hauling distances.” [Lane 2009o]. 
Venture Capital for Biofuels 
Rather than looking at corporate venturing and/or aliiances with large firms the alter-
native option for entrepreneurship in biofuels in the US was venture capital firms 
which played a very aggressive role for CleanTech and especially biofuels (VC- based 
startups). Fundamental assumptions and rationales of VCs in that area are: 
There were lots of efforts underway in the race to find a better biofuel, and 
that it is possible that one particular technology will take a dominating position 
(“dominant design”). Hence, put money into a host of promising new technolo-
gies (startups) and push them out into the market. Vinod Khosla (Khosla 
Ventures), more than anyone, was investing in many different efforts, on the 
idea that one of them will pan out, and he said. “If you back a lot of horses, it’s 
more likely you’re going to win.” [Marshall 2006] 
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Getting involved in some project and provide some project equity actually means to 
really prove the technology at the commercial scale. 
However, in CleanTech and especially biofuels venture capital had filled also roles 
that were previously occupied by project finance (venture) capital. In biofuels, venture 
capitalists were foregoing their customary role as just technology investors. They con-
tributed to the cost of demonstration plants and were putting their money into infra-
structure as well. This emphasis might stem from the perceived big biofuel op-
portunities that let venture capitalists fund biofuel infrastructure to push themselves 
toward a potentially bigger payoff [Barron 2007]. 
But there was another change of approach of VC-backing of biofuel startups, essen-
tially driven by billionaire Vinod Khosla who founded Khosla Ventures in 2004. Khosla, 
an electrical/biomedical engineer and MBA by education, himself operated as a very 
successful entrepreneur and was founding Chief Executive Officer of Sun Microsys-
tems before he turned in 1986 to the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & 
Byers (KPCB) as an Experienced Team Member focusing rather early on biofuels 
[Khosla 2006]. By 2009/2010, funding CleanTech startups was about two thirds of 
Khosla’s existing portfolio [Schonfeld 2009b, Khosla 2009]. 
Khosla’s approach of a “science project to a company” in biofuels was driven by his 
“own passion – green investing” and the related opportunities he envisioned for him-
self. His answer to the challenges was an unprecedented coordination of capital, in-
tellect, and pragmatism associated with the confidence to succeed. And he referred to 
an innovation architecture which he calls an “innovation ecosystem at work,” solving 
large problems by harnessing the power of ideas fueled by entrepreneurial energy of 
scientists, technologists, and entrepreneurs – very bright people working on solving a 
problem. 
This is actually a “VC-based and managed” multiple-stage entrepreneurial process 
being close to an innovation or new business development process of corporate entre-
preneurship (intrapreneurship). The innovation project related approach relies on 
three “legs” [Khosla 2008b]: 
 Bright academics from various scientific/engineering disciplines whose com-
petencies complement each others (founders and advisory board members); 
 Talented entrepreneurship-minded people who want to make money – and 
make a difference – based on profound professional management experience 
(15-35 years) in related industries (oil industry or biotechnology or bioengi-
neering area) – essentially industry veterans with track records (“entrepre-
neurs and executives”); 
 Intelligent capital and financial resources through committed people stepping 
up to the challenge and experience towards building businesses for the long 
run. 
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Khosla Ventures did seed, A and B and C investments and “don’t mind larger tech-
nology risks especially in the smaller seed fund” [Schonfeld 2009a]. However, 
Khosla’s basic attitude underlying his approach is not different from that of other ven-
ture capitalists: “If we did not have corn ethanol priming the pump, it would be too 
risky for me to invest in cellulosic ethanol,” he said [Anonymus 2006a]. 
Khosla’s focus on people with significant experience in the related or closely related 
field is in line with the above described innovation/entrepreneurship architectures for 
NTBFs with “subject veteran” founders, such as Bodo Wolf of German CHOREN 
Industries, David Ramey of ButylFuel, Arnold R. Klann of BlueFire Ethanol, Charles 
Wyman and Lee Lynd of Mascoma Corp. or Paul Woods of Algenol Biofuels. 
Khosla’s innovation architecture is often characterized as a VC-backed spin-out 
(RBSUs) with professional and experienced managers from almost the point of firm 
foundation. Khosla himself was also often heavily involved in firm foundation. For in-
stance, one company was originally formed casually in response to a bet. 
In a conversation with Professor Frances Arnold of the California Institute of Techno-
logy, Khosla suggested that “You can’t do that with synthetic biology economically 
yet.” She disagreed, and argued that a couple of graduate students working in the 
area could design bugs to make fuel – economically. Along with Matthew Peters and 
Peter Meinhold, also of Caltech, Gevo (Table I.99) was formed [Khosla 2008b]. 
Another example was the transformation of Kergy, Inc., a Silicon Valley engineering-
type startup in alternative energy. It is a Menlo Park startup, which raised $3.3 million 
in a first round of funding from Khosla Ventures to become later Range Fuels and 
Khosla appeared as one of the founders (cf. also KiOR; all in Table I.99). 
Khosla’s process is structurally related to particular innovation approaches in large 
and giant firms: 
 The leadership sponsor process of innovation (Table I.98) as described by 
Runge [2006:748,749] and 
 Utilizing features of a standard “Stage-Gate“ innovation or New Product De-
velopment (NPD) processes of large firms [Runge 2006: 653-654]. 
Khosla was investing heavily in biofuels as he could see a financially viable path to the 
future. “The risk profile has to work for investors,” Khosla said: “They see that this 
works in the marketplace over two years, not 20, and then they take the next step. It’s 
stair-step, incremental investment.” [Oneal 2006]. 
As in staged innovation processes (Stage-Gate, PhaseGate) Khosla also applies the 
“failing fast” principle [Runge 2006:787] as he said: “The ones we have cut off, we cut 
off relatively early.” [Rapier 2009a] But additionally, one key risk, Khosla said, is the 
power of the oil lobby [Oneal 2006], which in the US already played a “negative role” 
in the 1920s when there was a strong movement towards a “biobased chemistry” 
[Runge 2006:565-566]. 
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Table I.98: Comparing leadership activities of the innovation sponsor process and 
Khosla’s innovation “ecosystem process. 
Sponsor Process (Sponsor’s Job) Khosla’s “Innovation Ecosystem” 
Set the context – communicate a clear 
vision 
Have a clearly communicated vision and 
mission (defining a related portfolio): “My 
mission now is to put the fossil in fossil 
fuels.” 
Choose projects to sponsor Initiate a startup or find portfolio-driven 
startups/NTBFs to be invested in 
Find and select innovators – bet on people, 
not just plans 
Focus on bright scientific/technical and 
managerial innovators (“top-down team 
building”) 
Form cross-functional project teams – 
strive for functionally complete teams 
Build multidisciplinary teams with comple-
mentary competencies 
Support the team – provide resources and 
a “one stop shop” for decisions that will 
stick 
Organize and lead equity financing for the 
“startup-project” 
Guide the team – set milestones, ask the 
right questions, know when to redirect the 
team’s efforts 
Organize (and lead) staged financing re-
ferring to milestones (“gates”; series A, 
series B,…) and influence decision-making 
Reward the team – keep them on track dto. 
In Figure I.182 Khosla’s CleanTech Portfolio [Khosla 2009a] is presented. Related 
biofuels startups or NTBFs are further described and characterized in Table I.99. This 
set shall simultaneously be used to discuss entrepreneurship options in biofuels, re-
lated technologies and their hurdles, and selected business models of the new 
founded firms referring to the value system in Figure I.171. 
As is found often in previously discussed cases the majority of NTBF leaders 
of the set of companies Khosla has invested in have a very strong technical 
background and management experience by doing and executive manage-
ment training doing a job rather than by higher education. 
Concerning the appropriateness of his portfolio “Khosla says his previous 
investments in CleanTech companies have generated nearly $1 billion in 
profits.” [Reisch 2011b] 
Notably, Khosla Ventures has not invested in algae firms so far. Generally, he has five 
criteria for investing in cutting edge energy technologies. Algae meet four of those 
criteria but fail on the last: He seems to believe that the engineering problems of grow-
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ing and harvesting algae are manageable. And he obviously believes algae will have 
manageable startup costs and a quick innovation cycle. 
But, Khosla does not believe algae (exploiting algae biomass, not necessarily ethanol 
from algae) will be able to compete unsubsidized with petroleum and other alterna-
tives unsubsidized in the next five to seven years – after looking at “maybe two 
dozen.” “The economics of algae don’t seem to work,” he said [Kho 2009] 
And skepticism has not only increased with the VC community. The sentiment is: “We 
just don’t believe in the economic” and one is not sure that “algae is going to come 
down the cost curve.” This view is also shared by BP. BP, which has invested in algae 
startups Martek Biosciences (Table I.83), questioned the viability of different types of 
algae technology, and more specifically the kind that ExxonMobil recently invested 
$600 million in Synthetic Genomics [Phuong Le 2008; Oilgae Blog 2008; Kho 2009]. 
 
Figure I.182: Khosla Ventures Green Portfolio by industry, industry segments and 
applications/materials as well as technologies and equity-backed biofuels startups 
[Khosla 2009b]. 
When in 2008 the UK’s Carbon Trust Investments, which invested in biobutanol firm 
GBL (Table I.95), set out to fund algal biofuels research, it was confronted with a 
mélange of overzealous claims coming from the industry. Companies were projecting 
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biofuel yields ten times what is theoretically possible and proposing techniques that 
are not now and may never be economical. 
A year later, after wading through the claims and gathering opinions from a network of 
more than 300 experts, the agency announced the creation of the Algae Biofuel 
Challenge, a £16 (ca. $24) million fund that would support the development and large-
scale production of algal oil. The Carbon Trust’s experience navigating algae excite-
ment is one that generally funding groups and investors in the biofuels industry in-
creasingly face [Waltz 2009b]. 
The firms in Table I.99 provide developments of startups/NTBFs,  usually until the end 
of 2009, focusing on various types of biofuels backed by Khosla. 
Table I.99: Selected startups backed by Khosla Ventures reflecting a venture capital-
ists’ portfolio approach to CleanTech and specifically biofuels. *) 
Company 
(Foundation) 
Additions and 
Remarks 
Funding: 
Khosla 
Ventures 
and Several 
Other VC 
Firms 
Technology CEO, Other 
Executives and Key 
People 
Altra Biofuels, Inc. 
Los Angeles, Calif. 
(2004) 
Over $415M;  
in 2006 the 
company 
secured 
$63.5M 
Leverages various kinds of biofuel 
manufacturing processes. 
2009: A half-built $220M, 110M-
gallon (416M-liter) per year corn 
ethanol plant developed by Khosla-
backed Altra in Nebraska has been 
sold piece-by-piece. 
Altra began building the dry mill 
ethanol facility in Carleton in late 
2006 but halted development in 
November 2007 after completing 
approximately 50% of the project 
because the company was unable to 
secure additional financing 
CEO Larry Gross 
Cilion 
Goshen, CA 
(2006) 
As California repre-
sents 20% of the 
US ethanol con-
sumption, Cilion has 
distinguished itself 
by its destination-
based business 
model and energy 
efficient ethanol 
$200M, 
Cilion raised 
$105M in debt 
financing 
(2007), for the 
construction of 
two ethanol 
plants in 
California; 
$170M 
(09/2005) 
Converts corn into ethanol to power 
cars and trucks; 
rather than building a central plant to 
supply the whole country, Cilion was 
putting up multiple plants near popu-
lation centers and livestock markets, 
including three plants in California 
and two in New York. 
Apr. 2009: A leak in the tank at the 
Cilion Ethanol plant in Stanislaus 
County caused it to collapse into 
itself last month. The facility re-
Mark L. Noetzel, 
President and CEO, 
entered 2007 from BP; 
previously Group Vice 
President of BP PLC 
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facilities. 
The destination mo-
del creates added 
value by distillers 
grain which is a co-
product of ethanol 
production. 
Distillers grain is an 
economic, high pro-
tein dairy and cattle 
feed – localization in 
producer area or 
country, not near 
(steel) industry 
Series B mained closed, ceased operations in 
March. 
Other factors behind the demise of 
the facilities, industry experts say, 
include too-rapid growth. 
Originally, said Harrigfeld, “they were 
to be down three to four weeks. Now, 
because of the market, they are not 
sure when, or if, they are going to 
reopen. 
(Sonya Harrigfeld, director of the 
Stanislaus Department of 
Environmental Resources) 
[Anderson and Moran 2009]. 
“When Cilion was formed in 2006, 
they announced they would have 8 
plants in operation by 2008 and 
achieve an energy return of better 
than twice that of gasoline. Here in 
2009 they have zero plants in opera-
tion.” [Rapier 2009] 
Hawai’i BioEnergy 
Honolulu 
(2006) 
Partnering also with 
Hawaiian Electric 
Co. on testing and 
implementing such 
clean technologies 
as solar power; 
Hawaiian Electric is 
partnering in an 
algae production 
project with Maui 
landowner 
Alexander & 
Baldwin Inc. and 
startup HR 
BioPetroleum Inc. 
(Table I.89). 
The plan was to 
create a commer-
cial-scale algae 
facility adjacent to 
the Ma’alaea Power 
Plant 
[Moresco 2008] 
Hawaii 
BioEnergy 
<$1M 
[Rapier 2009] 
Researching the development of 
ethanol plants on Hawaiian islands; 
Hawai’i BioEnergy (HBE) is a corpo-
ration established by three of 
Hawai’i’s largest landowners. 
Mission is to reduce Hawai’i’s energy 
costs, green house gas emissions, 
and dependence on imported fossil 
fuels through the research and de-
velopment of local renewable bio-
energy projects; 
a variety of energy crops, including 
but not limited to sugarcane, woody 
biomass, and algae. 
Hawaiian Electric is also a partner in 
the proposed BlueEarth Biofuels LLC 
40 MMGYbiodiesel processing plant 
on Maui, which was expected to be 
operational in early 2010. The goal 
was to use locally grown oil feed-
stocks such as algae, jatropha or 
palm. 
Paul S. Zorner President 
and CEO; joined Hawai’i 
BioEnergy in 2008; 
was the CSO and 
Executive Director of 
Principle Energy Limited, 
a venture oriented to 
establish sugarcane 
conversion to ethanol 
and power in 
Mozambique; 
also served as the 
Chairman of the Board 
of Directors for Kuehnle 
AgroSystems, a 
Hawaiian company 
specializing in the re-
search and development 
of algae as a source of 
renewable fuels 
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Mascoma 
Corporation 
Cambridge, Mass. 
(2006) 
Founders of 
Mascoma Corp.: 
Charles Wyman and 
Lee Lynd; 
Charles Wyman’s 
interest in alterna-
tive fuels propelled 
his career during 
the late ‘70s and 
early ‘80s when he 
served as the Direc-
tor of the Biotech-
nology Center for 
Fuels and Chemi-
cals at the National 
Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL). 
Wyman (doctoral 
degree in Chemical 
Engineering from 
Princeton University 
in 1971) became an 
authority in the field 
of cellulosic ethanol 
in 1996 when he 
published the 
“Handbook on 
Bioethanol.” 
Alliance partner of 
General Motors 
(GM), Chevron, 
Marathon Oil 
$61M (5/2008), 
Series C, 
{$30M 
(11/2006), 
Unattributed} 
Raised about 
$100M in eq-
uity invest-
ments and ca. 
$100M in state 
and federal 
grants by 2009. 
That included 
the $61M in a 
third round of 
funding, with 
GM and 
Marathon Oil. 
Secured $26M 
from the De-
partment of 
Energy and 
$23.5M from 
the State of 
Michigan to 
build commer-
cial plant in 
Michigan 
[St. John 2009] 
Producer of biofuels from lignocellu-
losic biomass using microorganisms 
and enzymes; 
unique technology developed by 
Mascoma uses yeast and bacteria 
that are engineered to produce large 
quantities of the enzymes necessary 
to break down the cellulose and fer-
ment the resulting sugars into etha-
nol. 
Claim: combining the two steps 
(enzymatic digestion and fermenta-
tion) significantly reduces costs by 
eliminating the need for enzyme pro-
duced in a separate refinery; 
process, called Consolidated Bio-
processing or “CBP”; 
started producing cellulosic ethanol 
from wood chips at a demonstration-
scale plant (1,000-5,000  gallons 
scale) in Rome, NY. 
Said its microbes can convert plant 
material like wood chips, tall grasses, 
corn stalks and sugar cane bagasse 
into sugar; 
still feedstock testing: coop with 
Chevron and GM; 
Stepped down CEO Jamerson would 
become chairman of Mascoma and 
CEO of the company’s Frontier 
Renewable Resources subsidiary in 
partnership with timber and mining 
company JM Longyear, 
that meant developing a 20-40 MGY 
cellulosic ethanol plant in Kinross, 
Michigan for 2012 (sought funding for 
$250 million to $300 million). 
Jim Flatt, PhD, Acting 
President - Executive 
Vice President, 
Research & 
Development / 
Operations; 
served as Sr. VP of 
Research for Martek 
Biosciences Corporation 
(Columbia, MD), while 
the company searched 
for a new CEO; 
 
in 2009 CEO Bruce 
Jamerson stepped 
down. 
Co-founder Lee Lynd, 
was working on a farm 
where he noticed heat 
energy emanating from 
a compost pile. The ob-
servation of microbes 
producing energy from 
biomass sparked Lynd 
to speculate on the pos-
sibility of using biomass 
as a fuel source. 
He followed this idea 
with tremendous passion 
for decades; 
Masters and PhD de-
grees in engineering 
from Dartmouth College 
where in 1987 he joined 
the Dartmouth faculty. 
Range Fuels 
Broomfield, CO 
(2006) 
Started as Kergy, 
Inc. and Bioconver-
sion Technology 
(BCT), LLC, 
founded in 2003 in 
Colorado 
Replacement of 
Range Fuels 
founder and CEO 
Undisclosed 
round from 
Khosla, 
plus a $75M 
grant from 
DOE; 
dreamt of IPO 
already for 
2008; 
$100M Series 
B, 
$28.2M Series 
C (4/2008) 
Using modular facilities to bring the 
conversion process to the biomass 
source, thereby reducing the energy 
expended with supplying the facility 
with feedstock; will grow as more 
biomass becomes available; 
Claims it can account for fluctuations 
in feed material in terms of type, con-
sistency, moisture content, quality; 
Over 10,000 hours of testing has 
been completed on over 30 different 
David Aldous CEO and 
Director; experience in 
the energy, oil and 
petrochemical industries, 
was Executive VP 
Strategy and Portfolio for 
Royal Dutch Shell; 
Replaced former CEO 
Mitch Mandich  
Key persons from Kergy, 
Inc. connected to Range 
Fuels: 
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Mitch Mandich, who 
led the company 
through a $100M 
capital raise and 
secured $80 million 
funding for cellulosic 
ethanol demonstra-
tion from the DOE 
[Lane 2009e]; 
Business Model: 
Designing, building, 
and operating its 
plants; 
Be first to market 
with commercially 
produced cellulosic 
biofuels; 
Thermochemical 
syngas approach 
allows production of 
various biofuels 
(e.g. bioethanol, 
biomethanol) and 
chemicals); 
 
Rapidly gain market 
share by capturing 
the best plant loca-
tions (is independ-
ent from type of bio-
mass). 
Will need to capture 
a healthy percent-
age of the fuel etha-
nol market and be 
cost competitive to 
earn a reasonable 
return on the 
already substantial 
investment. 
Range Fuels’ 
Soperton Plant 
was supported 
by over $250M 
in support from 
public and pri-
vate sources; 
huge loan 
guarantees. 
Its first com-
mercial cellulo-
sic biofuels 
plant under 
construction 
and was 
scheduled to 
begin produc-
tion in the sec-
ond quarter of 
2010. 
Pilot plant (25 
tons per day 
scale) was at 
its Develop-
ment Center in 
Denver, CO 
(here 25 em-
ployees) 
[Schuetzle et 
al. 2007] 
Has raised the 
necessary ca-
pital to begin 
construction of 
a commercial-
scale cellulosic 
biofuels plant. 
non-food feedstocks. 
Originated with Bioconversion 
Technology’s process of Bud Klepper 
(as described in the text). 
Two-step thermochemical process; 
converted into syngas, cleaned syn-
gas is passed over a proprietary ca-
talyst and transformed into cellulosic 
biofuels; to low carbon biofuels, such 
as cellulosic ethanol and methanol 
etc. (Figure I.174); 
 
Working on a 100 million-gallon-per-
year facility by 2011 [Fehrenbacher 
2008]. 
Had some delays; said it had raised 
$100 million to build a commercial 
scale plant in Soperton, GA to make 
ethanol from wood waste, and said 
the plant’s first phase of 20 million 
gallons per year would be complete 
in 2009 [St. John 2009]; 
Despite some delays, it said it is 
about half done with construction of 
the full-scale plant in Soperton, GA 
[Wald 2009b]; 
the plant shall produce about 40 
million gallons of ethanol per year 
and 9 million gallons per year of 
methanol; 
about 1,200 tons per day of wood 
chips and forest waste feedstock are 
expected to be processed at full 
operating capacity [Schuetzle et al. 
2007]. 
(Cf. text in A.1.1.3 on “Range Fuels: 
Years of Broken Promises.”) 
In December 2011 Range Fuels, one 
of the first companies in a wave of 
startups that promised cheap bio-
fuels made from sources such as 
wood chips rather than corn, shut its 
doors for good and was forced to 
auction off its assets! 
Arie Geertsema (here 
Senior VP), 
Mitch Mandich CEO, 
Robert (“Bud”) Klepper 
(inventor of the Range 
Fuels technology). 
Robert “Bud” Klepper 
acted as advisor and 
Chief Technical Special-
ist and Inventor; brought 
many years of process 
equipment design and 
fabrication experience to 
the team. 
Arie Geertsema on the 
Scientific Advisory 
Board; was Managing 
Director of Corporate 
Research and Develop-
ment and managed a 
team of over 400 R&D 
staff at Sasol, the largest 
and most successful 
gasification company 
specializing in coal gasi-
fication and gas-to-
liquids production; 
was also a Director of 
the University of 
Kentucky’s Center for 
Applied Energy 
Research and a tenured 
associate professor in 
chemical engineering 
(with doctorate in chemi-
cal engineering and an 
MBA). 
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Coskata 
Warrenville, IL 
(2006) 
Incorporated by 
GreatPoint 
Ventures; 
was the culmination 
of research of Aaron 
Mandell and 
Andrew Perlman, 
two GreatPoint 
Ventures partners, 
had been doing 
since 2001 into 
alternative concepts 
for low cost cellu-
losic ethanol pro-
duction. 
 
Mandell began fol-
lowing ethanol re-
search taking place 
at Oklahoma State 
University and the 
University of Okla-
homa with the help 
of founding scientist 
Rathin Datta. 
When the Univer-
sity’s scientific 
teams identified a 
potent set of an-
aerobic microorga-
nisms for the con-
version of synthesis 
gas to ethanol, 
Mandell secured 
rights to license the 
technology and be-
gan to formulate the 
development strate-
gy. 
The team initiated 
experimental work 
at Argonne National 
Laboratories, and 
started to advance 
the organism and 
build a top-tier bio-
fermentation tech-
nology team. 
$40M 
(11/2008), 
Series D; 
Raised $19.5M 
in a second 
round of fund-
ing that should 
be used to-
wards con-
struction costs 
of its first 100 
MGY cellulosic 
ethanol plant 
$10M 
(06/2006), 
Series A 
Vision: be the global leader in the 
syngas to biofuels platform, begin-
ning with ethanol. 
Hybrid technology: 
Gasification of raw material is re-
leased into a bioreactor where mi-
crobes convert the gas into ethanol. 
The integrated biorefinery – utilizes 
Westinghouse Plasma Gasification 
on the front end and Coskata’s 
syngas-to-biofuels conversion pro-
cess on the back end – delivered to 
General Motors for early testing of 
bioethanol. 
The company can co-locate with 
steel mills to convert CO into gaso-
line. 
Ethanol commercial-scale plant 
should produce from either biomass 
(like wood biomass, agricultural 
waste, energy crops, switch grass) or 
municipal solid waste or other re-
cycled materials (like old tires – one 
reason GM is interested); the empha-
sis was on sugarcane bagasse. 
Claims a yield of 100 gallons per ton 
of feedstock at a cost of less than $1 
per gallon. 
Differentiator: secret sauce of micro-
organisms + microreactor for syngas 
conversion in a “hybrid” process 
[Fehrenbacher 2008] 
Pilot-scale facility opened in 
Warrenville, IL. 
first for hybrid process; about to build 
a 40,000 gallon demonstration plant 
for cellulosic ethanol in Madison, 
PA., 
Uses filter – membrane for separa-
tions. 
Business model: 
Biorefinery orientation (bioethanol, 
co-products); 
Technology licensor 
(to feedstock suppliers, chemical 
manufacturers, petroleum compa-
nies, ethanol distributors/blenders, 
William Roe President 
and CEO; 
prior to Coskata, a 29 
year career with Nalco, 
the world’s largest pro-
vider of industrial water-
treatment chemicals and 
process additives, 
served as COO; 
Dr. Rathin Datta CSO; 
more than 32 years ex-
perience in developing 
and commercializing 
process and product 
technologies for both 
established and emerg-
ing companies. 
Rathin founded Vertec 
Biosolvents, a technolo-
gy, manufacturing and 
marketing company 
dedicated to providing 
biologically-derived re-
newable resource alter-
natives to petroleum-
based solvents (ch. 
A.1.1.6). 
Prior to Vertec 
Biosolvents, Rathin was 
the VP of Research for 
the Michigan Biotechno-
logy Institute, where he 
led the commercial de-
velopment of lactic 
acid/polymer technology 
and the commercial de-
velopment and success-
ful implementation of a 
fluidized bed reactor for 
specific waste treatment 
technology; 
Richard E. Tobey VP 
R&D, spent 28 years 
developing and com-
mercializing new pro-
ducts and processes for 
The Dow Chemical 
Company within their Ion 
Exchange, Anti-
Microbial, 
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In the spring of 
2007, Coskata 
moved out of 
Argonne. 
(Cf. text in A.1.1.3 
“The Risks, 
Translated from 
SEC-speak.”) 
project developers); 
hopes that licensees enable rapid 
scale-up; 
 
owner and operator (of currently) a 
demonstration-scale facility; 
orientation: flex ethanol 
[Roe 2009] 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural business 
units. 
Gevo, Inc. 
Pasadena, CA 
(2005) 
Gevo Development, 
LLC is the develop-
ment arm; seeking 
opportunities to ac-
cess ethanol pro-
duction assets to 
make biobutanol by 
retrofitting ethanol 
plants at a low capi-
tal cost. 
Spin-out: 
three co-founders, 
renowned research-
ers Frances Arnold 
(Prof.), Matthew 
Peters and Peter 
Meinhold of the 
California Institute 
of Technology, 
plus co-founders 
James C. Liao 
(Prof.) and 
Christopher Ryan. 
In 2007 acquired an 
exclusive license to 
use UCLA’s method 
for modifying E.coli 
bacteria for use in 
biofuel develop-
ment; 
has exclusive rights 
to integrate Cargill’s 
world class microor-
ganisms (yeast 
strains) into Gevo’s 
Integrated Fermen-
Reported $17M 
Series C; 
(05/2009) 
$10M as 
Series B; 
backed also by 
French oil giant 
Total SA. 
Awarded 
$1.8M from the 
US Depart-
ments of 
Energy and 
Agriculture’s 
Biomass 
Research & 
Development 
Initiative to 
help fund on-
going devel-
opment of its 
yeast strain to 
produce bio-
butanol [Pruitt 
2009a] 
Technology: an enzyme process, 
developed at CalTech, that converts 
biomass (corn stover, switchgrass, 
forest residues, and other sustain-
able feedstock) to next-generation 
biofuels like butanol, which can be 
used in the existing petroleum supply 
chain; 
looks specifically into isobutanol; 
fermentation of all sugars including 
mixed (C6, C5) sugars. 
Business model includes 
selling products and licenses;  
raise capital to acquire assets either 
through direct acquisition, joint ven-
ture or tolling arrangements; 
 
retrofitting of existing ethanol plants; 
focus on biorefinery approach – pro-
ducts include biobutanol, isobutanol, 
biodiesel, jet fuel and biobased plas-
tics [Lane 2009d]. 
Differentiates through three pieces 
from other firms: 
Gevo’s “veteran team of research 
scientists” has developed a proprie-
tary process” based on “Protein 
Engineering of Biocatalysts” (to con-
vert agricultural waste products into 
different types of renewable, alcohol-
based, liquid fuels), 
“veteran leadership team” almost 
entirely from polylactic acid plastics 
firm NatureWorks, LLC; 
 
Metabolic Engineering of Suitable 
Host Organisms (engineering 
suitable host organisms that utilize 
carbon and energy efficiently for fuel 
production; strains to exhibit in-
creased yield and productivity to be 
Highly experienced man-
agement team with roots 
in biobased chemicals 
and polymers. 
Patrick Gruber, CEO; 
several general manage-
ment positions in tech-
nology and business de-
velopment for Cargill 
Inc., one of the founders 
of NatureWorks, LLC 
(formerly Cargill Dow, 
LLC) focused on poly-
lactic acid (PLA) where 
he was the VP of tech-
nology and operations 
and the CTO from 1997 
until 2005 [Runge 
2006:130, 245]; 
Christopher Ryan, EVP; 
served as COO and 
CTO for NatureWorks, 
LLC; 
David Glassner, Execu-
tive VP Technology; led 
the development of 
novel yeast biocatalysts 
for the production of 
lactic acid and ethanol at 
NatureWorks, LLC; 
also during this time he 
led the development of 
cellulosic processing 
technology and eco-
nomic models for PLA 
manufacture; 
Jack Huttner Executive 
VP Commercial & Public 
Affairs, 
came from DuPont 
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tation Technology 
(GIFT®) process for 
the production of 
butanols from cellu-
losic sugars that are 
derived from bio-
mass; 
Gevo and engineer-
ing firm ICM have 
entered into a stra-
tegic alliance for the 
commercial deve-
lopment of Gevo’s 
technology GIFT® 
process for produc-
tion of biobutanol 
and hydrocarbons 
from retrofitted 
ethanol plants. 
sufficient to produce commodity che-
micals – “green chemicals” –  and 
fuels on a large scale); 
Process Engineering (developed a 
proprietary process technology to 
enhance productivity and lower pro-
duct separation costs). 
Has announced (9/30/09) the start up 
of its 1 million gallon per year de-
monstration plant (through deploying 
its technology by retrofitting existing 
ethanol plants to produce biobu-
tanol). 
Claims successful retrofit completed 
in less than 3 months [Pruitt 2009a]; 
for expansion, Gevo planned to ac-
quire three to five ethanol plants over 
the next 12 to 18 months [Gevo 
2009]. 
Danisco Cellulosic 
Ethanol (DDCE); prior to 
joining DDCE, he was 
VP of biorefinery busi-
ness development at 
Genencor; 
Brett Lund VP & General 
Counsil, served as chair-
man of the legal, IP, and 
licensing group for 
Syngenta’s biofuels 
business; 
Glenn Johnston, VP 
Regulatory Affairs, prior 
to joining Gevo he was 
director of regulatory 
affairs with 
NatureWorks, LLC. 
LS9, Inc. 
San Carlos, CA 
(2005) 
How the idea of the 
technology and firm 
foundation came 
across is described 
by Svoboda [2008]. 
In 2008 made about 
5,000 liters of bio-
fuel in a pilot fer-
menter at its head-
quarter  
[St. John 2008]. 
Already in 2008 
wanted to raise 
$75M to $100M to 
build a demonstra-
tion plant (2.5 mil. 
gallons per year) 
By the end of 2010 
began engineering 
work on a full-scale 
commercial plant 
(up to 100 mil. 
gals.); could be up 
and running by 
2012 
$30M 
(12/20/2010) 
Series D; 
$25M 
(10/2009), 
Series C; 
$15M (10/9/07) 
Series B; 
$5M (3/1/2007) 
Series A; 
$20M from 
Lightspeed 
Venture Part-
ners, Flagship 
Ventures and 
Khosla Ven-
tures (latest 
Khosla invest-
ment, $5M). 
In 2009 applied 
for a multi-
million dollar 
Government 
Integrated 
Biorefinery 
grant which 
would cover 
80% of the re-
Uses synthetic biology to develop 
biofuels (gasoline, diesel, and jet 
fuel) from traditional feedstock that 
contain more energy than current 
biofuels; require less energy to pro-
duce and can be distributed through 
the existing petroleum infrastructure; 
commercializing and scaling-up 
DesignerBiofuels™ products; 
Basically, a technology platform with 
designer microbes converting renew-
able materials directly (one step to 
ultra-clean diesel) into transportation 
fuels and chemicals (strategic part-
nerships) [Del Cardayre 2009]. 
Metabolic engineering replaces 
whole swaths of genes inside mi-
crobes to turn them into tiny chemical 
factories; have engineered a strain of 
e. coli with a genome that can con-
vert sugars into a fatty acid methyl 
ester (FAME) which is chemically 
equivalent to California Clean diesel; 
 
LS9’s 1-step technology, compared 
to competitors’ multi-step processing 
technology, seemed to be highly cost 
competitive; 
Does not have to kill its microbes to 
The company was bring-
ing together leaders in 
synthetic biology and in-
dustrial biotechnology. 
George Church is Pro-
fessor of Genetics at 
Harvard Medical School 
and a co-founder of LS9; 
directed one of the first 
funded genome techno-
logy centers since 1987 
– now a DOE GTL sy-
stems biology center fo-
cused on photosynthesis 
and biofuels. 
Chris Somerville is 
Director of the Energy 
Biosciences Institute (BP 
funded) and a professor 
of plant and microbial 
biology at the University 
of California Berkeley, 
and a co-founder of LS9. 
Bill Haywood CEO; 
was Senior VP Manufac-
turing for Tesoro Petro-
leum, where he was 
responsible for the com-
pany’s seven refineries. 
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[St. John 2008]. 
In 2009 revealed 
that it has a promis-
ing opportunity to 
purchase an already 
existing plant at a 
reduced cost but 
would not say 
where as of yet; 
Expected to have 
commercial plant by 
2013 in Brazil as the 
cost of sugarcane is 
the lowest in Brazil 
[Stromeyer 2009]. 
Business model: 
Single platform: 
multiple products 
(biofuels, specialty 
chemicals); 
Low-cost producer; 
Proprietary single-
step technology; 
Feedstock agnostic  
technology; 
Capital efficient 
scale-up (retrofit); 
Localization-
oriented 
[Del Cardayre 2009] 
trofit and ope-
rating cost as-
sociated with a 
demonstration 
plant. 
Biorefinery em-
phasis; 
two partners, 
with P&G for 
sustainable 
chemicals and 
with Chevron; 
equity invest-
ment from 
Chevron; 
P&G has in-
vested tens of 
millions of 
dollars in LS9 
to produce 
“green surfac-
tants” 
[Stromeyer 
2009]. 
get the oil; they secrete it naturally 
and then can live to feed, digest and 
excrete more dollops of oil; has a si-
milar microbe that can make fatty al-
cohols [Kanellos 2009; Del Cardayre 
2009]. 
Said that LS9, along with its compe-
titors, will have to prove it can deliver 
on those low prices at full-scale pro-
duction; 
LS9’s goal was to be able to show 
that it could produce synthetic diesel 
for $45 to $50 a barrel by mid-2011 
[Kanellos 2009]. 
Would not reach commercial pro-
duction levels until 2013 
[Lane 2009f, Del Cardayre  2009]. 
Indications for the issues of early 
promises: 
LS9 went through two leaders in the 
three years since its founding; 
Haywood took the helm of LS9 from 
Robert Walsh, former president and 
a 26-year veteran of Royal Dutch 
Shell. Walsh replaced LS9’s first 
acting CEO, Doug Cameron, who 
was also chief scientific advisor for 
Khosla Ventures, in July 2007. 
Stephen del Cardayre 
VP R&D, biochemist by 
education, spent 9 years 
at Codexis and Maxy-
gen, was directly in-
volved in the develop-
ment, application, and 
commercialization of 
technologies for the en-
gineering of biocatalytic 
processes for the phar-
maceutical and chemical 
industry. 
Wei Huang VP Process 
Development and 
Engineering, over 17 
years of industrial bio-
process experience, 
including process scale-
up, facility and equip-
ment design, process 
simulation, construction 
support, facility start-up, 
operation support, as 
well as process develop-
ment and research. 
NOTE: By Jan. 2014 
LS9 was acquired by 
Renewable Energy 
Group, Inc. (REG) with 
most of the LS9 team 
incuding .the whole R&D 
leadership group. 
Amyris 
Biotechnologies 
Emeryville, CA 
(2003) 
Did not start as a 
fuel company in 
2003; it started with 
$40M in funds from 
the Gates Founda-
tion to develop 
Artemisinin, used 
for the treatment of 
malaria; 
transforming itself 
additionally into a 
next generation bio-
fuels company. 
Amyris engineered 
yeast to produce a 
Raised over 
$130M from 
the sale of 
equity from 
2/2008 to 
present to sup-
port scale-up 
operations and 
initial commer-
cial plant work 
[Lane 2009j]. 
$41.8M 
(10/2009), 
Series C, 
$70M 
(09/2007), 
Series B, 
$20M 
(10/2006), 
Uses synthetic biology to create bio-
fuels that can replace gas, diesel and 
jet fuel and chemicals; is engineering 
microbes specifically for that pur-
pose. 
Make fuel from any kind of ferment-
able sugar, start with sugarcane via 
relationships with producers in Brazil. 
Amyris’ portfolio of patents includes 
renewable diesel, renewable jet fuel, 
renewable gasoline, and renewable 
lubricants. 
Building relationships with feedstock 
producers around the world; can re-
trofit existing ethanol plants. 
JV with Brazil’s second-largest 
sugarcane grower, a demonstration 
John Melo CEO, before 
joining Amyris, Melo was 
President of US fuels 
operations for BP. 
Paul Adams Senior VP 
Fuels, spent 25 years 
with BP in its supply and 
trading business, where 
he was instrumental in 
building internal proc-
esses and policies to 
successfully maximize 
BP’s profitability in the 
supply chain. 
Jack D. Newman co-
founder and Senior VP 
of Research; over a 
decade of experience 
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malaria drug now 
being developed by 
Sanofi-Aventis; 
its genetic proc-
esses to deliver the 
low cost anti-malar-
ial drug could be ex-
ploited for producing 
biofuels (since 
around 2006). 
Products: 
Renewable Fuels, 
Chemicals, 
Malaria treatment 
(Artemisinin-based). 
As a producer of 
biofuels covering 
the whole value sys-
tem. 
Amyris Fuels, LLC. 
(wholly owned sub-
sidiary), formed to 
develop a robust 
network for supply-
ing and distributing 
renewable fuels. 
The company is 
growing its footprint 
by sourcing current 
generation of bio-
fuels – such as 
ethanol – from US 
and international 
producers and 
bringing them to 
market at the lowest 
possible cost. 
facility was located amid Brazil’s 
sugarcane fields; 
Brazil is the No. 1 exporter of ethanol 
and is moving into biodiesel produc-
tion. 
Planned to pump out a billion gallons 
within the next five years; planned to 
develop renewably sourced gasoline 
and jet fuel – but diesel was an ideal 
place to start. “Diesel fuel is what 
drives industry.” 
Amyris Brasil announced that it has 
entered into letter of intent agree-
ments with three sugar and ethanol 
producers in Brazil, Bunge Ltd., 
Cosan and Açúcar Guarani, with the 
purpose of partnering for the produc-
tion of high value renewable spe-
cialty chemicals and fuels. These 
products should be distributed by 
Amyris. 
In December 2009, Amyris an-
nounced it had entered into an 
agreement with the São Martinho 
Group to acquire a 40% stake in the 
Boa Vista mill; 
the parties would convert this mill to 
achieve the first production of Amyris 
products; wanted to invest up to 
$200 million in the project [Lane 
2009j]. 
Agreements are key steps toward 
building-out a fully integrated re-
newable products company – a com-
pany that encompasses the techno-
logy, industrial-scale manufacturing 
and product distribution capabilities. 
Formed wholly-
owned subsidiary 
Amyris Brasil tap-
ping into one of the 
most economical 
and sustainable en-
ergy sources – 
sugarcane. 
Fuels Industry 
Experience: 
Amyris Fuels has 
understanding and 
Series A. 
In 2009 re-
ceived $25M 
through the US 
government’s 
advanced bio-
refinery project 
stimulus 
award. 
Wanted to gen-
erate diesel 
fuel from 
sugarcane; 
 
Amyris wanted 
to use its $25M 
award for a 
pilot plant that 
will produce a 
diesel substi-
tute by fer-
menting sweet 
sorghum and 
other petro-
chemical sub-
stitutes [Riddell 
2009] 
Also investigate the feasibility of de-
veloping an optimal economical 
model using Amyris technology to 
produce cane-derived diesel fuel 
from molasses rather than from tradi-
tional sugarcane juice. 
New “capital light” model: 
Amyris will partner with a mill and 
provide its technology through an off 
take agreement – not a licensing 
agreement. 
Amyris Brasil will provide mill owners 
researching bacterial 
physiology and genetics, 
co-authored the ground-
breaking work under-
lying the technology of 
microbial terpene pro-
duction. 
Neil Renninger co-foun-
der and CTO; has a 
cross-disciplinary under-
standing of both the 
micro-world of strain en-
gineering and the 
macro-world of chemical 
engineering; received a 
doctorate in chemical 
engineering from the 
University of California, 
Berkeley, studying the 
metabolic engineering of 
bacterial cells for chemi-
cal transformations. 
Jeff Lievense Senior 
Vice President of 
Process Development 
and Manufacturing; 25 
years of industrial ex-
perience in bioprocess 
engineering and a 
proven track record de-
veloping, scaling, and 
commercializing ad-
vanced fermentation 
processes. 
Dr. Lievense served also 
as VP of technology and 
process development for 
the R&D organization of 
Tate & Lyle, where he 
led the fermentation 
R&D program, 
commercializing three 
large-scale industrial 
fermentation products 
and pioneering a pro-
duction process for Bio-
PDOTM (1,3-
propanediol). 
 1084 Appendix A 
seeks to deepen 
experience in the 
fuels industry; 
 
Has developed ad-
vanced capabilities 
in fuels marketing, 
supply, distribution, 
blending, systems 
development, ac-
counting, and risk 
management [Lane 
2009j]. 
GreenLane®: 
a typical “crossover 
strategy involving 
renewables” – pre-
pare to commercial-
ize renewables by 
learning from ope-
ration with non-
renewables 
[Runge 2006:584, 
855] 
In the US Amyris 
currently transports, 
stores, and markets 
ethanol from US do-
mestic and over-
seas sources 
through Amyris 
Fuels, LLC. – will 
allow quick and reli-
able distribution of 
biofuels in the US; 
building strong cus-
tomer relationships 
throughout the 
world and credibility 
as a reliable current 
generation fuel sup-
plier. 
with yeast strains, production proc-
esses and engineering design to pro-
duce Amyris products. 
The mill owner will provide capital to 
convert mill to produce Amyris pro-
ducts. Amyris Brasil will then pur-
chase Amyris products from mill 
owners at contracted price and dis-
tribute product directly to customers. 
To achieve planned 2011 commer-
cialization, has engaged a leading 
engineering, procurement and con-
struction management (EPC) firm for 
final design and construction of com-
mercial production facilities. 
Stages to commercialization: 
Emeryville Pilot Plant – Designed to 
mimic the full-scale fuel manufactur-
ing process; 
Campinas Pilot Plant – second pilot 
plant, in Campinas, Brazil, is strate-
gically located at the doorstep of 
Brazil’s sugarcane industry, similar to 
the Emeryville plant will validate 
technology for use in Brazilian pro-
duction conditions 
Q2 2009 Amyris Renewable 
Products Demonstration Plant – also 
in Campanis (14,000-square-foot 
facility) to conduct in-country scale-
up, demonstration and optimization 
of all Amyris fuels and chemicals 
manufacturing processes; 
the production of more than 10,000 
gallons of Amyris products under 
conditions representing full-scale 
manufacturing. 
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Celunol 
Corporation 
(now Verenium 
Corp.) Cambridge, 
MA 
(1994) 
Founded 1994 as 
BC International; 
traded on the 
NASDAQ, 
bought by Diversa 
for $150M+, 
became Verenium 
(Table I.84) in 2007 
[Childs 2007]. 
Business Units: 
Biofuels, 
Specialty Enzymes 
Reportedly 
raised more 
than $60M 
from Khosla 
Ventures, 
Braemar 
Energy 
Ventures, 
Charles River, 
Rho Ventures 
Produces enzyme-based (bioengi-
neering) cellulosic ethanol; 
has proprietary biotechnology pro-
cesses and project development 
know-how. 
Biomass used: sugarcane bagasse, 
corn stover, rice and wheat straws, 
wood waste, energy crops. 
Celunol’s microorganisms consume 
C6 and C5 sugars (not commercially 
fermentable by yeast as C6); 
emphasis on cellulosic ethanol from 
agricultural waste left over from proc-
essing sugarcane. 
Exclusive licensee of key cellulosic 
ethanol (CEtOH) technology devel-
oped at the University of Florida; 
R&D facilities in Gainesville, FL; 
Operating plant in Jennings, LA; Pilot 
facility (1st CEtOH in US) operational 
Nov.2006, demonstration-scale 
CEtOH facility entering construction 
in 2007 when merger was already 
announced [Howe 2006] 
CEtOH facility in Osaka, Japan 
(wood waste) developed by Celunol 
licensee Marubeni Corp; 
Licenses technology domestically 
and internationally. 
Diversa Enzymes pro-
spects in hot springs, 
ocean beds, soda lakes, 
and on the Arctic tundra 
for genes potentially 
useful in industry. 
Verenium achieved 
growing portfolio of spe-
cialty enzyme products 
and “unique technical 
and operational capa-
bilities.” 
Verenium claimed to be 
the only company to of-
fer fully integrated, end-
to-end capabilities in 
pre-treatment, novel en-
zyme development, fer-
mentation, engineering 
and project development 
[Childs 2007]. 
HCL CleanTech 
Ltd. 
Israel/US 
(2007) 
In 2012 re- named 
to Virdia 
Virdia is headquar-
tered in Redwood 
City, but has a tech-
nology center in 
Danville, Virginia, 
and a research cen-
ter in Tel Aviv, 
Israel. 
Improved a freely 
available techno-
logy, uses a ca. 80 
$5.5M 
(06/2009), 
Series A 
In 2012 Virdia 
closed its latest 
round of fi-
nancing, raised 
over $20 mil. 
from insiders, 
Khosla 
Ventures, 
Burrill & 
Company and 
Tamar 
Ventures; 
 
in addition, the 
company 
received $10 
mil. in a 
venture debt 
Virdia has developed the CASE™ 
(old acid solvent extraction) process, 
which converts cellulosic biomass to 
high quality fermentable sugars and 
lignin, and is based on a series of 
patented and patent-pending techno-
logies. 
Use of fuming hydrochloric acid to 
catalyze the hydrolysis of cellulose to 
glucose and, generally, all polycarbo-
hydrates to their constituent mono-
mers. 
Hydrolysis yields of the sugar fraction 
are over 95-97% (a significant im-
provement compared to traditional 
enzymatic processes) and lignin 
solids are recovered practically 
intact. 
Eran Baniel – Founder 
and CEO, serial entre-
preneur. 
Robert Janse, Head of 
engineering, 33 years of 
experience in corn, 
wheat, sugar processing 
and fermentation at Tate 
& Lyle. 
Paul McWilliams (USA) 
– US Engineering, 31 
years at Cargill working 
on wet milling plants. 
In 2012 Virdia got a new 
CEO Philippe Lavielle, a 
veteran of the industrial 
biotech sector. Lavielle 
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years old, indus-
trially-proven Ger-
man cellulosic to 
fermentable sugars 
and ethanol proc-
ess, the Bergius 
process (named 
after its Nobel Prize 
winning developer) 
– technically 
superb, but associ-
ated with operating 
high cost. 
Virdia focuses on 
fermentable C6 and 
C5 sugars and 
lignin from biomass 
for industrial uses. 
Strategy: 
Virdia’s cellulosic 
sugars and lignin 
are intermediate 
products in supply 
chains that can lead 
into biochemicals, 
biofuels, plastics 
and carbon fibers, 
as well as nutritional 
supplements for 
food and feed. 
Verdia is looking for 
partners to offtake 
those quantities of 
sugars and firms 
interested in the 
conversion of the 
sugars. 
deal with Triple 
Point Capital. 
Virdia’s use of fuming hydrochloric 
acid (HCl) allows a large variety of 
feedstocks to be used with minimal 
change of configuration. 
Using the proprietary technologies 
developed in house, it has improved 
the recovery of the acid, as well as 
the recovery of valuable by-products, 
such as high quality lignin and high 
quality tall oils. 
Its technology for the recovery of HCl 
from aqueous solutions and industrial 
processes can also provide complete 
acid recovery solutions to HCl de-
pendent industries (such as the PVC 
industry). 
In 2012 Virdia together with Virent 
(Table I.85) debut drop-in aviation 
biofuels made from drop-in cellulosic 
pine tree sugars. 
In 2012 Verdia announced a deal 
with the Mississippi Development 
Authority to build a plant to derive 
sugar from wood chips, a plentiful by-
product of the state’s forestry indus-
try. 
That deal included $75 million in low-
interest loans and up to $155 million 
in tax incentives over a 10-yr period. 
The first plant, due to start up in late 
2014 or early 2015, will have capac-
ity for 150,000 tons (300 million lb) of 
sugars per year. 
Virdia eventually aims to build plants 
for 500,000 tons (1 billion lb) per yr. 
replaced co-founder 
Eran Baniel as CEO, 
who now serves as Vice 
President of Business 
Development. Before 
joining Virdia, Lavielle 
was a member of the 
executive management 
at Genencor. 
The company is now led 
by a new  management 
team with decades of 
industrial-scale manu-
facturing experience 
(“veterans”) in industrial 
biotech, chemicals and 
sugar production. 
KiOR Inc. US / 
KiOR BV ,The 
Netherlands 
(2007) 
In 2007, KiOR was 
founded by Khosla 
Ventures and a 
group of catalyst 
scientists who 
shared a vision of 
making renewable 
fuels from cellulosic 
biomass through a 
$12.9M 
(06/2008), 
Series B, 
$1.4M 
(11/2007) 
Series A 
KiOR targets the fuel markets only. 
The technology originally pioneered 
by Bioecon in 2006. 
Converts biomass, particularly the 
recalcitrant polymeric biomass re-
sidue, to valuable molecules which 
can be utilized by the chemical and 
fuels industry. 
Biomass catalytic cracking process – 
a thermochemical process that pro-
duces biocrude from grass, wood 
and plant waste that can then be 
refined –  has significantly lower 
The Company was in-
corporated and com-
menced operations in 
July 2007 as a joint 
venture between Khosla 
Ventures and BIOeCON 
BV. 
KiOR BV, a Netherlands 
company, was formed 
on March 4, 2008 and 
commenced a process 
of liquidation in March 
2010. As of December 
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one-step catalytic 
process. 
Biofuel JV of Khosla 
Ventures and Dutch 
biofuel startup 
BIOeCON 
Number of employ-
ees (around 2008): 
15 
Khosla Ventures’ in-
volvement with what 
would become 
KiOR started with a 
call from an engi-
neer from Holland to 
Vinod Khosla. 
In contrast to the in-
ventor’s interest in a 
licensing business 
model, Khosla en-
visioned that the 
KiOR process could 
lead to an oil explo-
ration and produc-
tion company. 
Has adopted a 
build, own and 
operate strategy; 
Hopes also to li-
cense the technolo-
gy to customers like 
oil refineries and 
feedstock owners. 
capital costs compared with other 
biomass conversion technologies 
(claim); 
Develops and commercializes 
Biomass Catalytic Cracking (BCC) 
technology. BCC technology con-
verts lignocellulosic biomass into a 
“biocrude” which is suitable for up-
grading to transportation fuels; 
“Biocrude”: a mixture of small hydro-
carbon molecules that can be pro-
cessed into fuels, such as gasoline 
or diesel in existing oil refineries. 
Renewable biocrude oil can be re-
fined in a conventional hydrotreater 
into light refined products (gasoline 
and diesel blendstocks). 
Technology produces hydrocarbon 
blendstocks that will “drop in” to the 
existing transportation fuels infra-
structure for use in vehicles on the 
road today. 
Technology platform combines pro-
prietary catalyst systems with well-
established fluid catalytic cracking, or 
FCC, processes that have been used 
in crude oil refineries to produce 
gasoline for over 60 years. 
Constructed a pilot unit outside of 
Houston, Texas to continue develop-
ing and validating the technology; 
this pilot unit has amassed over 
9,000 hours of operation and evalu-
ated more than 250 catalyst systems 
[Admin 2011d] 
In 2010 was producing 15 barrels per 
day of biocrude (229,000 gallons per 
year) using its fast pyrolysis techno-
logy and a proprietary catalyst 
31, 2010, all of the ope-
rations of KiOR BV were 
combined into the opera-
tions of KiOR, Inc. 
Khosla targeted the 
hiring of mission critical 
technologists to the 
company, ultimately 
leading to the hiring of 
Fred Cannon as KiOR’s 
President (in 2008), and 
later CEO (2010). 
Prior to KiOR, Cannon 
was president of 
AkzoNobel Catalysts 
LLC from 1997 until the 
divestment of the busi-
ness in August 2004. 
KiOR Columbus, LLC, a 
wholly owned subsidiary 
of the Company (“KiOR 
Inc.”), was formed on 
October 6, 2010. 
LanzaTech Ltd. 
Auckland, New 
Zealand 
Founded in 2005 in 
New Zealand and 
now headquartered 
in Roselle, Illinois 
In 2010 LanzaTech 
Between foun-
dation in 2005 
and 2010 
LanzaTech has 
raised $30 mio. 
in venture capi-
tal and $10 mil. 
from the New 
Zealand gov-
The LanzaTech Process captures 
gas (CO) as a resource; 
innovation lies in using a bacterium 
to produce ethanol not from a carbo-
hydrate, but from a gas (cf. Coskata) 
A “hybrid” ethanol production proc-
ess that can be retrofitted to indus-
trial facilities, generates ethanol from 
Notably, David C. 
Aldous, was a member 
of the LanzaTech Board 
since October 2008; a 
former Executive VP of 
Strategy and Portfolio for 
Shell – was also Range 
Fuels’ CEO and 
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announced that it 
had engineered a 
microorganism that 
can produce 2,3-
butanediol, a chemi-
cal precursor that 
can be used to 
make the solvent 
methyl ethyl ketone 
(MEK), which is 
used in dry erase 
markers and in the 
manufacture of 
plastics and textiles. 
The same chemical 
can produce bu-
tanes and buta-
diene, which can 
then be used to 
make a variety of 
plastics and hydro-
carbon fuels. 
While the chemical 
market is smaller 
than the fuel mar-
ket, it can be more 
profitable, since 
chemicals such as 
MEK sell for more 
than twice the price 
of ethanol. 
ernment. 
Throughout 
2005 and 
2006, the 
company 
raised funding 
through New 
Zealand-based 
angel investors 
and secured 
grants. 
$3.5M 
(4/2007), 
Series A 
(for pilot plant) 
Series A in-
vestment was 
from a consor-
tium led by 
Khosla Ven-
tures; 
the Series B 
financing was 
led by Qiming 
Ventures. 
In 2012 it 
closed Series 
C investment 
led by the 
Malaysian Life 
Sciences 
Capital Fund 
($56 mio.). 
New investors 
included 
Petronas 
Technology 
Ventures Sdn 
Bhd, the 
venture arm of 
Petronas, the 
national oil 
company of 
Malaysia. 
the carbon monoxide (CO) of waste 
flue gases (little or no hydrogen as is 
in syngas; e.g. steel and other indus-
tries); 
can also use thermochemical syngas 
based on any biomass resource (mu-
nicipal waste, organic industrial 
waste (tires), waste wood); 
CO used as a food source for pro-
prietary LanzaTech microbes during 
the biofermentation process (hybrid 
process), 
non-genetically modified, non-patho-
genic bacteria, isolated from natural 
environments [Lanza Web]. 
The carbon monoxide containing 
gases are scrubbed, cooled and sent 
to a bioreactor. The carbon compo-
nent is used as a food source for the 
proprietary LanzaTech microbes 
during the biofermentation process. 
The microbes use this energy to pro-
duce ethanol. 
With its hybrid process LanzaTech 
claims to become the lowest cost, 
highest volume producers of fuel 
ethanol. 
Claimed major advantage over exist-
ing gas to liquid conversion technolo-
gies: Able to virtually eliminate capi-
tal cost associated with gas condi-
tioning. 
Rapidly growing patent portfolio, 
adopted a stage-gated critical path 
through process piloting to commer-
cialization [LanzaTech Media 
Release Aug. 18 2009]. 
Claims to have one of the world’s 
largest collections of industrial fuel 
and chemical production microbes. 
The fermentation suite comprises 
more than 20 bench-top gas fermen-
tation reactors and a test-bay allow-
ing the development and demonstra-
tion of several prototype reactor de-
signs in parallel and at scale. 
Director; 
Currently, LanzaTech is 
led by a multinational 
Board of Directors and 
Management Team with 
offices in New Zealand, 
China and the US. 
Dr. Jennifer Holmgren is 
the Chief Executive 
Officer. Jennifer has 
over 20 years of 
experience in the energy 
sector including a 
proven track record in 
the development and 
commercialization of 
fuels and chemicals 
technologies. 
Prior to joining 
LanzaTech, she was 
Vice President and 
General Manager of the 
Renewable Energy and 
Chemicals business unit 
at UOP LLC, a 
Honeywell Company. 
Dr. Sean Simpson is the 
Chief Scientific Officer 
and co-founder of 
LanzaTech. He spent 
the first 12 years of his 
life living in various 
countries around the 
world, including 
Mauritius, Zambia and 
Gibraltar, before his 
family returned to 
England. He now lives 
with his family in 
Auckland. 
*) From the firm’s Web site if not stated otherwise by a reference; 
Firms’ states: usually end of 2009, if not stated otherwise. 
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The biofuels investments of Vinod Khosla in startups (Table I.99) show various fates 
so far, from bankruptcies to good financial returns by IPOs, from promising develop-
ments to recent change of development directions away from biofuels and covering a 
very broad spectrum of technical approaches – and cooperation (LS9 and HCL 
Cleantech/Verdia) or interconnections (“networking effects”) via technology or people 
(for instance, Range Fuels and LanzaTech). 
For instance, in January 2012 LanzaTech purchased a facility in Soperton, Ga. pre-
viously owned by bankrupt Range Fuels at auction for $5.1 million. Range Fuels’ 
lender took control of the facility for non-payment and held the auction to recoup some 
of a $38 million loan, which had been guaranteed by the Department of Agriculture. 
Range was also awarded a $43 million grant from the Department of Energy to help 
construct this facility. LanzaTech acquired the facility for its location and access to 
cheap feedstocks from local timber operations. 
LanzaTech’s plan was to leverage some of the existing technology at the facility 
alongside own proprietary technology to produce renewable and domestic fuels and 
chemicals from the bountiful waste biomass in the region [Bomgardner 2012b]. The 
Soperton site, already renamed Freedom Pines Biorefinery, will be LanzaTech’s first 
production facility. The firm is currently working to launch a demonstration facility in 
Shanghai that will use waste gases from a steel mill operated by China’s Shougang 
Group. 
The fact that Range Fuels and LanzaTech share a lead investor – Khosla Ventures – 
has raised eyebrows because LanzaTech bought the Soperton site for a fraction of 
the amount spent developing the facility. 
As a summary, VC-backed startups, at least in biofuels, can be differentiated by 
 Financial backing of early stages (“technology investors”); 
 Backing specifically industrial scale-up of proven R&D (“project investors,” 
late-stage funding, also corporate venturing); 
 VCs being pro-activley involved in firm foundation; 
 Initiating firm foundation and proceeding along a defined development path. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurship in biofuels (and also other CleanTech areas) exhibits a 
number of founders who were riding the first wave of renewables in the late 1970s and 
1980s. 
As observed with corporate venture oriented startups with oil companies in the ven-
ture capital community impatience was also rising with the pace of commercialization. 
Generally, it is a rather normal process when the R&D/pilot phase changes into the 
engineering/scale-up phase to change the management team, in particular, the CEO 
who will have to emphasize commercialization rather than technology. But an indicator 
of problems with biofuels was successively fast change in NTBFs’ leadership teams. 
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For many new biofuels firms the proof-of-concept in the lab is not being translated 
quickly enough into production results at the plant and they still have to prove they can 
deliver on those low prices at full-scale production. Pressure related to the promises 
and postponed milestones into commercialization have built up. Examples of CEO or 
founders, respectively, stepping down or being replaced include LS9, Range Fuels 
and Mascoma [Lane 2009e]. 
The Great Recession 2009/2010 had also a great influence on financing (biofuels) 
startups’ further developments by VC firms. For instance, biotech and CleanTech 
fundraising from venture capital declined in the third quarter of 2010 [Voith 2010a; 
Voith 2010b] 
On the other hand, policy continued to step in. There have been established a number 
of programs by the US Federal Government to support technology entrepreneurship. 
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Energy (DOE) were 
investing $47 million over three years in eight pilot-scale R&D projects to make bio-
fuels and other products from various biomass sources [Mukhopadhyay 2011c]. 
For a bargain price of $1,000, start-up companies can get up to three of the thousands 
of unlicensed patents in the Department of Energy’s portfolio. The aim is to double the 
number of startup companies emerging from DOE’s 17 national laboratories, which 
hold more than 15,000 patents. Only 10 percent of federal patents are currently li-
censed to be commercialized, according to the agency. By simply submitting a busi-
ness plan and signing a generic agreement, available as a template on the DOE Web 
site, interested startups can apply to license up to three patents from a single labora-
tory at the reduced $1,000 fee [Mukhopadhyay 2011b]. 
Also the US military will play an important role here. The US military consumes more 
energy than is used by two-thirds of all nations worldwide! DOD needs cheaper and 
more abundant energy sources to power its global operations. 
Collaboration between the Departments of Defense and Energy was established to 
reduce the US’s dependence on oil. DOE is the nation’s largest funder of the physical 
sciences and DOD will act as a test bed for innovative technology. There are three 
areas that will benefit from the partnership: batteries; fuel cells; and alternative fuels 
derived from sources such as biomass, natural gas, and algae [Mukhopadhyay 
2011d]. 
In 2011 many of the firms listed in Table I.99 targeted an IPO for financing further de-
velopments. Coskata’s approach when it looked in December 2011 for an $100 million 
IPO has already been discussed (A.1.1.3). 
Basically, revenue streams of these NTBFs include 
 Grant revenue, 
 Licensing revenue 
 Biofuel sales and sales of related products. 
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Aspects of partnering in biofuels include 
 Feedstock sourcing and testing; 
 Product development and testing; 
 Final end use product formulations; 
 Commercialization of developed technologies; 
 Equity investments and development support. 
Mascoma (Table I.99) also filed an S-1 registration for a proposed IPO. For Masoma’s 
IPO several red flags were raised [Fehrenbacher 2011; Admin 2011c], for instance, 
expressed by “The Risks, translated from SEC-speak” [Admin 2011c]. 
Wanting to raise $100 million, Mascoma generated $34.5 million in revenue along the 
way, primarily government funding for R&D. They have not yet commercialized their 
corn ethanol technology or the hardwood process. The accumulated deficit as of June 
30, 2011 was $118.722 million. The net losses were $30.4 million, $38.3 million and 
$25.7 million for the years ended December 31, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively, 
and $14.8 million for the six months ended June 30, 2011 [Admin 2011c]. Mascoma 
said for its revenues in 2010, government grants constituted “86 percent of our 
revenue” while “product sales and other service agreements constituted 14 percent of 
our revenue.” [Fehrenbacher 2011] 
“It’s not a pretty prospectus: Mascoma’s auditors have questioned its ability to remain 
a going concern, and its debt carries interest rates as high as 11%. This is all to make 
cellulosic ethanol a fuel whose commercial viability many experts question. The 
trouble is, Mascoma’s plant was supposed to be virtually built by now. The company’s 
plan in early to mid-2008 was to leverage a grant from the state of Michigan to get 
debt financing, but that never did happen because the markets for energy-project 
finance closed after Lehman Bros. collapsed. More disturbing, perhaps, is the silence 
about Mascoma that has emanated from venture-capital firm Khosla Ventures, the 
company’s second-biggest shareholder.” [Mullaney 2011] 
IPOs of other firms in which Vinod Khosla invested include Amyris, Gevo, and KiOR 
(all in Table I.99). But here, for instance, Amyris raised around $363 million through its 
IPO and the IPO translated Khosla Ventures’ $15.59 million investment into a worth of 
$65.36 million meaning a 4X return at that time [Wesoff 2010]. 
According to  McDonald [2011] “Much advanced biofuel development is a combination 
of hype and science fiction, but these companies have practical business plans, near-
term commercial objectives and the financial resources to get across or near the goal 
line.” Cellulosic ethanol is the biggest disappointment, and so now attention is likely to 
switch to drop-in (road-ready) biofuels like renewable gasoline and diesel or jet fuel. 
For instance, for policy in Germany, in 2012, one year after its introduction and aiming 
to become the major type of fuel for Otto-engines, E10-gasoline flopped. E10 
achieved just 13 percent of all transportation fuels. Users did not accept E10 – not be-
 1092 Appendix A 
cause of concerns it might damage the current engines, but the population has seri-
ous doubts whether such biofuels show benefits for the environment and the climate 
[Eicher 2012]. 
Regarding companies, for instance, early in 2012 Shell announced that it has built the 
next generation biofuels pilot plant at Shell’s Westhollow Technology Center in 
Houston, TX, to produce drop-in biofuels rather than ethanol. It uses a thermocatalytic 
process technology licensed from its commercial partner Virent (Table I.85), which is 
similar to the process being used at the Virent pilot plant in Madison, Wisconsin 
[McDermott 2012]. 
The benefits of drop-in biofuels from the perspective of being able to use existing fuel 
infrastructure without modification should not be overlooked. Drop-in biofuels have the 
same properties as conventional fuels. This eliminates the need for additional blend-
ing and storage infrastructure as well as engine modifications (Table I.82) that may be 
required for the use of more ethanol in blends with conventional fuels. That means 
there are a lot of sunk costs there financially. 
In early 2011 Khosla-backed KiOR focusing on drop-in  “biocrude” (Table I.99) filed for 
an IPO. At that time KiOR signed an offtake agreement with Hunt Refining of 
Tennessee for biofuels produced at the facility KiOR is developing in Columbus. The 
company was planning to invest $500 million in three wood chip-to-biofuel plants in 
Mississippi and the Columbus plant was expected to be online in 2012. The state’s 
development authority was granting KiOR $75 million based on the deal with Hunt 
[Admin 2012d] 
“We are a development stage company with a limited operating history, and we have 
not yet commercialized our cellulosic gasoline and diesel nor have we generated any 
revenue. Until recently, we have focused our efforts on research and development, 
and we have yet to generate revenue.” “As a result, we had generated $108.7 million 
of operating losses and an accumulated deficit of $130.4 million from our inception 
through December 31, 2011. We expect to continue to incur operating losses through 
at least 2013 as we continue into the commercialization stage of our business.” [KiOR 
2012] 
In raising $150 million by its IPO, the Khosla Ventures-backed KiOR raised 50 percent 
more than expected at the time of its initial filing, but well short of the $241 million po-
tential the company had tipped in filings over the past month. Through the IPO Khosla 
Ventures retained up to 70 percent voting control through the structure outlined by the 
company. That means, Khosla Ventures controls a majority of the outstanding com-
mon stock and will continue to control a majority of KiOR’s common stock after the 
IPO. As a result, KiOR is a “controlled company” [Admin 2011d; Admin 2011e]. 
“In November 2007, Khosla Ventures bought in to the old BioeCON technology (val-
ued at the time at $2.6 million) for $4.4 million at $0.36 per share. By June 2008, the 
company sold another $10 million in shares to Khosla at $0.97 per share – and 
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another $15 million came in via a promissory note. The company came back in spring 
2010 with a $95M capital raise at $9.80 per share – that’s a lot of added value based 
on the $30 million invested.” [Admin 2011e] 
KiOR said it has completed construction of its first commercial-scale facility on budget 
and ahead of schedule. The company was commissioning the plant in Columbus, 
Miss., and expected to begin production in summer 2012. Once it is fully operational, 
the facility will have an annual capacity of 11 million gal. The feedstock will be local 
southern yellow pine [Bomgardner 2012a]. 
Furthermore, many promising biofuels startups changed their focus softly, de-
clared as “initial orientation,” from biofuels to biobased specialty chemicals. 
Amyris Biotechnologies (Table I.99) now intends to become a leading provider of re-
newable specialty chemicals and fuels worldwide. In 2010 it went public [SEC 2010], 
as mentioned above. Its initial focus was on farnesene, a sesquiterpene that exists as 
a variety of isomers and stereoisomers. It intended to convert farnesene into diesel 
and jet fuel and materials for detergents, cosmetics, perfumes, and lubricants. Capital 
injection was $244 million in funding since its inception [Tullo 2010]. The Amyris strat-
egy: commercialize farnesene on a contract manufacturing basis, then turn to farne-
sane, produced by adding hydrogen to farnesene. Farnesane is the company’s show-
case diesel molecule. 
Amyris had, as its primary post-IPO challenge, to tackle the proof that it can replicate 
its lab and pilot results at scale. Apart from scale-up Amyris’ further Achilles heel is the 
dependence for the near term on Brazilian sugarcane resources for its sugar feed-
stocks. Sugar is half the price of farnesene in the Amyris equation – near as any 
analyst has been able to decipher, and with the price of Brazilian sugar doubling in the 
2008-10 time frame before retreating in 2011 – the dependency will not only be on 
Brazilian harvests, but India’s (which are more subject to variance) [Administrator 
2010]. 
According to Amyris’ annual report 2011 [Amyris 2012] total revenues and net loss, 
respectively, developed as follows: 
Revenues ($ mio.) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Product sales 129.8 68.7 61.7 10.7 - 
Grants and 
collaboration revenues 
17.2 11.7 2.9 3.2 6.2 
Total revenues 147.0 80.3 64.6 13.9 6.2 
Net loss ($ mio.) (179.5) (82.8) (64.8) (42.3) (11.8) 
In 2011 and 2012, Amyris leveraged contract manufacturing capabilities to begin pro-
ducing Biofene®, Amyris’s brand of farnesene, at three sites in three countries around 
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the world: Biomin (Piracicaba, Brazil), Tate & Lyle (Decatur, Illinois), and Antibioticós 
(Leon, Spain). 
With regard to execution its strategy Amyris established a number of partnerships, co-
operation, JVs with established large companies addressing their anticipated applica-
tions of farnesene. In 2010 Amyris announced a series of agreements with The 
Procter & Gamble Company (P&G). The agreements focused on the use of farnesene 
in certain specialty chemical applications within P&G’s products. 
Also in 2011 Amyris Inc. and French energy giant Total have expanded a partnership 
to produce renewable diesel products through a joint venture, to which Total will 
contribute an additional $105 million on top of the $180 million the companies already 
have committed, according to financial filings (approximately 17 percent equity interest 
in Amyris). The 50-50 joint venture has the exclusive rights to produce and market re-
newable diesel and jet fuel worldwide. It also has a non-exclusive agreement to de-
velop and market other non-fuel products [Riddell 2011]. 
In a partnership, French tire maker Michelin has joined with Amyris to develop renew-
able isoprene. Amyris said it will use technology similar to its process for making 
farnesene [Bomgardner 2011e]. Under the agreement, Amyris and Michelin will 
partner to contribute funding and technical resources to develop Amyris’s technology 
to produce isoprene from renewable feedstocks. Amyris expected to begin com-
mercializing this isoprene in 2015 for use in tire and other specialty chemical appli-
cations. Michelin is committed to off-take volumes on a ten-year basis. In addition, 
Amyris retains the right to market its renewable isoprene to other customers. 
Furthermore, in 2011 Amyris signed a collaboration agreement with the Japanse firm 
Kuraray Co., Ltd. to develop innovative polymers from Biofene. Under the agreement, 
Kuraray will use Biofene to replace petroleum-derived feedstock such as butadiene 
and isoprene in the production of specified classes of high-performing polymers. 
And, as part of an effort to solve production problems, in 2012 Amyris made a $59 
million private placement of common stock and issued $25 million in convertible 
bonds. Most of the new capital came from existing investors. The firm, will use the 
new funds to pay for the scale-up of its commercial operations [Bomgardner 2012c]. 
However, in February 2012 Amyris said it is giving up making fuels. Instead, it will 
focus on higher value products, such as moisturizers for cosmetics. The company 
learned firsthand just how difficult it is to achieve the kind of yields seen in lab tests in 
large-scale production. Range Fuels, one of the first of the current crop of companies, 
recently went out of business. Others were giving up on making biofuels too, also hop-
ing to break into markets for higher value chemicals. 
Amyris’s technology may still be used to make renewable fuels, but this will happen 
not at Amyris, but under joint ventures established with Total and Cosan. These 
ventures will need to build up their own production capacity. Amyris had said that in 
2012 it would produce 40 to 50 million liters of farnesene, basically a fragrant oil. 
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Amyris also said it is indefinitely delaying plans for one of two large production facili-
ties it was to have built this year [Bullis 2012b]. 
In 2012 Neil Renninger, a co-founder of Amyris Technologies (Table I.99), stepped 
down as CTO. Concerning science versus business the visions of the CEO and CTO 
for the company proved incompatible. CEO John Melo came from a big-company cul-
ture at odds with Amyris’s freewheeling researchers. The scientists balked when he 
tried to apply big-company rigor and measure employees’ contributions and their per-
formance [Grushkin 2012]. 
A related execution of its strategy is observed for Gevo which also went public. And 
Gevo seemed to hope to become profitable by turning corn into chemicals. According 
to its prospectus Gevo showed a net loss of $78.579 million from June 9, 2005 (date 
of inception) through September 30, 2010 [NASDAQ 2011]. According to Gevo’s 
annual report 2011 total revenues and net loss, respectively, developed as follows: 
Revenues ($ mio.) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Bioalcohol sales and 
related products 
63.74 14.77    
Licensing revenue  0.14    
Grant, research and 
development program 
revenue 
0.81 1.49 0.66 0.21 0.28 
Total revenues 64.55 16.40 0.66 0.21 0.28 
Net loss ($ mio.) (48.21) (40.11) (19.89) (14.54) (7.23) 
According to Gevo’s IPO prospectus, venture capitalists own 60 percent of the com-
pany (Khosla Ventures, 26.8%; Virgin Green Fund, 10.5%; Total Energy Ventures 
International, 9.2%; Burrill & Company Life Sciences, 7.1%; Malaysia Life Sciences, 
6.3%) and LANXESS Corporation owned 4.7 percent. The German firm LANXESS is 
the world’s largest synthetic rubber producer. But, after the IPO, LANXESS increased 
its position to 9.1 percent. Total Energy Ventures is the VC arm of French oil multi-
national Total SA. Gevo management and directors own 22.7 percent. 
In and after 2011 Gevo received important foundational patents for its operations, but 
it was also involved in a heavy litigation with Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC (Table 
I.83). 
In 2012 Gevo was awarded US Patent No. 8,071,358, covering additional “Methods of 
Increasing Dihydroxy Acid Dehydratase (DHAD) Activity to Improve Production of 
Fuels, Chemicals, and Amino Acids.” This invention further details and protects the 
innovations contained in the Gevo yeast organism to turn an industrial yeast strain into 
a highly efficient cell factory to produce isobutanol. Also in 2012 the USPTO granted 
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US Patent No. 8,153,415 entitled “Reduced By-Product Accumulation for Improved 
Production of Isobutanol.” The ‘415 Patent” covers technology which eliminates two 
pathways that compete for isobutanol pathway intermediates in yeast. 
Gevo was awarded US Patent No. 8,101,808, “Recovery of Higher Alcohols From 
Dilute Aqueous Solutions.” This patent addresses the separation technology used to 
produce propanols, butanols, pentanols, and hexanols. The claims also address how 
ethanol plants can be retrofitted to produce higher alcohols. It solves the long-standing 
problem for the practical production of higher alcohols, specifically how to separate 
these alcohol products from fermentation broth and achieve economic concentrations. 
This is the technology, along with Gevo’s proprietary yeast, being implemented at the 
Luverne, Minnesota plant, which Gevo acquired in September 2010. The Gevo Inte-
grated Fermentation Technology (GIFT® system) permits the continuous removal of 
isobutanol as it is formed. 
In 2011 Gevo was awarded US Patent No. 8,097,440 “Engineered Microorganisms 
Capable of Producing Target Compounds Under Anaerobic Conditions.” It refers to 
Gevo’s yeast technology to enable the low-cost, high-yield production of biobased 
isobutanol. Gevo has been awarded a patent for an anaerobic yeast utilizing a novel 
enzymatic structure. Gevo believes the most efficient and economical way to make 
isobutanol through fermentation is to use yeast that is anaerobic, or does not need 
oxygen.  
In 2011 Gevo filed a lawsuit against Butamax™ Advanced Biofuels, LLC and its affili-
ate DuPont. Butamax has publicly disclosed its use of Gevo’s claimed technology in 
several later-filed patent applications. Butamax has attempted to reach commercial-
scale production of isobutanol for several years (Table I.83). To produce commercially 
relevant levels of isobutanol, however, one must use the technology covered by 
Gevo’s 8,153,415 Patent. This patent illustrates the importance of eliminating these 
pathways before Geve’s competitors do. 
In March 2012 the USPTO rejected all patent claims of Butamax covering isobutanol-
producing yeast in US Patent No. 7,851,188 which is currently being asserted against 
Gevo. Gevo also successfully petitioned the USPTO to reexamine Butamax’s claims 
in US Patent No. 7,993,889 covering a method of producing isobutanol using a recom-
binant yeast microorganism. The USPTO actions in the ‘188 and ‘889 patents also re-
inforced Gevo’s position that the technologies and process steps claimed by Butamax 
were known in the field, published in numerous scientific journals or invented by 
others, including Gevo, before Butamax applied for its patents. 
The recent emphasis of Gevo turned to biobased chemicals and intermediates, in par-
ticular, biobased solvents (isobutanol and n-butanol) and synthetic rubber and plas-
tics, based on isobutene derived from isobutanol. Concerning biofuels the focus 
turned to biojet fuel. Further promising developments with Gevo depend essentially on 
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achieving commercial scale production of isobutanol. To drive developments Gevo is 
working directly with its important potential customers. 
Gevo, Inc. through its wholly owned subsidiary, Gevo Development, LLC, has entered 
into a joint venture transaction (“JV”) with Redfield Energy, LLC of Redfield, SD, to 
retrofit Redfield’s existing ethanol plant into an isobutanol plant with an expected pro-
duction capacity of approximately 38 million gallons per year (MGPY). The retrofit 
commenced by year end 2011, and Gevo expected to begin commercial production of 
isobutanol at the facility in the fourth quarter of 2012. 
In July 2012 Gevo succeeded to ferment isobutanol in large (250,000 gallon) com-
mercial fermenters, isolate the product and get it into tanks and railcars. The learnings 
gained in achieving this milestone are viewed as enormous and further derisk Gevo 
technology. 
In 2012 Gevo established itself as a company producing bio-based solvents, meeting 
industry standard specifications for all current isobutanol and n-butanol applications, 
particularly derived solvents for the coatings market. 
Also in 2012 Gevo received a USDA $5 million grant for development of jet fuel from 
woody biomass and forest residues. The award is a portion of a $40 million grant pre-
sented to the Northwest Advanced Renewables Alliance (NARA), a consortium led by 
Washington State University (WSU). Other NARA members include the firms 
Weyerhaeuser, Catchlight Energy and Oregon State University, Pennsylvania State 
University, and the University of Minnesota. 
The airline industry and the US Department of Defense are eagerly looking for near-
term alternatives to petroleum-based jet fuel. Gevo previously announced its progress 
to airline engine testing using starch derived isobutanol to jet fuel. Gevo expects to 
receive full fuel certification by 2013 from the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM) for its biojet fuel.  
In 2011 Gevo successfully completed the construction and commissioning of the 
world’s largest ATJ biofuel demonstration plant at South Hampton Resources’ facility 
near Houston, TX. The facility has begun operations and is delivering test volumes of 
ATJ biofuel to Gevo’s initial customers. Gevo was awarded a contract by the Defense 
Logistics Agency to supply up to 11,000 gallons of ATJ based biojet fuel to the US Air 
Force. Also the German airline Lufthansa evaluates Gevo's renewable jet fuel. 
The German chemical firm LANXESS plays a key role for Gevo. It is not only the 
world’s largest synthetic rubber producer. Butyl rubber represents 25 percent of 
LANXESS’ sales. It is the world’s largest purchaser of isobutene and, for instance, in 
the long term, biobased isobutene will account for half of LANXESS synthetic rubber 
production at its plant in Sarnia, Canada. LANXESS strengthened its commitment to 
produce premium synthetic rubber from biobased raw materials and, as part of this 
commitment, it increased its minority shareholding in Gevo, Inc. in early 2011 
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amounting to 9.1 percent after having invested $17 million in Gevo’s IPO. LANXESS 
initially invested $10 million in Gevo as part of a private placement in May 2010. 
The LANXESS-Gevo partnership is working on a unique method that may hold the 
key to the sustainable production of isobutene and created a breakthrough dehydra-
tion process that converts isobutanol into isobutene. The dehydration process has not 
only proven to be successful in the laboratory by the end of 2011, but has also 
undergone several months of practical testing in a small-scale reactor at LANXESS’ 
site in Leverkusen, Germany 
In 2011 Gevo announced a groundbreaking agreement with The Coca-Cola Company 
(Coca-Cola) to create renewable para-xylene from plant-based isobutanol. Gevo will 
work to develop an integrated commercial-scale system to produce renewable para-
xylene, a key building block towards reaching Coca-Cola’s goal of leading the bever-
age industry away from fossil-fuel based packaging by offering an alternative made 
completely from renewable resources (PET plastic packaging). The global market for 
PET is 54 million metric tons and has a value of $100 billion, with approximately 30 
percent used for plastic bottles. 
Isobutanol that can be converted into para-xylene using known chemical processes is 
a key raw material in PET production. Gevo has previously set up a cooperation and 
is supplying the Japanese chemical giant Toray with lab-scale quantities of renewable 
para-xylene. Toray has successfully converted Gevo’s para-xylene into PET films and 
fibers. Toray employed its existing technology and new technology jointly developed 
with Gevo and used Gevo’s para-xylene and commercially available renewable mono 
ethylene glycol (MEG) to produce fully renewable PET (all of the carbon in this PET is 
renewable). 
Box I.26: Drivers for Synthetic Rubber from Biobased Intermediates 
[Bomgardner 2011e]. 
The common automobile tire contains rubber that is extracted from latex-bearing trees 
and rubber that is synthesized from petroleum feedstock. Industrial biotechnology 
companies such as Amyris, Gevo, and Genencor (belonging to Danisco which is now 
owned by DuPont) want to give tire manufacturers a third option: biobased rubber in-
termediates. Microbial fermentation targets three renewable rubber intermediates: iso-
prene, isobutene, and butadiene. Five-carbon isoprene is used to make synthetic latex 
similar to that of the rubber tree. Isobutene and butadiene are four-carbon intermedi-
ates used to make butyl rubber and styrene-butadiene rubber. 
Two leading tire makers – Goodyear and Michelin – along with synthetic rubber manu-
facturer LANXESS have entered into partnerships with industrial biotech firms to ad-
vance the commercial production of biobased rubber intermediates. But, it is still as-
sumed that new renewable sources will not be commercially available for another 
three to five years. 
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For instance, Goodyear partnering with Danisco’s Genencor confirmed that biobased 
isoprene meets specifications for the catalysts it uses in rubber manufacturing and 
has even made concept tires with it. But, the project originally targeted 2013 for com-
mercialization has been pushed back a few years. DuPont acquired Genencor’s pa-
rent company, Danisco, and now the new owner is weighing in. 
But it is not just that tire makers want to ride a “green wave.” They are also motivated 
by tightening supplies of both natural and synthetic rubber, driven in recent years by 
strong global demand, especially from emerging economies, by soaring postrecession 
demand and constraints on the expansion of rubber plantation acreage. The cost of a 
common grade of natural rubber shot up. 
Furthermore, today, the chemical intermediates come from the cracking of liquid feed-
stocks in ethylene plants. But as petrochemical makers switch to lighter natural gas 
feedstocks, production of C4 and C5 chemicals is drying up. Hence, tire makers want 
something to help them control volatile raw material costs. 
It is expected that overall global demand for both synthetic and natural rubber will 
grow to 35.9 million metric tons by 2020, from 25.7 million metric tons in 2011. De-
mand will be met roughly equally by synthetic and natural rubber. 
Basically, it is assumed that for renewable isoprene, isobutene, and butadiene the vol-
umes produced in the next five to ten years will remain quite small. And regarding 
their suppliers “it very much remains to be proven if they can produce on a cost-
competitive basis {compared} with more traditional petrochemical pathways.” Despite 
these facts industry representatives maintain that renewable feedstocks will be 
valuable to cushion swings in raw material costs. 
Though also emphasizing jet fuel another biofuel NTBF that changed its business di-
rection and strategy is Virdia (Table I.99). It focuses on high-quality C6 and C5 cellu-
losic sugars which can replace corn, beet, and cane sugars (!) and dry solid lignin. 
These sugars that do not compete with sugars for food consumption and lignin are 
ready for fermentations or chemical conversions as products and intermediates for 
industrial uses. That means Virdia offers products that are directly usable by industries 
with well established conversion processes for sugars (Figure I.184). Virdia can act as 
a raw material (input) supplier (Figure I.183). In this way, Virdia can address the 
following markets: 
 Diesel, jet fuel, gasoline, butanol (sugars); 
 Surfactants, lubricants, plastics, synthetic rubber (sugars); 
 Lignin as an energy source (for Virdia plants (cf. Table I.88) and other manu-
facturing plants); 
 Lignin-based complex carbon fibers to incorporate into composite materials 
for a large number of industries. 
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Early in 2012 Virdia announced major company milestones, including a new brand 
and CEO, and a $75 million deal with the Mississippi Development Authority to build 
manufacturing plants in the state. The agreement includes an incentive package with 
$75 million in low-interest loans, as well as up to $155 million in various tax incentives 
over a 10-year period. 
Furthermore, to fund its piloting activities and engineering plans, Virdia recently closed 
its latest round of financing, raising over $20 million from insiders, Khosla Ventures, 
Burrill & Company and Tamar Ventures. In addition, the company closed a $10 million 
venture debt deal with Triple Point Capital. 
The company will build, own and operate its first plant, and after that the company will 
pursue other business models including licensing its technology There are a number 
of competitors in the rush for sugar as a raw material, including Renmatix, Inc. 
(A.1.1.6) and BlueFire’s SucreSource (Table I.86) [Lane 2012r]. 
Emphasizing diesel and surfactants and lubricants Virdia has interfaces to LS9 (Table 
I.99). As other “biofuels startups” LS9 has shifted its emphasis more towards the che-
micals side of its portfolio [De Guzman 2012a]. LS9 now positions itself as a supplier 
and licensor of technologies to the fuels industry, but will entertain direct project par-
ticipation on a case-by-case basis. In its chemicals orientation it envisions more of a 
partner-venture model or potentially select LS9-only investments. 
LS9’s target is to provide drop-in chemicals and fuels. Its chemical products are the 
building blocks for many functional materials, such as surfactants, lubricants, emol-
lients, and functional fluids. Drop-in biofuels are fuels containing hydrocarbons identi-
cal to those in petroleum-based gasoline. 
By the end of 2011 LS9 scaled its technology to the 20,000 liter scale, demonstrating 
continued progress in the scale-up and commercialization of its biobased chemicals 
and fuels technology platform. From initial production of 1,000 liters at the Company’s 
pilot plant in South San Francisco, California, LS9 has utilized a 20-fold step-up pro-
cess to produce approximately one ton of a specific chemical for its strategic partner, 
Proctor & Gamble (P&G). 
LS9’s initial products in the chemicals arena were sugar-based fatty alcohols (C10-
C18) and specialty esters, such as biodiesel fatty acid methyl esters (FAMEs) and 
fatty acid ethyl esters (FAEEs) under the banner of UltraClean Diesel, which can be 
directly blended into current petroleum-based diesel. And the company said it has 
already shipped a ton of fatty alcohol from its pilot facility (and headquarters) in San 
Francisco to P&G for sampling into surfactant products [De Guzman 2012a]. These 
products are directed against natural oils as a raw material (Figure I.184). 
Biobased feedstock means essentially traditional feedstock. These include traditional 
feedstocks, such as sugarcane and corn syrups, waste products such as molasses 
and glycerin, and emerging feedstocks such as sweet sorghum syrup and the hydro-
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lysates of plant biomass (for instance, from Virdia). Addressing all of these, LS9 
avoids the many issues with the procurement and pretreatment processes in 
biomass/waste to biofuels conversions (Figure I.184). 
By mid of 2011 LS9 in conjunction with partner Virdia (HCL CleanTech) was awarded 
a $9 million grant from the Department of Energy (DOE) to improve and demonstrate 
an integrated process to convert biomass feedstocks into fermentable sugars (Virdia 
part) and then into diesel and other fuel and chemical products (LS9 part). Virdia ad-
dresses surfactants and lubricants explicitly as its markets. LS9 is also looking to build 
a brownfield 10,000-25,000 tons/year facility initially in Brazil to produce sugarcane-
based chemicals [De Guzman 2012a]. 
For June 2012 LS9 planned the opening of its scaled-up demonstration facility. LS9 
uses genetically engineered microbes to convert biobased feedstock to diesel and 
chemical intermediates in Florida. The Okeechobee plant, which will start making 
biodiesel, contains a 135,000-l fermentation vessel, a jump from earlier production of 
50,000-l quantities. The output shall provide commercial samples for testing by pro-
spective customers [Bomgardner 2012a]. 
LS9 is hoping to hit their commercialization target by the end of 2012 (obviously they 
were about 85 percent). Its 135,000 liter fermentation vessel is a key: “At that scale, 
we are close to world-scale fermentation, which is about 3-4x away. We are well along 
the pathway towards de-risking our technology processing. The Florida facility has 
four (each at 700,000 liter) world-scale fermentation capability.” “The company is 
looking for a strategic round of funding this year to go to commercial-scale up by the 
end of 2014.” [De Guzman 2012a] 
Since around 2010/2011 bio-lubricants are in the spotlight of NTBFs like Virdia or LS9 
which originally targeted biofuels. And also Amyris formed a joint venture with distribu-
tor US Venture to produce, market and distribute finished lubricants for the North 
American market using Amyris’ farnesene-derived base oils. Amyris is said to be 
working on the production of a complete line of renewable lubricants, including hy-
draulic, compressor, turbine and gear oil and grease, as well as 2-cycle and 4-cycle 
engine oil [De Guzman 2011a]. 
Typically lubricants contain 90 percent “base oil” and less than 10 percent additives. 
Base oils are mostly derived from a mixture of fractions of the crude petroleum oil 
refining process. Natural (vegetable) oils (Figure I.184) are also used as base oils and 
there are already a lot of biobased lubricants in the market especially derived from 
vegetable oil. 
For instance, bio-based hydraulic fluids are estimated to grow 5-10 percent per year 
worldwide and now represent 2-4 percent (US) and 3-7 percent (EU) of the hydraulics 
markets mostly because of advancement in performance, cost and its “green” factors. 
Amyris’s modified yeast converts the cane syrup to farnesene (Biofene™) which then 
has to be finished chemically to create base oils [De Guzman 2011a]. 
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Structuring Complexity of Biofuels for Entrepreneurship and Intra-
preneurship 
With all the outlined empirical observations concerning involved firms (players), their 
technologies, types of offerings, financing and leadership/management approaches, 
development and innovation processes (Figure I.180) and hindsight, one can take a 
more fundamentally structured view of biofuels and their promise to be available, 
affordable, and clean.  
Taken all the input and process variables together biofuels production and commer-
cialization represents a combinatorical complex problem. Systemic complexity of en-
trepreneurship in biofuels referring to the input-conversion-output block (Figure I.5) 
may be approached by Equation I.21 where co-product variety may induce the con-
sideration whether the co-products shall become significant contributions to the firm’s 
revenue stream or fed back into the production process, for instance, for energy 
(steam) generation. 
Equation I.21 and the implicitly associated hurdles (Figure I.171) represent simultane-
ously the space of business opportunities, the opportunity landscape, in biofuels. But, 
there are almost too many options to choose from, particularly if the chosen option 
shall give a sufficiently reliable assessment regarding 1) the overall energy efficiency 
(energy input; Equation I.20:), 2) overall Greenhouse gas emissions (by products and 
processes) and 3) whether the cost to produce in relation to the mineral oil price 
calculated for laboratory or pilot plant arrangements will also materialize in large-scale 
commercial plants. 
Equation I.21: 
Biofuels Input-Output Complexity → 
Input type variety (types of biomass/algae) ⊗ Input location/transportation variety ⊗ 
Conversion sub-process variety (thermochemical, bioengineering, “hybrid”) ⊗ 
Microbe/bacteria/yeast/enzyme/microorganism variety ⊗ Scale-up approaches ⊗ 
Output/product variety (type of biofuel) ⊗ co-product variety ⊗ by-product variety …  
As the space provided by the biofuels value system is so large and complex, one sees 
a myriad of diversity in the range of business models – and entrepreneurial risks. Ma-
jor risks and development hurdles are listed below. A very detailed description of risks 
and hurdles can be found, for instance, in the offering prospectus of Amyris Biotech-
nologies [SEC 2010]. 
 Contextual legislative/regulatory risks (changes of biofuels related laws and 
programs, for instance, blending mandates, requirements of certificates; “pol-
icy and politics”); 
 Special Regulatory Risks (plant permissions); 
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 Funding Risks (by VCs, large firms, government, funding priorities among 
different types of biofuels or input); research approach highly dependent on 
grants: change of government – change of programs and financial support; 
 Technological Risks (scale-up, cost) 
 Environmental Risks (societal attitudes; products are not so “green”; GMOs); 
 Supply Risks (type of biomass input; cost of biomass procurement and logis-
tics, biomass price developments); 
 Financial Risks (CAPEX, OPEX; profit, exit in VC-backed NTBFs); 
 Operational & Execution Risks (management, partnerships with other firms); 
 Market Risks (adoption; oil price, natural gas price for thermochemical pro-
cesses, acceptance of GMOs for bioengineering/hybrid processes; special 
situation of policy-driven markets); 
 Infrastructural Risks (Big Oil’s role for the transportation fuels industry). 
When producing next generation biofuels from renewable, non-food feedstocks like 
wood-chips, roughly 25 percent of the output is lignin. Firms can burn the lignin and 
thus transform a “by-product” into an energy contribution to drive their processes. 
However, lignin and the chemical properties and functional attributes of a wide range 
of lignin derivatives, for instance, lignins in carbon fiber, open also new opportunities 
for entrepreneurship: High purity lignin extractives (and their subsequent derivatives) 
which can be engineered to meet the chemical properties and functional requirements 
of a range of industrial applications that until now has not been possible with tradi-
tional lignin by-products generated from other processes. 
On the input and output level one can differentiate “plant-based biomass” and appro-
priate waste versus aquatic biomass like algae and output in terms of bioalcohols (bio-
methanol, bioethanol, or biobutanol), biogasoline and biodiesel and jet fuel. 
For most business plans of biofuels startups addressing a policy-driven market was 
central. And often the business models for many biofuel companies were predicated 
on a much higher price of crude oil, making biofuels more attractive. 
Concerning output the fundamental “pure biofuel versus biorefinery model” was actu-
ally often reduced to a “biorefinery light” model providing just small volumes of se-
lected biobased chemicals for various industries originally encountered as co-pro-
ducts. 
The actual complexity expressed in Equation I.21 can be visualized by a number of 
graphics. In Figure I.183 key components for business models and the financing mo-
dels are summarized. There is a broad diversity in the range of business models. 
Input, conversion technologies and output options are largely specified in Figure I.184. 
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Figure I.183: Optional components and financing options for business models of bio-
fuels NTBFs. 
One important model for these CleanTech companies is to make strategic alliances 
with big or giant companies. For example, they can trade sales and marketing rights 
for a capital investment. Or they can sell the licensing rights for a product in exchange 
for an investment. Or they establishe JRAs or JDAs. 
There was a clear focus of the cooperative model on “Big Oil” and “Big Chemistry” and 
sometimes also the automotive and tire industry. As many NTBFs emphasized a 
producer/owner and licensor approach, as they stumble, big companies will be able to 
snap up technologies on the cheap, when and where they need them [Carey 2009]. 
Finally, an important business model addresses input localization, establishing pro-
duction (subsidiaries or JVs) where input is plentiful and cheap and in sufficient proxi-
mity to the plant(s) to minimize transportation and storage cost. In this regard, for 
instance, BP/Verenium JV Vercipia (Table I.83, Table I.84), Cobalt/Rhodia (Table 
I.96), Amyris and LS9 (Table I.99) addressed Brazil. On the micro-level one also finds 
localization near steel or power plants for flue gas (LanzaTech and some algae firms) 
or land fills (waste). 
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For to-be entrepreneurs in biofuels this does not only mean to know critically 
these competitive technologies, but also to know the patent landscape around 
the anticipated technology to be used and the related existing intellectual pro-
perty rights. 
Figure I.184 summarizes essentially the technologies discussed so far for generating 
second and third order biofuels. 
 
Figure I.184: Biomass conversions: many feedstocks, many conversion options, 
many products; different economics and energy balances (adapted from Khosla 
2009a]). 
Figure I.184 does not address explicitly the pretreatment and hydrolysis sub-proces-
ses leading to fermentable sugars and correspondingly whether the subsequent fer-
mentation proceeds with C6 or C5 sugars or C6 and C5 sugars. The pretreatment pro-
cess of biomass has several options, for instance,  
 Water-based (hot water or steam explosion, combination of both) 
 Chemistry-oriented (acids, alkaline bases, ammonia or oxidative processes); 
 1106 Appendix A 
 Solvent-based (alcohols, esters or both); especially “supercritical water” (A 
supercritical fluid is any substance at a temperature and pressure above its 
critical point, where distinct liquid and gas phases do not exist (A.1.1.6). 
Supercritical water is suitable as a substitute for organic solvents. Super-
critical water oxidation is a process that can be used to advantage in the 
destruction of hazardous wastes.) 
 Biological (enzymes or microbes; enzyme activity and cost?). 
Which process will be adopted by around 2020 as the leading technology is still hard 
to predict because process economics are key and industrial scale production are just 
emerging. 
Figure I.185 illustrates rather than completely reflects the issues and complexity of 
cost and energy efficiency consideration for manufacturing second-order bioalcohols. 
 
Figure I.185: Some biofuels energy and cost efficiency options for input and conver-
sion emphasizing second-generation biofuels. 
One key issue of biofuels economics is find feedstock (Table I.97) at a good relatively 
stable price over a mid-term period. Basically, it seems that sugarcane and its ba-
gasse and the plant that the sugarcane comes from is going to be the cheapest, most 
scalable feedstock on a global basis for quite a while. Obviously, sugarcane is going 
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to be best within some distance from the equator. And biofuels startups seek localiza-
tion of subsidiaries or JVs to be established in Brazil. 
Correspondingly, firms, such as BASF and Monsanto as described above (A.1.1.1), 
are genetically engineering sugarcane to produce more sugar per acre and take less 
fertilizer and less water.  
In different climates other (non-waste) feedstock exhibit also good potential. For in-
stance, sugar beets, sorghum, cassava, and things like this have very high sugar 
content. 
That means economically, any biofuels startup whose process requires to first con-
verting biomass into sugar(s) is squeezed between two benchmarks: 
 Output cost has a ceiling related to the price of petro-oil (currently ca. $100 
per barrel rather than $85 as given in Figure I.185 for 2008/2009). 
 If fermentable sugar is the key input cost will have to meet the price of Brazil-
ian sugar derived from sugarcane. 
By mid of 2011 one would have spotted the probable winners to be those with deep 
pockets and patience, such as Royal Dutch Shell, BP, chemical giant DuPont, 
agriculture giants Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) or Cargill or the rare startups with 
significant revenues from businesses other than biofuels, such as making biobased 
chemicals (specialty or fine chemicals or building block monomers or drugs) or serving 
the health and nutrition segments as in case of algae. 
But, what are then options of biofuels startups lacking the above features as a pre-
ferred exit strategy, acquisition or IPO? Obviously, going public is pretty much difficult. 
If there is a very sound prove that the startup has economical and scalable biofuels, 
and it is IP protected, then there is a chance to become a public company. But the 
reality is that most firms that are venture-backed actually will sell. Many people think if 
they can get a good valuation on a merger and acquisition transaction, they should go 
ahead and do that instead of get in a critical public market. 
All these difficulties do not mean advanced biofuels are not coming, or that they will 
not play a role in fighting climate change. But everything will happen more slowly than 
many venture capitalists and government expect. 
Indicative of this situation, in 2012 BASF and Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM) made 
opposite announcements within few weeks around the same overall subject. BASF 
invested in a company which proposes a singular technology to address a “sugar 
platform” to transform biomass into fermentable sugars (A.1.1.6) while ADM at the 
very end of the same biochemical value chain decided to exit from its five-year-old 
venture bioplastic’s JV Telles with Metabolix [Molitor 2012, Runge 2006:871]. 
Telles produces Mirel, Metabolix’ biobased biodegradable plastic at a fermentation fa-
cility in Clinton, Iowa, that has capacity to produce 50,000 tons per year of Mirel, a 
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polyhydroxyalkanoate, or PHA, plastic. The facility is adjacent to an ADM corn-
processing plant and was built and owned by ADM. With ADM exiting the venture 
Metabolix will lose access to the facility and its corn sugar feedstocks. The intellectual 
property related to Mirel will revert back to Metabolix. “ADM says financial returns from 
the five-year-old venture, called Telles, were too uncertain.” [Bomgardner 2012d] 
Already in January 2010 it has been reported that the “PHA project between Metabolix 
and ADM has suffered delays and cost overruns.” [Taylor 2010]. 
The ADM decision puts a spotlight to the entire family of polyesters and their mono-
mers (for instance, including the 3-hydroxypropionic acid – 3-HP [Runge 2006: 867-
868]). 
Beyond the production of bioplastics several companies intend to convert the 3-
hydroxypropionic acid into acrylic acid (for instance, OPX Technologies; A.1.1.6). “No 
doubt that the ADM decision will have an impact on future IPO’s or investment rounds 
of start-ups whose businesses have to pass the so-called ‘valley of death’ when 
development cost unexpectedly increase and the perceived risks and uncertainty.” 
[Molitor 2012] 
“Both decisions point the current perceived risks and uncertainty in the white biotech-
nology field: on one hand biorefinery concept as an alternative to a petrochemical 
feedstock and on the other hand the scale-up of fermentation processes to economic 
viable and attractive margins.” [Molitor 2012] 
The mid-2012 economic developments indicated the possibility of another downturn – 
with consequences for the biofuels field and one is reminded of what has happened 
before. In the early 1980s, higher-mileage cars and an economic downturn sent 
petroleum prices swooning, killing off many renewable energy efforts, including those 
supported by Big Oil. 
Remarks Concerning the Role and Effects of Policy on Technology 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
With all the issues and problems of biofuels and Cleantech in general “thank good-
ness cleantech has the government as a customer.” [Bormgardner 2011c] 
Policy as an “investor” in capital-intensive innovation and entrepreneurship is not new, 
particularly not in Germany (ch. 1.2.6; Box I.2, Box I.3; A.1.1.2). But also in the US 
much more than one hundred and fifty years ago this was not unusual, for instance, 
with regard to Samuel Morse (1791 – 1872), the co-inventor of the telegraph code and 
American contributor to the invention of a single-wire telegraph system based on 
European telegraphs. Morse combined marketing and political skills to secure state 
funding for development work, and to spread the concept of communication over vast 
distances on the continent of America in 1844. 110 
 Appendix A 1109 
However, over the last decade also the US encountered very strong intervening into 
the entrepreneurship arena generating policy-driven markets. But, the mental frame-
work of policy concerning entrepreneurship and innovation is very simplistic (in the US 
and Germany). Take biofuels or biorefineries: 
A government agency puts into place an alternative feedstock program, identifies 
molecules, and provides funding; national labs or research centers develop the organ-
ism; and then a private company works with development partners to move the R&D 
project through to commercialization. 
For instance, US President Bush outlined his plan to offer tax credits, subsidies, and 
federal research support to fuel a drive for (bio) ethanol that would move the nation 
“beyond a petroleum-based economy and make our dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil a thing of the past.” 
Bush’s support for ethanol and his mix of energy, economic, and electoral policies 
have been continued by President Obama, particularly the push for fuels made from 
cellulosic feedstocks. They have provided billions of dollars to support cellulosic etha-
nol R&D and biorefinery construction. But despite the money and talk, no commercial 
cellulosic ethanol biorefinery is operating in the US [Johnson 2010]. 
President Obama has explicitly called for government funding to be used as a tool to 
promote the next great companies. And the National Economic Council announced a 
“National Innovation Strategy” in which “the government should make sure individuals 
and businesses have the tools and support to take risks and innovate.” [Bandyk 2009] 
Generally, for the (renewable) energy and CleanTech field there was a grow-
ing interaction and collaboration between federal and state governments and 
authorities and the country’s entrepreneurs. 
The potential payoff for entrepreneurs in these fields was big enough that it is 
worth spending time and money. And it cannot be excluded that one or the 
other entrepreneur can be a beneficiary of favoritism. 
For policy-driven markets it is important for NTBFs looking for or being de-
pendent on grants to have persons in their leadership team early on with ex-
perience and preferentially established contacts to the political world on the 
federal, state and county/communality level. 
The job this personnel has and the related importance emerges as “VP of 
Regulatory Affairs” (Gevo, Table I.99), “SVP of Government Relations” 
(Solazyme, Table I.90) or as a role and responsibility assigned to a particular 
SVP (Bluefire, Necy Sumait) or even hiring a former US state governor like 
Renmatix (B.2). 
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There is some evidence that the increasing role of the federal government has forced 
many entrepreneurs in the US to emphasize lobbying, politicking, and jumping through 
administrative hurdles (cf. SiGNa, ch. 1.2.2; B.2). Similar effects – more under the sur-
face – can also be envisioned in Germany. 
During a conference in Washington D.C. in 2009 one panelist, Jonathan Wolfson, 
CEO of biofuel firm Solazyme (Table I.90), was somewhat surprised he found himself 
in D.C. “In the 50, 60s, and 70s, entrepreneurs did not come to Washington,” he said. 
The difference in culture is stark between the world of politics and the world of entre-
preneurship. “Silicon Valley is a meritocracy. Best business strategy wins,” said 
Wolfson, whose company Solazyme recently just won a contract with the Department 
of Defense to develop clean biofuel produced from algae for the US Navy, as well as a 
Department of Energy grant to build a biorefinery [Bandyk 2009]. 
And Wes Bolsen of the cellulosic ethanol company Coskata (Table I.99), a speaker at 
the conference, added. “Washington, D.C. has become the new Wall Street when 
banks aren’t lending.” But many attendees expressed skepticism that any one entre-
preneur with a great idea could attract the federal government’s attention – and wallet 
– without significant political connections. 
But despite all this investment in high-tech companies, venture capitalists who work in 
the field were skeptical that the money will find the new drivers. “Is {the stimulus 
money} a good use of tax dollars? Maybe,” said John Backus, managing partner at a 
VC firm. “But will it spur innovation? No.” One concern is that the brand-new innova-
tive companies will get left out.” “The government doesn’t know how to work with 20-
person companies,” said Backus. “Most cleantech money in stimulus won’t go to the 
startups. It goes to the defense contract giants.” [Bandyk 2009] 
And Bandyk [2009] continued: Those who have won contracts with the government 
are much more comfortable with the growing collaboration between Washington and 
the nation’s entrepreneurs. “Government has always had a major role in the energy 
industry,” Wolfson said. In the case of his firm, government might be necessary. Get-
ting production of his company’s algae-based biofuels off the ground will require sig-
nificant investment – over $100 million for one plant – that the capital markets simply 
cannot supply right now, he said. But he did not want to be a beneficiary of favoritism 
– Wolfson said that after government investment gets the ball rolling, the market 
should take care of the rest. “Policy should be driven by ends and be technology-
agnostic,” he said. 
For entrepreneurs like Wolfson, the potential payoff is big enough that it is worth 
spending time and money away from Silicon Valley to take the risk that the Obama 
administration will not pick their technologies.  
For instance, expenses for lobbying for Sriya Innovations Inc. (connected to RenMatix 
in A.1.1.6, B.2) amounted to $30,000.00 in 2010 for Provisions in pending energy and 
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climate legislation (S.1462, S.2877, Draft APA by Kerry / Lieberman) related to Bio-
fuels. 
In the face petro-oil drying out and soaring energy demands over the past decade, 
more than 50 countries, including the US and Germany, have been scurrying to imple-
ment policies to integrate biofuels into the transportation infrastructure in the face of a 
number of pressing needs – national energy security, a sustainable agricultural sector, 
job creation in the rural economy, and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions to curtail 
climate change. 
“The biofuels business globally would not exist if it weren’t for the mandates.” Thanks 
to the policies, global biofuel production has gone from about 4 billion gal in 2000 to 
more than 26 billion gal in 2010 [Mukhopadhyay 2011e]. 
A recent detailed analysis [Mukhopadhyay 2011e] culminated in the conclusion that 
government mandates have shaped the market but not always for the best due to 
unsustainable production (Box I.1). 
It has becoming clear that biofuels will not solve all the problems proponents had 
hoped they would solve, but many countries are still rushing headlong as though they 
will, with policies that, experts say, are doing both harm and good. Governments need 
to pause, step back, and take a more nuanced and sophisticated view of biofuels, 
taking into consideration their sustainability and social costs – and, furthermore, 
should be aware of systemic effects they may induce (Box I.1) – as painfully encoun-
tered by the recent Great Recession and the financial crisis. 
A particular questionable role of government for CleanTech is observed in the US 
looking at massive bankruptcies of solar, photovoltaic firm Solyndra, Inc. (ch. 4.3.5.2), 
battery NTBF A123 (ch. 3.2.1) or most recently electric car manufacturing NTBF 
Fisker Automotive (founded in January 2005). Fisker is the US Government’s “biggest 
public loss since the infamous Solyndra Solar debacle.” [Koetsier 2013] Fisker was 
one of the largest US venture capital backed companies ever. 
Based on exclusive documents PrivCo [2013] outlined how a “billion dollar startup 
became a billion dollar disaster” and “2 of America’s smartest VCs – Kleiner Perkins & 
New Enterprise Associates & others to lose over $1 billion dollars in ‘The Largest 
Venture Capital Investment Debacle in U.S. History.’“  
The PrivCo Fisker Papers released “never before seen original government docu-
ments regarding the Department of Energy’s $529 Million loan to Fisker Automotive, 
definitively proving loan underwriting that no rational lender would have ever under-
taken, waiver after waiver from the D.O.E. after Fisker missed covenants of the Loan, 
and the subsequent concerted effort by the Loan Programs Office to cover up and 
obfuscate the unraveling of Fisker and the inevitable erasure of U.S. taxpayer 
collateral that funded the Loan.”  
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Explicit descriptions of the DOE $529 million loan issue on the “Fisker case” are also 
given, for instance, by Koetsier [2013], Chernova and Ramsey [2013] and Vlasic 
[2013]. “The untested Fisker loans totaled $529 million, more than the company had 
initially requested, and an amount that encouraged private backers to chip in more 
funds.” [Chernova and Ramsey 2013] (See also Figure I.34 for encouraging private 
backers in policy-driven markets.) 
“Fisker has become – to lawmakers and others – the Solyndra of the electric car 
industry.” “Fisker, with its technical problems, management turmoil and mounting 
losses, offers a cautionary tale in the fiercely competitive arena of alternative-fuel 
vehicles and of government subsidies for start-up businesses.” [Vlasic 2013] 
A.1.1.6 The Shift from Biofuels and Co-Products to 
Biobased Chemicals as the Primary Target of 
Entrepreneurship 
Back to the Agricultural Future for Chemical Innovations: 
What’s a rerun? 
[Runge 2006:563 
A Different Context 
An overview of the biofuels industry situation by 2010 is given by Wikipedia. 111 As 
outlined in the previous sub-chapter there emerged a clear shift of many “promising” 
biofuel NTBFs’ business models from biofuels to biobased chemicals. Here, the type 
of advanced biofuels (fuel not made from food-like feedstocks such as corn sugar) 
was cellulosic ethanol [Bomgardner 2011b]. 
With so much land devoted to raising livestock feed the focus of biofuels startups 
could also be on feed. For instance, animal feed is a lucrative business for the US, 
with China importing it at rates of up to 50 cents a lb. If methods can be developed to 
break down plant cell walls to get the sugars for biofuels while saving the proteins for 
animal feed, biofuel sources, such as corn or algae (Table I.90), can provide fuel and 
feed [Mukhopadhyay 2011e]. 
Also the role of the US chemical giants DuPont (Table I.83) and Dow Chemical 
(Figure I.179) in biofuels has been tackled above. 
In the area of polymers and plastics DuPont followed a stepwise crossover strategy 
for biobased products. This means for chemical products produced by a proven proc-
ess by several components the overall transition to a fully biobased product proceeds 
through substituting the components separately by already available biobased com-
ponents. 
For instance, DuPont used petroleum-derived propanediol (PDO) to produce some 
10,000 metric tons of Sorona per year. DuPont’s Sorona 3GT is a copolymer de-
signed to be made from corn-derived 1,3-propanediol and petroleum-derived tereph-
 Appendix A 1113 
thalic acid (Sorona: polytrimethylene terephthalate (PTT) polyester). DuPont then 
started construction of a large-scale propanediol fermentation facility in collaboration 
with carbohydrate processor Tate & Lyle. Intermediates for DuPont Sorona® polymer 
would then use Bio-PDO™ to get a partially biobased copolymer [Runge 2006:583] – 
but have to wait for availability of biobased terephthalic acid. 
The enormous and looming challenge facing biofuels companies, of which none have 
actually gotten far enough with the research process to confront, is scaling-up to the 
enormous requirements of the transportation fuel market and getting the costs down 
to achieve pump parity. Without those two achievements and the necessary capital, all 
of these firms remain science and technology experiments. Additionally, for the bioen-
gineering route to biofuels a genetic breakthrough has nothing to do with a (produc-
tion) breakthrough when scaling-up to large-scale production. 
Things are different if biomass from food-like feedstocks, such as corn or sugarcane, 
is taken into consideration. For instance, NTBFs with a biorefinery approach with food-
related ethanol as a basic chemical for biobased polyethylene or polypropylene may 
find strategic partners in the Brazilian plastics industry (cf. Figure I.174). 
Braskem SA, the largest (petro-)chemical company in the Americas by production 
capacity and among the top ten largest in the world, initiated a five-year project with 
Danish enzymes manufacturer Novozymes to work on a new sugarcane-based route 
to polypropylene. Braskem has already synthesized polypropylene from sugar-based 
ethanol. 
In 2009 Braskem was constructing a 200,000-metric-ton-per-year plant to make 
polyethylene from ethanol, planned to be completed in 2010. And it signed contracts 
to sell the “green” polyethylene to the global packaging giant Tetra Pak [Tullo 2009]. 
And in 2011 Braskem started up the 200,000-metric-ton ethanol-based polyethylene 
plant in Brazil [Tullo 2011]. 
For instance, German LANXESS does not only target biobased butylrubber through its 
cooperation with Gevo (see above), but also ethylene propylene diene monomer 
(EPDM) synthetic rubber. It plans to use ethylene derived from the purely renewable 
resource sugarcane. Braskem shall supply the bio-based ethylene via pipeline to 
LANXESS’ existing EPDM plant in Brazil. It will be the first form of bio-based EPDM 
rubber in the world [Specialchem4polymers 2011] and will be sold under the brand 
name Keltan Eco. 
Activities of the chemical industry until 2005/2006 are described by Runge (The Che-
mical Industry in a Biobased Economy [Runge 2006:567-571], White (Industrial) Bio-
technology in a Biobased Chemical Industry [Runge 2006:571-578] and Research, 
Development and Innovation with Renewable Resources in the Chemical Industry – 
Green Chemistry [Runge 2006:578-590]). 
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The concept of a “biobased chemistry” including biobased plastics is not new. In the 
1920s in the US there was a strong movement in that direction under the name 
“chemurgy,” but was ultimately stopped by political interference of the petrochemical 
industry  [Runge 2006:565-566]. 
Some early entrepreneurial activities in biobased chemical solvents were reported in 
the 1990s [Runge 2006:860-861]. The bio-oriented small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) often targeted areas that were niches. The “green solvents” niche at 
that time was a generic thrust in line with general trends to replace organic solvents 
due to regulatory pressures. The emphasis was on oxygenated solvents, such as 
lactic acid esters (like ethyl lactate) and soy-based solvents (methyl soyate). 
For instance, Vertec Biosolvents Inc. (assumed to be founded in 1997 and currently 
having five issued US patents) produced environmentally friendly solvents made from 
ethyl lactate derived from farmer grown corn and soybeans. Vertec BioSolvents of-
fered also environmentally-friendly ink cleaners. Vertec Biosolvents, in particular, was 
planning to replace NMP (N-methyl pyrrolidone, Figure I.187), a powerful organic sol-
vent with broad solubility for resins and high chemical and thermal stability. 
Currently Vertec Biosolvents manufactures and sells biosolvents and formulations 
(blends) based primarily on four major ingredients – ethyl lactate, fatty acid methyl 
esters (soy methyl esters), d-limonene and ethanol for a variety of specialty applica-
tions in industrial and agricultural markets targeting replacement of petrochemical 
solvents in use, even NMP and hydrocarbon solvents. 
Another firm which, by the mid of the 1990s, focused early on green oxygenated sol-
vents was Diversified Natural Products, Inc. (DNP), an industrial biotechnology com-
pany organized into two divisions, Biobased Fuels and Chemicals, and Gourmet and 
Functional Foods. Its main product was succinic acid. 
DNP addressed another niche which comprises “short chain diacids” called “building 
block chemicals” (see below) that can serve as key feedstock for future biorefineries 
(for instance, adipic acid = hexanedioic acid HOOC-(CH2)4-COOH or succinic acid = 
butanedioic acid HOOC-CH2-CH2-COOH) or even long-chain diacids. DNP received 
investment from several Japanese venture firms including Toyota Tsusho Corp., a 
sister company of Japanese automaker Toyota Motor Corp. [Runge 2006:860-861]. 
The origins of the DNP’s succinic acid business go back to 1995, when it was estab-
lished by a company called Applied CarboChemicals. The company operated under 
this name until 2003, when it was restructured, refinanced and renamed Diversified 
Natural Products. The company subsequently expanded its activities into other fields; 
succinic acid became just one of its businesses [ORNL 2010]. 
In 2006, Diversified Natural Products established a collaborative R&D effort with Agro 
Industrie Recherches et Développements (ARD), the R&D subsidiary of a French agri-
cultural consortium led by Champagne Cereales. The focus was on disuccinate esters 
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as “green solvents.” Over the next two years the partners scaled-up succinic acid pro-
duction to 80,000 liters and developed an economical, aqueous based isolation and 
purification process [ORNL 2010]. 
DNP Green Technology was established in 2008, when all succinic acid assets, in-
cluding all intellectual property, contracts, joint venture interest and employees, were 
spun off from DNP. Following the spin off, the company’s shares were distributed to 
Diversified Natural Product’s shareholders, making DNP Green Technology a stand-
alone legal entity with no ties to Diversified Natural Products. 
A joint venture called Bioamber SAS between ARD and its US partner DNP Green 
Technology was established in 2008, resulting from the R&D partnership between its 
two shareholders. BioAmber targeted succinic acid production. The existing organism 
for production, originally funded by the DOE in the late 1990s, was further developed 
and scaled-up, and optimized at the large-scale manufacturing facility in France [De 
Guzman 2011b] 
ARD industrialized its laboratory procedure and invested €21 million in an industrial 
demonstration facility with a capacity of 2,000 tons per year. BioDémo enjoyed also 
financial support from the General Council of the Marne Département (€1.25 million), 
the Champagne-Ardenne Region (€1.25 million) and the ERDF (€2.5 million). 
Diversified Natural Products contributed its intellectual property portfolio. 
DNP Green Technology fully executed an exclusive license agreement for three 
patents invented solely by Argonne National Laboratory and jointly by Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) or Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), one patent spe-
cifically was on “Mutant E.coli Strain with increased succinic acid production” [ORNL 
2010]. Their process uses a strain developed particularly to produce succinic acid, 
with wheat-derived glucose currently being used as the substrate. 
In 2009, DNP Green Technology completed a $12 million financing with a group of in-
stitutional investors led by Sofinnova Partners, a European venture capital firm, and 
including, for instance, also the Japanese Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners. In 2010 DNP 
Green Technology acquired 100 percent of the shares of its BioAmber joint venture 
from ARD. Concurrent with the acquisition of the joint venture, DNP Green Tech-
nology changed its name to BioAmber Inc. Siclae, a leading European agricultural 
group and the principal shareholder of ARD, became a shareholder in BioAmber 
through the transition [ORNL 2010]. 
BioAmber owns or have exclusive rights to specific microorganisms, chemical cataly-
sis technology and a unique, scalable and flexible purification process. BioAmber 
manufactures its bio-succinic acid in a facility using a commercial scale 350,000 liter 
fermenter in Pomacle, France, which was used to refine its process and issue a claim 
to make cost-competitive bio-succinic acid. The purpose of the Pomacle plant is to 
showcase the production technology, which is available for license by other parties. 
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As expected, BioAmber has set up a “veterans approach.” Its management team con-
sists of experienced professionals, possessing on average over 25 years of relevant 
experience in scaling-up, manufacturing and commercializing chemicals, gained at 
large companies or entrepreneurial startups. 
Since its creation in 2008, BioAmber executed its strategy by several business part-
nerships and had successfully commissioned an industrial scale production facility. It 
has moved down the value chain through its acquisition of Sinoven Biopolymers, 
which produces modified PBS (Figure I.187), an innovative biodegradable polymer. 
BioAmber has licensed DuPont’s hydrogenation catalyst technology to make bio-
based 1,4 butanediol (BDO). The major uses of BDO (Figure I.187) are in the pro-
duction of tetrahydrofuran (THF) and polybutylene terephthalate (PBT). 
Recently, BioAmber has signed an agreement with Mitsui to jointly build a facility in 
Sarnia, Ontario, that is expected to produce bio-succinic acid and bio-BDO with a total 
capacity of 34,000 metric tons of bio-succinic acid and 23,000 metric tons of bio-BDO 
at full capacity.[Bomgardner 2011g]. 
The Sarnia plant will be operated by BioAmber’s new subsidiary Bluewater Biochemi-
cals, and will have initial capacity of 17,000 tons per year by 2013. This capacity will 
increase to 35,000 tons/year by 2014 and will then use next-generation yeast devel-
oped by Cargill and successfully used and commercialized by Cargill in lactic acid 
production. 
The Bluewater Biochemicals subsidiary was specifically created as a Canadian legal 
entity that will own and operate the Sarnia plant. The Sarnia plant investment was 
supported by government grant/loans [De Guzman 2011b]. The Sarnia plant will 
initially use corn kernels as a sugar source for E. coli fermentation. But the switch to 
the engineered yeast licensed exclusively from Cargill will mean producing succinic 
acid from hydrolyzed agricultural wastes, such as corn stover [Ritter 2011]. 
In 2011 BioAmber formed a number of partnership, for instance, with Mitsubishi Che-
mical Corp. (MCC) of Japan to produce bio-succinic acid for MCC’s joint venture 
company PTT MCC Biochem. The joint venture will manufacture and market bio-poly-
butylene succinate (PBS). BioAmber plans to have its succinic acid facility located 
next to PTT MCC Biochem’s 20,000 tons/year PBS plant in Thailand. 
Since its inception, BioAmber raised an aggregate $76.1M from private placements of 
equity securities and convertible notes. It expected to spend around $200 million per 
plant on construction and start-up operating costs for facilities in Canada and Thailand 
[De Guzman 2011b] 
In 2011 BioAmber filed for an IPO hoping to raise up to $150 million with the US 
Securities & Exchange Commission. BioAmber said it has made 221 metric tons of 
biobased succinic acid at its facility in Pomacle, France, but has yet to book any sales. 
Instead, the firm touts its strategic partnerships with potential succinic acid buyers. 
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BioAmber’s filing acknowledges that it faces tough competition in the nascent bio-
based succinic acid market both from startups and from established companies. 
[Bomgardner 2011g; De Guzman 2011b]. 
In 2013 BioAmber announced the pricing of its initial public offering of 8 million units 
consisting of one share of common stock and one warrant to purchase half of one 
share of common stock at $10 per unit, before underwriting discounts and commis-
sions which means it would raise $80M at $10. But its per-share stock price fell from 
$10 to $8 in its first five days of trading. In the first quarter of 2013 BioAmber posted 
small sales of about $330,000 and posted a loss of $9.6 million for the quarter 
[PlasticsNews 2013]. 
In 2012 BioAmber set a strategic collaboration with the German firm LANXESS in the 
field of  plasticizers to show that bio-succinate esters are viable alternatives to phtha-
lates, which have come under scrutiny for their potential toxicity. It has also completed 
its Series C round of financing with net proceeds of $30 million involving existing in-
vestors and LANXESS. 
Many advanced biofuel startups have been diversifying into the biobased chemicals 
sector given the higher potential profits for chemicals versus biofuels. For most of all, 
it appears to be quicker (but not easier) to get into the chemicals sector especially if 
you are looking into drop-ins as long as you have partners who know the chemical 
industry’s well-oiled system. For instance, above the cooperation of US Gevo and 
German chemical firm LANXESS was described concerning their isobutanol/isobutene 
efforts to produce renewable butylrubber. 
But many startups perceive opportunities to focus essentially on chemicals or more 
generally biorefineries and to execute their strategies, seeking alliances with chemical 
firms which are making considerable investments into what they call “sustainable 
chemistry,” “green chemistry” or “CleanTech Chemistry.” 
For instance, OPX Biotechnologies (see below), founded in 2007 and emphasizing 
“good chemistry,” and chemical giant Dow Chemical announced a collaboration to de-
velop an industrial scale process for the production of biobased acrylic acid from 
renewable feedstocks. The global petroleum-based acrylic acid market is estimated to 
be $8 billion and growing 3 to 4 percent per year. Acrylic acid is a key chemical build-
ing block used in a wide range of consumer goods including paints and coatings, 
adhesives, diapers and detergents [Bomgardner 2011h]. 
Simultaneously with the increasing interest of the chemical industry and the disap-
pointment of VCs with biofuels venture capital is re-directed towards startups targeting 
biobased chemicals, intermediates, resins and plastics for the petrochemical branch. 
There was a golden age, from the late 1930s through the mid 1960s, when the che-
mical industry invented and commercialized most of the polymers we use today 
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[Runge 2006:411-424]. Those early plastics were so successful that it has become 
difficult to launch newer polymers in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, an established infrastructure of resin producers, plastics converters, and 
processing machinery makers is dedicated to multi-million-ton-per-year applications. 
Many companies have since unveiled ambitious plans to establish new resins, but the 
history of the plastics industry is littered with their failures. “But some companies are 
still inventing polymers much like their counterparts did in the old days: by coming up 
with novel chemistry and then sorting out where it will be useful.” [Tullo 2011] 
The most promising way for plastic success lies in a global view, from design up to 
finished devices. Design integrating multiple functions is by far the most important 
aspect followed by compounding integration 112 preferentially supported by modeling 
and simulation. 
Any to-be entrepreneur addressing biobased chemicals or plastics is advised 
to read the story of Patrick Gruber, innovator of polylactic acid (PLA) plastics 
at US giant Cargill and now CEO of Gevo (Table I.99) [Benda 2003]. A further 
very lucid article by C. Benda (http://www.cargill.com/news/00_08_cd.htm: 
Mission Possible! Cargill News International) is unfortunately no longer ac-
cessible on the Web. 
New polymers have rather long scale-up and gestation periods. And this applies also 
to biobased plastics, for instance, those derived from Ingeo polylactic acid [Tullo 2011; 
Runge 2006:129-130,581,756]. 
NatureWorks, a subsidiary of US giant Cargill, opened its Ingeo polylactic acid (PLA) 
plant in 2002 with 70,000 metric tons of capacity. At that time the company had high 
hopes merely because bioplastics were still new. Converters started experimenting 
with it for nearly every conceivable application. But, it had to cultivate markets. Simul-
taneously PLA took advantage from improvements in blending and multilayer tech-
nology and, finally, over the past two years, NatureWorks’ sales have grown by more 
than 25 percent annually. 
Entrepreneurship and Intrapreneurship in Drop-In Building-Block 
Chemicals 
Riding a wave 
Over the last two to five years two strong trends have emerged – not just for 
existing biofuel NTBFs to jump on, but also for the foundations of new firms. 
They relate to shifts of advanced bioalcohol NTBFs, whether bioethanol or 
biobutanol, to producing non-food related C6 and C5 sugars and/or drop-in 
biobased chemicals (“CleanTech Chemistry”). In particular, there is a rush for 
low-cost non-food industrial sugars as reflected, for instance, by Bluefire’s 
wholly owned subsidiary SucreSource (Table I.86) and Virdia (Table I.99)! 
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Since 2006 a new wave of findings of biotechnology companies, primarily in the US, 
has changed the landscape that people had about the field. Driven by big players and, 
to a large portion, venture capital new biotech companies propose to replace petro-
chemicals originated raw materials by chemically identical products originated from 
biomass feedstocks. Based on generic technologies this family of biobased products 
is currently called “drop-in” technologies because of addressing markets of existing 
and identical or very similar products. 
Biobased chemicals appeared in the focus, not just as an expression of a “green” at-
titude and sustainability, but the chemical industry is also looking for ways to attenuate 
generally the impact of cost fluctuations in fossil-fuel feedstocks (Box I.26). 
According to Lux Research biobased chemicals and materials was expected to grow 
to $19.billion in 2016 as its global capacity jumps 140 percent. Lux Research said that 
it has listed down 151 global facilities and their intended operational dates, products 
and capacities. These capacities are expected to climb to 9.2 million tons in the next 
five years [De Guzman 2011c], 
In particular, the reports says [De Guzman 2011c] 
Bioplastics will slow down in terms of expansion though capacity is still ex-
pected to grow 57 percent from 2011 to 2016. From 2006 to 2011, bioplastics 
have experienced explosive growth of 1,500 percent to a current aggregate 
capacity of 470,000 tons, and a 10.9 percent share of all bio-based materials. 
Cellulose polymers and starch-based plastics remain dominant but their share 
of total capacity will slide from 45 percent in 2011 to 21 percent in 2016. Cel-
lulose polymers and starch-derived materials still rule because they are dura-
ble, strong and easily biodegradable: They have been widely used in high-
performance plastic coatings, buttons and yarns, and even early LEGO bricks. 
By 2016, there will be consolidation – both within sectors of biobased mate-
rials manufacturing, and regionally, as leaders buy up technologies and ac-
cess to feedstock. Momentum derived from existing capacity – ethanol from 
sugarcane being converted to ethylene and propylene, for instance – will 
influence regional specialization. 
Related VC-based startups bring a unique set of technical core strengths, processes 
and long-term business approaches again by a “veterans” management team to de-
liver a consistent, readily convertible sugar feedstock that can compete on price and 
quality with crude oil feedstock for petroleum fuels and chemicals and food-based 
industrial sugars from corn and sugarcane. 
Within a biorefinery concept which is heavily supported in the US and Germany by 
policy [Runge 2006:849-873] and which embraces fuels (energy), chemicals and ma-
terials referring to non-food biomass as feedstock there are a sugar platform and a 
syngas platform [Runge 2006:865] and the two main process options to use are the 
 1120 Appendix A 
(sugar-oriented) biochemical platform and the thermochemical platform. The techno-
logy platforms will be featured by industrial biotechnology, materials technology, and 
reaction and process design. 
Notably, there is a pioneer plant demonstration to produce cellulosic ethanol by syn-
gas fermentation, Coskata (Table I.99), which was basically co-founded by Argonne 
National Laboratory scientists. This means, there may be combining both platforms. 
In the US a list of chemicals was created by industry and academia that considered 
the compounds’ compatibility with existing petrochemical processing, technical com-
plexity of the syntheses from biomass, known market potential, and other factors. A 
shortlist of 30 compounds was selected and from among those compounds a final 12 
top-tier compounds that can be produced from plant sugars were chosen [Runge 
2006:871]. 
Of the hexosen (C6 sugars) glucose derivatives offer most potential for top-tier 
building-block chemicals as key feedstocks [Runge 2006:867-868]: 
 Lactic acid (cf. the graph “chemicals from lactic acid” [Runge 2006:868]); 
 3-hydroxypropionic acid (3-HP; cf. [Runge 2006:249-251,584,871-872], in par-
ticular, the graph “3-Hydroxypropionic acid (3-HP) – A New Chemical Inte-
rmediate Platform” on page 249) 
 Succinic acid. 
Further notable building-block chemicals for the chemical industry include acrylic acid 
and 1,4-butanol (1,4-BDO). Acrylic acid (H2C=CH-COOH) may be derived from 3-HP. 
1,4-butandiol is one of the many compounds that can be obtained from succinic acid 
by established chemical transformation (Figure I.186). 
Different from a start in biofuels to enter the chemical industry a deep knowl-
edge of the broad application spectra of the targeted offerings is necessary, 
and also the current and anticipated regulatory environment. 
Novel chemicals’ market barriers are well known: product registration, performance 
and costs versus established products, switching costs, long market introduction 
cycles to name a few. 
But, drop-in chemicals will experience quite different challenges compared with novel 
chemicals, converging to a large part around the cost of goods – that is levels of in-
novativeness, conservatism, and risk aversion of potential customers (ch. 4.2.1.1). 
Hence, for biochemicals-oriented startups a “veterans approach” has turned out to be 
mandatory with managers having not only broad experiences in the chemical industry, 
but also being appropriately connected in related networks. 
Execution of a startup’s strategy (commercialization) requires intense partnerships 
with firms from the sugar and/or biotechnology-oriented nutrition industry and, very 
importantly, the rather conservative chemical industry in terms of large and giant 
chemical companies, particularly from the US, Germany, The Netherlands and Japan. 
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For instance, 1,4-butanol from succinic acid provides a typical example for the highly 
competitive situation for entrepreneurship/intrapreneurship in biobased chemicals, 
particularly with regard to economies of petroleum-based chemicals (Figure I.187). 
 
Figure I.186: Chemicals and intermediates derived from succinic acid. 
US firm Genomatica, Inc., which in 2011 filed for an initial public offering (IPO) of 
stock worth up to $100 million [Bomgardner 2011f; Admin 2011f], is known for making 
as a first product 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BDO) by feeding sugar to an engineered strain of 
Escherichia coli. But, in 2012 Genomatica withdrew its $100m IPO – “in light of current 
market conditions.” [De Guzman 2012d]. 
On the basis of demonstration-scale tests with sugar processor Tate & Lyle, Geno-
matica said it can produce the intermediate at lower cost than petroleum-based proc-
esses. Its second product made from renewable feedstock shall be butadiene 
[Bomgardner 2011a]. In line with numerous examples from the biofuels scene, in 2012 
Genomatica pushed back the timeline for commencing commercial-scale production 
of renewable butanediol from 2012 to 2013 [Lane 2012q]. 
Concerning renewable butadiene Genomatica clashes with Amyris (Table I.99 and be-
low text), but more importantly its focus must be on butanediol made from biobased 
succinic acid which is offered by many other firms. Among the largest emerging appli-
cations of bio-succinic acid is the production of “green” 1,4-butanediol (BDO). Further-
more, consideration of just butanediol and producing it at lower cost than petroleum-
based processes will not suffice: The overall cost of the customer in a system of other 
products related to succinic acid and BDO is relevant (Figure I.25, Figure I.187). 
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Moreover, by mid of 2012 LanzaTech (Table I.99) signed a joint development agree-
ment with one of the world-leading nylon producers INVISTA focused on bio-based 
butadiene. According to the agreement, INVISTA and LanzaTech will collaborate on 
projects to develop one-step and two-step technologies to convert industrial waste gas 
carbon monoxide (CO) into butadiene. Initial commercialization is expected in 2016. 
The collaboration will initially focus on the production of butadiene in a 2-step process 
from LanzaTech’s CO-derived 2,3-butanediol (2,3-BDO). A direct single step process 
will also be developed to produce butadiene directly through a process of gas fer-
mentation. 
Butadiene is a key intermediate chemical used by INVISTA in its proprietary buta-
diene-based adiponitrile (ADN) production technologies. ADN is a critical intermediate 
chemical used in the manufacture of Nylon-6,6. 
Currently LanzaTech runs a 15,000 gal/year pilot facility at a steel mill in New Zealand 
that produces ethanol and 2,3-BDO from waste carbon monoxide gas. In Shanghai, 
China, LanzaTech’s 100,000-gallon-per-year demonstration plant uses waste gases 
from a Baosteel steel mill to produce ethanol. 
The issues of introducing and ultimately replacing biobased succinic acd and/or 1,4-
butanediol to a large chemical firm can be lucidly illustrated looking at the specific 
situation of BASF. 
The world’s largest chemical company BASF with its “Verbund”-approach [Runge 
2006:369-370] can interconnect biobased succinic acid and 1,4-BDO with its pro-
duction streams for petroleum-based derivatives and products with production sites all 
over the world as given in Figure I.187. This provides a huge potential for crossover 
strategy for products containing various amounts of biobased components and thus a 
great potential for cost management and price settings. While mostly succinic acid is 
currently made mainly from fossil-derived maleic anhydride that provides the basic 
four-carbon backbone BASF can utilize its proprietary acetylene platform. 
Furthermore, contrary to its peers and other large chemical firms, such as US firms 
DuPont or Dow Chemical, BASF has an oil business including exploration through its 
100 percent subsidiary Wintershall Holding GmbH [Runge 2006:63-64,586]. It is the 
largest crude oil and natural gas producer in Germany (turnover of €12.1 billion, $15.8 
billion) in 2011, net profit €1.1 billion). Wintershall is a big revenue contributor to 
BASF. Hence, BASF does not depend fundamentally so much on oil price swings as 
other chemical companies do. 
Combining bio-BDO and bio-succinic acid opens up the possibility of greener biopoly-
mers, such as polybutylsuccinate (PBS), which is used in biodegradable packaging 
films and disposable cutlery. Another potential market is in polyester polyols and poly-
urethanes, currently dominated by the use of adipic acid as a precursor. Companies 
are looking at replacing the six-carbon adipic acid with four-carbon biosuccinic acid, 
providing the costs become comparable, because adipic acid production is a messy 
process that produces a lot of carbon dioxide [Taylor 2010]. 
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Figure I.187: The role of succinic acid for BASF in its production Verbund environ-
ment. 
Currently the majority of polyamides (PAs) of the Nylon-type is on C4 and C6 com-
ponents (succinic or adipic acid). But interest in polyamides based on α,ω-diacids 
(long-chain diacids) and diamines (C10– C18) emerged. There was already interest in 
“green” long-chain α,ω-diacids (with 9 or more carbon chain atoms) rather than the C4 
or C6 diacids before 2007. The German firm Cognis, acquired in 2010 by BASF (now 
BASF Personal Care and Nutrition GmbH), was particularly active in this field target-
ing polyamides, polyesters, and polyurethanes. A series of Nylons were synthesized 
and tested using octadecanedioic acid (C18 diacid) made from Cognis’s biofer-
mentation process. 
Cognis had developed a proprietary strain of the yeast “Candida Tropicalis” which 
efficiently oxidizes natural based fatty acids produced from vegetable, animal or tall oil 
sources to produce the novel diacid momomers. Candidas Tropicalis was developed 
to oxidize terminal (“end”) methyl groups on the molecules efficiently into terminal 
carboxylic acid groups. Thus an alkane or renewable monobasic fatty acid feedstock 
can be oxidized to a dicarboxylic acid [Runge 2006:861]. 
Interestingly, Wallace Carothers, who was the first to develop polyamides (Nylon-6,6) 
at DuPont in the 1930s [Runge 2006:414-418], insisted that Nylon-5,10 is better than 
Nylon-6,6 or Nylon-6 of BASF (then I.G. Farben), the latter two of which are the most 
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common for textiles and plastics. Carothers had wanted to bring Nylon-5,10 to com-
mercial status, but was unable to, because he could not identify an economically ef-
ficient production process [Ravenstijn 2011]. 
BASF has developed a 100 percent bio-based PA-5,10 with performance suitable for 
automotive applications. However, Bio-PA-5,10 is rather expensive and thus limits its 
applications. Dutch firm DSM works on PA-4,6 grade expected to replace metal parts 
under the hood, such as turbo diesel systems components.113 DSM’s high-heat poly-
amide Stanyl 4,6 was one of the few successful polymer introductions since the 
1980s. 
Succinic acid is currently only a niche product, with the 30,000 tons produced a year 
creating a market worth $225 million. Market research firm Frost & Sullivan believes 
the market will expand six-fold to 180,000 tons by 2015, thanks largely to the intro-
duction of bio-succinic acid. There is a rather strong competition in the bio-succinic 
acid arena. 
The emerging bio-succinic acid market in particular shows a very competitive environ-
ment with small and large players – from Europe, the US, Japan, China and Thailand. 
Apart from BioAmber discussed above at least four other groups are gearing up to 
develop commercial capacity for bio-succinic acid. The companies investing in bio-
succinic acid clearly believed these projections are reasonable, given that collectively 
three of them intended to bring over 140,000 tons of capacity online by 2012 [Taylor 
2010]. According to the BASF/Purac JV (see below) the main drivers are expected to 
be bioplastics, chemical intermediates, solvents, polyurethanes and plasticizers. 
US-based Myriant Technologies is among the companies which see the main poten-
tial for bio-succinic acid as lying in the BDO market. As BioAmber also Myriant (motto: 
“Chemistry Refined …Naturally”) filed for an IPO in 2011 worth up to $125 million. 
Myriant’s filing disclosed that it was planning a 220 million-lb-per-year bio-succinic 
acid facility in China in partnership with China National Bluestar, in addition to a 
smaller plant to be built in Louisiana. This plant in Louisiana should have a capacity of 
15,000-ton succinic acid and should be built by 2012 with the help of $50 million in 
Department of Energy funding. 
Founded in 2004 as BioEnergy International, Myriant focused on the production of 
renewable biobased chemicals using a proprietary biocatalyst platform. Myriant is the 
exclusive licensee of technology from the University of Florida and has since ex-
panded its intellectual property portfolio with internally generated patents, patent 
applications and a scientific knowledge base. In 2009 bioethanol specialist BioEnergy 
International span out Myriant as an independent company and incorporated all of its 
biobased chemicals business and intellectual property. 
The other players include very large chemical firms. Dutch DSM and the French firm 
Roquette Frères, through their Reverdia joint venture, expected their 10,000-metric-
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tons plant in Spinola, Italy, to be online in the second half of 2012. Finally, Mitsubishi 
Chemical Corp. (MCC) has been making PBS from fossil-based succinic acid [Taylor 
2010]. It has developed its own process for making bio-succinic acid from biomass, 
although no details of its process are known. 
The company was formerly collaborating with Ajinomoto on the project. Mitsubishi 
wanted to follow the typical “crossover strategy” and wanted to target the market being 
developed by the (then) Dow-Cargill JV NatureWorks for PLA. [Runge 2006:861]. 
Mitsubishi currently has also a joint venture with the Thai company PTT (PTT MCC 
Biochem) to develop bio-succinic acid-based PBS and also BioAmber envisions a 
partnership with that firm. 
Owing to BASF’s traditional raw material base interconnected with research, appli-
cations, and product driven business approaches it is not surprising that a leading 
white biotechnology project is the production of succinic acid (Figure I.187; cf. also 
Quantifying the BASF “Knowledge Verbund” – Figure I.188). In 2009, BASF and 
Purac announced they will form a joint venture to produce up to 25,000 metric tons of 
the intermediate in Barcelona (Spain) by 2013 planning already a world-scale plant 
with a capacity of 50,000 tons [Taylor 2010; Purac 2011]. 
Purac is a subsidiary of the Dutch firm CSM, a global player in bakery supplies and 
food ingredients and preservations. Purac (revenue ca. €400 million, 1,100 employ-
ees) is active in a variety of markets, with a focus on natural food ingredients, lactic 
acid, biogases, chemicals and biobased monomers for PLA [Taylor 2010; Purac 
2011]. 
The JV will make bio-succinic acid using a BASF-developed bacterial strain (Basfi 
succiniproducens) which can process a wide variety of C3 (glycerin), C5 and C6 
(glucose) renewable feedstocks, including biomass sources. Using a fully equipped 
fermentation and down stream purification plant the partners will demonstrate the 
economical production of succinic acid on industrial scale; carbon dioxide (CO2) will 
be used as a raw material and fixed during the highly efficient fermentation process 
(cf. BioAmber’s process). 
The BASF/Purac JV followed closely a stringent typical scale-up process (Figure I.8). 
Critical steps of the jointly developed production process have been validated in 
several successful production campaigns. The resulting volumes were used to evalu-
ate the market. In particular, the giant BASF can simultaneously provide a very large 
in-house test field. 
“After successfully testing the BASF in-house applications we are now able to make 
large volumes available for external customers.” In view of the risky situations of exist-
ing or to emerge bio-succinic acid startups as competitors BASF emphasized that 
“The goal is to globally provide a high product quality and offer security of supply to 
the customers.” [Purac 2011] This means BASF is very serious about its inroads into 
the bio-succinic acid intermediate – and that does not bode well for startups. 
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Differently to the startups BioAmber and Myriant which rely on cost models for just the 
production of bio-succinic acid the BASF/Purac JV works together to achieve manu-
facturing cost levels by empirical in-house and outside tests for making biobased 
succinic acid competitive for a systemic context of a wide variety of novel applications. 
Correspondingly, BASF and Purac are establishing a joint venture for the production 
and sale of biobased succinic acid named Succinity GmbH with headquarters in 
Düsseldorf, Germany which should be operational in 2013. “We know from many dis-
cussions with customers and samples we sent them that the demand for biobased 
succinic acid for example for biodegradable plastics is set to grow faster and more 
strongly than expected earlier,” said the President of Purac [BASF 2012c]. 
Generally, the demand for succinic acid is anticipated by Succinity to grow strongly in 
the years ahead, driven mainly by bioplastics, chemical intermediates, solvents, poly-
urethanes and plasticizers and Succinity to take advantage from all of these fields. 
This plant, having commenced operations in March 2014 with an annual capacity of 
10,000 metric tons of succinic acid, will put the new joint venture company in a leading 
position in the global marketplace. This is complemented by plans for a second large-
scale facility with an annual capacity of 50,000 metric tons of succinic acid to enable 
the company to respond to the expected increase in demand. The final investment de-
cision for this facility will be made following a successful market introduction. 
Additionally in 2013 BASF planed to begin also production of 1,4-butanediol based on 
renewable feedstock (renewable 1,4-BDO) using the patented process of Genomatica 
utilizing a license agreement allowing BASF to build a world-scale production facility. 
The one-step fermentation process is based on sugars as a renewable feedstock. And 
concerning non-food sugars as a renewable feedstock BASF has linked itself to 
Renmatix (see below). Furthermore, “initial lifecycle analyses show that Genomatica’s 
Bio-BDO will require about 60 percent less energy than acetylene-based BDO” (cf. 
Figure I.187 and [Bomgardner 2011i]). 
Genomatica will continue to advance its patented renewable BDO production process 
while BASF will produce renewable BDO, which shall be available in the second half 
of 2013 for sampling and trials. “We are pleased to cooperate with BASF, the leading 
global BDO manufacturer with a worldwide manufacturing and sales network and 
many years of market experience,” said Christophe Schilling, Chief Executive Officer 
of Genomatica, and continued: “This agreement highlights Genomatica’s commitment 
to delivering innovative process technologies to the global chemical industry.” [BASF 
2013] 
The starting materials for the production of conventional petrochemical BDO are natu-
ral gas, butane, butadiene and propylene. BASF currently produces BDO and BDO-
equivalents (Figure I.187) at its sites in Ludwigshafen, Germany; Geismar, Louisiana; 
Chiba, Japan; Kuantan, Malaysia; and Caojing, China, and has an annual capacity of 
535,000 metric tons. BASF has recently announced the intention of building a BDO 
complex in China with a capacity of 100,000 annual metric tons [BASF 2013]. 
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Biobased chemicals and plastics as a new wave is about to emerge. But, according to 
BioAmber’s CEO Huc for entrepreneurship the wave will have a serious threshold for 
startups: “A lot of large chemical companies are still looking at bio and saying ‘prove 
it.’“ “In the sphere of succinic acid, if any of the early players fail it will undermine the 
credibility of the whole industry.” [Taylor 2010] 
Obviously there is a “Catch 22” situation: Green startups need large capital 
and big companies waiting for proven startups. 
While succinic acid addresses the “4-component” in Nylon derivatives adipic acid 
addresses the “6-component” which also brings up the “BASF-factor” for startups. 
BASF, the innovator of Nylon-6 in the 1930s from ε-caprolactam [Runge 2006:416-
417] and the world’s largest manufacturer of caprolactam, is generally a leading 
manufacturer of carboxylic acids. Its product portfolio reaches from monocarboxylic 
acids to dicarboxylic acids like adipic acid and fumaric acid to name the most im-
portant ones. Correspondingly BASF is one of the leading manufacturers of polyamide 
intermediates and polyamides with production sites all over the world. The BASF 
process for making adipic acd is by direct oxidation of cyclohexane using air only 
[ChemSystems 2010]. 
US startup Verdezyne, Inc. (“Green Chemistry by Design”) is developing a yeast plat-
form to optimize metabolic pathways, microorganisms and fermentation processes for 
the conversion of sugars to biofuels (bioethanol from C6 and C5 sugars) and biobased 
chemicals and plastics by proprietary metabolic pathway engineering tools. In particu-
lar, by the end of 2011 it opened its first pilot plant to produce adipic acid, the key 
component of Nylon-6,6. The company said “the plant will be used to demonstrate 
scalability of their process, validate their cost projections and generate sufficient quan-
tities for commercial market development.” 
Verdezyne was founded in 2005 as CODA Genomics, a University of California at 
Irvine spin-out that used computational technology to design genes for the research 
world. In 2008 it transitioned from being a lead synthetic gene provider to pharmaceu-
tical and industrial enzyme businesses to focus on fermentation pathway engineering 
for renewable fuels and chemicals. As expected it currently follows a “veterans ap-
proach” for its executive management with personnel having 25+ years of experience. 
Among investors in Verdezyne BP Alternative Energy Ventures and DSM Venturing 
BV are notable in this context. 
CODA Genomics (Computationally Optimized DNA Assembly) was founded by mem-
bers of UC Irvine’s Intitute of Genomics and Bioinformatics as an LLC. In 2007/2008 
CODA  overhauled its core business strategy, recruited a new CEO, William Radany, 
along with a new management team, changed its name, and moved its headquarters 
from Orange County to Carlsbad, CA, near San Diego [Bigelow 2009c]. 
The business model emphasized 1) the company to look for having core expertise 
around developing a process and 2) validating out that process in a 10 liter laboratory 
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scale fermentor. “After validation, it requires scale-up and that’s where partnership 
with chemical companies has to come in.” [De Guzman 2009]. Verdezyne seems to 
have kept its strong research orientation. Asked about its driver we read: “An excep-
tional R&D team.” [Admin 2011g]. 
Foundation was actually by “stage-oriented entrepreneurs” as is Pamela Contag of 
Cobalt Biofuels (Table I.96). Both co-founders Rick Lathrop (Professor of computer 
sciences, then 51 years old) and Wes Hatfield (Professor of microbiology and mole-
cular genetics, UCI School of Medicine. Professor of chemical engineering, UCI 
Samueli School of Engineering. Director, UCI Computational Biology Research Labo-
ratory, then 65) had already founded other biotechnology firms. Hatfield’s favorite 
quote that characterizes their stage-oriented entrepreneurship is: “Do good science 
and leave management to professionals.” [Stewart 2006] 
Originally, Verdezyne focused on fatty acid distillates or soapstocks from the oil seed 
processing industry (a by-product of soybean processing) [De Guzman 2009; Admin 
2011g]. Verdezyne needed help with breaking down cellulosic (and hemi-cellulosic) 
materials into the sugars to tackle converting grass, straw, sugarcane stalks and other 
such tough plant material into chemicals. Interestingly in this context, one of BP’s 
other big moves into biofuels came with its purchase of the  lignocellulosic biofuels 
business of Verenium (Table I.84) [St. John 2011]. As investors in Verdezyne BP 
represents the bioethanol side, DSM is interested in the chemical side. 
From the beginning of chemistry and chemical endeavors plant oils played a key role 
as a raw materials for the chemical and then also the cosmetics and nutrition indus-
tries. The surfactants (soaps!), detergents and oleochemicals industries existing since 
ages provide a strong bridge into biofuels (biodiesel) and a biobased chemical in-
dustry [Runge 2006:252-256, 563]. 
Relevant plant-based oils contain large varieties of fatty acids and their esters. Olefin 
metathesis technology has emerged as key for converting biobased oils to industrial 
chemicals, feedstock and consumer products [Runge:865-867]. Correspondingly, we 
encounter considerable entrepreneurial activities in this segment. 
Through the acquisition of German firm Cognis the chemical giant BASF [Runge 
2006:188] is now back-integrated to a large extent also in renewable oleochemicals. 
Similarly, US “food and feed giant” Cargill plays a key role here [Runge 2006:244]. 
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Industrial Non-Food Sugars versus Petroleum as a Feedstock and 
Raw Material 
Fundamental components of a business model of biobased chemicals oriented start-
ups are producing and selling cellulosic industrial sugars and a synergistic back-end 
to proprietary chemical companies to produce high value products. 
From an economic point of view cellulosic industrial sugars to be used for key inter-
mediates to create the biochemical products and biofuels are a raw material com-
modity and, consequently, the business really is a cost game. And the competitive 
situation is envisioned as follows: 
“In the end, the lowest cost providers will be the winners, and maybe a couple or three 
will be there. There won’t be twenty.” (Renmatix, B.2). 
BASF is back-integrated in oil and gas as key raw materials for its intermediates. And 
BASF’s $30 million investment in 2012 in US cellulosic sugar developer Renmatix 
(B.2) signals the German chemical firm intends to expand its feedstock sources and 
raw materials especially for its renewable chemicals and materials portfolio [De 
Guzman 2012b; BASF 2012a; Fehrenbacher 2012]. 
Renmatix (derived from Renewable Materials) claims itself to be the current lowest-
cost producer of industrial sugars, the building blocks of renewable (“green”) chemis-
try, utilizing non-edible biomass as feedstock. Mike Hamilton, the chief executive of 
Renmatix, said in an interview that the startup plans to build a facility by 2014 that will 
ship sugar that can compete in cost with Brazil’s sugarcane crop, the global bench-
mark for the commodity [WOC 2012]. 
The end products in the two-step PlantroseTM process of Renmatix are C5 (xylose) 
and C6 (glucose) sugars, and optionally lignin. Basically, the process follows a patent 
protected “supercritical fluid hydrolysis” technology as well as patent-protected (sup-
ported liquid membranes, SLM) separation technology. 
Supercritical fluids for use in processing biomass are used as mixtures. These include 
water, carbon dioxide and ethanol at selected temperature and pressure intervals, for 
instance, above the critical points for ethanol and carbon dioxide but at a temperature 
and/or pressure below that of the critical point for water, etc. Furthermore, the Nano 
Carbonic Solvothermal Technology (NCST) provides methods for generating micro- or 
nano-structured raw materials and performing biomass and particularly cellulose 
hydrolysis (Renmatix, B.2). 
Apart from Renmatix there have emerged a number of pure-play sugar technology de-
velopers and manufacturers, such as Bluefire’s wholly owned subsidiary SucreSource 
(Table I.86) and Virdia (formerly HCL CleanTech) (Table I.99) which changed its 
emphasis away from biofuels. Also Sweetwater Energy launched in 2006 in the US 
under the name SweetWater Ethanol, LLC, belongs to that category. It intends to ad-
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vance a decentralized business model it developed to allow farmers to produce etha-
nol from crops right on their farms. 
On the other hand, London, Ontario-based Comet Biorefining Inc., founded in 2009, 
produces its cellulosic sugar as syrup which has high glucose concentration. The 
Comet cellulosic sugar process uses a two stage process to activate cellulosic bio-
mass, followed by conversion to glucose at very low enzyme loading. Co-products are 
used for energy production [Sims 2012]. It has demonstrated its cellulosic sugar tech-
nology at pilot scale and is currently scaling up to commercial applications. However, 
it was not saying much about the company’s technology. What it said is that the firm’s 
process uses fewer enzymes to break down biomass than in competing processes 
(Renmatix, B.2). 
Having sugars next to come is the conversion of these into various products. In this 
line BASF announced by mid of 2012 a collaboration with BioTork, LLC of Gainesville, 
FL. According to its Web site after six months of a pilot study, both firms are going into 
a combination of their complementary approaches to strain development to improve 
the efficiency and resulting economics of biochemical production processes. 
Created in 2008, BioTork LLC is a biotechnology company developing certain micro-
bial strains for the industrial production of biobased polymers and green chemicals. 
BASF has been conducting intensive research on the use of microorganisms for the 
production of proteins, enzymes, vitamins and other high value and low cost chemi-
cals. 
In their natural environment, microorganisms generally synthesize these che-
micals only to meet their own requirements for survival. The challenge faced 
by chemical companies is to push these microorganisms to produce these 
chemicals faster, in much larger quantities, and under industrial conditions 
that are different from the microorganisms’ natural environment. This is the 
only way to use microorganisms for commercially viable production of chemi-
cal products. 
In addition in 2010 BASF and Solix Biofuels (now Solix BioSystems) (A.1.1.4) started 
a collaboration demonstrating the BASF commitment to generate growth from indus-
trial biotechnology and algae representing an addition to BASF’s technology portfolio 
as they offer the potential to produce a number of specialty chemicals and products. 
Apart from “sugar entrepreneurs” and existing firms focusing on bioplastics and che-
mical products firms are also using 3-hydroxypropionic acid (3-HP) as a chemical 
intermediate platform to produce acrylic acid (and esters), acrylamide and acetonitrile, 
1,3-propanediol, and malonic acid esters [Runge 2006:248-249]. Acrylic acid is a key 
chemical building block used in a wide range of consumer goods including paints, 
coatings, adhesives, diapers and detergents. 
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At first, in the US Codexis and food and feed giant Cargill cooperated and announced 
a breakthrough in developing a novel microbial process that will convert corn sugar to 
3-HP [Runge 2006:248-249]. Currently Cargill and its Danish partner Novozymes are 
assumed to be planning to release their technology available for licensing within the 
next couple of years [De Guzman 2012c]. 
By August 2012 BASF joined the Cargill and Novozymes cooperation to develop the 
process for conversion of 3-HP into acrylic acid. All three firms have signed an agree-
ment to develop technologies to produce acrylic acid from renewable raw materials. 
Presently, acrylic acid is produced by the oxidation of propylene derived from the re-
fining of crude oil. BASF is the world’s largest producer of acrylic acid and has 
substantial capabilities in its production and downstream processing. BASF plans 
initially to use the bio-based acrylic acid to manufacture superabsorbent polymers 
[BASF 2012b]. 
The three companies bring complementary knowledge to the project. Novozymes is 
the world-leader in industrial enzymes. BASF and Cargill are global leaders in their 
industries. Together this trio is uniquely positioned. 
The large French specialty chemicals firm Arkema will look at the direct conversion of 
glycerin to acrylic acid, as well as the conversion of glycerin to acrolein (propanal) and 
use of conventional technology to oxidize acrolein to bioacrylic acid. The process is 
not new; the Japanese firm Nippon Shokubai has developed catalysts for conversion 
of glycerin to acrylic acid. 
Arkema is the third-largest player in the huge global acrylic acid market after number 
one BASF and Dow Chemical as number two. As early as 2004, Arkema had been 
working on a method to make acrylic acid from renewable resources. Hence, startups 
in the field have to encounter heavy competition in the bioacrylics area with 
petroleum-based acrylics [Reisch 2010]. 
Dow has a rather small biotechnology portfolio compared with BASF and DuPont, but 
they were among the first to invest in bioplastics via the firm NatureWorks, the JV with 
Cargill. But Dow sold its stake at a time that the 100,000 tons plant was almost idle in 
2005 [Runge 2006:129-130,245]. 
In 2011 Dow and startup OPX Biotechnologies, Inc. (OPXBIO) signed a joint develop-
ment agreement to prove the technical and economic viability of an industrial-scale 
process to produce acrylic acid using a fermentable sugar feedstock with equal perfor-
mance qualities as petroleum-based acrylic acid, creating a direct replacement option 
for the market. If collaborative research is successful, the companies will discuss com-
mercialization opportunities that could bring biobased acrylic acid to market in three to 
five years [OPXBio 2011]. In 2011 OPXBIO raised $36.5 million in an equity financing 
round C. This added to a total of more than $53 million OPXBIO raised so far with 
venture investtors. 
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Dow is focusing on the use of sugar feedstock and the conversion process of sugar to 
bioacrylic acid while OPXBIO is focusing on its microbe using its “Efficiency Directed 
Genome Engineering” (EDGE™) platform, as well as developing the 3-HP bioprocess. 
OPXBio uses microorganism to biosynthesize 3-HP by fermentation of sugar and sub-
sequent dehydration of the 3-HP to acrylic acid. Both Dow and OPXBIO will jointly 
fund the development, demonstration and commercialization of bioacrylic acid. 
OPXBIO’s rebuttal against the Cargill technology is that OPXBIO claims to have a 
lower-cost biobased route (and also the competitive to petroleum-based route)  [De 
Guzman 2012c]. 
OPXBIO was founded in 2006/2007 and follows currently a “veterans” approach for its 
management team. For instance, Charles R. (Chas) Eggert, the current President and 
CEO, has more than 30 years of experience in the global specialty chemical industry. 
He began his career with Monsanto Company, progressing through roles in techno-
logy, manufacturing, business development, marketing and general management. 
Michael D. (Mike) Lynch, MD, PhD – the Chief Scientific Officer and Co-Founder – is 
still on board. He received an AB in anthropology as well as a BS and MA in biomedi-
cal engineering from Washington University in St. Louis, followed by a PhD in chemi-
cal and biological engineering from the University of Colorado in 2005 and an MD 
from the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center in 2007. He has nearly a de-
cade of research experience in the life sciences, including the fields of molecular bio-
logy, protein thermodynamics, microbiology, and metabolic engineering, and is the 
primary inventor behind OPXBIO’s platform technologies. 
In 2006, Lynch started OPX Biotechnologies, and successfully raised three rounds of 
financing after demonstrating the concept’s viability. In 2009 the company had more 
than 30 employees. After launching with $1 million in seed capital in 2006, OPX 
Biotechnologies closed funding rounds in October 2007 and April 2008 of $1.3 million 
and $2.6 million, respectively, before closing on an impressive $17.5 million round in 
2009 [INITIAL LIGHT BULB 2009]. 
OPXBIO’s goal is to compete with petroleum-based chemicals and fuels on both qual-
ity and price. OPXBIO has developed and piloted the microbe and bioprocess that will 
produce its first renewable chemical product, BioAcrylic. In 2011, based on pilot-scale 
development, it announced that it has achieved the commercial bioprocess perform-
ance and cost goals for BioAcrylic. The company plans to diversify its product portfolio 
into the fatty acid and acrylamide sectors. But both products are still in the early phase 
of development [De Guzman 2012c]. 
OPXBIO has scaled up its bioacrylic acid production to 3,000 liter fermentation (equi-
valent to 60,000 lbs/year) at the demonstration plant in Lansing, Michigan, owned by 
MBI, a non-profit organization owned by Michigan State University (MSU) Foundation. 
OPXBIO said the company plans to have a second demonstration plant with a capac-
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ity of 600,000 lbs/year in 2013. A commercial plant with a capacity of 100 million 
lbs/year is expected by 2015 [De Guzman 2012c]. 
Like in previous market hypes (US) investors seemed to be ready to invest in almost 
any biotech company provide they follow the mainstream which this time is the “drop-
in” technology. 
But a recent Wall Street Journal article (of  September 2013) referring to OPX entitled 
“Biotech Firm Tests Investors' Patience” emphasized it may be a test case of private 
investors' appetite for risk with investing in related startups. Specifically, OPX “Chief 
Executive Charles R. Eggert has said the company doesn't expect to generate any 
commercial revenue until at least 2017. That is hard math for some investors.” 
 
A.1.2 William Henry Perkin and Industry Genesis in the 
Last Third of the Nineteenth Century 
In Runge [2006:397-402] the Berlin (Prussian) Blue innovation from 1704 and the re-
lated birth of inorganic chemistry has been mapped against current notions, concepts 
and thinking of innovation and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, in the same way key 
aspects of William Henry Perkin’s synthetic dye innovation in 1856 in the UK by ser-
endipity has been roughly mapped to current concepts of radical innovation [Runge 
2006:295]. Therefore, it is of interest to inquire in more details into the entrepreneurial 
aspects of Perkin’s dye innovation (Figure I.87). 
There is a myriad of literature on the synthesis of the iconic dye mauveine by (Sir) 
William Henry Perkin as a major landmark in the history of science and technology, as 
it led to the establishment of the synthetic dye industry and further development of or-
ganic chemistry. But, apart from the emphasis on history of industry, Perkin and the 
dye industry provide a wealth of generic features of entrepreneurship in the environ-
ment of entrepreneurial capitalism. Furthermore, it can be viewed as an example for 
one of the first research-based startups (RBSUs) in a broad sense. Actually Perkin 
was a “university drop-out.” 
In Table I.100 the combined entrepreneurship and innovation concepts are displayed 
focusing on industry genesis [Runge 2006:266- 269, 274-276; 293-296; Ball 2006] 114. 
Table I.100: Current entrepreneurship and innovation concepts and processes re-
flected already during the middle of the nineteenth century by William Henry Perkin. 
Scientific and Socio-
Economic Context 
There was a scientific vision of the famous German Justus von 
Liebig in line with societal attitudes and convictions. 
We “believe that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow someone will 
discover a process ... to make the wonderful dye of madder or 
helpful quinine or morphine from coal tar.” [Runge 2006:293] 
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Table I.100, continued. 
Idea and 
Serendipity 
Following Liebig’s vision August Wilhelm Hofmann at the Royal 
College of Chemistry based in London targeted the demand of the 
market to have an antimalarial drug (quinine). Ball [2006] de-
scribes the chemical rationales at that time for selecting a specific 
route to synthesizing quinine. 
William Henry Perkin, a student of A. W. Hofmann of 18 years, had 
been directed to make the anti-malarial drug quinine based on ma-
terial from coal tar by an oxidation route. Initial trials with an en-
visioned starting material failed, but when using the coal tar pro-
duct aniline things changed dramatically. “The resulting black 
sludge dissolved in methylated spirits, and the resulting solution 
was a beautiful purple.” 
Revealing the 
Opportunity 
Perkin “stumbled” over an unexpected result, serendipity. Silk 
dipped in this solution took on the same royal hue. Perkin grasped 
that his purple solution could be used to color fabric. And Perkin 
took the recklessly bold move of quitting his studies to exploit the 
opportunity. 
Opportunity 
Evaluation 
Early Assessment 
by a Potential 
Customer 
Perkin realized that this coloring matter had the properties of a dye 
and resisted the action of light very well thus making it the world’s 
first synthetic dye. He quickly grasped that his purple solution 
could be used broadly to color fabric. 
Perkin changed the project direction – he wanted to exploit the first 
synthetic organic dyestuff based on abundantly available feed-
stock. 
He sent some specimens of dyed silk to a dyeing firm in Perth, 
Scotland, which expressed great interest provided that the cost of 
the cloth would not be raised unduly. 
“It was to his credit, and luck, that he sought out the advice of 
Robert Pullar, the owner of a well-regarded dye works in Scotland. 
Pullar encouraged the eighteen year old Perkin to manufacture 
more dye, and told him that if the dyed fabric would remain color-
fast and not fade in the sun, Perkin would be a very wealthy man.” 
[Nelson 2002] 
Securing Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Referring to this situation, Perkin filed for a patent in August 1856, 
while he was still only 18. 
Venture Financing 
and Formation 
Against Hofmann’s recommendation Perkin believed in his busi-
ness idea and convinced his father to invest in his idea and bor-
rowed his father’s life savings. 
With the help of his father and brother (3F financing), Perkin set up 
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a dye factory in 1857 (Perkin & Sons) at Greenford Green, near 
Harrow, for mass production of the first synthetic organic dye – 
mauveine – on a six-acre site near the Grand Union Canal, not far 
from London. 
The location was selected for cheap transportation of coal-tar from 
London, the by-product for the emerging gas lighting infrastructure. 
Commercialization 
Issues 
Inventing the dye was one thing, raising enough capital for manu-
facturing the dye in quantity cheaply, adapting it to cotton, getting 
acceptance from commercial dyers, and creating demand for it in 
the public was something else. 
Perkin was active in all of these areas. In a whirlwind of activity, he 
got his father to put up the capital, his brothers to partner in the 
creation of a factory, (as a response to Robert Pullar’s remark) he 
invented a mordant (a pre-dyeing treatment) for cotton, became a 
one man technical service operation, and publicized it in the mar-
ketplace. 
Production; 
New-to-the-World 
Products 
Utilizing the cheap and plentiful coal tar that was an almost unlim-
ited by-product of London’s gas street lighting the dye works be-
gan producing the world’s first synthetically dyed material in 1857. 
Initially there were difficulties. Since aniline was not readily avail-
able, it had to be produced at the factory from benzene. 
Manufacturing of synthetic dyestuff also revealed large needs for 
inorganic basic chemicals, such as sulfuric acid and alkalis, caus-
tic soda, lime and soda ash. 
Unexpected Market 
Success 
Stepwise Market 
Entry via Customer 
Segments 
Already historic in its very founding, the company received an un-
expected commercial boost from the Empress Eugenie of France 
when she decided the new color flattered her. In short order, 
mauve was the necessary shade for all the fashionable ladies of 
France. 
The product met immediately a market with high purchasing power 
based on fashion and “life style,” and only later expanded into the 
large end-user markets via the textile industry. 
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Table I.100, continued. 
Competition 
Hyped Industry 
Genesis 
Ten years after Perkin’s discovery of (synthetic) mauve organic 
chemistry was perceived as being exciting, profitable, and of great 
practical use. 
Many other dyes and new firms followed, and Perkin & Sons was 
soon facing stiff competition from manufacturers in England and 
France. 
By the mid-1860s, the German (later giant) companies Bayer, 
Hoechst and BASF were already in business making dyes, as 
were Ciba and Geigy in Switzerland [Runge 2006:266-269] (and 
Figure II.20 in Runge [2006:275]). 
Britain and France dominated the dyestuff industry till ca. 1870 to 
then encounter a dramatic decline through the new players from 
Germany. 
The important lesson learned is that the companies and industry of 
the country the innovation originated in do not necessarily win. 
A similar situation occurred currently: First the US leadership in the 
photovoltaic (solar cells) industry was overtaken by Germany, and 
currently both the US and Germany are behind China – and China 
having overcome both previous leaders. 
Perkin discovered and marketed also other synthetic dyes. 
Profits and 
Harvesting 
Over the next few years, Perkin found his research and develop-
ment efforts increasingly eclipsed by the German chemical indus-
try, and in 1874, he sold his factory and retired from business, al-
ready a very wealthy man at the age of 35. 
He devoted the rest of his life to research in pure science. For in-
stance, he became particularly interested in Faraday rotation 115 
and produced over 40 papers on this topic. 
After Perkin’s retirement from the industry he remained active in 
his field in other ways, such as being secretary of the Royal 
Chemical Society in 1869 and he became president in 1883. He 
also sat on the boards of several scientific journals. 
Multidimensional 
Innovation Success: 
Industrial: created and/or stimulated new industries (the organic 
color industry of coal tar dyes and pharmaceuticals); 
Scientific: stimulated organic chemistry and the search for a better 
understanding of the structure of molecules 
It should be noted that malaria is still a very serious problem. The search for an anti-
malaria drug is currently repeated by Amyris Biotechnologies (Table I.99). 
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By 1914 Germany dominated the world of synthetic dyes by ca. 85 percent. As de-
scribed by Runge [2006:266-269] Murmann [2003] has attributed the exorbitant rise 
and superiority of German dye companies largely to a co-evolutionary, self-reinforcing 
development of higher education, university research – the S&T system – and the 
industry system – by strong political involvement outlined in detail by Streb [1999]. 
However, Streb [1999] made some important additions to the co-evolutionary explana-
tion pointing out some important other external drivers and an innovative marketing 
and sales strategy of the German firms. On the one hand, it was both decreasing im-
ports of natural dyes during the German-French War of 1870/71 and government’s 
demand for dyed tunics which accelerated the innovation of coal tar dyes in Germany 
(cf. also the. Prussian/Berlin Blue innovation and its role for the Prussian army). 
On the other hand, it is little noticed that the German producers of coal tar dyes also 
owed their success to the two new marketing strategies “customer consulting service” 
and “customer training.” Furthermore, the German chemical firms of the late 19th cen-
tury had both technological and economic innovation capital. And innovation of coal 
tar dyes occurred in cooperation with the textile industry in the second half of the 19th 
century [Streb 1999]. 
According to Streb [1999] German chemical firms, such as BASF, established so-
called “Coloristische Abteilungen” (“Dyes Departments”) to generate new markets for 
product innovations in the field of coal tar dyes. These were responsible for imple-
menting new marketing strategies in the textile industry. Therefore, the Coloristische 
Abteilungen were affiliated with the industrial research laboratories and filled with both 
commercial and technical staff. 
Chemists provided customer consulting service who did not only know the special 
characteristics and performance of new coal tar dyes but were also trained to demon-
strate how to dye and print textiles. These chemists did understand the problems and 
the “language” of textile producers. Before sales they explained textile producers how 
to apply the new coal tar dyes in production plants and also provided technical help in 
cases of actual processing problems (“after sales service”). 
Around 1900 the Coloristische Abteilungen developed customer training. The Colo-
ristische Abteilungen used customer consulting service and customer training to gain 
textile firms as long-term buyers by technological knowledge transfer. They taught em-
ployees of textile firms how to handle the latest techniques of dying and printing. Of 
course, they informed the trainees only about their own products inducing prefer-
ences. 
Obviously their one-year training was advantageous for textile firms. The chemical 
firms on their part won the loyalty of future customers. In our times firms these 
marketing strategies are recalled when playing the game of technological cooperation 
for various areas by “Technical Service Centers.” 
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“The enormous expansion of universities, technical universities (in German Tech-
nische Hochschulen) as well as the many research institutes formed after the 1880s 
was orchestrated from the desk of Friedrich Althoff, who all handled professorial ap-
pointments at Prussian universities and Technische Hochschulen, between 1882 and 
1907, serving under five successive ministers. 
Because he shared the vision that broad scientific and technological research and 
education would be of immense benefit to society, he was a key ally in the efforts of 
the dye industry to expand educational facilities. Furthermore, given his unique control 
over the direction of the Prussian university system and Prussia’s trend-setting role for 
other German states, the dye industry would have to form an alliance with him if they 
wanted to be successful at all during his long tenure. The German dye industry em-
ployed three strategies to upgrade its supply of scientific and engineering talent that 
could staff its firms: 1) use collective organizations to mobilize support, 2) lobby parlia-
ment directly, 3) create private-public academic partnerships.” [Streb 1999] 
There are also mentioned some more factors contributing to the exorbitant rise of the 
German synthetic dye industry. The development of a very broad variety of dyes could 
be based on many platform technologies (chemically different types of dyes) [Runge 
2006:268]. 
According to the patent law of 1877 the chemical industry could only protect proc-
esses in Germany, contrary to the situation in France or the UK where also products 
(substances) could be protected by a patent. Therefore during the acquis the new law 
had less protection impact than expected by the firms. And it is argued that, as no one 
could afford to rest on its monopoly, the German patent law “outright drove the com-
panies into innovation competition.” [Hoffritz 2013] 
A.1.3 Structures and Issues of Current University-
Industry Relationships 
Emphasizing technology transfer (ch. 1.2.6.3) there is a broad diversity of approaches 
and models for university- and public research institute-industry relationships. Diver-
sity does not only result from the involved units of two partners, but also from the 
number of different partners and the more or less active role policy may play. There is 
a pentuple of partners: industry firms (from medium-sized to giant), universities of 
different types, national laboratories or research centers, other public research organi-
zations and policy. Usually, the relationships can be characterized as project-like goal- 
and time-related endeavors, which are rather firm-specific concerning preferences. 
Persons working in particular university-industry or public research institute-
industry organizations may take the experience they gained here (Figure I.64) 
as a springboard for technology entrepreneurship. 
Examples in the US for biofuels of such relationships with “Big Oil” companies are 
described above (A.1.1; Table I.83). For instance, chemical giant DuPont got $9.0 
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million for a partnership with the biofuel startup Bio Architecture Lab from the US 
Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E). 
Chevron had a biofuels development agreement with the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) and also an agreement with Texas A&M University (four-year pe-
riod). It formed research arrangements with Georgia Tech, the University of California, 
Davis and the Colorado Center for Biorefining & Biofuels, which is a consortium of the 
Energy Department’s NREL, three major Colorado universities and other private 
companies (Table I.83). 
Royal Dutch Shell established a joint venture Cellana LLC in 2007 with HR 
BioPetroleum to build a pilot facility for growing marine algae and producing algal oils 
that can, in turn, be used to make biofuels. HR BioPetroleum Inc., headquartered in 
the State of Hawaii, is a developer of large-scale microalgae production technology. It 
is a University of Hawaii, School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology based 
company. Additionally, an academic research program would support the project. The 
program would include scientists from the Universities of Hawaii, Southern Mississippi 
and Dalhousie, in Nova Scotia, Canada; with professional management (Table I.89). 
Industry calls for proposals for collaborative research networks (like US firm HP); the 
German government may call for development projects across the value system (in 
Germany “Verbundprojekte” – “joint projects”). 
For technology entrepreneurship university-industry relationships based on exchange 
of R&D personnel or sharing R&D personnel in a dedicated organizational unit, such 
as a laboratory or a firm (Figure I.41), can play an important basis for potential en-
trepreneurs to gain experience and first insights into the business world (ch. 2.1.2.4), 
but also may reveal opportunities for to-be entrepreneurs. Generally, the personality- 
or personnel-oriented R&D-industry relationship types are as follows. 
1. Sponsorship of a professorship or a network of professors for given research 
or technology directions by industry 
2. Exchanging research personnel in both directions 
3. Sharing personnel in joint firms (or joint projects) 
4. Sharing research personnel at a firm’s site (laboratories) or on the campus. 
More in the US than in Germany sponsorship of individual university professorships 
mostly refer to sponsorship by (wealthy) individuals or foundations. But sponsoring 
professorship or research units involving several professors mostly from different dis-
ciplines has become also of interest to industry as a mode for creating knowledge and 
technology transfer. 
For instance, BP provided $500 million over ten years to establish a dedicated bio-
sciences energy research laboratory attached to a major academic center. BP funding 
for the Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) is led by Berkeley and includes additionally 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (Table I.83). 
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German firms have historically had very close ties to academia (Box I.3; A.1.2). For 
the German industry it is quite common that people from industry hold teaching posi-
tions or professorships at universities. Current university-industry-relationships do not 
only follow common tracks, but, often with support from policy, try new approaches. 
For instance, the German Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT, Table I.20) estab-
lished the concept of “Shared Professorship.” The concept is based either on a 1:1 
research institute-industry relationship or a 1:many relationship. 
In one case capable young scientists are given the opportunity to gain experience in 
research and industry (basically for a period of four years) in order to facilitate their 
later decision in favor of a university or an industry career. The model for a shared 
professor means working half of the time period at industry and the other half of the 
time at the KIT. This close-to-industry professorship is to enhance permeability be-
tween the KIT and industry by a talent transfer in both directions – with benefits for 
both partners, the KIT and industry [KIT 2008]. 
In another case [KIT 2009] the shared professorship involves several enterprises as 
industry partners. For instance, a cooperation designed for a period of five years will 
comprise KIT, Bayer Technology Services, BASF SE, and Roche Diagnostics, each 
industrial partner contributing a quarter of the funds – apart from a professorship – the 
setup of an institute-overlapping thin-film-technology platform [KIT 2009]. 
Thin Film Technology (TFT) deals with the setup and properties of thin layers and the 
devices and process technology required for their production. The thickness of the 
layers varies between a few micrometers and a few nanometers. A particularly 
promising new market is Organic Electronics with organic photovoltaics. In this field, 
TFT mainly focuses on polymer solar cells and hybrid solar cells, which means, on 
polymer solar cells with inorganic nanoparticles. Other projects cover medical diagno-
sis test strips, coatings and varnishes as well as functional thin layers and structures 
for thin-film batteries and optical foils. 
A related approach to intensify industry and science and universities relationships was 
followed by German Henkel AG & Co. KGaA. In 1998 Henkel and “to-be-professors” 
and researchers from a university worked in dedicated projects for a restricted period 
in the industrial research environment [Runge 2006:689-690]. A specific description 
involving the chemical industry in Germany is described by Runge [2006:687-692]. 
A very special situation of technology transfer in the context of entrepreneurship is the 
private-public-partnership (PPP) firm founded by a university and a large company. 
These firms do not only do research, but develop marketable products. Here, a legal 
entity is set up between the two partners. 
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA set up a biotechnology and cell physiology PPP-firm Phenion 
GmbH & Co. KG with the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt am Main 
and merged it with Henkel AG & Co. KGaA effective January, 1 2009. Furthermore, it 
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set up a new materials firm Sustech GmbH & Co. KG on the campus of the Technical 
University of Darmstadt [Schweinberg 2007]. 
The research company SusTech Darmstadt with an appropriate legal form was estab-
lished by Henkel, the Technical University of Darmstadt, and five professors from dif-
ferent disciplines and different universities – with Henkel having a majority stake in it 
and concentrating on management and commercialization (Table I.101). The start 
phase of the PPP-firm was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF). 
Table I.101: Organizational setup of the PPP-firm Sustech GmbH & Co. KG. 
Henkel Henkel AG & Co. 
KGaA 
Technical University of 
Darmstadt 
Five Professors from 
Various Organizations 
60% 10% 30% 
Offices, Laboratories, 
Infrastructure 
Finances 
Utilization, Exploitation 
Management 
Legal and Patents 
Chairman of Advisory 
Board: 
CTO of Henkel 
Foundation: 2000 
Acquired by Henkel: Sep. 
2008 
Employees: 
16 (Sep. 2008) 
20 (2006) 
Colloids, Emulsions 
(U Saarbrücken). 
Polymers, Surfaces 
(U Aachen, RWTH), 
Biomineralization 
(MPI Desden), 
Particular Systems (HGF 
FZK Karlsruhe, now KIT), 
Modeling 
(TU Darmstadt) 
When it started Sustech had an international team of 30 scientists that should develop 
new materials, systems and products. It was set up to enable the fast conversion of 
innovative ideas into economically usable products and processes. The emphasis was 
on utilizing the practical potential of nanoparticles to tackle the widespread problem of 
sensitive teeth. Founded in 2000 Systech was acquired by Henkel in Spetember 2008. 
A similar PPP-approach is also found in the UK, for instance, for ionic liquids technolo-
gy Scionix Ltd. Scionix is set up as a joint venture between the University of Leicester 
and Genacys Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Whyte Group Ltd., Britain’s 
largest privately owned chemical company (A.1.5 and Scionix in Bioniqs Ltd. – B.2). 
Chemical giant BASF follows basically two approaches for sharing research person-
nel, at a firm’s site (laboratories) or on the campus. 
Combining the creative freedom and rapid exchange of ideas unique to the academic 
environment with the resources of a giant company, BASF wanted to create a new 
paradigm for productive academic-industrial research, with all the benefits of both 
worlds. The concept relies on bringing academic and industrial researchers physically 
as close as possible together in one laboratory. 
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In 2003 it opened a laboratory at the Institut de Science et d’ Ingenierie Supra-
moleculaires (ISIS), Louis Pasteur University, Strasbourg (France). The ISIS group 
was headed by a researcher from BASF. Along with BASF’s own expertise with 
nanostructured polymeric materials, a multidisciplinary international team of post-
doctoral researchers provided a wide range of scientific backgrounds, from supra-
molecular complexes to polymer/layered silicate nanocomposites, to sol-gel conden-
sation of highly porous silica networks, to the design and use of automated reactor 
systems for high-output polymer chemistry [Runge 2006:691-692]. 
The BASF lab at Louis Pasteur University in Strasbourg (ISIS) is specialized in supra-
molecular chemistry, developing synthesis pathways for synthetic foams with nano-
meter-scale pore sizes. These nanopores prevent cell gas molecule collisions, and in 
this way reduce heat conduction in the foam to less than half of that observed with 
conventional materials. The nanofoam is designed as an insulating material for refrig-
erators, buildings, cars and even planes. It will reduce energy consumption and save 
materials, thus benefiting the environment. 
Furthermore, since 2006 BASF and Heidelberg University run a Catalysis Research 
Lab (CaRLa) 116 led by BASF in the Technologiepark Heidelberg (Technology Park 
Heidelberg) devoted to homogeneous catalysis. The laboratory was funded by both 
partners and by the State Government of Baden-Württemberg. Furthermore, the 
Chemistry Department of the University of Heidelberg has a catalysis research area 
specially funded by the German Research Foundation DFG (“Sonderforschungsbe-
reich,” SFB 623 (Collaborative Research Centre): Molecular Catalysts: Structure and 
Functional Design). 
CaRLa is led by a Steering Committee with representatives of the University of Hei-
delberg and BASF. It has six postdocs from the University and funded by the Univer-
sity. Also six postdocs and a senior researcher from BASF as managing head of the 
laboratory are financed by BASF. The laboratory’s proximity to Heidelberg University 
as well as to BASF’s global Research Verbund with its Ludwigshafen based Research 
Headquarters offers ideal conditions for outstanding catalysis research and for a swift 
transfer of technology. The joint laboratory has become a prime research location 
attracting catalysis researchers from around the world. 
Another approach of BASF concerning innovation and technology transfer is the com-
pany InnovationLab GmbH (iL) 117 inaugurated in September 2006, a “Joint Innovation 
Lab” (JIL). Here, BASF experts are collaborating with partners from industry and 
academia on materials and device structures from the field of organic electronics. The 
researchers at the JIL are currently focusing on the areas “Organic Light Emitting 
Diodes” (OLEDs) and “Organic Photovoltaics” (OPV) and also fuel cells. 
Referring to the photovoltaics value system (Figure I.11, Figure I.12) iL reflects an in-
novation strategy of BASF turning to a higher level in the value system. It is funded 
equally by science and industry. It is conceptually embedded in the so-called “Top 
 Appendix A 1143 
Cluster Organic Electronics” including printed electronics supported and awarded as 
an excellent cooperation network by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF) comprising twenty-five firms, universities and research institutes working in 
the field on organic electronics. 
The Universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim (near Heidelberg) have 40 percent and 
10 percent stakes, respectively, and industry hold the other with 8,33 percent each for 
the chemical firms BASF SE, Merck KGaA and Freudenberg & Co., Heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen AG (the printing machine giant), Roche Diagnostics GmbH und 
software giant SAP AG. The initiative is part of the German Federal Government’s 
high-tech strategy and the OLED initiative is one of it. 
The business model of iL aims to establish research platforms for various key techno-
logies. Organic Electronics represents a first step. Each platform has three central ele-
ments: applied research, supporting young talents and services, such as acquisition of 
public funds. The activities of each platform are controlled and managed by indepen-
dent management. 
If researching partners have no interest in commercializing inventions of the research 
platforms of iL the inventions will be assessed by the unit “Transfer and Incubation” 
with regard to opportunities and, in case, they will be further developed to reach a 
market within a “virtual enterprise.” iL will not go for commercialization within its own 
structure. Commercialization is intended by either bringing the project back to one of 
the research partners or by a spin-off as a new firm and thus iL may act as an incu-
bator. 
When looking for “New Instruments for Promoting Innovation,” the origin of the “Top 
Cluster Organic Electronics” was the German Ministry of Education & Research 
(BMBF) which established a competition for high-level technology clusters. But it did 
not specify categories or established preconceived boundaries as to the kinds of 
technologies that were eligible. In 2007, it published a call for entries in the first of a 
total of three rounds of the German Top Technology Cluster competition. The prize 
was roughly $260 million for a maximum of five clusters. Out of thirty-eight applicants 
twelve finalists were eventually invited to make a 10-minute presentation to the prize 
jury. 
Two of the five winners were from the Heidelberg – Rhine-Neckar Rivers (RN) region 
(Figure I.50). A tight focus helped winning the prize. [Short 2009a]. The organic elec-
tronics cluster – Forum Organic Electronics – is managed by InnovationLab GmbH (iL) 
with a primary focus on products such as luminous wallpaper and solar absorption 
coatings for energy-efficient heating and cooling. [Short 2009a]. The other cluster 
BioRN emphasizes biotechnology [Short 2009b]. 
The heavy focus of BASF on worldwide research cooperations is illustrated in Figure 
I.188. As similar structures are found also for other German large to giant industrial 
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firms it stresses the concept of a “networked economy” for the German innovation 
system (Figure I.51). 
 
Figure I.188: Quantifying the BASF “Knowledge (now Science) Verbund”: 1,800 R&D 
Cooperations [Jahn 2008]. 
For German university-industry relationships and technology transfer based on shar-
ing personnel more concepts have been reported, such as “project houses” [Runge 
2006:556-557, 575-576] or “science-to-business-centers” [Runge 2006:575; Dröscher 
2008]. 
Moreover, for the chemical industry, in particular, a joint program “Academia-Industry-
Exchange (in German Akademia-Industrie-Austausch – AIA) has been set up by the 
German Chemical Society and the (German) Chemical Industry Association to bring 
(for two to eight weeks) academics into industrial R&D laboratories or industrial re-
searchers into laboratories of universities or public research institutes. Experiences of 
an academic in a so-called Innovation Concept Lab of German Merck KGaA in Cam-
bridge (Mass.) have been reported recently [Schneider 2010]. 
PPP structures similar to those in Germany are also found in the US. The broad areas 
of industry-academia alliances concern essentially “entry” into new or emerging tech-
nologies, for the chemical industry, for instance, ionic liquids, nanotechnology, “white 
and green biotechnology” and biobased or green chemistry or co-evolutionary areas, 
such as electronic chemicals. 
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For instance, DuPont had intense cooperative agreements with MIT which started in 
2000 with about 30 specific research programs in biotechnology. Each research pro-
ject at MIT was assigned a DuPont Liaison and projects were regularly reviewed at 
DuPont. The DuPont MIT Alliance (DMA) was renewed in 2005. 
Originally as a five-year $35 million investment, the alliance should receive another 
$25 million from DuPont to continue funding through 2010. This 10-year, $60 million 
commitment made the DMA the largest corporate R&D investment at MIT. In the 
second stage, the alliance planned to expand beyond biobased science to work with 
nanocomposites, nanoelectronic materials, alternative energy technologies and next-
generation safety and protection materials [Runge 2006:690, 691]. 
Furthermore, DMA also provided an opportunity for DuPont to collaborate with MIT’s 
Sloan School of Management to define new business models for these emerging 
technologies. Another aspect of DMA concerned idea generation. Since its inception, 
the DuPont MIT Alliance has also asked for proposals from the MIT community that 
draw upon the science, engineering and business expertise at MIT to extend DuPont’s 
reach in the areas of biology, genetics, bioinformatics and catalysis . 
Another way for academia-industry relationships targeting compelling topics is used 
by the US firm HP. Its Innovation Research Program (IRP) 118 is administered by the 
HP Labs Open Innovation Office, which is responsible for enabling strategic collabora-
tions with academia, the government and the commercial sector to produce mutually 
beneficial, high-impact research. 
HP Labs’ IRP is designed to create opportunities at colleges, universities and re-
search institutes around the world for collaborative research with HP. It offers awards 
in the range of $50,000 to $75,000. Each year IRP sends out open calls for proposals. 
It is designed to create opportunities for breakthrough collaborative research with HP. 
Proposals will be judged on their potential scientific and societal impact, as well as the 
caliber of the principal researchers, the availability of matching funds for the project 
and the quality of the proposed research plan. 
Discussing issues of university-industry relationships we can refer again to BASF. 
Fundamentally, industry at the moment might benefit from getting something into the 
market quickly, but it also might destroy the free-ranging activity of the professor(s). It 
is the question over the degree of influence the industry partner firm could exercise 
over projects chosen. While not opposed to university-industry partnerships to ad-
dress technical challenges such partnerships might compromise researchers’ inde-
pendence and commitment to the public interest, such as a “green” environment, un-
less the program had a clear organizational structure [Reisch 2007a]. 
In the US in recent times the partnership between industry and universities has been 
weakened over difficulties associated with negotiating IP rights in research contracts. 
Largely as a result of the lack of federal funding for research, American universities 
have become extremely aggressive in their attempts to raise funding from large corpo-
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rations. But industry feels that it takes too much time, effort, and money to negotiate 
an agreement. 
Typically at present, negotiating a contract to perform collaborative research with an 
American university takes one to two years of exchanging emails by attorneys, 
punctuated by long telephone conference calls involving the scientists who wish to 
work together. All too often, the company spends more on attorneys’ fees than the 
value of the contract being negotiated. This situation has driven many large com-
panies away from working with American universities altogether, and they are looking 
for alternate research partners [Johnson 2005; Reisch 2007b]. 
In 2007 BASF and Harvard University’s Office of Technology Investment agreed to 
form the BASF Advanced Research Initiative. With $20 million from BASF, the five-
year program would initially support 10 postdoctoral students and other Harvard re-
searchers, primarily in the School of Engineering & Applied Sciences. However, the 
initiative would also draw on a network of faculty and students in labs throughout Har-
vard. 
Under the agreement, BASF will have the opportunity to further develop discoveries 
and innovations. But Harvard faculty investigators reserved the right to distribute and 
publish any discoveries from the initiative. Although it involves two high-profile names, 
the announcement of this program set off no obvious alarms, perhaps because it had 
many of the hallmarks of traditional university-industry research initiatives and in-
volved no debate over public policy. Its focus was on research leading to new pro-
ducts. BASF would decide on the projects it will fund and had pledged to work with 
Harvard on applying fundamental research to new product development [Reisch 
2007a; Reisch 2007b]. 
A.1.4 Foundation and Development 
of SAP AG in Germany 
German SAP AG is the largest software enterprise in Europe and the fourth largest 
software enterprise by revenues in the world as of 2009 (behind Microsoft, IBM and 
Oracle). Its revenues over the last years amounted to €11.6 billion in 2008 (€10.6 
billion in 2009 during the Great Recession and €12.5 billion in 2010). 
The company now is best known for its SAP Enterprise Resource Planning (SAP 
ERP) software covering accounting, controlling, distribution, purchasing, production, 
storage and inventory, and human resources. Describing the foundation and develop-
ment of SAP AG rely on selected literature [SAP-1; SAP-2; Nonnast 2006, Anonymus 
2004; Breuer 2009] with information relevant for entrepreneurship. 
In April 1972 five computer experts employed at the IBM office in Mannheim (Ger-
many) founded their own firm with the simple name “Systemanalyse und Programm-
entwicklung” SAP (“Systems Analysis & Program Development in Data Processing”), 
using the simplest legal form (GbR) for a firm in Germany. They rented rooms in a 
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building in Mannheim close to the IBM office. And as they told, these rooms were usu-
ally left empty, occupied by just a secretary, to receive calls from customers as the 
team was off developing software with customers [Nannost 2006]. 
At that time (mainframe) computers were like big cabinets with many switches and 
buttons. These mainframes were run by “operators” through stack processing generat-
ing a sequence of programs with a meaningful order. Input of data and commands via 
keyboard monitors did not exist. And IBM did not only provided hardware, but deliv-
ered also customized software programs worked off by the computer, for instance, for 
accounting or payroll. 
By the early 1970s, many in the computer industry realized that an affordable video 
data entry terminal could supplant the ubiquitous punched cards and permit new uses 
for computers that would be more interactive. At universities (at least in Germany) 
there was no computer science or informatics, just courses in programming with 
ALGOL 60 or on analogue calculations. 
Dietmar Hopp, an engineer (diploma in telecommunication technology) who after gra-
duation started to work at IBM as a software developer, and then system consultant 
and account manager and his assistant Hasso Plattner, also an engineer (diploma in 
telecommunication technology) and having started at IBM as software developer, 
were engaged in an IBM program for order processing – based on stack processing - 
for a customer Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in Germany, the once British 
chemical giant, then split and now no longer existing. 
Hopp and Plattner, both from the University of Karlsruhe, suggested to ICI that the 
task could be done much smarter with monitors. ICI agreed and IBM developed an 
order processing system using monitors which then was much requested also by 
other customers. 
Both developed the idea of standard software for accounting whose work processes 
proceed largely identical in firms. And both were ready to develop a corresponding 
system for IBM. However, something which is not so rare in big firms happened. 
Infights with regard to the project between the Mannheim office and the IBM Head-
quarter in Germany emerged – and Hopp and Plattner were frustrated. 
Simultaneously, ICI wanted to have a monitor-based solution for procurement, inven-
tory and invoice-checking. Hopp and Plattner recognized the opportunity: provided ICI 
with what it wanted and got agreement to distribute the created programs with their 
own firm. Both convinced other IBM colleagues, mathematician Hans-Werner Hector, 
graduated physicist Klaus Tschira and economist Claus Wellenreuther, business 
administration and accounting specialist who also thought about standardization of 
accounting software, to join the foundation team. 
SAP was founded with capital of the founders and ICI was their very first client in 
1972. By the end of 1972 there were nine employees and revenues in the first year 
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amounted to DM620,000 (€310,000) leaving a small profit. Their vision and business 
idea was to develop standard application software for real-time business processing, 
in particular, standardization and unification of all kinds of software that is applied in 
firms (which later was extended to provide enterprise software applications and sup-
port to businesses of all sizes globally). More of their entrepreneurial and innovative 
approach is described under the heading “value innovation” (ch. 4.3.6, Table I.78). 
The five ex-IBMers actually acquired the technology from which they based their soft-
ware platform from IBM itself which got it from Xerox as a swap deal for a contract 
Xerox had with IBM. It was called the SDS/SAPE software then and IBM gave the 
software rights to the five engineers in another swap deal, now, for the five’s stock 
ownership of about 8 percent. 
After a short while they came out with the very first financial accounting software. This 
was the seed from which other components were developed to create the system 
known as the SAP R/1 where “R” means real time. Thus came to fruition the founding 
engineer’s vision of developing the standard software systems for real time business 
data processing [SAP-2]. 
During the first years the founders were simultaneously consultants, developers and 
salesmen who could complement each other by various personal characteristics. Suc-
cess factors included that SAP standard ERP software filled a market niche, they had 
customers and marketing was unnecessary; development was done with the custom-
ers and internationalization soon took place. Simultaneously, the founders created a 
corporate culture of trust and customer-orientation as the basis. For employees they 
were always addressable. Key was a corporate environment free from fear and ac-
cepting error and failure so that innovation could thrive. 
The founders focused more on development than sales, but average yearly growth 
rate in terms of revenues in the first five years remained very strong with ca. 60 per-
cent. Further development was with ups and downs. A serious obstacle occurred 
when IBM announced its own accounting software. SAP could not sell any accounting 
software for one year. 
SAP lived on software introduction service [Breuer 2009]. And we learn: “In the first 
half of 1975 we did not grasp any new order.” Five years after foundation SAP was 
still a small firm with 25 employees and DM3.8 million (€1.9 million) revenues 
[Nannost 2006]. It took SAP approximately ten years to achieve €10 million in reve-
nues (Figure I.189) which simultaneously represented the inflection point when linear 
growth changed to exponential growth. 
In 1977 the legal form of the company was converted to a limited liability company 
(“GmbH,” LLC) and the name was changed to “Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte in 
der Datenverarbeitung” (SAP GmbH; Systems, Applications and Products in Data 
Processing) and it moved its headquarters to Walldorf near Heidelberg. 
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The breakthrough was induced again by the former employer of the team. Early in 
1979 IBM launched a new mainframe computer. The new type 4300 was faster by a 
factor of four compared to the most powerful computers existing so far on the market. 
Furthermore, the price of the 4300 series was just a quarter of the other high power 
computers. 
And SAP had the right software R/2 which could map many business processes. In 
the 1980s, SAP released SAP R/2 which boasted of a better stability compared to its 
predecessors. It also started becoming multilingual and had become multi-currency to 
accommodate the needs of their international customers. 
Only one year later half of Germany’s top 100 industrial firms were SAP’s customers. 
SAP’s significant growth became more noticed. In 1986 SAP’s revenues exceeded 
DM100 million (€50 million) [Nannost 2006]. By 1995 the global chemical industry had 
the largest percentage of SAP installations and accounted for 40-50 percent of SAP’s 
annual revenues and Chemical Market Reporter called SAP the “ERP standard 
among large chemical companies.” [Runge 2006:241] 
The original foundation team worked together roughly for ten years. In 1982 Claus 
Wellenreuther left the firm. In 1988, SAP GmbH transferred into SAP AG (a stock-
based corporation by German law), and public trading started on the stock exchange 
by the end of the year. Hans-Werner Hector became responsible for SAP’s business 
in the US. Until its IPO SAP financed its growth by own profits. 
After fifteen years in 1987 SAP achieved revenues of €77.7 million with 468 employ-
ees, and €1.38 billion with 6,857 employees in 1995, after 23 years (Figure I.189). For 
comparison, it took Microsoft nine years (until 1983) to reach $50 million in annual 
revenues and fifteen years to cross $1 billion (1989) (cf. [Bhidé 2000:16] and Figure 
I.144, Figure I.157). 
What was the basis of SAP’s success? Contrary to Microsoft or Oracle which, during 
their early phases, relied essentially on products, tools (programming languages and 
computer operating system or relational databases), SAP was focused on business 
processes emphasizing industrial customers. And, according to Dietmar Hopp, there 
was an additional situation: “Simply, at the right time we had the right idea” (“Wir 
hatten einfach zur richtigen Zeit die richtige Idee”). 
 1150 Appendix A 
 
 
Figure I.189: Developments of revenues of German SAP AG from its foundation. 
A.1.5 Entrepreneurship Cases Referring to Ionic Liquids 
Referring to the field of ion liquids (ILs) provides exemplary insights into aspects of the 
birth of (largely) “economic markets” (Table I.15) out of science and the approaches of 
entrepreneurs to grasp corresponding opportunities based on a new technology – 
which means essentially a technology push approach (ch. 1.2.5.1, Figure I.26). 
But contrary to biofuels and biobased chemicals (A.1.1) venture capital did not show 
up here as a financial source. Related cases tackle entrepreneurship perceived as a 
disruptive innovation based on a platform technology with broad applicability for many 
markets. Furthermore, the evolved area after ca. five years had a limited number of 
players. 
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We shall focus on the fates of two university spin-outs (RBSUs) and one NTBF, two 
from Germany and one from the UK, over the first 8-10 years of their existence. Only 
one survived the entry into the new technology area (IoLiTec GmbH, B.2), one was 
purchased by a large firm (Solvent Innovation GmbH, B.2) and one went bankrupt 
(Bionics Ltd., B.2). The Bioniqs case contains also a larger discussion of another 
university spin-out in the UK, Scionix Ltd. founded in 1999, which still exists. 
 Solvent 
Innovation GmbH 
IoLiTec GmbH Bioniqs Ltd. 
Founded 1999 2002/2003 2004 
Current State Purchased by Merck 
KGaA in 2007, 
integrated 2008 
Still operational; 
has US subsidiary 
Dissolved 2011 in 
Nov.; liquidation 
> 12  months 
Concerning entrepreneurship it is notable that IoLiTec has been founded by a 
former employee of Solvent Innovation. 
Ionic liquids for broad chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnological, industrial and 
research applications emerged only by the end of the 1990s though they were known 
for decades. They are salts (with negatively charged anions and positive cations), but 
they are not solid as commonly salts are but liquid at “low” temperatures (usually 
considered to melt near or below 100 degC) and are relatively low viscous. However, 
only a melting point below 80 degC allows a broad substitution of conventional organic 
solvents by ionic liquids – in principle. 
Replacing an organic solvent by ionic liquids can lead to remarkable improvements re-
garding reactivity and selectivity. In many cases the proper choice of the cation/anion-
combination allows an optimization of the ionic liquid solvent, especially for a reaction 
under investigation. Ionic liquids have been used to dissolve not only simple organic 
compounds, but also enzymes, polymers, even coal and nuclear waste. 
The role of ionic liquids as a solvent is not restricted to chemical reactions; it can also 
be used for extraction reactions. The extraction of metals from different sources will 
play an important role in times of depleting resources. Selected ionic liquids show a 
high extraction capacity for some metal ions which will make these ionic liquids 
interesting solvents. 
Researchers from the University of Leuven, Belgium, have used ionic liquids to sepa-
rate the rare earth metals neodymium and samarium from transition metals like iron, 
manganese and cobalt – all elements that are used in the construction of permanent 
rare earth magnets, which are found in electronic devices ranging from hard drives to 
air conditioners and wind turbines. Hence, recycling old magnets with ILs provide 
opportunities, so that rare earth metals can be re-used in electronics [Farrell 2013]. 
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China has almost a monopoly concerning rare earths. This degree of dependence 
gives many Western governments an uneasy feeling, especially when the materials 
are so crucial to high-tech defense projects. Recycling is at least a partial solution to 
the supply-risk problem. 
China has 37 percent of the world’s accessible reserves, according to the British 
Geological Survey, followed by the former Soviet Republics that make up the Com-
monwealth of Independent States, then the US and Australia. But China supplies 
about 96 percent of the world’s rare earth elements (REEs). Many green technologies 
are heavily dependent on the REEs, especially wind turbines and hybrid cars; each 
Toyota Prius hybrid car is reported to contain as much as 1kg of neodymium in its 
motor and 10-15 kg of lanthanum in its battery. 
“Although less than 1% of rare-earth elements are recycled currently, 20% of global 
demand could be met in this way. By combining mining and recycling the western 
world could become largely independent of China in the future.” [Farrell 2013] 
Ionic liquids are also specified as “designer solvents.” The choice of the cation or 
anion can affect other salt properties, including density, viscosity, and water stability 
and miscibility. Tailor-made ionic liquids were becoming increasingly important. 
Ionic liquids form two-phase reaction systems with many organic product mixtures. In 
this way, simple product separation by phase separation and easy catalyst recycling is 
possible. Moreover, the lack of vapor pressure allows destillative separation of the 
product from the ionic catalyst solution without formation of azeotrops. In some cases 
the catalyst is even stabilized by the ionic liquid during distillation. Currently a growing 
variety of ionic liquids is becoming commercially available, a development that has fed 
the surge of research using these unorthodox liquids [Runge 2006:538-540]. 
One of the most widely heralded features of ionic liquids is the virtual absence of va-
por pressure. Ionic liquids are “the ultimate non-volatile organic solvents.” A great deal 
of attention has consequently been given to the use of ionic liquids as “green” re-
placements for volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which are being subjected to in-
creasingly stringent regulations [ICB Americas 2004]. 
By theory about 1018 different ionic liquids are conceivable. The numbers of ca. 500-
1,000 products for R&D and 10-20 different commercially available industrial scale 
products [Schubert 2008a] seem to be just a start for the new technical field. This ratio 
also demonstrates that design of ionic liquids is a game with gigantic numbers and 
combinatorics. 
Though being rather fragmented into many relatively small markets this totally new 
technical area attracted not only some notable startups and NTBFs (Solvent Inno-
vation GmbH and IoLitec GmbH in Germany, Scionix Ltd. and Bioniqs Ltd. in the UK), 
but also large chemical companies, such as the German firms Merck KGaA (which ac-
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quired recently Solvent Innovation GmbH), Cytec and Covalent Associates in the US 
as well as the chemical giant BASF in Germany. 
lonic liquids can be viewed as a generic and platform technology (Table I.12, Table 
I.51) with a very large number of commercially relevant applications as is shown by 
IoLiTec GmbH founder T. Schubert [2008a]. He lists 26 specific applications clustered 
into 6 different general areas. A corresponding slide in a presentation (available with 
the author) was published by IoLiTec already in 2004 [Schubert 2004], one year after 
its foundation. A corresponding list of applications was later also published by Short 
[2006]. 
Having such a broad choice set of opportunities requires careful selection and setting 
priorities. And the setting of priorities means usually making hard choices among 
conflicting (sub)goals. 
But publicizing and illustrating the broad spectrum of applications for ionic liquids was 
not only meant to show what choices IoLiTec could make from existing options and 
which ones it finally made. The spectrum of applications was additionally made public 
to prevent any entrant to patent a particular application and thus constrain IoLiTec’s 
further expansions into other applications of interest to them. 
In search for commercial applications of ionic liquids and the necessity to reveal fur-
ther opportunities ionic liquids startups had to closely watch results of the intense 
research efforts in the field. In this line startups focused on building broad and intense 
networks with academia and, in particular, to get leading scientists as members of 
their Advisory Boards. 
Markets 
The gross market of ionic liquids comprises research and development in academia 
and industry as well as components or auxiliaries for technical devices and machines 
as well as solvents for special technical processes (functional fluids). 
Most industry observers reckoned that the chemical industry’s interest in ionic liquids, 
mainly as a solvent, was kick-started only in 1999 by Solvent Innovation GmbH, 
founded in Cologne, Germany focused on the development, production and marketing 
of ionic liquids. Soon Degussa AG (now Evonik Industries) through its subsidiary 
Creavis Technologies & Innovation gained an interest in Solvent Innovation (B.2). Also 
in 1999 in the UK Scionix Ltd. (in Bioniqs Ltd. – B.2) was established. 
“The purpose of the strategic partnership that we have entered with Solvent Inno-
vation is to obtain ionic liquids as a new product category for large-scale production 
applications.” According to a Degussa spokesperson around 2004 the company aimed 
to produce and market ionic liquids as specialty chemicals, particularly for technical 
applications, such as pigment-sensitized solar cells, high-capacity batteries, fuel cell 
membranes, plastics additives and special functional coatings. Degussa was rumored 
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already to have commercialized a hydrosilylation reaction using ionic liquids [ICB 
Americas 2004]. 
Chemical giant BASF SE entered the field in 2002 and in the same year also the 
formation of IoLiTec GmbH occurred (in Cologne/Aachen, Germany). 
Most of the applications of ion liquids that do come to fruition in 2006 were estimated 
to be relatively small. “Everybody is looking for the blockbuster – but it won’t happen. 
There will be $1 million here and $5 million there, a lot of different uses in a lot of dif-
ferent markets.” It was expected that in this way the worldwide ionic liquids business 
could add as much as $50 million annually in a very short time [Short 2006]. 
Sales projections by market entrants were understandably still vague in a business 
that was less than a decade old. For his startup IoLiTec (B.2) Schubert [2004] esti-
mated the total market for R&D environments in 2004 to be €2.5 million per year and 
distribution to be via chemicals’ catalogs of dedicated firms, such as German Merck 
KGaA or Sigma-Aldrich. These firms sell (and produce) its chemical and biochemical 
products and kits that are used in scientific and industrial research, biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical development, the diagnosis of disease, and as key components in 
high technology manufacturing. On the other hand, Schubert envisioned applications 
for sensors (for the detection of moisture, the use of gases and dangerous materials) 
to reflect a total market of €25 million per year. 
Most ion liquids may have very high prices, €400 - €2,000 per kilogram. Economies of 
scale for ionic liquids would not exist soon, and their expense would slow their 
adoption. Costs, however, may be surmountable. 
It was pointed out that “the price might look bad in the beginning, but it is always price-
to-performance that is important.” If the performance of an ionic liquid is 20 times that 
of the material it aims to replace, for example, a customer would need much less of 
the ionic liquid. Furthermore, one hears “You always need to help a customer dif-
ferentiate a product from a competitor’s or make a technology leap.” “If the im-
provement is only incremental, you’d better forget about it.” [Short 2006] 
Experts fast dampened expectations arising from early research into ionic liquids – 
particularly when it came to forecasting widespread applicability. “Most of the ionic 
liquids that academia is playing with are new chemicals. They are not listed in regula-
tory framework. They can be used in research but can’t be used in large quantities 
without being registered with the authorities around the world. And that, will involve 
considerable amounts of time and money.” [Short 2006] 
“In Degussa,” the German large specialty chemicals company renamed to Evonik 
Industries, “researchers have some degree of freedom to work on potential projects 
and to be innovative. But once something becomes a bigger, controlled project, 
questions come up: Toxicity? Raw materials? Availability? Listing? These questions 
do kill some projects.” 
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The willingness of large companies, such as Evonik, to encourage the use of ionic 
liquids will be a key to their widespread adoption. 
More specific ionic liquids market segments and their magnitudes are described in the 
context of the cases of Solvent Innovation GmbH (B.2) and IoLiTec GmbH (B.2). 
After 2005 large or giant global German firms like Evonik (Degussa), Merck KgaA or 
BASF looked for large-scale applications of ionic liquids and had increased their in-
house production capacities to the multi-ton level for selected applications. 
Some ionic liquids are not miscible in organic solvents, a property that BASF made 
the foundation of its BASIL technology. For example, the company produces alkoxy-
phenylphosphines at multi-ton scale by reacting phenyl-chlorophosphines with alco-
hols [ICB Americas 2004]. 
Merck KGaA began working with ionic liquids for battery applications already in the 
mid 1980s, though the project was ultimately dropped, said its Urs Welz-Biermann. In 
1999, the company was one of the co-founders of the QUILL network (Solvent Inno-
vation GmbH, B.2), in which it took a fairly passive role, following developments and 
considering how it might use ionic liquids. In 2002, however, Merck restarted its own 
ionic liquids program. “We decided we would try to sell compounds and see if there 
was interest,” said Mr. Welz-Biermann. 
Merck began a Web site offering a list of compounds, at that time over 250, many of 
them based on building blocks patented by the company. “We’ve put a lot of effort into 
analytics,” he adds. “We’re doing the business a different way from other companies-
not just putting together a catalog of compounds, but also giving specific data like 
melting point, solvation, etc., to help customers begin working with new compounds.” 
[ICB Americas 2004] 
Merck made most of its ionic liquids in-house at its headquarter in Darmstadt, Ger-
many. Large volumes were not a problem, according to Mr. Welz-Biermann – a new 
multi-purpose facility built for the company’s liquid crystal business was also available 
for manufacturing ionic liquids in the hundreds of kilograms. 
While large firms, such as BASF SE and Merck KGaA, have multi-purpose plants for 
large production levels economies of scale as, for instance, found for biofuels (A.1.1) 
or solar cell manufacturing (Figure I.154), this did not exist for NTBFs and their ionic 
liquids. Without economies of scale the related little reductions of expense and price 
of ionic liquids also slowed adoption of their offerings. 
“The success of ionic liquids will not necessarily be equated with large-scale chemis-
try,” noted Prof. Robin D. Rogers, at the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. As most 
applications will be small, usually only a couple of tons of ionic liquid per application 
per year, a micro-reactor that can quickly be configured to produce different types of 
ionic liquids on a kilogram-per-day scale could be an advantage. For IL NTBFs 
scaling-up via micro-reactor technology (MRT) has turned out to be the technology of 
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choice for small and mid-sized companies to face the challenges of scale-up (IoLiTec 
GmbH, B.2). 
In their early phases ionic liquids startups usually relied on joint production alliances 
with large firms (mostly Merck KGaA) to produce larger volumes of ILs, say more than 
1 metric ton. But concerning the issue of scaling-up startups also considered limiting 
themselves concerning production capacities. 
For instance, Claus Hilgers, the co-founder of Solvent Innovation GmbH said [Short 
2006]: “We could extend up to 50 or 100 metric tons, but that’s it. We won’t go beyond 
that. We are positioned between the global players and the small guys.” If his com-
pany needs significantly larger quantities, he added, it would work with Degussa 
(Evonik), BASF, or another large company to actually produce the compounds. 
Entrepreneurial Startups in Ionic Liquids 
The industry’s concept of what ionic liquids can do has evolved significantly over the 
last years. Advanced materials and functional compounds, such as high-performance 
lubricants, thermal fluids, and dispersion of nanoparticles, became major directions. 
In 2010 the ionic liquids markets worldwide was forecasted to reach $3.4 billion by 
2020 from 300 million that year. Catalysis and synthesis are seen as the biggest ap-
plications by value. German and US companies lead the market and developments 
with a share today of 70 percent [Helmut Kaiser Consultancy 2010]. 
Generally, IL startups could take advantage from the general interest in the field in 
academia and industries – at least in Germany. A serious entry of startups into com-
mercialization began around 2005. 
Around 2006-2007, for instance, to push growth in promising technical directions and 
development of the markets by sales professionals Solvent Innovation looked to catch 
€2 million of investment capital (B.2) and IoLiTec looked for €3.5 million investment 
capital. In parallel, scientific research on ionic liquids progressed with fast pace. A 
host of known academic groups was busily expanding the limits of what is known 
about ionic liquids. 
As a consequence, IL startups must keep knowledge about the developments of new 
classes of materials, including their applications and potential markets. 
Computer-supported prediction of the performance and properties and simulation of 
ILs turned out to be mandatory to manage the myriad of continuously created new 
data and also to respond to customized solutions for clients. IoLiTec and Bioniqs run 
(ran) related computer systems. The issue here is often a trade-off between proper-
ties, for instance, hydrophobicity (water-repellent; tending to repel and not absorb 
water), thermal stability and price versus biodegradability and corrosiveness [Sahin 
and Schubert 2012]. 
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“If a new material is to be accepted as a technically useful material, the che-
mists must present reliable data on the chemical and physical properties 
needed by engineers to design processes and devices.” – Lowell A. King, 
Pionier of Ionic-Liquids-Research 
The startups had to continuously adapt to their environments by changing their busi-
ness models and organizational structures, having sufficient financial resources and 
establishing networks with appropriate universities and public research institutes and 
cooperation with industrial partners which are potential customers and participate in 
corresponding project consortia – utilizing public R&D and public financial support. 
They had to continuously work on reducing the price levels of the offerings, but simul-
taneously keeping the quality. For ILs quality is associated with purity, and purity usu-
ally translates into performance of the ILs. Collaborative projects are a preferred 
method of introducing materials to the market place as an optimized process solution. 
Furthermore, in the sense of “technology push” (ch. 1.2.5.1) and commercialization of 
the technology startups had to develop their markets and fight for market share. If ILs 
occur in the market as a new technology or if ILs appear as an enhancing or generic 
technology, fight is against other, often well established technologies in the market. 
The above requirements represent important factors and conditions against which the 
fates of the startups mentioned in the introduction can be discussed, considering addi-
tionally the role of the Great Recession. 
Solvent Innovation GmbH 
The RBSU Solvent Innovation GmbH (B.2) survived the Dot-Com Recession around 
2001, as did Scionix Ltd. in the UK. 
Solvent Innovation GmbH (SI) was founded in 1999 by Claus Hilger and later Prof. 
Peter Wasserscheid, a worldwide renowned pioneer and expert in ionic liquids, as a 
spin-out of the Technical University (RWTH) Aachen in Germany. 
By January 2008 the German firm Merck KGaA :took over SI with ten employees at 
that time and integrated it into Merck’s Performance & Life Science Chemicals unit, 
but it continued to operate as “Merck Solvent Innovation GmbH.” In this regard 
Solvent Innovation shared the fate of another spin-out of the Technical University 
(RWTH) Aachen, Puron AG, which also was acquired by a large firm after a couple of 
years ([Runge 2006:95-96]; Table I.41, Figure I.73). 
Before foundation of Solvent Innovation in 1999 availability of ionic liquids in commer-
cially relevant quantities did not exist. A small number of systems for laboratory ex-
periments could be purchased from catalog firm Sigma-Aldrich [Wagner and Hilgers 
2008]. Furthermore, Cytec, Acros and other “catalog firms” had supplied the labora-
tory market with ionic liquids for years. 
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Having the adequate entrepreneurial mind-set Claus Hilgers went in 1998 to the Tech-
nical University (RWTH) of Aachen. Under the leadership of Dr. Peter Wasserscheid a 
working group emerged that dealt with the synthesis and applications of ionic liquids 
and Hilgers performed his doctoral thesis in this group. At that time industry became 
more interested in ILs. And as they were not commercially available, Wasserscheid’s 
workgroup received an increasing number of requests for samples. 
Talks with industry professionals indicated that people wanted the ionic liquids and 
were willing to pay for ILs. When development of demand reached a certain level, 
Wasserscheid und Hilgers recognized the opportunity for a business and founded 
Solvent Innovation GmbH. 
Such an entrepreneurial situation starting already with industrial or academic custom-
ers is often observed with RBSUs, such as WITec GmbH (B.2), Attocube AG (B.2), 
Nanion Technologies GmbH (B.2) in Germany or Cambridge Nanotech (B.2) in the 
US. 
The company’s founders were both pioneers in the development and application of 
new ionic liquids with enhanced efficiency. The most significant research results of 
Wasserscheid and Hilgers were combined to form a unique technology platform, the 
AIMFEE™ technology (Advanced Ionic Materials for Enhanced Efficiency), which was 
seen as the basis and a powerful tool for numerous potential applications in life sci-
ence and chemical synthesis as well as catalysis and material science. 
SI’s technology was protected by a number of patents (or patent applications, respec-
tively). 
In the early days Solvent Innovation viewed itself as a partner for systems solutions in 
the field of ionic liquids rather than only a producer. It also offered custom synthesis of 
specialties and contract research. Early customers included the big names in the che-
mical and petrochemical industry. 
For foundation and further developments SI followed the typical entrepreneurial path 
of a German RBSU. 
Solvent Innovation did not need external financing during its startup thrust phase (ch. 
4.3.2; Figure I.125), its first three to four years of existence [Hilgers 2006]. On the one 
hand, the founders could utilize the laboratories and the infrastructure of the univer-
sity. Furthermore, after Hilgers’ scholarship for his thesis ended the program PFAU 
(“Programm zur Finanziellen Absicherung von Unternehmensgründern aus Hoch-
schulen”) of the State Government of Northrhine-Westphalia secured his cost of living. 
The program financed founders of the state universities for a maximum of two years 
by a quasi-salary. Hence, Hilgers did not need to make revenue, but could concen-
trate on developing the business. Hilgers was supported by PFAU for the period July 
1, 2000 until June 30, 2002. 
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The time of the PFAU scholarship was used essentially for generating a technical 
Proof-of Concept (PoC), developing concepts for financing and distribution and market 
tests. During that period also two new processes were developed with the claim to re-
duce production cost by 35 percent and increasing quality and SI submitted these as 
patent applications. 
Solvent innovation could not finance growth which required also a new location by suf-
ficient own revenues (profits) and, hence, looked for an investor. As there where al-
ready contacts with the German large specialty chemicals firm Evonik Industries 
(named Degussa at that time) Hilgers succeeded in getting Evonik on board as a third 
(minority) partner for the GmbH (LLC) in 2003. It complemented its growth financing 
deal together with capital from a public investment organization. 
In February 2004 Solvent Innovation moved to its new site at the Biocampus Cologne, 
a sort of technology park. Since 2004 Solvent Innovation manufactured its products in 
Cologne and had an option on the neighboring building so that its site could be ex-
tended without problems. 
Business orientation was driven essentially by the fact that published research results 
indicated that the unique character of ionic liquids could open up new “solutions” for 
catalysis and organic synthesis emphasizing the “green” character of ionic liquids for 
chemical processes in terms of 
 replacing volatile organic solvents, 
 minimizing the consumption of catalyst, 
 enhancing the overall activity and selectivity of chemical processes. 
In order to meet rising market demands for ionic liquids in larger quantities, in 2005 
Solvent Innovation increased its capacities distinctly with the acquisition of a new 100 l 
plant. Together with the already existing 25 l plant and two 20 l reactors at that time 
Solvent Innovation had an annual production capacity of more than 5 metric tons. 
Between 2005 and 2007 within Solvent Innovation a business re-orientation emerged. 
The industry’s concept of what ionic liquids can do had evolved significantly. There-
fore, Hilgers changed the business model. Over time it had turned out that positioning 
and commercialization of ionic liquids as a replacement of organic solvents for synthe-
ses were not sufficient for distinct growth. Solvent Innovation should no longer be 
viewed as only a producer of solvents – mainly used by academic research 
SI turned to materials and functional compounds – for industrial customers. 
And there was a new business model. Organizationally, SI could expect its impressive 
list of persons on the Advisory Board to be helpful for the re-orientation. Products 
would be sold directly via a catalog business or via distributors. SI then focused on the 
fields of  
 1160 Appendix A 
 Separation 
 Analytics 
 Organic Synthesis 
 Enzymatic Biocatalysis 
 Electrochemistry 
 New Materials. 
This shift of emphasis away from the solvent aspect was associated with addressing a 
different type of customers. And the firm had to learn that for the market of functional 
materials the times from first contact to applications with the existing customers were 
significantly shorter. Until an industrial customer replaces a solvent in a running proc-
ess an extremely long time will pass. Other applications of ionic liquids can be im-
plemented within one or two years [Hilgers 2006]. 
Solvent Innovation strove for becoming a systems and solutions provider; it offered 
the complete portfolio of customer services, joint development, consultancy, and so 
on. 
Solvent Innovation offered two kinds of products [Wagner 2006a, 2007]: 
 Platform products – pure ionic liquids 
 Integrated products – finished formulated products and masterbatches. 
A masterbatch is a product in which components (often pigments and/or other ad-
ditives) are already optimally dispersed in a carrier material that is compatible with the 
main target/material in which it will be used. Integrated product classes of SI with mar-
ket potentials of €300 million to €500 million were, for instance, 
INNOLUBE™ High-performance 
lubricants and electrically conductive 
lubricants 
INNOLUBE acts as an electrically 
conductive lubricant for a bearing in 
frequency-controlled motors 
INNOVAC™ Liquid for vacuum pumps 
and compressor fluid for screw com-
pressors 
INNODISPERS™ Dispersing agents 
for nano-particles 
INNOSTAT™ Anti-static agents for 
plastics and coatings 
AMMOENG acts a dispersing agent, 
for instance, for homogenization of 
color pigments 
However, it appeared that most of the products had still the status of prototypes. For 
instance, the prototype INNOSTAT™ anti-static agents, such as INNOSTAT™PU or 
INNOSTAT™PVC or INNOSTAT™PC targeted the polymers and plastics commodity 
markets of polyurethanes, polyvinylchlorides and polycarbonates which, however, are 
produced since decades on a million tons level relying on an established set of highly 
competitive suppliers of processing aids and additives. 
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To replace existing anti-static agents for well established and optimized manufacturing 
processes would mean that “technical specification of customers met,” as noted by 
Wagner [2007] for INNOSTAT™PU, does not suffice. SI had to fight against switching 
costs and convenience and customers taking the risks these additives to function not 
only in a laboratory or 500 kg level pilot plant, but in a multi-million tons plant. 
In 2006 SI targeted an institutional investor to finance finishing its “products” and the 
development of the market by sales professionals. 
According to SI’s Head of Marketing & Sales M. Wagner the biggest risk was associ-
ated with the challenge of efficient market penetration for the newly developed pro-
ducts INNOLUBE and INNOSTAT. 
By January 2008 the German firm Merck KGaA acquired SI. The takeover meant ac-
quisition of technical know-how and experience. Furthermore, Merck obtained addi-
tional production capacities and products to access new markets with the high-
performance lubricants and antistatic agents for plastics. 
SI was slow in transforming science into businesses providing sufficient revenues 
compared with its direct German competitor IoLiTec whose most important co-founder 
was a former employee of SI. It lacked sufficient financial resources to drive pilot pro-
ducts into commercial offerings and lack of human resources to sufficiently support 
the successful entry into lucrative markets by technically versatile professionals. 
Bioniqs Ltd. 
As Solvent Innovation GmbH in Germany also in the UK the RBSU Bioniqs Ltd. (B.2) 
was founded (in December 2004) by an entrepreneurial pair consisting of a scientific 
co-worker or graduate, respectively and a professor. 
It provided designs and developed proprietary ionic liquids (ILs) which aimed to facili-
tate and improve biochemical and biocatalytic processes in industry, particularly in the 
chemical, pharmaceutical, paper and textile sectors. It addressed a heterogeneous set 
of industrial processes, from bioconversions and chemical synthesis to analytics 
(chromatography), extraction of natural products and decontamination/cleaning. 
Bioniqs was set to be profitable by the end of 2007 [RSC 2007]. However, Bioniqs 
went bankrupt and was dissolved in November 2011. 
Founding Bioniqs had a biological origin and perspective. It was essentially science-
driven based on attitudes and activities of Adam Walker who wanted to work at the 
interface between biology and chemistry. For a study for a PhD to find a way to inte-
grate biological catalysts into the preparation of an opioid analgesic Walker joined Neil 
Bruce, then at the Institute of Biotechnology at the University of Cambridge, UK. 
Walker realized that the intermediates in the path to that analgesic are poorly water 
soluble, but enzymes only function in a water-based environment. In the attempt to 
solve the problem Walker came across using ionic liquids as solvents. Eventually he 
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succeeded in chemically modifying an ionic liquid to make it resemble water more 
closely, so that his enzymes and drug intermediates remained stable in one solvent. 
Towards the end of his PhD, Walker had the business idea that replacing water with 
modified ionic liquids as solvents for industrial applications would be commercially 
viable – and a related startup would not seriously interfere with other IL startups oper-
ating already in the UK and Germany 
And he decided to set up a spin-out company, Bioniqs, with Neil Bruce. The University 
of Cambridge filed the patents for their “designer solvents,” but before Walker and 
Bruce could set up a spin-out company in Cambridge, Bruce was offered a position as 
chair of biotechnology at the Centre for Novel Agricultural Products (CNAP) at the 
University of York, UK. 
Bruce and Walker moved to CNAP and they “designed an ionic liquid that would 
mimic water, but would not hydrolyze enzymes” – “Second Generation Ionic Liquids.” 
They thought they can develop tailor-made ionic liquids at a competitive price. 
They positioned their technology as an enabling technology (Table I.12) which means, 
you can do things that you cannot do using existing processes. Furthermore, the new 
company would be based upon a strong patent portfolio arising from work performed 
at the Universities of York and Cambridge. 
Bioniqs aimed to generate revenues through design and process development (royalty 
stream on sale of licensed products), not manufacturing – hence, exploiting opportu-
nity by alliance rather than competition with major IL manufacturers. Bioniqs also of-
fered contract research and consulting services. Its major target markets were in the 
pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals sectors. 
By type there were two customer segments, industrial customers (solvents for indus-
trial enzymes) and customers from academia and public research institutes. But, de 
facto the consultancy element of what Bioniqs did was really helping the firm to under-
stand and develop its own products rather than generating a stream of revenue. 
To fill roles of CEO and director of operations for growing a company quite literally 
from scratch and pushing new technology into almost non-existing markets, a “tech-
nology push” situation, Walker had to master a steep learning curve. 
CNAP in York took a very proactive approach to spin-outs. In the York Science Park 
as its location Bioniqs had an analytical room where ionic liquids were designed and a 
synthesis suite, where the resulting liquids were produced in small scale. In York they 
also found a partner in Amaethon Ltd., a technology commercialization company spe-
cifically created to commercialize CNAP research. Financing was through own and 
public sources as well as private investors. 
IL research of the then founders of Bioniqs was also funded by the ProBio Faraday 
Partnership and BBSRC (Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Council). 
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In 2006 Bioniqs could take advantage of Connect, Yorkshire’s Fast Invest Scheme – a 
program that offered technology businesses loans of up to £50,000 combined with 
business mentoring (at January 2007: 1 £ = 1.52 € = 1.96 $). To help Bioniqs’ trans-
formation from a purely development focus to one of sales and growth, Fast Invest 
allowed Bioniqs to recruit a business development manager, an experienced com-
mercial director on a consultancy basis. 
Also in 2006 Bioniqs established a partnership agreement with the large German che-
micals firm Merck KGaA (Darmstadt). Through this partnership, Merck KGaA manu-
factured and distributed through its catalog a selected range of Bioniqs’ proprietary 
ammonium based ionic liquids.(“catalog business”). 
In 2007 the Yorkshire Forward Bioscience award for the “Young Company of the 
Year” was given to Bioniqs. 
By 2006/2007 with ionic liquids as solvents and its application in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries Bioniqs put its focus largely on production processes via 
production and distribution alliances with IL as solvents or auxiliaries for decontamina-
tion and cleaning of process reactors and recycling processes as well as extraction of 
natural products from biomass and biocatalysis. 
It hoped to take advantage from the “green chemistry” and CleanTech trends which 
emerged clearly by 2005/2006. As a differentiator, Bioniqs positioned its offerings on 
identification and design of environmentally friendly solvents that offer performance 
and efficiency improvements over many hazardous materials and as a timely service – 
as many conventional solvents were becoming more difficult and expensive to use 
due to increasingly stringent environmental and safety legislation, such as the so-
called REACH registration for Europe. This would tend to require replacing sub-
stances and solvents because of their negative environmental impact. 
As there was (and is) much discussion about the notion and the understanding of 
“green solvents” as a marketing tool Bioniqs introduced and promoted a green solvent 
certification (named “econiqs”) in response to confusion over the reality of claims 
made about “green chemicals” and many novel solvents. 
As a further marketing instrument, ahead of its 2009 product catalog, Bioniqs 
launched three solvent kits – “Product Catalogue Starter kit,” “Low Viscosity kit” and 
“Hydrophobic kit.” These offered a representative selection of ammonium salts and 
would address researchers who are new to protic ionic liquids (PILs). 
The cleaning business promised to be multi-scale tons envisioning tailor-made ionic 
liquids for dissolving poorly soluble active pharmaceutical ingredients off the walls of 
reactors. 
In 2008/2009 Bioniqs was successful in winning funding from the UK government to 
design solvents that will enable some plastics (high performance polymers) to be re-
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cycled more efficiently. The related HiPerPol project aimed to enable polymers to be 
separated from plastic waste-streams. 
As Bioniqs strived for assisting the customers in developing increasingly sustainable, 
safe and ecologically efficient working practices it used its “solventS” service  to work 
with their customers to develop solvents which they claim are optimized for their tech-
nical, economic and environmental performance. 
This service was made by the high-throughput screening and design capabilities of 
Bioniqs solvent modeling software and proprietary database of over 12 million solvent 
permutations (including both ionic and molecular solvents). The ROSETTA solvent si-
mulation database [Newton 2009] combined advanced structure-property alignment 
tools with a series of databases to evaluate the performance and properties of 
solvents along with other requirements, such as cost and toxicity/environmental im-
pact. 
Concerning the potential of “extraction of natural products” for ionic liquids Bioniqs 
had, for instance, successfully extracted artemisinin (also called artemesinin), the anti-
malaria drug precursor (Table I.99, Amyris), from both fresh and dried plant material 
following an in silico solvent design process (performed on computer or via computer 
simulation) from a database of some 350 proprietary ionic liquids. In 2008 Bioniqs had 
secured £50,000 of investment to enable continuing to fund its work with artemisinin. 
But, Bioniqs’ approach to artemisinin extraction turned out to be a scientific investiga-
tion rather than a recipe for implementing a real process – it was not a demonstration 
of the artemisinin extraction process at scale and fulfilling the commercial potential of 
Bioniqs’ ionic liquid. The study revealed that further fine tuning can lead to the end 
product of an ionic liquid optimized for the needs of the real process. A set of process 
parameters were revealed and it was recommended that these parameters are used 
as the basis for a final product specification and that multi-parameter screening is 
used. In addition, the involvement of chemical engineering specialists was recom-
mended (B.2). 
On foundation in 2004 Bioniqs consisted of three people, but was growing to employ 
eight people in 2007. But the financial decline of Bioniqs towards a financial collapse 
was already reflected by some financial indicators, such as “cash at bank” and “net 
worth,” comparing 2006 and 2007 data. After five years of existence, Bioniqs was no 
longer viable, the liquidation process started by the mid of 2009 (B.2). 
There were still tremendous issues of market entry in terms of cost of ILs and replac-
ing existing processes including a fight against switching cost and attitude and risk 
aversion of customers to implement a totally new technology – industrial customers 
did not want to act as the “guinea pigs.” 
Bioniqs Ltd remained largely a curiosity-driven research endeavor with (probably) 
meager revenue in an entrepreneurial environment relying on perceived potential or 
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unexpected commercial opportunities without a clear identification and focus on its 
major markets and executing related market entry – or, at least, convincing demon-
strations. 
Over its time of existence Bioniqs can be assumed to have had little direct, sufficient 
contacts with the market and its customers. Competing with other IL startups con-
cerning contract research and consulting services for revenue generation may have 
suffered from the same services offered by the more established other IL startups. 
The end was a state of the firm without enough cash and probably no chance for fur-
ther financing due to the Great Recession. 
IoLiTec GmbH (and Scionix Ltd.) 
Ionic Liquids Technologies (IoLiTec) GmbH (B.2), founded in 2002/2003, has been 
cited already in various contexts in this book as an example to illustrate particular en-
trepreneurial situations. The current discussion shall focus on IoLiTec’s development 
and position in emerging markets based on its technology push approach. IoLiTec 
emerged as a rather successful NTBF and the most successful of the ionic liquids 
startups. 
IoLiTec is engaged in top value technology (TVT, Table I.1). Its founder reported sev-
eral times that IoLiTec made always a profit since its foundation. It shows continuous 
growth by various indicators. For instance, after six years of existence it had 12 em-
ployees, whereas on average the number of TVT startups’ employees after 6-8 years 
is 8 (Table I.70). The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR, Equation I.10) of em-
ployees between 2005 and 2012 is 17.8 percent. 
Contrary to all other IL startups which are university spin-outs (RBSUs) IoLiTec GmbH 
is an “academic startup” (Table I.2) and is special by four facts. 
 It started with a customer, which eased getting further financings via banks. 
 It comprised a team of experienced founders in the ionic liquid fields and in 
industry. 
 The key founder Thomas Schubert worked as a “post doc” with Professor 
Peter Wasserscheid at the Technical University (RWTH) in Aachen (Ger-
many), a worldwide renowned pioneer and expert in ionic liquids, and worked 
already for 18 months for Solvent Innovation as a Leader of Distribution, with 
responsibilities for technical synthesis and marketing of ionic liquids. In 
Aachen he also met one of the then co-founders of IoLiTec. 
 The founder team fell apart rather soon, but without serious troubles. Thomas 
Schubert replaced one of the co-founders by an angel investor in 2004 who 
took over responsibilities for taxes, finances and law. In 2006 the second co-
founder left IoLiTec to further pursue his scientific career at a university (with 
Professor Peter Wasserscheid). 
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The firm was born in a climate of excitement about ionic liquid technologies in Ger-
many and also the UK (Scionix Ltd. in the Bioniqs Ltd. case, B.2) that was shared 
between academia and industry and embedded in a “green” attitude of society and 
policy. There was (and is) much support by related joint projects (ch. 1.2.6, Figure 
I.40, Table I.92) financed by federal and state governments and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), such as the Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt (DBU; The 
German Federal Environmental Foundation). 
DBU is one of the largest foundations in Europe. It promotes and funds innovative and 
exemplary projects for environmental protection. And IoLiTec’s development projects 
represented what in Germany is called “sustainability innovation” (ch. 1.2.5.1; [BMBF 
2007]) – or, at least, paths to sustainability innovations. 
IoLiTec had to successfully respond to a number of issues associated with ionic liq-
uids and to achieve competitive advantage. 
 A technology push situation with very many fragmented rather small markets 
 A science-driven environment in which technical developments by firms are 
continuously associated with external scientific developments. It was not to 
use just one key scientific effect or result which had to be commercialized as 
a technical solution and subjected to further developments 
 Success of ionic liquids will not necessarily be equated with large-scale pro-
duction 
 Economies of scale for ILs do not exist yet for ionic liquids as, for instance, for 
biofuels (A.1.1) or solar cell manufacturing (Figure I.154). Hence, their slow 
reduction of expense and high prices will also slow their adoption 
 A special situation for scale-up of production. 
IoLiTec founders selected carefully the location of the firm in the city of Freiburg and 
its BioTechPark, having had in mind networking with academia in the science-driven 
field. 
Massive networking with academia, public research institutes, and industrial 
firms as external resources (Figure I.125, Figure I.170) became a typical 
feature of IoLiTec’s further development. 
During its first three to four years of existence, its startup thrust phase (ch. 4.3.2; 
Figure I.125), IoLiTec was in search for lucrative applications and markets and devel-
oping “experimentally” its business model. Major customers were from academic and 
industrial research groups [Schubert 2006a]. 
IoLiTec elaborated a rather large opportunity options set (Box I.13, ch. 5.1) of a plat-
form technology from which to select the most promising opportunities for the firm. 
The options were related to the various broad application fields matching relevant pro-
perties of the ionic liquids technology. Furthermore, priorities had to be established. 
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The derived technology strategy and associated marketable products and strategy 
evolvement over time, consequently adapting the firms organization to the strategy 
and implementing and executing the strategy, represented the framework for IoLiTec’s 
development over its first ten years of existence. 
Evolvement of IoLiTec’s organizational and network structures are presented by 
graphics in the case description (B.2). These reflect the increase of complexity of the 
firm, changing functions and roles for the leadership team and developing applications 
(businesses). In the case description (B.2) it is also exemplified how IoLiTec achieved 
a competitive advantage. 
In its early days around 2004 IoLiTec’s offerings had two components. 
 (Bio-)analytical applications (IoLiTec offered new materials that could make 
the life of biochemists and scientists from other disciplines much easier.) 
 Consulting and custom R&D. 
Additionally, anti-static fluids – functional fluids for the use on glass-surfaces – were 
offered. Activities in nano-particles and sensors were planned. 
Concerning intellectual properties (IPs) by 2005 IoLiTec had submitted eight patent 
applications and owned some trademarks (for instance, IoLiTive®, IoLiTherm® and 
IoLiSens®). 
Around 2005 IoLiTec decided to focus on the following five areas for commercializa-
tion: 
1. Contract R&D services 
2. Special Chemistry (Ionic Liquids) 
3. Sensor technology 
4. Energy 
5. Nanotechnology 
IoLiTec ran own R&D, but contract R&D to generate revenues. 
Since then, fundamental and necessary R&D for all these areas was partially 
pursued by participating in publicly funded projects, essentially the typically 
German joint projects (“Verbundprojekte”; ch. 1.2.6, Figure I.40). 
Joint projects cover universities, public research institutes, and small and mid-sized 
firms. They are often initiated out of “competence networks” (Figure I.39) in which 
IoLiTec also participated. This did not only broaden the scope of IoLiTec’s network, 
but provided also many contacts to and cooperation with potential customers and was 
used to enlarge its group of Scientific Advisors. Project money always represented an 
important revenue stream for IoLiTec. 
Running almost continuously R&D projects, publicly financed by the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Federal Ministry for Economics (BMWi) 
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and the Deutsche Bundestiftung Umwelt (DBU), was (and is) central for financing 
IoLiTec and running its own internal applied R&D. 
IoLiTec increased systematically its knowledge base and set up computer-supported 
technology intelligence focusing on literature and patent search activities. These are 
the basis of knowing the state of the art und current awareness about new develop-
ments. The systematic activity of “current awareness” and “state-of-the-art” knowledge 
based on the scientific literature and patents became the basis for related databases – 
and to provide an IoLiTec newsletter as well as consulting activities and design of new 
ILs or customized ILs.  
As a marketing instrument for technology push IoLiTec launched its free newsletter 
“Ionic Liquids Today” already in March 2005. It does not only provide news about 
IoLiTec’s products and their applications and cooperation set up by IoLiTec, but re-
ports also on scientific and technical progress in ILs. 
In 2005 IoLiTec moved out of BioTechPark Freiburg to a new location in Denzlingen 
very close to Freiburg due to more favorable cost of needed facilities. And since 2006 
IoLiTec acted also as a distributor for other IL firms. It made phosphonium ionic liquids 
of the US firm Cytec Industries available. 
Within a huge joint project (called NEMESIS) IoLiTec engaged intensively itself with 
the scaling-up technology via micro-reactor-systems. Micro-reactor technology (MRT) 
is the technology of choice for small and mid-sized companies to face the challenges 
of scale-up. Another aspect during the project was the development of concepts for 
efficient recycling of used ionic liquids. One micro-reactor was set up in 2008, in 2009 
IoLiTec built its second micro-reaction system. 
Furthermore, micro-reactor technology was assumed to be not only the means for 
scale-up, but also for quality management and to reduce the prices of ILs. 
By 2007/2008 IoLiTec had a growth strategy in place with a corresponding organiza-
tional structure and a related requirement of investment (Figure 4 and Figure 5 in the 
case description, B.2). As T. Schubert did not succeed getting finances from banks he 
turned to an investment firm, the “Zukunftsfonds Heilbronn” (ZFHN). The venture 
capital fund acquired a 30 percent stake in the technology firm and IoLiTec had to 
move its location from Denzlingen to that of the investor, to Heilbronn (Germany). 
Preparing for the move to Heilbronn had consequences for the original plans of 
IoLiTec. Activities in R&D projects were reduced and its intention to establish a sub-
sidiary in the US was delayed. Though in 2009 IoLiTec, Inc. was incorporated as a 
one-man-firm in the Business Technology Incubator at the University of Alabama in 
Tuscaloosa. But it started the operative business only in April 2010. The selection of 
the location in Tuscaloosa followed very rational arguments. 
After Europe the US is the most important market for ILs – and simultaneously there 
was no IL startup. Out of a small office the IoLiTec representative is contacting North 
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American companies, universities and researchers interested in ionic liquids. ILs are 
shipped to Tuscaloosa from Germany, and IoLiTec Inc. then fills the orders for North 
American customers. 
Having established its distribution organization for ILs, marketing and sales of ionic liq-
uids have remained tough as they remained expensive due to the difficulty of manu-
facturing them. Much of the difficulty is associated with purification. Hence, recycling 
of ILs played an important role to support sales. But, in 2010 IoLiTec opened another 
revenue stream, ionic liquids rental service. IoLiTec claimed to be an industry first with 
renting ionic liquids to customers. 
By the end of 2011 IoLiTec achieved a status concerning the level of progression from 
R&D via piloting to commercialization of offerings which is depicted in Figure 6 of the 
case description (B.2) and which also indicates the state of executing the strategy. 
IoLiTec has positioned its ionic liquids in the “low volume, high value” segment of spe-
cialties. The diversified orientation of offerings and industry segments makes IoLiTec 
rather independent from economic ups and downs of the addressed industries. 
Growth of the number of employees across the period of the Great Recession (Table 
2 of the case description, B.2) corroborates this. 
Several metrics for IoLiTec show that the firm grew considerably and healthy and 
since 2006/2007 has accelerated its development. Characteristics of IoLiTec’s growth 
are: 
 Innovation persistence (ch. 4.2.3, Figure I.115, Figure I.127) 
 Strong customer orientation 
 Execution of a longer term strategy and 
 Diversification of applications and continuous expansions of its basis of ILs as 
its platform technology. 
Concerning the competitive landscape, as described in the IoLiTec case (B.2), there 
was no serious competition with the very few large firms active in ILs except probably 
with Merck KGaA which acquired the NTBF competitor Solvent Innovation GmbH in 
2008. IoLiTec operates in lucrative niches and for large firms like BASF the related 
markets and volumes of production are too small to be of interest. IoLiTec operates 
complementary to the large firms. 
Concerning the IL startups during its life-time Bioniqs Ltd. (B.2) has never been a 
competitor of IoLiTec. Bioniqs focused largely on ionic liquids as solvents and on ap-
plication in just the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. 
The remaining competitor from the UK, Scionix Ltd. (in case Bioniqs Ltd, B.2), shows 
few fields that could become competitive areas, if Scionix would leave its two key 
markets 
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 Electrochemistry (metal deposition and electropolishing, metal recovery) and 
 Process technology (metal extraction including catalyst recycling). 
Scionix’ ionic liquids are essentially based on choline chloride promising mass product 
related ionic liquids which could be assumed to be applicable to large scale proces-
ses. One basic orientation of Scionix is ILs to offer a clean way to carry out chemical 
processes  avoiding strong acids (removing harsh acid-based processes). 
Scionix is a joint venture between the University of Leicester and Genacys Ltd. (a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Whyte Group Ltd). The company was set-up in 1999 to 
commercialize the industrial use of a novel class of solvent systems, focusing on ILs. 
Scionix pursued an entrepreneurial process which is quite different from IoLiTec’s ap-
proach. It follows the narrow path of a university/industry cooperative organization. 
This Private-Public-Partnership (PPP; A.1.3) allows fundamental and applied research 
to be carried out at the university while providing the production, marketing and licens-
ing capability by the private organization. The essential structure in case of Scionix 
attributed a dual role to Prof. A. Abbott of the University of Leicester (UK) to be a re-
search leader at the university and as a co-founder to act as the Research Director of 
Scionix. 
The PPP construct involves Whyte Group Ltd. which is Britain’s largest privately 
owned chemical company and has a number of diverse activities, including manu-
facturing, distribution and R&D. The flagship of the group is Whyte Chemicals Ltd., 
one of the largest private distributors of chemicals and polymers in the UK and it also 
manufactures pharmaceuticals – and ultimately also ILs. 
The interrelations between Leicester University and Whyte Group are mediated by 
Genacys Ltd. Genacys is a special external organization of the Whyte Group acting as 
a corporate venturing company (CVC) and on the basis of bringing together research 
ideas and entrepreneurial spirit, targets to turn early-stage technologies into separate 
successful corporate entities through collaborations, strategic partnerships and joint 
ventures. 
Contrary to IoLiTec which pursues many links with industrial firms and universities and 
public research institutes Scionix concentrates essentially on only the University of 
Leicester and Whyte Group. This means, Scionix’ access to external resources for 
research, development and commercialization and competitive strength are rather 
small compared with those of IoLiTec. 
With regard to the IL NTBFs IoLiTec’s competitive advantage is discussed in the case 
description in terms of the VRIO attributes of a resource-based view (RBV) (ch. 
4.3.3,Table I.75): 
A final remark concerns entrepreneurship and innovation with high priced offerings. In 
contrast to, for instance, German Smart Fuel Cell (SFC) AG (now SCF Energy AG) 
which could sell its fuel cells systems in niche markets (such as leisure, recreation 
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vehicles, military) with customers with high purchasing power [Runge 2006:331-335] 
for ILs there are no such opportunities. An entry into a broad industry segment 
through a market with high purchasing power occurred also when William Henry 
Perkin (A.1.2) introduced his synthetic mauve dyestuff [Runge 2006:293-294]. 
A.1.6 Formalization of Structures of Founder Teams and 
Architectures of New Firms 
Dealing with “architectures,” “configurations” (ch. 4.3.2; Figure I.124) and ultimately 
taxonomies of new technology ventures (Figure I.128) relates to several complemen-
tary aspects of subjects or objects of a set: “identification,” “distinction” and “similarity.” 
Such concepts play an important role to describe the development of new firms in 
terms of biological analogies. The discipline that provides metaphoric explanations of 
firm or industry segment growth is Developmental Biology [Runge 2006:7; Bhidé 
2000:249]. 
Developmental biology relates to three key concepts, similarity, homomorphism and 
heritage versus analogy (actually function-analogy). Two structures are homologous, if 
they look similar and the similarity is due to descent from a common ancestor pos-
sessing the ancestral version of the part in question (Figure I.190). If two structures 
are analogous there is no common ancestry and the parts look similar as the pressure 
of natural selection has forced a convergence of structure to meet the need for similar 
function. In biology identity of form or shape or structure is termed isomorphism. 
Fundamentally we dealt with sets of n entities, objects or states, and their representa-
tions in terms of the “Diagram Lattice” (with Young Diagrams) which are related to 
partitions of an integer n (Figure I.73, upper right). This means decompositions of n 
into a sum of integers and is related to permutation algebra to deal with structures of 
founder teams and discuss issues of coordination (Figure I.72 – Figure I.74). 
In essence, there was a proposition that structures and attributes can be associated 
with meaning. For instance, in Figure I.73 we have introduced a binary differentiation 
of weak and strong coupling of (structural) subjects based on the subjects’ attributes. 
Sharing the same attribute has been interpreted as “strong coupling” requiring much 
less efforts of coordination – for instance, by reference to effects of “boundary span-
ning” (ch. 1.2.3). 
Using Young Diagrams, in a similar way as coordination, one could also represent and 
discuss social ties of the members of a founder team (social coupling, Figure I.71). 
Furthermore we used partial orders of Young Diagrams (Figure I.74) which are related 
to moving boxes within a Young diagram and illustrated that in Figure I.73 (lower 
right). The WITec GmbH case (Figure I.73, lower right) provides a special example for 
dealing with homology without changing the number n of objects due to a common 
ancestor (here the column with three boxes). 
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In discussing development of new ventures Young Diagrams 119 provide also a mode 
of (structural) relations of relevance for mappings and representations of the current 
subject of interest. That is, the relations generated by adding or removing a box pro-
viding relations for build-up processes. 
From a systems point of view in the realm of entrepreneurship we are dealing 
with small numbers of components (2-30), often numbers between 1 and 8-
12. For systems of such smallness (the lowest level of “organized complexity”) 
one can expect that adding or removing just one component may have a sig-
nificant effect for a team and/or the firm. 
To discuss structures and similarities of teams we shall understand a partition diagram 
of a Ruch lattice as a histogram (bar chart, Figure I.191) or, in other words, a finite 
discrete distribution with a partition diagram being comparable to an intra-system 
state. 
Without needing to go into the details of (mathematical) group theory, particularly of 
the symmetric groups Sn and their irreducible (non-decomposable) representations 
(mathematically homomorphisms), Zhao [2009] provides sufficient information to be 
utilized for our purpose. 
One needs to know that irreducible representations of the symmetric group Sn are in a 
one-to-one correspondence with Young Diagrams having n boxes. And a representa-
tion of the symmetric group on n elements, Sn, is also a representation of the sym-
metric group on (n − 1) elements, Sn−1. 
Furthermore, one can describe a basis of each irreducible representation using stan-
dard Young Tableaux, which are numberings of the boxes of a Young Diagram with 1; 
2; …; n such that the rows and columns are all increasing. For instance, the bases of 
the standard representation of S3 correspond to the following two standard Young 
Tableaux relating to the partition (2,1) (Figure I.73) which are the only standard 
tableaux for (2,1). 
 
A general example of a standard tableau would be 
 
There are interesting connections for further discussions following essentially a visual 
approach. Suppose we have an irreducible representation in Sn and we want to find its 
induced representation in Sn+1. It turns out that the induced representation is simply 
the direct sum of all the representations corresponding to the Young Diagrams ob-
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tained by adding a new box to the original Young diagram! For instance, the induced 
representation of the standard representation from S3 to S4 is simply 
 
 
Similarly, the restricted representation can be found by removing a box from the 
Young diagram 
 
 
These relations and corresponding extensions become lucidly visualized by another 
approach interconnecting Young Tableaux and representations of Sn. In addition to 
partial order of Young Diagrams by the Diagram Lattice (Figure I.74) relations in terms 
of the “Young Lattice” generalize the addition or removal of boxes. 
Following Zhao [2009] let the symbol λ  µ denote that µ can be obtained by adding a 
box to λ. To create a Young Lattice at the nth level all the Young Diagrams with n 
boxes are drawn. In addition, λ to connected to µ if λ  µ., Figure I.190 displays the 
bottom portion (n = 4) of the Young Lattice which will extend infinitely upwards (∅ is 
the NULL). 
 
Figure I.190: The bottom of the Young Lattice [Zhao 2009]. 
We can think that a Young Diagram is a pile of bricks and the Young Lattice is the 
order in which bricks are placed. 
The issue of firm development can be related to the question: What was the shape of 
this pile of bricks in the past and what would be a favorable shape for the pile in the 
Res
S2
IndS4
S3
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future? Or could there be an adequate interpretation of the shapes when building a 
pile? In essence rows of the Young Lattice can represent homologies in biology. 
To be useful with regard to the last question one must ask, can there be any meaning 
attached to the relation λ  µ with regard to “directions” or strategies chosen for fur-
ther development of new firms? 
To answer the last question one can use the example of entrepreneurship with the 
number of founders being n ≤ 4 which covers almost all situations of technology 
entrepreneurship or we can use sources of financing (essentially n ≤ 8).  
For our purposes the discussion refers primarily to structural characteristics, such as 
looking at a founder team with three members as equivalent subjects. On secondary 
consideration we shall introduce attributes of property or function (“roles”) of the struc-
tural entities, such as personal operational competencies of the individuals of founder 
team (Figure I.72). Adding attributes in this discussion is similar to using “colored sym-
metries” as displayed in Figure I.2. 
If we attribute numbers to the boxes in Figure I.190 (which has nothing to do with 
Young Tableaux) all boxes in a row reflect only one entity (for instance, one member 
of a team) having a set of relevant attributes (for instance, personal operational com-
petencies) which equals the number of the boxes in the row. In this view the outer left 
part of the Young Lattice (Figure I.190) means “growth by learning,” adding an attri-
bute to the same entity, such as learning of new subjects like a competency or chunk 
of knowledge. 
As the extreme a single entrepreneur (Figure I.72) has all the needed personal com-
petencies to found and develop a new firm. A lucid  example coming into one’s mind 
would be William Henry  Perkin (A.1.2). In a related way concerning financial sources 
of a new firm one can define the attribute of a source of capital, for instance, as ten 
percent per box (Figure I.193). 
Hence, one can view the left part of a Young Lattice with attributes, symbolized by 
λ L↑ µ, to put the emphasis on rows as “centralization” (“monopolization”) of attributes 
and the right part focusing on columns, λ ↑R µ, as “decentralization” (“diversity”). In a 
Young Diagram the length of the leftmost column is the maximum number of non-
equivalent objects/subjects. Hence, λ ↑R µ may represent, for instance, adding a 
further person to a team with a particular useful competency or knowledge. 
Furthermore, Ruch’s Diagram Lattices allows a general description of comparing fre-
quency distributions as an order relation. This can be extended to discuss a firm’s 
organization or sub-states on the basis of Ruch’s [1975] concept of the “mixing char-
acter,” distinction of objects by relating classification to mixing character. 
Accordingly, the mixing in the set of n objects is certainly at a maximum, if the number 
of distinguishable objects is maximal. This suggests that increasing mixing character 
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should be defined by a mixing process. The mixing character allows comparing sets of 
differing mixing character. That is, a judgment can be obtained of “more” or “less 
mixed,” at least for comparable (compatible) cases. 
The mixing character denotes the composition of a set of partly equivalent objects or 
the distribution of objects among different states. Two sets are “mixing-equivalent,” if 
the partition of the classes (structure) is the same for both. In Figure I.73 the founder 
teams of Puron AG and JPK Instruments AG would be structurally mixing-equivalent, 
but attributively different. 
Generally, according to Ruch [1975], a statement that a set M is more mixed than 
another one, M’, implies that the comparison must be restricted to pairs of sets such 
that M is obtainable by mixing together sets of mixing character of M’. We must define 
M to be more mixed than M’ if M can be obtained by mixing sets with the same mixing 
character as M’. If the set finally obtained has a partition of objects which is an integral 
multiple of a partition of n, we may consider a corresponding set of n objects as 
equally mixed.  
We can characterize all “mixing-equivalent” sets by a sequence of integers νI (includ-
ing zero) in a column matrix or graphically by means of diagram-like figures in which 
rows with νI boxes are arranged along a vertical scale with indices I = 1, 2, …n 
denoting the different kinds of objects or the distribution of objects among different 
states. 
Figure I.191 illustrates how to address similarity (including equality) for multi-
dimensionality of underlying criteria. It provides an example of structurally mixing-
equivalent sets of three subjects and of the representative diagram and the binary 
relationships which these exhibit with regard to structurally and attributive characteris-
tics. In so far, these considerations may provide an option to discuss aspects of  
heterogeneity  which is important concerning competencies or traits of members of a 
founder team or resources of a startup or NTBF, respectively. 
Attributes refer, for instance, to personal operational competencies. Here we can 
differentiate inequivalency and incompatibility. However, we regard the structurally 
mixing-equivalent, but attributively mixing-inequivalent constellations having the same 
set of attributes as similar. For our purposes in the realm of small numbers, usually 
n ≤ 8, graphics will suffice to work with issues of mixing characteristics. 
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Figure I.191: Illustrating structural and attributive features with regard to their mixing 
characteristics referring to an entrepreneurial triple with regard to the personal opera-
tional competencies for firm foundation. 
For future applications it should be noted that Young Diagrams allow also a mapping 
to (state) vectors which is shown in Figure I.192. The integers of the example partition 
can be mapped to a 2-dimensional vector. To obtain vectors with the same dimension 
within a Diagram Lattice one expands the 2-dimensional vector with zero elements. 
Correspondingly, one could also separate structure and attributes denoting structure 
by a Young Diagram and attribute by a vector, respectively, reflecting the different 
attributes’ value by a 1 and otherwise a 0 for the related vector’s coordinates. For 
instance, for state 2 in Figure I.191 with attribute values (2,5,7) out of eight attributes 
one can write a binary value row vector: 
 (2,5,7) → (01001010) 
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Figure I.192: Representation of Young Diagrams as vectors based on their partitions. 
It is immediately evident that in Figure I.193 the founder teams concerning experience 
of the team members are equal in structure and attributes. To quantify “similarity” of 
entities with regard to attributes generally vector calculus can be utilized. 
The related non-systemic and component-oriented cosine similarity may provide a 
rough measure. Cosine similarity is a measure of similarity between two vectors by 
measuring the cosine of the angle between them. The cosine of 0 is 1, and less than 1 
for any other angle; the lowest value of the cosine is -1. For our case, however, the 
cosine similarity will be restricted to 0 ≤ 1. 
The cosine of the angle between two vectors thus determines whether two vectors are 
pointing in roughly the same direction. In Euclidean space, the dot product of two unit 
vectors is simply the cosine of the angle between them. This follows from the formula 
for the dot product, since the lengths are both 1. Hence, we could measure cosine 
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similarity by creating n-dimensional vectors, normalizing them to unit vectors, and then 
calculating the cosine similarity. 
For instance, in Figure I.193 we compare operational competencies of two startups 
founded by an entrepreneurial triple. And we deal with eight-dimensional vectors. In 
the first step we construct the attribute vectors of the related Young Diagrams starting 
with (3,1,1) versus (2,2,2) and then add the three related vectors in the usual way to 
get in the first case (1,1,0,0,1,1,1,0) and 0.4472⋅(1,1,0,0,1,1,1,0) as the unit vector. 
Creating the second unit vector and multiplying both leads to cosine similarity = 0.73 
for attributes – a rather high (quantitative) similarity. This, however, does not tell any-
thing about the actual performance of the two startup teams. At best it is an indicator 
that both have a similar potential of performance. 
 
Figure I.193: Comparing architectures of two startups founded by an entrepreneurial 
triple focusing on selected resources. 
One can extend this approach to deal with finances as another key resource of a 
startup. For the financial attributes we assume for simplicity equally weighted financial 
sources quantified by financial contributions expressed in multiples of 10 percent. 
Figure I.193 allows comparisons between the financial states of two startups. How-
ever, an immediate question arises concerning the underlying attributes, the origins of 
the money and the consequences for the founder(s) in terms of control over the start-
up. 
 Appendix A 1179 
For instance, debt and equity financing (Table I.28) will mean incompatible attributes if 
equity means also external control of the firm by VCs. Hence, it would not allow com-
paring startups with related financial sources. The financial states of the two new firms 
in Figure I.193 show compatible financial attributes which puts them into the same 
class of startups (Table I.74). They are structurally mixing-inequal. 
For quantitatively assessing rough cosine similarity we give characterization of the fi-
nancial sub-states by vectors with non-binary-valued coordinates (Figure I.192). This 
would mean (row) vectors (1,0,1,4,1,0,0,0) and (1,0,2,2,3,0,0,0) for the two firms and 
attributive cosine similarity = 0.70. 
The outlined approach may be used to visualize architectures or even configurations 
of startups (ch. 4.3.2) which means the firm’s genetics for a particular state in time. 
For instance, in Figure I.193 the initial configuration of two NTBFs or the startup thrust 
phase was displayed referring particularly to resources (knowledge/competencies, 
business experiences or foundation experience, respectively, and financial endow-
ment). 
A more elaborate visualization of architectures may connect structures and attributes 
to block forms of their dimensions as given in Figure I.194. It is envisioned that the 
firm is in the startup thrust phase (ch. 4.3.2) and having a customer for its foundation 
(initial configuration) means generating cash as part of the financial structure. 
The NTBF’s architecture given here shall not be discussed in detail. It should be noted 
how further resources may be integrated into such a diagram, such as classes of 
technology underlying the firm’s offerings. And network partners and type of 
networking activity indicate how to tackle the firm’s environment to represent also 
configurations of new ventures in a related manner. 
Finally, also relationships between the firm’s offerings, business activities and its reve-
nue model (Table I.3) can be visualized by such block forms. And if we focus on the 
early stage of startups with say less than 15 employees one can envision also to deal 
with organizational states in terms of specialization as discussed in Table I.69 or given 
by their value chains (Figure I.7) including an advisory board. 
Variations on a Theme 
The preceding outlines focused on identifying generic relationships, where the attri-
bute “generic” will be viewed as an “operational definition”: the limited or even unlim-
ited number of structural variations based on one particular selection of structural 
features/units or one particular function (application). 
For entrepreneurship from a GST and permutation perspective corresponding varia-
tions (Figure I.194) can be related metaphorically to music, to Variations on a Theme. 
In music, variation is a formal technique where “content” is repeated in an altered ex-
pression (theme-and-variation form) and is recognizable by the addressee. Variation 
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forms show up as “free-standing” pieces for solo instruments or ensembles, or can 
constitute a movement of a larger piece. Most jazz music is structured on a basic 
pattern of theme and variations. 
Most famous and very illustrative for the current context are Johann Sebastian Bach’s 
Goldberg Variations (BWV 988) and the first movement of the Piano Sonata in A 
Major (K. 331) or the finale of the Quintet for Clarinet and String Quartet  in A Major of 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. 
These examples have been chosen as there are lucid demonstrations available refer-
ring to perception of variation on the acoustical and visual levels (inspecting the 
sheets of music) and to get a feeling for the “systemic nature” of the underlying pat-
terns [Denk 2012]. 
Furthermore, the topic allows also to see that composers use pieces of other compos-
ers to generate variations, for instance, Johannes Brahms wrote “Variations on a 
Theme by Haydn.” All this establishes interconnections to Faltin’s [2007] article enti-
tled “Founding successfully – The Entrepreneur as an Artist and Composer.” 
The Goldberg variations do not follow the melody of the aria, but rather use its bass 
line (and chord progression) and even without any music education and even if you 
cannot read music or have little feelings for music variations of the baseline are easily 
grasped by inspecting visually the notes or/and hearing them and recognizing the four 
eight notes sequences as “similar patterns.” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldberg_Variations)  
In music variation can concern a number of elements. In its most 
literal sense, for music a melody is a sequence of pitches (in German 
Tonhöhe) and durations of tones and a theme is the material, usually 
a recognizable melody. A chord is a sound created by a set of three 
or more different notes from a specific key that sound. A rhythm is the 
variation of the length and accentuation of a series of sounds or other 
events – also a matter of execution. 
Hence, variation is a formal technique where material is altered during repetition: reit-
eration with changes. And changes may involve, for instance, the theme/melody, 
chords or rhythm or a contrast of major/minor mode. 
Similarly, the realization of the systemic character of a founder team depends on the 
“measuring device” to bring it up. Viewing three music notes arranged vertically upon 
each other on a music note sheet may realize three individual “music note compo-
nents.” However, pressing on a piano the three related piano keys, the “chord.” one 
hears a tone which do not allow most of us to discern the individual constituting tones 
of the notes – it is a “whole” (Figure I.193). 
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Offerings: 
1. Product(s) 
2. Tech. Processes 
3. Services 
4. Consulting 
5. Contractual R&D 
6. Analytics, Tests 
7. IPR, Licenses 
8. Knowledge 
Early Phase Business Activities: 
1. Business Development 
2. Product/Process Development 
3. Application Development 
4. Project Management 
5. Purchasing, Procurement 
6. Selling Products/Processes 
7. Managing Patents and Licenses 
8. Stakeholders Relationships 
Figure I.194: Architectural outline of an NTBFs startup thrust phase as block dia-
grams using related dimensions of involved entities (business activities not specified). 
Chords can be related to collections of attributes of a single entity, such as a person 
with personal traits, experiences, attitude towards risk etc. or a financing structure of a 
firm (as seen  in Figure I.193 and Figure I.194). 
Correspondingly, for the core-shell model the “core-entrepreneur” or the new venture 
(Figure I.16) chords can be viewed to be transformed to particular extended chords 
(via interactions with super-systems) and variations may occur by changing the origi-
nal chord (initial architecture) by additional systemic “notes” and accentuation 
(strengths of interactions of the systems) establishing configurations. 
Entrepreneurship then is shaped by environmental rhythm (ch. 1.2.1) of the shells 
which provide the relevant exogenous variables (parameters), the drivers from the set 
of given shells in Figure I.13, for firm development over time. 
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A.1.7 Special Networking Effects for Entrepreneurship: 
The “PayPal Mafia” 
According to Wikipedia 120 the “PayPal Mafia” is an informal term for a network of 
American business people, actually (serial) entrepreneur-investors, centered in Silicon 
Valley, who were founders or early employees of PayPal before founding a series of 
other technology companies. The PayPal Mafia are often credited with inspiring Web 
2.0 and for the re-emergence of consumer-focused Internet companies after the dot- 
com bust of 2001. Some commentators consider these credits to be exaggerated or 
partly mythologized. 
This group of serial entrepreneurs and investors represents a new, but special gene-
ration of wealth and power. In some ways they are classic characters of Silicon Valley, 
where success and easy access to capital breed ambition and further success 
[O’Brien 2007]. 
PayPal grew to serve the broader market of electronic currency, used in particular for 
online auctions. It went public in 2002 and was bought by eBay later that year for 
$1.65 billion, after eBay gave up on its own competing service, BillPoint. A number of 
serial entrepreneurs from the group worked with each other in the following years to 
form new companies, venture funds, and to make private equity investment in each 
other’s companies, particularly in the field of social networking. Figure I.195 shows 
which companies dealt with in this treatise can trace their ancestries to PayPal. 
It is not uncommon for a company’s employees to leave and start successful new 
companies of their own after their old company is acquired. PayPal’s former employ-
ees launched more successful companies in a shorter time than almost any other 
company in history. Apart from the networking effect the diversity of skill-sets among 
the former employees ensured that the social group has a full range of financiers, en-
gineers, designers, operations experts, marketers and others available to help each 
other start new companies. 
The group’s name for itself, “PayPal Mafia” was already a minor cultural meme, but 
gained wide exposure due to a 2007 article in Fortune Magazine [O’Brian 2007] that 
used the term in its headline and featured most of the members posed at San 
Francisco’s Tosca Cafe in gangster outfits. Members included and startups are listed 
in note 120. 
Peter Thiel and PayPal’s Development 
At the center of the network there is Peter Thiel with a story of a money manager 
extraordinaire and special personality and the foundation of PayPal. While at high 
school, Peter developed into both a math genius and a chess prodigy. He achieved 
and has maintained his US Chess Master rating up to the present. 
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He picked nearby Stanford, deciding to major in philosophy, and became a free-
market libertarian, believing that people should be permitted to do as they wished, 
assuming they did not impinge on the freedoms of others [Thomas 2010]. 
Following Thomas [2010], after graduating in 1989, Thiel decided on law school at his 
alma mater and earned his JD from Stanford. He clerked as a corporate lawyer for se-
veral organizations, but after a couple of months he resigned because of total bore-
dom. Thiel needed the excitement and thrill of “the deal” to keep his considerable pro-
fessional juices flowing. Finance has always been more his thing. 
He decided to polish his totally theoretical investment skills by joining the firm of CS 
Financial Products, now part of the Credit Suisse Group. He quickly decided it was 
time to follow his own map, not someone else’s. In California, he somehow raised $1 
million from friends and family, beginning his first macro fund, Thiel Capital Manage-
ment. With no experience, Peter faced daily struggles to raise funds and investors, but 
by 1998, he did have more than $4 million in his management portfolio. 
This was about the time Thiel had the fateful meeting with Max Levchin, a Ukrainian-
born American computer scientist. While he was conducting a finance lecture at Stan-
ford, the young software engineer, Max Levchin, dreaming about an Internet startup, 
walked into his class by chance. 
During a later meeting for breakfast of the two, Levchin asked if Thiel would invest in 
his idea to offer a secure method of allowing handheld computers to communicate. 
Peter liked the idea. Originally believing he would have a short-term relationship Thiel 
eventually froze his fledgling hedge fund career, dedicating the next four years to the 
new company – which eventually grew into PayPal. Thiel even joined the new venture 
as a co-founder and its CEO in December 1998, but together Thiel and Levchin set 
out to “create the new world currency.” [O’Brien 2007] 
A staunch libertarian, Thiel figured a Web-based currency would undermine govern-
ment tax structures. Getting there, however, would mean taking on established Indus-
tries – commercial banking, for instance – which would require financial acumen and 
engineering expertise [O’Brien 2007]. 
Thiel had invested $240,000 in the new company after his meeting with Levchin. Only 
eight months after PayPal’s IPO it was sold to the giant auction site eBay for $1.65 
billion and Thiel realized a very attractive payout. Only 34, he rode off into the sunset 
with $60 million [O’Brien 2007]. 
Only weeks after the PayPal sale to eBay in 2002, Thiel decided to found a hedge 
fund firm, Clarium Capital Management, LLC, in his apartment. And, indeed, he be-
came a successful hedge fund manager in the US. In 2005 Thiel started a San Fran-
cisco-based venture capital investment firm, The Founders Fund, with fellow mem-
bers. Peter Thiel and the firm’s six partners have been founders of or early investors 
in numerous companies, such as Facebook, PayPal, Napster, and Palantir Techno-
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logies. Founders Fund launched four suites of funds by 2010 with more than $1 billion 
in aggregate capital under management [Thomas 2010] 120 . 
The amazing success of PayPal was not without problems and serious issues. Shortly 
after PayPal began fulfilling the dream of its becoming the “new currency for the world 
economy,” Thiel had to face a number of challenges. Russian hackers managed to pi-
rate millions of dollars from the new venture by cribbing credit card numbers. Credit 
card processing companies claimed that PayPal was in violation of their regulations. 
Customer-service complaints flooded the phone lines and in-boxes and were often 
dealt with by simply not answering the phone or doing a mass deletion. Louisiana 
temporarily banned PayPal from doing business in the state; MasterCard threatened 
to pull the plug because of the high number of chargebacks [Thomas 2010; O’Brien 
2007]. 
At one point, PayPal had enough funding to survive only another two months while still 
losing around $10 million a month. Shortly after, because of what was then the dot-
com zenith, Thiel tried to raise money for PayPal, then valued at around $500 million 
by VC’s even though losing money at a rapid rate. NASDAQ had just broken its own 
record, hitting 5,048, and the majority of investors thought the dot-com phenomenon 
would last forever [Thomas 2010]. 
Thiel already realized what the market came to know shortly thereafter: There was 
very little substance to the majority of dot-com “superstars.” Nonetheless, he capital-
ized on the opportunity presented to him, worked feverishly to locate interested VCs 
and jumped through numerous obstacles to close the deal so quickly and rose $100 
million to fund these hard times for PayPal. The closing for the deal was March 31, 
2000. This was critical as the very next day the NASDAQ began its famous freefall 
[Thomas 2010]. 
Thiel established PayPal as the leading company to handle purchase payments over 
the “Net” and was successful at branding his company as the expert in this area. As a 
result, he began positioning the company for an IPO, which he registered only weeks 
after the World Trade Center (“9/11”) tragedy. Again his strategy was successful. 
Thiel was not always successful. He missed the opportunity to invest in the highly 
successful YouTube, bought by Google for $1.65 billion, (Thiel said, “It just kind of fell 
through the cracks.” [Thomas 2010]). But he was very high on Facebook, founded by 
Mark Zuckerberg in 2004. Thiel backed the startup and advised Zuckerberg to relo-
cate to Silicon Valley. Calling Thiel his mentor, Zuckerberg did just that. He said good-
bye to Harvard University, where he was a student, and headed west (Box I.15). 
In the context of the expected IPO of Facebook (in 2012) Facebook’s first outside in-
vestor Peter Thiel led a $500,000 investment in Facebook in late 2004. He has 44.7 
million shares that could be worth more than $2 billion. Accel Partners, whose princi-
pal partner, Jim Breyer, invested in the startup seven years ago (Box I.15), holds 
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201.4 million shares. Accel could have a thousandfold return on some of its invest-
ment [Bilton and Rusli 2012]. 
PayPal’s Corporate Culture 
For PayPal’s development Thiel and Levchin had to bring in several hundred em-
ployees to what would become PayPal. They signed up more than 20 million users 
and burnt $180 million in funding before breaking even and selling out to eBay. The 
eBay deal indicated a remarkable factor of PayPal’s success – obviously unique cor-
porate culture and networking conditions. Most of PayPal’s key employees left eBay, 
but they stayed in touch. [O’Brien 2007]. 
It is hypothesized by O’Brien [2007] that PayPal’s success comes back to the early 
hires. Thiel and Levchin began recruiting everyone they knew at their alma maters. “It 
basically started by hiring all these people in concentric circles,” Thiel rememberd. “I 
hired friends from Stanford, and Max brought in people from the University of Illinois.” 
They were looking for a specific type of candidate. They wanted competitive, well-
read, multilingual individuals who, above all else, had a proficiency in math. Thiel and 
Levchin also wanted workaholics who were not MBAs, consultants, frat boys, or, God 
forbid, and jocks (an American term for a stereotypical male athlete). In other words, 
they were looking for people like themselves. For instance, Levchin lives to work. The 
company was male-dominated; nearly all employees were young men. 120 
“The difference between Google and PayPal was that Google wanted to hire PhDs, 
and PayPal wanted to hire the people who got into PhD. programs and dropped out,” 
said Roelof Botha, PayPal’s onetime CFO. “Most of them were very introverted any-
way,” Levchin recalled. “They’d come in, eat crappy food all day, and sleep under their 
desks.” [O’Brien 2007] 
Thiel’s leadership style was as unconventional as his worldview. All employees, not 
just managers, were made aware in detail of company finances, performance etc. His 
management at PayPal (at least, pre-IPO) was the all-hands open-book session. Cus-
tomer logs, revenue flow, fraud losses, burn rate: He showed it all for every employee 
to see. This access to information, coupled with the lack of offices, created a flat struc-
ture where any idea could win the day. 
Company decisions were made according to reasoned arguments (“Good decision-
making flows out of details”) rather than executive experience. It was allowed and 
even encouraged for low level employees to criticize executive decisions and lobby for 
their own positions.  
Reid Hoffman, a former executive VP, loved PayPal’s meritocracy. “The group was 
very analytical,” says Hoffman. “It was all about, ‘Here are my arguments; here’s my 
perspective.’ You could never say, ‘In my experience,’ because experience wasn’t 
there as a variable.” 
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And O’Brien [2007] continued that the former COO David Sacks further opened the 
culture by establishing a no-unnecessary-meetings policy. He became a meeting cop. 
Anytime he saw a closed-door discussion happening, he had sit in for three minutes. If 
he considered the meeting to be valueless, he would declare it adjourned. Sacks re-
called how the lack of meetings helped create a culture of many workers and few 
managers. Prestige was measured “by how few people there were above you who 
could prevent you from doing what you wanted to do.” 
Not everyone liked the PayPal vibe. Chief among the dissenters was Elon Musk. Musk 
who came to PayPal not through Levchin/Thiel’s regime but during the company’s 
merger with his Internet bank, X.com. Despite having perhaps the greatest entrepre-
neurial streak of all the PayPal mafia (see last paragraphs), Musk was purged from 
PayPal like some kind of toxin. Soon after the merger, Thiel resigned. Musk became 
CEO of the combined company and decided it was time for a technological overhaul. 
Specifically, he wanted to toss out Unix and put everything on a Microsoft platform. 
That may sound innocent enough to laypeople but not to Unix zealots like Levchin and 
his team. A holy war ensued. Musk lost. The board fired him and brought back Thiel 
while Musk was on a flight to Australia for his first vacation in years. “That’s the pro-
blem with vacations,” Musk deadpanned. It was not just Musk; anyone who did not 
mesh with the Levchin/Thiel culture ran into trouble. X.com had a number of people 
from the banking industry who did not last long. And that awkwardness turned into 
total dysfunction and warfare. Most X employees ended up leaving or getting fired. 
The infighting eventually stopped. It had to, because there were too many other issues 
to deal with. PayPal problems and losses were multiplying as described above. 
Networking – The Soil of Entrepreneurship 
By then, the PayPal Mafia was well established. PayPal’s founders encouraged tight 
social bonds among friends who continued to trust and support one another despite 
their relatively short time together at PayPal. They call upon one another when they 
need money or advice – and when they need both, they go to Thiel, who seems to be 
at the center of it all (Figure I.195). 
Many of PayPal employees were mining new territory. Chad Hurley, Steve Chen and 
Jawed Karim founded the ever more successful video sharing Web site YouTube, Inc, 
finally selling it to Google for $1.65 billion. 
The now-famous Max Levchin founded Slide, a popular photo-sharing website. Reid 
Hoffman, Executive VP, started the successful LinkedIn Corp. for business networkers 
(ch. 3.4.2.1, B.2), while Vice President Jeremy Stoppelman began Yelp, helping 
people find restaurants, entertainment, businesses and shops in their local area 
[Thomas 2010]. Slide was sold to Google in August 2010 for $182 Million and, in 
August, Levchin joined as Vice President of Engineering. In August 2011, Google 
announced it was shutting down Slide, and that Levchin was leaving the company. 
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And both YouTube and Yelp learned a valuable lesson from PayPal: The first idea is 
not always the best. YouTube started as a video dating play. CEO Hurley rememberd 
his PayPal days as an education in business. When he arrived in California with a de-
gree in art from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, building a successful company 
seemed like something other people did. “You never think it could happen to you,” 
said Hurley. “But seeing Peter and Max and the guys come up with ideas and seeing 
how to make things work gave me a lot of insight. You may not have a business de-
gree, but you see how to put the process into effect. The experience helped me real-
ize the payoff of being involved in a startup.” [O’Brien 2007]. 
Yelp, Inc. is a company that operates yelp.com, a social networking, user review, and 
local search Web site. Yelp.com had more than 54 million monthly unique visitors as 
of late 2010. Yelp was one of three projects, including Adzaar and Slide, to come out 
of the San Francisco incubator, MRL Ventures. The project arose out of research into 
the local services market by David Galbraith, who worked with Jeremy Stoppelman on 
the early stages of the project. Stoppelman and Russel Simmons, both of whom were 
early software engineering employees at PayPal, spun the service off as a separate 
company. After an aborted start as an email recommendation service, Yelp launched 
its namesake Web site into the San Francisco market in October 2004. 121 
 
Figure I.195: Significant interrelationships of selected persons and new firms involng 
the “PayPal Mafia.” 
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In the context of the entrepreneurship of the PayPal context the aspect of “negative 
thinking” is notable. 
Many successful businesspeople reject the idea of setting firm goals, but assume that 
sometimes the best way to address an uncertain future is to focus not on the best-
case scenario but on the worst (“negative thinking”) [Burkeman 2012]. 
“Positive thinking,” by contrast, is the effort to convince yourself that things will turn out 
fine, which can reinforce the belief that it would be absolutely terrible if they did not. 
Prof. Saras Sarasvathy interviewed 45 successful entrepreneurs, all of whom had 
taken at least one business public (“serial entrepreneurs”). Almost none embraced the 
idea of writing comprehensive business plans or conducting extensive market re-
search. 
They practiced instead what Sarasvathy calls “effectuation.” Rather than choosing a 
goal and then making a plan to achieve it, they took stock of the means and materials 
at their disposal, then imagined the possible ends. Effectuation also includes what she 
calls the “affordable loss principle.” [Burkeman 2012]. 
With an emphasis on technology entrepreneurs and in the context of PayPal in this 
book a short addendum on Elon Musk is required. 127 Elon Musk (born 1971), who 
was born in South Africa and came to the US to study at the University of Pennsyl-
vania received a BS in physics and BA in economics from the University of Pennsyl-
vania, was not only a co-founder of PayPal. Before PayPal’s sale to eBay he was the 
company’s largest shareholder, owning 11.7 percent of PayPal’s shares. 
Drawing inspiration from innovators such as Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla, Musk 
considered three areas he wanted to get into that were “important problems that would 
most affect the future of humanity,” as he said later, “One was the Internet, one was 
clean energy, and one was space.” 
In June 2002, Musk founded his third company, Space Exploration Technologies 
(SpaceX) of which he is currently the CEO and CTO. SpaceX develops and manufac-
tures space launch vehicles with a focus on advancing the state of rocket technology.  
NASA selected SpaceX to be part of the first program that entrusts private companies 
to deliver cargo to the International Space Station (ISS). In December 2008, SpaceX 
was awarded a $1.6 billion NASA contract for 12 flights of their Falcon 9 rocket and 
Dragon spacecraft to the ISS, replacing the Space Shuttle after it retired in 2011. In 
seven years, SpaceX had designed the family of Falcon launch vehicles and the 
Dragon multi-purpose spacecraft from the ground-up. 
Musk was also co-founder and head of product design at Tesla Motors, where he led 
development of the Tesla Roadster, the first production electric sports car. Musk’s in-
terest in electric vehicles extends long before the creation of Tesla. He originally went 
to Silicon Valley to do a PhD in Applied Physics and Materials Science at Stanford, 
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where his goal was to create ultracapacitors with enough energy to power electric 
cars. 
Musk provided almost all of the capital for Tesla’s first two funding rounds and contin-
ued to invest in every subsequent financing round. As a result of the financial crisis in 
2008 and a forced layoff at Tesla,  Musk agreed to assume the additional responsibil-
ity of CEO. 
Tesla Motors after having built an electric sports car and having shipped over 2,200 
vehicles to 31 countries expected to be in production with its four-door Model S sedan 
by July 2012. In addition to its own cars, Tesla sold electric powertrain systems to 
Daimler for the Smart EV and Mercedes A Class, and to Toyota for the upcoming 
electric RAV4. Musk was also able to bring in both companies as long term investors 
in Tesla. 
Finally, Musk provided the initial concept for the firm SolarCity, founded in July 2006 
by brothers Peter and Lyndon Rive, where he remains the largest shareholder and 
chairman of the board. SolarCity is the largest provider of solar power systems in the 
US. His cousin Lyndon Rive is the CEO and co-founder. Musk’s underlying motivation 
for funding both SolarCity and Tesla is to help combat global warming. 
The aerospace industry reached a milestone in May 2012, when Space Exploration 
Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) became the first private company to dock a spacecraft 
with the ISS. The accomplishment also helped buttress plans by the NASA to pay pri-
vate companies to transport cargo and crew to the orbiting station. But SpaceX was 
assumed to face huge challenges to turn its achievement into a thriving, long-term 
business – one that could help birth an industry of privately funded space ventures 
[Pasztor 2012]. 
The major question is whether Musk and his management team can transform 
SpaceX from a boutique development outfit into a low-cost, relatively high-volume pro-
duction house, said aerospace industry officials and space experts. “Will they be able 
to reliably repeat this, and do it at the price they promised?” asked a former senior 
NASA official [Pasztor 2012]. 
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APPENDIX B 
B.1 Background Information on the  
NTBF Selections 
Concerning NTBF selection we differentiate providing information on startups or other 
firms only in a specific context of the book’s content or on those firms which were se-
lected intentionally and elaborated as cases. The majority of selected cases cover 
critical early histories of mostly successful entrepreneurs whose firms had survived 
and grown through 8 – 12 years. This alone would reflect a “survival bias” and “hind-
sight bias” for the selections. Therefore, we looked also at some cases that showed 
NTBFs’ failures to survive. Admittedly, many of them were wiped out during or after 
the Great Recession. 
Concerning inter-cultural and socio-economic effects the emphasis is on German and 
US startups and existing firms with some firms from the UK allowing differentiating 
situations of culture in the US and UK which both follow Anglo-American capitalism for 
their economic systems. 
Rationales for selection of cases according to technical subjects are given in Table I.1; 
for software/Internet startups the focus was on social networks (ch. 3.4). 
Further selection criteria for cases referred to 
 “Competitive groups” to inquire into competitive strategies, but also to provide 
more insights into related industry segments the new firms are operating in 
and 
 “Strategic groups, particularly the so-called German “Hidden Champions” (ch. 
4.1.1) and outstanding representatives (such as Enercon GmbH, Prominent 
Group and SAP AG). 
Finally, on secondary thoughts, NTBFs were also selected to cover a broad range of 
modes of financing by the various sources available to technology ventures (ch. 
1.2.7). 
The focus of cases of new ventures with three or more representatives was 
 Biofuels and biobased chemicals/materials 
 Lighting/Optoelectronics (LED/OLED) 
 Nano coatings/films 
 Nano-tools/Scientific Instruments 
 Ionic Liquids 
 Specialty/fine chemicals and polymers and plastics 
 I&CT = Informatics (HW/SW)/Consumer/Web Services/ incl. Bio- and Chemin-
formatics. 
 1192 Appendix B 
Out of the global ca. 350 “plant-based biomass” firms and 200 algae-related startups 
we have, for instance, selected ca. 40 NTBFs for detailed discussions in the text, not 
as cases, but rather detailed in a specific context, the biofuels industry (A.1.1). Most of 
these NTBFs are “promising” biofuel firms. For their identification reference was made 
to Biofuels Digest which published on the Web the  “50 Hottest Companies in 
Bioenergy” Here, “hottest” does not mean “best,” “biggest” or “most significant” – it 
means the companies that are, in the readers’ judgment, the most worthy of attention. 
Selection of biofuels firms focused, furthermore, on representatives for biomass type, 
used conversion technologies and their interrelations, entrepreneurial history, inter-
connections with agricultural, oil, chemical and automotive industries, financing mod-
els and diversity of business models. 
The selection of “successful” technology startups relied on assessments of NTBFs 
regarded as “technology pioneers,” “most promising,” “fast or strong growing,” “high 
expectation” etc. expressed in terms of being awarded or nominated in contests for 
prestigious national or international awards and prizes provided by international 
NGOs, national governmental representatives, technical or business magazines, en-
trepreneurship-oriented for-profit firms like savings banks in Germany or big industry 
firms or consulting firms. 
Approximately 80 percent of founders invited giving guest lectures within the author’s 
Technology Entrepreneurship curriculum 1 were either rewarded with or nominated for 
a highly prestigious award or prize, respectively. 
The most important of these assessments often referred to in this book (following 
[Bhidé 2000]) is the ranking of Inc. Magazine which is for the people who run growing 
privately held companies. The magazine publishes an annual list with rankings of the 
500 (5000) fastest-growing private companies in the US, the “Inc. 500.” or 500/5000 
list categorized by industries. In addition to rankings by growth rates, since 2009 in 
Inc. Magazine a new ranking will also determine which small businesses have gener-
ated the most jobs. Most industry classes of Inc., however, do not belong to the indus-
tries covered by technology entrepreneurship. 
Another US magazine in this category with a focus on practice is “Fast Company.” 
Through identification of the very creative individuals sparking change in the market-
place the magazine and Web site intends to uncover best and “next” practices, and 
thus may help new leaders work smarter and more effectively. 
In any Systems Design (ch. 5.1) one is faced with the problem of determining the ex-
tent to which certain variables can be quantified and measured (ch. 4.1; Box I.17). 
Therefore, when making selections of NTBFs, we did not only utilized the various or-
ganizations which publish lists and/or rankings to select “successful” firms, but looked 
also into the basis, the criteria of their assessments, to gain insights into what features 
and data are regarded as relevant. The major sources for NTBF selection and their 
criteria are given and discussed in Box I.17 and sub-chapter 4.3.6. 
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B.2 List of NTBFs and Other Companies Surveyed 
by the Author 
Startups/NTBFs investigated in detail for or during the preparation of the treatise as 
cases in separate documents are listed in Table I.102. The corresponding case docu-
ments that were publicly available when this treatise was published are listed in sub-
chapter B.3. 
Sharing entrepreneurial stories widely does not only create impacts for learning-by-
example of founders or to-be founders but may also provide impacts on national policy 
issues. 
The cases of the NTBFs will refer usually to no more than the first twelve years of their 
existence. 
The typical gross structure of the cases is as follows: 
 The Technology and the Market 
 The Entrepreneur(s) 
 Awards and Publicity 
 Business Idea, Opportunity and Foundation Process 
 Innovation Persistence, Expansion and Diversification 
 Vision/Mission, Business Model and Risks  
 Intellectual Properties 
 Key Metrics 
 Competition 
 References and Notes. 
Table I.102: Case documents prepared specifically for this book. 
Firm Name 
(Country) 
1, 5)
 
Type of 
Technology 
Industry / 
Customers 
Prod. 
2)
 
(yes/no) 
VC 
3)
 
(yes/no) 
Bioniqs Ltd (UK) 
5, 6) 
Ionic liquids Various indus-
tries, industrial 
and academic 
research 
No No 
IoLiTec GmbH (DE) 
5) 
Ionic liquids Various indus-
tries, industrial 
and academic 
research 
Yes No 
Solvent Innovation 
(DE) 4) 
Ionic liquids Various indus-
tries, industrial 
and academic 
research 
Yes No 
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Table I.102, continued 
Xing AG (DE) Social networks (for 
professionals) 
Industry, 
universities, 
research 
institutes 
No No 
LinkedIn Corp. (US) Social networks (for 
professionals) 
Industry, 
universities, 
research 
institutes 
No Yes 
Gameforge AG (DE) 
(Flaregames) 5) 
Games  on com-
puters and mobile 
devices 
Social network, 
consumers 
Yes Yes 
Zynga, Inc. (US) Games  on com-
puters and mobile 
devices 
Social network, 
consumers 
Yes Yes 
hte AG (DE) 4, 5) Hard-/software; 
high throughput 
screening 
Industry Yes Yes 
CeGaT GmbH (DE) 
5) 
Genomics, 
bioinformatics, 
high throughput 
screening 
Academic 
research, 
consumers, 
industry 
No Yes 
Nanion  
Technologies GmbH 
(DE) 5) 
Nano-tools, high 
throughput 
Academic and 
industrial 
research: 
medicine, 
pharmaceutical 
industry 
Yes No 
Nanofilm LLC (US) Nano-coatings, 
nano-films 
Industry, 
consumers 
Yes No 
Nano-X GmbH (DE) 
5) 
Nano-coatings, 
nano-films 
Industry, 
consumers 
Yes No 
Nanopool GmbH 
(DE) 5) 
Nano-coatings, 
nano-films 
Industry, 
consumers 
Yes No 
Industrial Nanotech, 
Inc. (US) 
Nano-coatings, 
nano-films 
Industry, 
consumers 
Yes No 
InovisCoat GmbH 
(DE) 
Multi-layer coatings, 
photographic films 
Industry, 
consumers 
Yes Yes 
WITec GmbH (DE) 
5) 
Nano tools, scientific 
instruments 
Academic, in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes No 
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JPK Instruments AG 
(DE) 
Nano tools, scientific 
instruments 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes Yes 
Cambridge 
Nanotech, Inc. (US) 
6) 
Nano tools, scientific 
instruments; ADL 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes No 
Attocube AG (DE) 
4) 
Nano tools; scientific 
devices and 
instruments 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes No 
Vitracom AG (DE) 
5) 
Image processing; 
shop monitoring 
Industry, 
communalities 
Yes Yes 
ATMgroup GmbH 
(DE) 5) 
Process, automa-
tion, measuring and 
inspection techno-
logies, industrial 
image processing 
Industry Yes Yes 
SiGNa Chemistry, 
Inc. (US) 
Fine chemicals, 
reagents, hydrogen 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes ? 
ChemCon GmbH 
(DE) 5) 
Fine chemicals, 
APIs, CRO 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes No 
ASCA GmbH (DE) Fine chemicals, 
APIs, CRO 
Academic,  in-
dustrial R&D 
Yes No 
Polymaterials AG 
(DE) 5) 
Polymer, plastics, 
compounding 
Industry Yes ? 
Novaled AG (DE) 
4)) 
OLED,  Displays, 
liighting 
Industry No Yes 
Zweibrüder 
Optoelectronics 
GmbH (DE) 4, 5) 
LED,  Lighting Professional 
customers, 
consumers 
Yes No 
MineWolf AG 
(DE/CH) 4) 
Mine cleaning Military, 
Governments, 
NGOs 
Yes ? 
Torqeedo GmbH 
DE) 
Electromobility Consumers Yes Yes 
SunCoal GmbH 
(DE) 
Bioenergy, biomass-
to-coal 
Industry, 
communalities 
Yes Yes 
Renmatix, Inc. (US) Biobased chemicals 
and biofuels 
Industry Yes Yes 
Enercon GmbH 
(DE) 
Wind power, wind 
turbines 
Industry Yes No 
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Quiet Revolution, 
Ltd. (UK) 
Wind power, wind 
turbines 
Professional 
customers, 
consumers 
Yes Yes 
TimberTower Gmbh 
(DE) 5) 
Wind power, wind 
turbines 
Industry, 
Professional 
customers 
Yes Yes 
SkySails GmbH & 
Co. KG (DE) 
Wind power, energy 
efficiency, shipping 
Industry Yes Yes 
Marrone Bio 
Innovations, Inc. 
(US) 
Biopesticides Farmers, 
consumers 
Yes Yes 
Heppe Medical 
Chitosan GmbH 
(DE) 
Raw materials, 
natural products 
Industry, chito-
san for phar-
maceuticals, 
cosmetics 
Yes Yes 
Aluplast GmbH PVC windows Industry, 
professional 
customers and 
consumers 
Yes No 
KWO Kunststoffteile 
GmbH (DE) 
Plastics Industry Yes No 
Nanosolutions 
GmbH (DE) 6) 
Nano-pigments, in 
ink jet printers or 
fountain pens 
Consumers, 
industry 
No No 
Zoxy Energy Sys-
tems AG (DE) 6) 
Batteries Industry Yes Yes 
MnemoScience 
GmbH (DE) 6) 
Special plastics (with 
shape memory) 
Industry, 
medicine 
Yes Yes 
1) DE = Germany; 2) firm with production or anticipated production; 3) early financed by private 
venture capital including corporate venturing 4) acquired by a large firm; 5) presentations 
available on the Technology Entrepreneurship Web; 6) insolvent or bankrupt by 2012. 
The startup of some firms is described in individual sub-chapters including Perkin & 
Sons (UK, founded in 1856, A.1.2), SAP (DE, founded in 1972, A.1.4) and PayPal 
(US, founded in 2000, A.1.7, ch. 4.3.2). The situation of four startups in ionic liquids 
with an emphasis on a technology push situation and the competitive constellation is 
presented in sub-chapter A.1.5. 
Larger discussions in context are provided for the birth of Microsoft Corp., Cisco 
Systems, Inc. and Q-Cells AG. 
Startups/NTBFs presented in tabular form or tackled in large text blocks in particular 
contexts with or without associated figures or in text boxes (“short stories”) are given 
in Table I.103. 
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Table I.103: Startups/NTBFs tackled by larger descriptions in the text. 
Firm Name 
(Country) 
1)
 
Technology Firm Name 
(Country) 
1)
 
Technology 
Verenium Corp 
(US) 
Biofuels Cobalt Biofuels, 
Inc. (US) 
Biofuels 
Virent Energy 
Systems, Inc. 
Biofuels Cilion, Inc. (US) Biofuels 
BlueFire Ethanol 
Fuels, Inc. (now 
BlueFire 
Renewables) 
Biofuels Range Fuels, Inc. 
(US) 
Biofuels 
CHOREN 
Industries GmbH 
(DE) 
Biofuels Mascoma Corp. 
(US) 
Biofuels 
Süd-Chemie AG 
(DE) 
Biofuels Coskata Energy, 
Inc. (US) 
Biofuels 
Bio Methanol 
Chemie Nederland 
BV (BioMCN) (NL) 
Biofuels Gevo, Inc. Biofuels 
ZeaChem, Inc. 
(US) 
Biofuels LS9, Inc. Biofuels 
Cellana, LLC (US) Biofuels Amyris 
Biotechnologies, 
Inc. (US) 
Biofuels 
Solazyme, Inc. 
(US) 
Biofuels HCL CleanTech 
Ltd. (now Verdia) 
(US) 
Biofuels 
Algenol Biofuels, 
Inc. (US) 
Biofuels KiOR Inc. (US) Biofuels 
Cyano Biotech 
GmbH (DE) 
Biofuels LanzaTech 
(US/NewZealand) 
Biofuels 
Sapphire Energy, 
Inc. (US) 
Biofuels Nanophase 
Technologies 
Corp. (US) 
Nanotechnology 
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IGV GmbH 
(Institut für 
Getreideverarbei-
tung) GmbH (DE) 
Biofuels Scionix. Ltd. (UK) 
2) 
Ionic liquids 
Bioprodukte Prof. 
Steinberg GmbH” 
(BPS) DE 
Biofuels Google, Inc. (US) Search engine 
and electronic 
media 
Solix Biofuels 
(now Solix 
BioSystems) , Inc. 
(US) 
Biofuels First Solar Photovoltaic, solar 
cells 
ButylFuels, LLC 
(US) 
Biofuels US LED Ltd. (US) LED, Lighting 
Green Biologics 
Ltd. (GBL) (UK) 
Biofuels Albeo 
Technologies, Inc. 
(US) 
LED, Lighting 
OHB AG (DE) Aerospace MetroSpec 
Technology, LLC 
(US) 
LED, Lighting 
1) DE = Germany, 2) more detailed in Bioniqs case document. 
NTBF cases including historical firms’ foundations’ dealt with in the author’s previous 
book [Runge 2006] and updated as appropriate are listed in Table I.104. 
Table I.104: Other case stories of firm foundations by Runge [2006]. 
Firm Name 
(Country, Foundation Year) 
1)
 
Original Type of Technology 
BlueBioTech GmbH (DE, 2000) Algae based additives to nutrition, cosmetics. 
Fine chemicals 
Nanogate AG AG (DE,1999) Nano-coatings, nano-films 
SFC Energy (Smart Fuel Cell) AG (DE, 
2000) 
Fuels Cells (Direct Methanol Fuel Cells, 
DMFCs) 
Puron AG (DE, 2001) 1) Water treatment, membranes 
Prominent GmbH (DE, 1960) Water treatment, pumps, filters, chemicals 
Osmonics, Inc. (US, 1969) 1) Membrane separations, water treatment 
vH&S GmbH (DE, 1971) Aerospace,  instruments, devices 
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Closure Medical Corp. (US, 1971; 
1997) 1) 
Adhesives, medical adhesives 
Perkin & Sons (UK 1856) Organic dyes 
Bayer,AG (DE, 1863) Organic dyes, pharmaceuticals 
The Dow Chemical Company (US, 
1897) 
Chemicals 
Avery Dennison (US, 1935) Adhesives, pressure-sentive adhesives (PSA) 
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA (1876) Washing, adhesives 
The Eastman-Kodak Company (US, 
1899) 
Photography, apparatus and films 
Röhm & Haas (DE, 1907); 
Rohm & Haas (US) 
Chemistry 
Perstorp Holding AB (SE, 1881) Chemistry 
The Prussian (Berlin) Blue Endeavor 
(DE, 1704) 
Inorganic dyes/pigments 
1) Acquired by a large firm 
B.3 Publicly Available Case Documents 
of Companies 
Table I.105 provides the list of documents of NTBF case stories of those firms of 
Table I.102 that are published together with the treatise (on the KIT EnTechnon Web 
site – Downloads). Other documents will follow regularly over 2014/2015. 
For firms marked with an asterisk corresponding presentations of founders are also 
available on the Technology Entrepreneurship Web. 1 
Table I.105: Published case stories of firms. 
Firm Name 
(Country) 
1)
 
Firm Name 
(Country) 
1)
 
Remarks Concerning 
the Cases 
IoLiTec GmbH *) Gameforge AG 
Solvent Innovation GmbH Zynga, Inc. (US) 
Bioniqs Ltd. (UK) Xing AG 
Nanion Technologies GmbH *) LinkedIn Corp. (US) 
Novaled AG *) Nanopool GmbH 2) 
The pairs Gameforge vs. 
Zynga and Xing vs. 
LinkedIn allow  compar-
ing Germany vs. US 
IoLiTec, Bioniqs (includ-
ing Scionix) and Solvent 
Innovation is a competi-
tive group of startups 
1) German firms if not stated otherwise; 2) as a presentation. 
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Glossary 
This glossary is an alphabetical list of terms in a particular broad area of knowledge 
with the definitions for those terms. The list includes terms that are either newly intro-
duced or specialized and aims to cover several domains of knowledge accounting for 
the many scientific and technical disciplines which are relevant for technology entre-
preneurship. 
It is also a reference to notions in the text for which definitions are used that are some-
times differently understood in various scientific disciplines or sometimes have slight 
differences in a particular discipline to have the basis for common understanding 
among disciplines. 
Cross-references to other terms in the glossary are indicated in the list by italics face. 
Apart from the many possibilities to look up definitions, notions and terms on the Web 
the work of Dorf and Byers [2007] provides a glossary directed toward business 
administration vocabulary. 
Advisory board (or board of advisers): 
A group constituted to provide advice and contacts (“networking”) to a venture by 
members with distinct skills and knowledge – and by level of reputation of its members 
it may also add credibility to a venture. 
Agent: 
Participants who play a role in achieving the objectives or changes of a system; 
attendees of the various programs. 
Ascribed value (or imputed value): 
A systemic category which is generated by consensus or common interests and be-
havior of a social group in attributing value. It refers usually to valuating or perceiving 
value of a current situation or object or specifically a firm and the expectation that it 
will provide future socio-economic benefit – often related to (technology) speculation. 
Asset: 
Something with economic value that an individual, corporation or country owns or con-
trols with the expectation that it will provide future benefit. 
Assets are acquired to increase the value of a firm or benefit the firm’s operations. 
 
Backward-integration: 
Means the situation in which on a corporate basis a plant or business (of a firm) is in-
terrelated to an upstream plant or processing facility for producing its offerings (cf. 
forward-integration). 
Book value: 
The net worth (net asset value) of a firm according to accounting rules, calculated by 
total assets minus intangible assets (patents, goodwill) and liabilities. 
Breakeven: 
Is the point at which cumulated income (revenues, sales) equals loss (expenses, 
cost). 
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Brand: 
A combination of name, sign or symbol that identifies the goods or services sold by a 
firm. 
Business model: 
A business model is an organization’s core logic for creating value; a hypothesis how 
to create value for all its stakeholders. 
Business plan: 
A business plan is a structured document that includes a current and projected de-
scription of a new venture or a business of an existing company, its offerings like pro-
ducts and/or services and related market(s) and how the business will achieve its 
goals in a particular environment. 
 
Cannibalization:  
Processes of introducing offerings, mostly products that will compete with, usually 
even replace, existing products of a firm. 
Cash flow: 
Means the transfer of cash into or out of a business, project or financial product (note 
that the word cash is used here in the broader sense, where it includes bank depos-
its). It is usually measured during a specified, finite period of time. 
Complement: 
A product that improves or perfects another product. 
Certainty: 
Under certainty there is complete knowledge of the value of the outcomes and of the 
occurrences of the states (of the system). 
Closed-loop system: 
A self-regulated system is called a closed-loop system and it has its output coupled to 
its input. 
Cluster: 
Here, a cluster is a network of interconnected companies and/or organizations with 
spatial proximity of the nodes (organizational components) and similar or related ac-
tivities of the nodes.  
Communication: 
Covers interactions of entities (people or things) and behavior; with regard to people it 
may relate to actions to work together for a given goal, purpose, function or effect. 
Competitive advantage: 
An advantage that a firm has over its competitors; how a firm could gain and sustain 
an advantaged position at potential customers. There can be many types of competi-
tive advantages including the firm’s cost structure, product offerings, distribution net-
work and customer support. 
Cognitive framework: 
Cognitive psychology explains human behavior broadly by examining the “cognitive 
frameworks” that are used to interpret (how to see) the world and change attitude, 
behavior and activities accordingly. 
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A (holistic) system of reciprocation which is a relation of mutual dependence or action 
or influence over time. A cognitive framework of an individual appears as an internal 
mental counterpart of a state which is induced by perceiving a situation as the external 
counterpart. 
Complexity: 
Complexity in the context of systems expresses a condition of the number of compo-
nents in a system and the numerous forms of relationships among the components. 
The numbers may be very large or even infinite, but remain enumerable in the mathe-
matical sense. 
Configuration: 
In the context of a system, particularly a firm, its situation or state, respectively, char-
acterized by endogenous (system-internal) variables combined with exogenous (ex-
ternal) variables (called “parameters”) of supersystems. All the factors are interde-
pendent and interacting, such that their effects may be enhanced or diminished. 
Control: 
The purposive influence or enforcing power toward a predetermined goal involving 
continuous comparison of current states to future goals (“is” versus “shall” assess-
ment). 
Coordination: 
For living systems comprising components and/or subsystems coordination together 
with sub-ordination in the system exists or is developed to produce an output or out-
come or achieve a goal. It is seen as a source of competitive advantage. 
Core competency: 
It is the one thing that a company can do better than its competitors; an area of spe-
cialized expertise that is the result of orchestrating complex streams of technology and 
work activities and processes, including building and keeping unique relationships with 
customers, suppliers, research, development or marketing partners, and operational 
agility or unique business practices. 
Customization: 
Provision of a product or service designed to meet a customer’s or user’s preferences 
or specifications. 
 
Decision-maker: 
A decision-maker is someone who is internal to a system and who can change the 
performance of the parts. Responsibilities for the guidance of the system toward 
achievement of its objectives are with decision-makers, managers and agents. 
Directed Evolution: 
Describes a set of techniques for the iterative production, evaluation and selection of 
variants of a biological sequence, usually a protein or nucleic acid 
(http://dbkgroup.org/direvol.htm); 
Directed evolution allows exploring enzyme functions never required in the natural 
environment and for which the molecular basis is poorly understood. Its purpose is, for 
instance, to produce useful biocatalysts. With directed evolution one now has the abil-
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ity to tailor individual proteins as well as whole biosynthetic and biodegradation path-
ways for biotechnology applications. 
Francis H. Arnold Research Group. Evolution, Synthetic Biology, Protein Engineering, 
Biocatalysis, Biofuels.  
(http://www.che.caltech.edu/groups/fha/, http://www.che.caltech.edu/groups/fha/). 
Discovery: 
Describes a novel observation or finding of something already existing, often of a 
natural phenomenon or effect of a (natural) product. 
Driver: 
Is a relevant endogenous variable or exogenous parameter of a model which provides 
sufficient power (“strength”) or influence to explain (and probably “predict”) a system’s 
state and development. Drivers are those combinations of factors which suffice to de-
termine an observable response of the system. 
Dominant Design: 
Means that, after a technical innovation and a subsequent era of digestion and pro-
gressive developments in an industry, a basic architecture of a product or process be-
comes the accepted market standard. 
Due diligence: 
A process of gathering and verifying facts, data and information in plans or purposive 
documents, such as a business or project plan or description of a firm to be acquired, 
before making a commitment to the terms of an investment, or firm merger or acquisi-
tion. 
Entry barrier (barrier of entry): 
A factor that keeps a firm from entering an industry or a market. 
Dynamic capability: 
The ability to build and develop firm-specific capabilities and, simultaneously, to renew 
and re-configure the firm’s competencies in response to key factors and conditions of 
the environment. 
 
Economics: 
Economics is the social science that analyzes the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of goods and services (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics) and sharing 
of information. Information may have economic value because it allows individuals to 
make choices that yield higher expected payoffs or expected utility than they would 
obtain from choices made in the absence of information. 
Economics is “the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” The subject thus defined in-
volves the study of choices as they are affected by incentives and resources 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarcity). 
Efficacy: 
A measure of the extent to which a system contributes to the purposes of a high-level 
system of which it may be a subsystem. 
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Entity: 
An entity is something that has a distinct, separate existence, though it need not be a 
material existence. In general, there is also no presumption that an entity is animate. 
Entities are used in system developmental models that display communication and 
internal processing of, say, documents compared to order processing 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entity. 
Equifinality: 
Means a system can reach the same final state from different initial conditions and by 
a variety of paths (the ability to reach a goal from myriad ways and beginning at vari-
ous locations). For open systems this option of finding equally valid ways is the ex-
pression of equifinality. 
Equivocality: 
The state or quality of being ambiguous in meaning or capable of double interpreta-
tion. It is viewed as the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations about an 
organizational situation or situations where multiple meanings information or informa-
tion patterns exist among people (striving for the same objectives). 
Environment: 
In a systems approach any system is viewed in relation to all other systems larger 
than and interfacing with itself. Such a “Whole System” comprises all the systems 
deemed to affect or to be affected by the problem at hand. Within a Whole System the 
environment is defined as comprising all the systems (subsystems and supersystems) 
over which a decision-maker of a given system has no control. 
Environmental rhythm: 
The environment within which the entrepreneur operates may have certain regularities 
or patterns. An environmental rhythm exists when patterns in the environment vary 
over time with some regularity. Its recognition, however, is perhaps not simple or 
easy. 
Epistemology: 
Is the theory of knowledge and the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature 
and scope (limitations) of knowledge focusing on 1. What is knowledge? 2. How is 
knowledge acquired? 3. What do people know? 4. How do we know what we know? 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology). 
Escalation: 
An expression of a binary relation originating with a special phenomenon or event and 
showing up either as a significant increase or rise, lifting something’s extent, volume, 
number, intensity or scope stepwise to a higher level or a corresponding decrease. 
Established business ownership: 
Percentage of population aged 18-64 years who are currently owner-manager of an 
established business, for instance, owning and managing a running business that has 
paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owner for more than 42 months 
(according to Global Entrepreneurship Monitor). 
Exit: 
The way investors or entrepreneurs get their money out of a venture making a signifi-
cant profit. 
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Expert: 
A person with considerable experience (and knowledge) in a certain field – someone 
who knows the most serious mistakes one can make in a field and how to avoid them. 
Factor market: 
A market where the factors of production (conversion) are bought and sold, such as 
the labor markets, the capital market, the market for raw materials and the market for 
management or entrepreneurial resources. 
Feedback: 
The regulatory mechanism of closed-loop systems. It is the modification or control of a 
process or system by its results or effects; output of an action is “returned” (fed-back) 
to modify the next action. 
“Negative feedback” is a process in which an initial change will bring about an addi-
tional change in the opposite direction. A “positive feedback” is a process in which an 
initial change will bring about an additional change in the same direction. In positive 
feedbacks, a small initial perturbation can yield a large change which is self-reinforce-
ment. A produces more of B which in turn produces more of A. 
Feedforward: 
It is a control mechanism that can be measured but not controlled. The disturbance is 
measured and fed forward to an earlier part of the control loop so that corrective ac-
tion can be initiated in advance of the disturbance having an adverse effect on the 
system response. 
In industrial processes when some output of an earlier step is fed into a step occurring 
down the line; self-fulfilling prophesy: if people believe the stockmarket is going to rise, 
their purchases drive up the stock prices thus creating the very situation they believed 
will happen 
Finality: 
A term used to describe the goal-seeking nature of systems, that is, achieving a pre-
defined future state. Open systems have equally valid alternatives easy of attaining 
the same objectives from different initial conditions (cf. equifinality). 
Forward-integration: 
The situation in which on a corporate basis a plant or business (or a firm) is interre-
lated to a downstream plant or processing facility for producing its offerings (cf. 
backward-integration). 
Function: 
Means that something is used for; serve: serve a purpose or role; a form/structure or 
activities of a system to achieve a particular purpose or goal or a specific subsystem 
to contribute to purpose/goal achievement of the supersystem, usually associated with 
an order of processes (cf. also the division/department/function of a firm). 
 
Gatekeeper (Boundary Spanner): 
Someone acting as an interface, if “differences” between intervening parts are too 
large to allow direct contact and communication between the parts. For instance, a 
“technical gatekeeper” interconnects various scientific and technical disciplines or 
corporate-internal and external research. 
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Genetic Engineering: 
Genetic engineering, recombinant DNA technology, genetic modification/manipulation 
(GM) and gene splicing are terms that apply to the direct manipulation of an organ-
ism’s genes. 
Genetic engineering uses the techniques of molecular cloning and transformation to 
alter the structure and characteristics of genes directly. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_engineering) 
Genome: 
A genome is the total of all an individual organism’s genes. Thus, “genomics is the 
study of all the genes of a cell, or tissue, at the DNA (genotype), mRNA (transcrip-
tome), or protein (proteome) levels.” (US Environmental Protection Agency). 
Genomics: 
A branch of genetics that studies organisms in terms of their genomes (their full DNA 
sequences) – (http:// wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn); 
a branch of biotechnology concerned with applying the techniques of genetics and 
molecular biology to the genetic mapping and DNA sequencing of sets of genes or the 
complete genomes of selected organisms, with organizing the results in databases, 
and with applications of the data (as in medicine or biology). 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/genomics) 
Goal: –  Objective 
A goal is where you want to be; it focuses on a qualitative statement. It is a broad, general, 
tangible, and descriptive statement. It does not say how to do something, but rather 
what the results will look like. 
Some common business goals are: being always profitable, achieving sustainable 
competitive advantage, customer loyalty, etc. 
Goodwill: 
In law and accounting, an intangible asset constituting a value over and above the 
valuation of the tangible assets of the business, and representing all benefits derived 
from the distinctive location, trademarks, credit rating, reputation, and patronage of the 
business. 
On the sale of a business, a charge usually is made for the goodwill as one of the as-
sets. Sometimes goodwill may be sold by itself without the transfer of any other as-
sets; for example, a business that is moving to another locality may sell the right to 
use its name and to occupy its former premises. 
(http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567903/Goodwill.html) 
 
Hard system: – Soft System 
A characterization of a system with regards to determining the extent to which certain 
variables can be quantified and measured and lines of reasoning. “Hard” systems 
usually will admit formalized reasoning processes where logico-mathematical and 
analytical-mechanistic derivations, causality and quantitative approaches using the 
“Scientific Method” are prevalent. Typical domains cover physical sciences, engineer-
ing and chemistry and systems are usually treated as “closed” ones. 
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Human-activity system: 
A social system and open system dealing primarily with goal-seeking subjects. It is a 
purposeful system directed toward the achievement of a final state, the goal – usually 
a man-machine system with “subjects” and “objects” and characterized by exhibiting 
organized complexity. 
 
Implementation: 
Is the use or adoption of change; the actions of accomplishing some goal or executing 
some order; to put into practical effect; executing given procedures. 
Impact value (in German Wirkwert): 
A value that is not directly associated with a tangible or intangible entity per se, but 
emerges in a particular situation or constellation and may be related to a particular 
time period. (Shakespeare, Richard III: “A horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse!) 
Indicator: 
In social sciences the decision how to relate measurement to a particular “observable” 
(“metrics”) is often associated with its operational definition, an indicator assumed to 
reflect a variable. 
Influence: 
A capacity to change the behavior of other individuals, to get them to do something 
that they would not otherwise do. 
Information asymmetry: 
A state of social group interactions where one or several individuals of the group has 
more or better information than the other ones; or, at least, one party has information 
relevant for a subject under consideration whereas the other(s) do not. This could lead 
to imbalance for decision-making or power which may become counter-productive for 
the group. 
Intangible: 
Nonmaterial: lacking material qualities, and so not able to be touched or seen 
(http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/search.aspx?q=intangible); 
Antonym – Tangible: able to be realized, capable of being given physical existence 
tangible – financial benefits. 
Intelligence: 
“Intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us – the prelude to 
{Presidential} decision and action” (US CIA Factbook on Intelligence). 
Interdisciplinarity: 
Interdisciplinarity “is based on the integration of ideas from across fields and directed 
towards a common goal. In this regard it is essential that those involved have a funda-
mental understanding of the core concepts of the area, its research traditions or 
themes and the basic questions under consideration.” 
A multi-disciplinary approach – that is often confused with interdisciplinarity –  gener-
ates little or no cooperation between areas. 
(A Moral Tourism Industry? Release: Jul. 29, 2010. 
http://www.hotelmule.com/html/72/n-3072-3.html 
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Intervening variable: 
In social science intervening variables ((“latent variables”) are hypothetical internal 
states (constructs) that are used to explain relationships between observed variables, 
such as independent and dependent variables. They are not real things; they cannot 
be seen, heard, or felt. They are interpretations of observed facts, not facts them-
selves. But they create the illusion of being facts. Typical examples include personal-
ity, traits, memory or learning. 
 
Leadership: 
Is a process of social influence in which one person (or a coherent group) can enlist 
the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common goal. Leadership is 
reflected by a purposive collective or group process and is ultimately concerned with 
fostering change directed toward some future end or condition which is desired or 
valued. Leadership is about people (and “doing the right things”). 
Learning Curve: 
A learning curve shows the rate of improvement in performing a task as a function of 
time, or the rate of change in average cost (in hours or €/$) as a function of cumulative 
output. 
It is a (graphical and/or mathematical) representation of the common sense principle 
that the more one does something the better one gets at it (the more times a task has 
been performed, the less time will be required on each subsequent iteration). 
 
Management: 
Management is a process and the art, or science or practice, of setting and achieving 
objectives utilizing and coordinating appropriate resources including people in order to 
attain them with least cost and minimum waste which means attaining the best return 
on such resources by getting things done efficiently. Management is about business 
results and processes (and “doing the things right”). 
Measurement: 
Is the assignment of numbers (or numerals) to represent attributes (properties). Nu-
merals possess order only because of arbitrary assignment or mere convention. One 
of the first requirements of measurement is the determination of the appropriate scale 
in which the attribute in question could be mapped. Prevalence of measurement 
scales differs for hard and soft sciences. 
Mental model: 
Mental models are representations (for instance, connected information), about a par-
ticular topic or subject. Mental models include not only cognitive information, but also 
feelings and motives in regard to the particular topic. The subject of mental models 
often involves aspects of the self (for instance, self-concept in regard to spelling), and 
aspects of the world (for instance, beliefs about a competitive firm). 
A mental model is an explanation in someone’s thought process for how something 
works in the real world; it reflects conscious or subconscious perceptions of reality. 
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Metabolic engineering: 
Metabolic engineering is the practice of optimizing genetic and regulatory processes 
within cells to increase the cells’ production of a certain substance. Producing beer, 
wine, cheese, pharmaceuticals, and other biotechnology products often involves 
metabolic engineering (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metabolic_engineering). 
Means targeted and purposeful alteration of metabolic pathways found in an organism 
in order to better understand and use cellular pathways for chemical transformation, 
energy transduction, and supramolecular assembly. 
(http://www.metabolicengineering.gov/) 
 
Network: – Cluster 
An interconnected system of entities denoted as “nodes” (such as people, firms or 
things) irrespective of distance. Interconnections may be “hard” like electric lines in a 
computer network or “soft” via human relationships, interactions and communication 
as for a social network. 
New Technology-Based Firm (NTBF): 
An entrepreneurial organization with the goal to actively create, develop, and/or com-
mercialize offerings based on technology and/or research, particularly innovative pro-
ducts, processes, applications and services, which is no more than 12 years in opera-
tion and which is usually still led by the original founder or founder team or, at least, 
one member of the founder team. 
 
Objective: 
An objective or goal is a projected state of affairs that a person or a system plans or 
intends to achieve – a personal or organizational desired end-point in some sort of 
assumed development. Many people endeavor to reach goals within a finite time by 
setting deadlines (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objective_(goal)); 
but, an objective is a specific, measurable, actionable, realistic, and time-bound situa-
tion that must be attained in order to accomplish a particular goal. Objectives define 
the actions that must be taken within a time period to reach the goals. For example, if 
an organization has a goal to “grow revenues,” an objective to achieve the goal may 
be “introduce 2 new products by the third quarter (Q3) of 20xy.” Other examples of 
common objectives are, increase revenue by x% in 20xy etc. 
(http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/dan-feliciano/lean-six-sigma-rock-star/do-you-
know-difference-between-goal-and-objective) 
Open system: 
An open system has an environment with which it has inflows and outflows, for in-
stance, of material, energy, information – or people. It possesses other systems with 
which it relates, exchanges and communicates (for instance, shares information). All 
systems with living components are open systems. In particular, man-machine sys-
tems with “subjects” and “objects” are open systems. 
Opportunity: 
A timely and favorable juncture of circumstances providing a good chance for a suc-
cessful venture [Dorf and Byers 2007:28] (in German often translated as “unternehme-
risches Handlungsfeld”). 
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Organizational learning: 
Comprises the acquisition, application, and mastery of new information and intelli-
gence, tools and methods that allow more rapid decisions and improvement of those 
processes which are critical to the success of an organization. 
Organized complexity: – Complexity 
Organized complexity has as the main feature that there are only finite, relatively small 
numbers of components and relationships in the system. Organized complexity is 
what we usually encounter dealing with new firms (with “small” numbers of employ-
ees, say number is < 30). 
Outcome: – Result 
An outcome is any result or consequence, good or bad, intended and unintended, de-
sired or undesired. 
 
Parameter: 
An observable or measurable factor exogenous to a system forming one of a set that 
influences or defines the conditions of the system’s operation in the sense of a vari-
able. 
Partnership: 
A legal partnership is created when two or more people work together with a view to 
make a profit. Legal partnership means that partners are jointly and separately re-
sponsible for all the partnership’s debts and liabilities. 
Performance: 
Is the quotient of Actuality (A) and Potentiality (P) when A corresponds to the current 
achievement of a system using existing resources and constraints and P is what could 
be achieved by developing resources and removing constraints (Performance ∼ A/P). 
Performance is a relation between “what is” and “what could be,” or verbalized “more 
with the same or even more with less.” Change of productivity is an indicator of per-
formance. In essence, in the current context performance can be related to the first 
derivative of productivity. 
Plan:  – Strategy 
When you know what you want to do and exactly how to do it. A plan is characterized 
by knowing what the next step will be. 
Each step is designed by taking into account the next step. 
Positive feedback: – Self-reinforcement 
Positive feedback occurs in a feedback loop when the mathematical sign of the net 
gain around the feedback loop is positive. That is, positive feedback is in phase with 
the input, in the sense that it adds to make the input larger. Positive feedback is a 
process in which the effects of a small disturbance on a system can include an in-
crease in the magnitude of the perturbation. Positive feedback tends to cause system 
instability. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_feedback) 
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Procedure: 
A specified course of action intended to achieve a result; a prescribed process; a 
structured process by an explicitly given, often documented order of activities accord-
ing to steps, rules and execution conditions; 
how to execute a process, is repeatable. 
Process: 
Ordered activities to achieve a goal, purpose or function; steps may be sequential 
(finite, prescribed steps (for 1 to n) or not prescribed, parallel, may be branched (if 
…then; case x = 1, …case x = n), looping (do …while) or facultative (do X out of Ys). 
Productivity: 
An economic measure of output per unit of input. Inputs include labor and capital, 
while output is typically measured in revenues, for instance, revenue per number of 
employees. Capital and labor are both scarce resources, so maximizing their impact is 
always a core concern of modern business (cf. performance). 
Program: 
A program is coded or prearranged information (actually “instruction”) that controls a 
process (or behavior) leading it toward a given end; it is a planned sequence and 
combination of activities designed to achieve specified goals, also a planned series of 
future events. 
Program structure: 
Is a classification scheme relating the activities of an organization according to func-
tion they perform and the objectives they have been designed to meet. The program 
structure may cut across formal organizational (and other) boundaries. 
 
R&D intensity (research intensity): 
The proportion of R&D expenses in relation to the overall revenues (sales) of the firm 
in percent. 
Recursion: 
In mathematics a recursive definition (or inductive definition) is used to define an ob-
ject in terms of itself. Most recursive definitions have three foundations: a base case 
(basis), an inductive clause, and an extremal clause. 
The base case satisfies the definition without being defined in terms of the definition it-
self. The factorial function n! (0! = 1, n! = n⋅(n - 1)⋅ … 2⋅1 ) is a typical example. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursive_definition) 
Red Tape: 
“Red tape is excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that is considered 
redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. It is usu-
ally applied to governments, corporations, and other large organizations.” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_tape) 
Reflexivity: 
In social sciences a circular relationship between cause and effect. A reflexive rela-
tionship is bidirectional; with both the cause and the effect affecting one another in a 
situation that renders both functions cause and effect. 
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Research-Based Startup (RBSU): 
Also called an academic spin-out; is mostly viewed as a new for-profit and independ-
ent company based on the findings of a member or by members of a research group 
at a university or public research institution. 
Resource: 
A source of aid or support that may be drawn upon when needed. 
Result: 
A result is the final consequence of intended actions or of events 
(There are explicit references to actions/activities or events). 
Regulation: 
In the context of control rather than law means that the interrelated subjects and ob-
jects constituting a system must be regulated in some way so that the goal can be 
achieved. Regulation implies that deviations must be detected and corrected (cf. feed-
back). 
Revenue: 
Sales of offerings of a firm after deducting all returns, rebates, and discounts. 
Revenue model: 
Specifies by which kinds of offerings the firm will earn revenue to make more money 
than it spends. In business, a revenue model is generally used for mid and long-term 
projections of a company’s profit potential and operation. 
Risk: 
In situations of risk the decision-maker knows the value of the outcomes and the rela-
tive probabilities of the states (of the system). For a given situation it relates to hazard. 
Role: 
A function: the actions and activities assigned to or required or expected of a person 
or group or thing (“acting as”); “the function of a manager”; 
a role is a set of behaviors, rights and obligations conceptualized in a social situation. 
Routine: 
A course of action to be followed regularly, not necessarily by an explicitly defined or 
prescribed given order; 
a series of steps followed in a regular definitive order to accomplish something; also a 
set of instructions designed to perform a specific task; a standard procedure. 
 
Scale-up: 
Is the process of transfer of materials from preparation in the lab (“lab scale”) to large 
scale or mass production or from small models and prototypes of machines, devices 
or vehicles to actual size machines/devices/vehicles and their production in large 
numbers as for automobiles. Here often science is connected with development and 
engineering to ultimately “Production/Manufacturing.” 
Self-reinforcement: 
It represents a mechanism, a positive feedback mechanism, by which a system’s out-
put or state is enhanced or brought into a more favorable situation. 
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Positive feedback is in phase with the input, in the sense that it adds to make the input 
larger. Positive feedback is a process in which the effects of a small disturbance on a 
system can include an increase in the magnitude of the perturbation. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_feedback) 
Self-employment: 
In the technological context self-employment refers to a restricted aspect of entrepre-
neurship related essentially to an autonomy orientation (“be one’s own boss,” per-
ceived freedom). 
Securities: 
Securities are financial instruments that can be traded freely on the open market and 
representing ownership (stocks), a debt agreement (bonds), or the rights to ownership 
(derivatives); they are broadly categorized into debt securities (such as banknotes, 
bonds and debentures) and equity securities, for instance, common stocks; and de-
rivative contracts, such as forwards, futures, options and swaps. 
(http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/securities.htm) 
Serendipity: 
Is finding something unexpected and useful while searching for something else en-
tirely. 
Social network: 
In its simplest form, a social network is a system of specified ties between individuals 
as network nodes being observed or studied concerning relationships and social in-
teractions (“edges”), such as friendship, kinship, common social values or interest, 
relationships of beliefs, knowledge or prestige. 
Functionally, it is currently understood as an Internet-based service that allows inter-
acting with others. They play a critical role in socialization into norms and determining 
the way problems are solved, organizations are run, and the degree to which indi-
viduals succeed in achieving their goals. 
Soft system: – Hard System 
A characterization of a system with regards to determining the extent to which certain 
variables can be quantified and measured and lines of reasoning. “Soft” systems, typi-
cally covering biology and life sciences, psychology, cognitive, behavioral and social 
sciences, focus more on qualitative approaches, perceived causal relationships, intui-
tion, discontinuities with low level of replication, etc. They are usually treated as 
“open” systems. 
Spillover effect: 
In economics neglecting the effects of one system upon another one is often referred 
to as “spillover effects.” In systems theory it is related to sub-optimization. 
Spin-off: 
Is a new organization or entity directly formed by a split from a larger one, such as a 
new company formed from a large firm being still governed by the parent company. 
Spin-out: 
Is a firm formed when an employee or group of employees leaves an existing entity to 
form an independent startup firm. This can refer to a university or a research institute, 
directly or mediated by a business incubator. Spin-outs typically operate at arms 
length from their parent organizations (formally and legally independent, but usually 
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with certain ties) and have independent sources of financing, products, services and 
customers. 
Strategy: – Plan 
When you know what goal you want to achieve, but you are not sure exactly how to 
do it. A strategy is characterized by not knowing what to do at the next step until you 
have results from the previous step. 
Each step of a strategy is realistically influenced by what was learned from the pre-
vious step. 
Stakeholder: 
A stakeholder (in German Einflussnehmer, Anteilsnehmer) is a person (or a group) 
who has a stake or interest in the outcome of a system’s activities, operations and 
conversion processes, but also one who is or may be affected by a firm’s projects; 
all the parties that have an interest, financial or otherwise, in a company, including 
shareholders, creditors, bondholders, employees, customers, management, the com-
munity, government and even media. 
Sub-optimization: 
Sub-optimization refers to issues of improving or even optimizing the performance of 
open systems. Optimization is only possible for closed systems! Open systems can, at 
best, only be partially optimized – we have sub-optimization. Moreover, optimizing the 
subsystems does not guarantee that the total system optimum is reached, whereas 
the optimization of the total system (if it could ever be reached) does not guarantee 
that all the subsystems can be optimized at the same time. It is related to spillover 
effects. 
Supply chain: 
The supply chain (or value system) is a “supplier-to-end-users value chain.” Specifi-
cally, a supply chain is a system of organizations, people, technology, activities, infor-
mation and resources involved in moving an offering, product or service, from supplier 
to the “end-user customer”. 
Synthetic Biology: 
The design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems, also the 
re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes. 
(http://syntheticbiology.org/). 
It is a new area of biological research that combines science and engineering in order 
to design and build (“synthesize”) novel biological functions and systems. 
Engineers view biology as a technology. Synthetic Biology includes the broad redefini-
tion and expansion of biotechnology, with the ultimate goals of being able to design 
and build engineered biological systems that process information, manipulate chemi-
cals, fabricate materials and structures, produce energy, provide food, and maintain 
and enhance human health and our environment. 
One aspect of Synthetic Biology which distinguishes it from conventional genetic engi-
neering is a heavy emphasis on developing foundational technologies that make the 
engineering of biology easier and more reliable. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology). 
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Task: 
A task is an activity or set of activities (that might be defined as part of a process) that 
needs to be accomplished within a defined period of time. 
Skill is the ability to perform a task. 
Tacit knowledge: 
Tacit knowledge (as opposed to formal or explicit knowledge) is a kind of knowledge 
mainly ingrained in people rather than documented or encoded and represents corre-
spondingly an issue for “knowledge or technology transfer” or also “licensing” of tech-
nology. 
With tacit knowledge, people are often not aware of the knowledge they possess or 
how it can be valuable to others. It is usually gained through personal experience in 
particular fields and environments of activities (cf. learning curve). 
Tacit technology: 
Is not codified or not documented practical knowledge of and experience with tech-
nical fields of people and, hence, an important competitive advantage of a firm and 
part of its core competencies – as long as the firm can keep the people. Tacit techno-
logy is often brought to bear as and when it is required (cf. resource). 
Technique: 
Represents an applicable element of a technology. Techniques constitute what is also 
called instructional (practical) knowledge. Like any recipe they comprise essentially in-
structions that allow people to “produce” or “re-produce,” respectively. A technique is a 
procedure used to accomplish a specific activity or task. 
Technology: 
Technology has more than one definition, but generically it refers essentially to the 
body of know-how about the means and methods of producing tools, goods or ser-
vices. Technology comprises a system of application-oriented statements about 
means and ends. Technology comprises often a set of techniques. Correspondingly, 
this notion does not require an interconnection to science; it may related to “art, skill 
and craft” and “useful arts” to create some value. Current definitions often refer explic-
itly to science, in particular when focusing on “high technology.” 
Technology implementation: 
Technology implementation means selecting the techniques to target a given goal re-
lated to tools, goods or services. 
Teleology: 
Teleology anticipates future existence of systems. As an analytical method it is associ-
ated with purpose. Related to finality, it represents an antithesis to causality and linear 
thinking in terms of causes and effects, which is prevalent in natural sciences. 
Trade-off (or tradeoff): 
A trade-off (or tradeoff) is a situation that involves losing one quality or aspect of 
something in return for gaining another quality or aspect. It implies a decision to be 
made with full comprehension of both the upside and downside of a particular choice. 
Trade-offs are regarded as “compromises” or exchanges which decision makers must 
effect when all their objectives cannot be carried out at the same time. As the extreme 
one has to be sacrificed totally at the expense of the other, for instance, either quality 
or low price, but not both. 
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Trait: 
Traits are multiple, thematically-related personality features that collectively reflect the 
operation or characteristic functioning of a particular area of person, a characteristic 
way in which an individual perceives, feels, believes, or acts. 
For example, the trait of intelligence describes the level of functioning of broad areas 
of the cognitive system. Traits typically emerge from many diverse contributors. 
Transcriptomics: – Genome 
The study of the complete set of RNA transcripts produced by the genome (transcrip-
tome) at a given time. 
 
Uncertainty: 
Under uncertainty, the values of the outcomes may be known but no information on 
the probability of (occurring) effects or events is available. 
Utility: 
In the context of systems theory utility can be used as valid guides for decision-
making. Utility is assigned expected utility values to choices and represents, to a 
certain degree, the behavioral (psychological) characteristics of decision makers, who 
are faced with choice situations under risk [Gigch 1974:107]. 
In economics, utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from, or desirability of, 
consumption of various goods and services. Given this measure, one may speak 
meaningfully of increasing or decreasing utility, and thereby explain economic behav-
ior in terms of attempts to increase one’s utility. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility) 
 
Value chain: 
A value chain is a sequence of activities that a firm operating in a specific industry per-
forms in order to deliver something valuable, such as a product or service. 
Value proposition: 
Is a statement how customer value will be created summarizing why a customer 
should buy an offering (product or service). This statement should convince a potential 
customer that one particular product or service will add more value or better solve a 
problem than other similar offerings (if they exist). 
Value system: 
It is the network of organizations and the value producing activities involved in the 
production and delivery of an offering. The value system consists of value adding 
components which correspond to supplier/channel-customer bunches. It is an inter-
connection of processes and activities within and among firms that creates benefits for 
intermediaries and end-users (consumers). 
Verbund (German): 
The Verbund principle enables a firm to add value as one company through efficient 
use of its internal and external resources. 
Verbundprojekt (according to the German BMFB ministry): 
It is a pre-competitive, division of labor and cooperation of several independent part-
ners from industry and academia with independent contributions to the solution of a 
research and development task. (Ein Verbundprojekt ist eine vorwettbewerbliche, 
Glossary 1217 
arbeitsteilige Kooperation von mehreren unabhängigen Partnern aus Wirtschaft und 
Wissenschaft mit eigenständigen Beiträgen zur Lösung einer Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungsaufgabe.) – usually translated as “cooperative project” or joint project.” 
 
Verbund system: 
A Verbund system creates efficient value chains that extend from basic input right 
through to high-value-added offering like products. The Verbund principle extends 
beyond production and technology to embrace the firm’s employees and also their 
interconnections of knowledge, experience and expertise to other internal or external 
people (Employee Verbund, Technology Verbund, …, Customer Verbund). 
 
Window of Opportunity: 
Is a short time period during which an otherwise unattainable opportunity exists. 
 
Zeitgeist: 
The Zeitgeist (spirit of the age or spirit of the time) is the intellectual fashion or domi-
nant school of thought which typifies and influences the culture of a particular period in 
time. According to the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-
1831) “no man can surpass his own time, for the spirit of his time is also his own 
spirit.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitgeist) 
In an extension of this view, systems theory would allow to use the notion also in a re-
stricted sense, such as how to do business at a particular time period and location (re-
gion, country) or “prescriptions” how to innovate or found a firm. 
Zeitgeist – Goethe: 
Faust – 575-577 Translation *) 
„Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt, 
das ist im Grund der Herren eigner 
Geist, 
in dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.” 
The spirit of the ages, that you find, 
In the end, is the spirit of Humankind: 
A mirror where all the ages are 
revealed. 
What you call “spirit of the ages” 
Is after all the spirit of those sages 
In which the mirrored age itself reveals. 
*) http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/German/FaustIScenesItoIII.htm; 
http://goethe.holtof.com/faust/Faust_I_02.htm. 
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Acronyms 
ALD  Atomic layer deposition 
AUTM Association of University Technology Managers 
B2B Business-to-business 
B2C Business-to-consumers 
B2G Business-to-government 
B2P Business-to-public 
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research) 
BMVh Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of 
Defense) 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology) 
BOS Balance-of-System (Cost) 
CAPEX Capital expenditures 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief financial officer 
CdTe Cadmium telluride 
CFD Computational fluid dynamics 
CHP Combined heat and power plant (in German Blockheizkraftwerk – 
BHKW) 
CIGS Copper indium gallium diselenide 
CMP Chemical mechanical planarization 
COO Chief operating officer 
CoP Communities of practice” 
COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf (products, components) 
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
CSF Critical success factor 
CSO Chief-science-officer 
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CTO Chief-technology-officer 
CV Corporate venturing 
CVC Corporate venture company 
DFG Deutsche Forschunsgemeinschaft (German Research 
Foundation) 
DIY Do-it-yourself 
DOD or DoD (US) Department of Defense 
DOE or DoE (US) Department of Energy 
DPMA Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt (German Patent and Trade 
Mark Office) 
DSO Days Sales Outstanding 
EEG (Germany) Erneuerbare Energie Gesetz – Renewable Energy Act 
EERE (US) Office of Energy Efficient and Renewable Energy 
EGC Entrepreneurial growth company 
EH&S Environmental health and safety 
EISA (US) Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
EMEA European Medicines Agency 
EPA (US) Environmental Protection Agency 
EPC Engineering, procurement and construction 
EPO European Patent Office 
ERP Enterprise resource planning 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESTCP (US) Environmental Security Technology Certification Program 
EU European Union 
EU27 European Union comprised of 27 members 
EV Electric vehicle 
F2P Free-to-play 
FCV Fuel cell vehicle 
FFE Fuzzy Front-End 
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FFV Flex Fuel Vehicle 
FhG Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (Society) 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
GMA General morphological analysis 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (cf. LLC) 
GMO Genetically modified organism or object 
GP General Partner(ship) 
GST General Systems Theory 
HAP Hazardous air pollutant 
HR Human Resource(s) 
HAWT Horizontal axis wind turbine 
HTS High throughput screening; high-temperature superconductor 
HVT High value technology 
HW Hardware 
I&CT Information and communication technology 
IC Intellectual Capital 
ID Identification (mark, sign, signal, code etc.) 
IHK Industry und Handelskammer (Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce) 
IP Intellectual property 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IPR Intellectual property right 
IT Information technology 
JD Juris Doctor (degree), Doctor of Jurisprudence 
JDA Joint development alliance 
JRA Joint research alliance 
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JV Joint venture 
KAI Kirton Adaptive Innovative (instrument) 
KDT Knowledge discovery in text databases 
KIBS Knowledge-intensive business service (firm) 
KIT Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (Germany) 
LCF Lignocellulose feedstock 
LED Light emitting diode 
LLC Limited Liability Company (cf. German GmbH) 
LP Limited Partner(ship) 
M&A Mergers & Acquisitions 
MBI Management buy-in 
MBO Management buy-out 
MBTI Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
MD Medicinae Doctor (Doctor of Medicine) 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MMOG Massively Multiplayer Online Game 
MPG Max Planck Gesellschaft (Society) 
MPI Max Planck Institut 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAICS North American Industry Classification System 
NASA (US) National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
NBD New Business Development 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NIH National Institutes of Health; not invented here 
NPD New Product Development 
NREL (US) National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
NSF National Science Foundation (of the US) 
 1222 Acronyms 
NTBF New technology-based firm 
NVCA (US) National Venture Capital Association  
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OLED Organic light emitting diode 
OPEX Operational expenditures 
OPV Organic photovoltaic 
OTC Over-the-counter 
P2P Pay-to-play 
PARC Palo Alto Research Center 
PDA Personal digital assistant 
PoC Proof-of-concept 
PPP Private-public-partnership 
PR Public Relations 
PV Photovoltaic 
RBV Resource-Based View 
RES Renewable energy source 
RFS Renewable Fuel Standard (of  US EPA) 
RI R&D intensity (or research intensity) 
ROI Return on investment 
S&T Science & Technology (System) 
SBA Small Business Administration (in the US) 
SBIC Small Business Investment Company 
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise 
SOL Society for Organizational Learning 
SSBIC Specialized Small Business Investment Company 
STVP Stanford Technology Ventures Program 
STTR Small Business Technology Transfer 
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SW Software 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
Syngas Synthesis gas 
TBS Technology-based service 
TIM Technology and Innovation Management 
TOI Timing of industrialization 
TS Technical service 
TFT Thin film transistor 
TVT Top value technology 
UIRC University-industry-research centers  
USDA US Department of Agriculture 
USP Unique selling proposition; Unique selling point 
USPTO US Patent and Trademark Office 
VAWT Vertical axis wind turbine 
VC Venture capital (or venture capitalist) 
VOC Volatile organic compound 
WWI World War I 
WWII World War II 
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INDEX 
Indexing is rather detailed including hierarchies following Figure I.1, Figure I.5 and the 
Table of Contents. This is intended to facilitate working with this book, such as “an-
swering questions”, preparing a presentation, a course and reading list or looking for 
background for a research issue. 
A page number for an index entry may be the start covering a range of following 
pages associated with that index term. 
For the index term “Definition/Explanation” the page number of the key definition will 
be given in bold face. 
For an index term in a figure or a company description in a sub-chapter, table or box 
the related page number may be given in italics. A company name and directly as-
sociated page in italics means a detailed description of the company in a box, sub-
chapter or table. 
Company Index
3B Scientific 
Strategy, 576 
3M 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 57 
Cooperation/Alliances, 187 
Corporate Culture, 326, 400 
Development/Growth, 677 
Idea, 283 
Ideation, 409, 514 
Intrapreneurship, 400, 404 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 157 
Leadership/Management, 633, 665 
Opportunity, 420 
Organization, 394 
Serendipity, 30 
A123 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 466, 
1111 
Financing/Capitalization, 466 
Technology, 466 
AgraQuest 
Business, 487 
Customers, 123 
Founders, 23, 347 
Agrinova Projektmanagement 
Business, 1042 
Albeo Technologies 
Customers, 813 
Founders, 813 
Opportunity, 814 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 814 
Technology, 813 
Algenol Biofuels, 1021 
Cooperation/Alliances, 180, 1020 
Financing/Capitalization, 1020 
Idea, 412 
Networking, 1020 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1037 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1020 
Technology, 1019, 1020 
Altana 
Corporate Venturing, 243, 679 
AluPlast 
Founders, 310 
Opportunity, 507 
Amazon 
Corporate Venturing, 530 
New Business Development, 518 
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Offerings/Products/Services, 762 
Amyris Biotechnologies, 1082 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1094 
Customers, 1094 
Founders, 1095 
Income or Loss, 1093 
IPO, 1091 
Strategy, 1094 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1101 
Technology, 1093 
Apple Computer 
Founders, 341 
Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM) 
Cooperation/Alliances, 936, 1107 
Arkema 
Technology, 1131 
ASCA 
Business, 1046 
Founders, 301, 308, 347 
ATMgroup. See ATMvision 
ATMvision 
Founders, 311, 316 
Idea, 499, 500 
Organization, 650 
Attocube Systems 
Customers, 411 
Financing/Capitalization, 216, 808 
Founders, 808 
Incubation, 199 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 809 
Technology, 809 
Avery Dennison 
Founders, 316 
Leadership/Management, 634 
BASF 
Cooperation/Alliances, 173, 1051, 1125, 
1126, 1130, 1131, 1144 
Corporate Venturing, 218, 231, 514, 
679, 1129 
Customer Training, 1137 
Customers, 1137 
Innovation, 427, 431, 1123, 1125 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 414 
New Business Development, 399 
Strategy, 66, 1122 
University-Industry Relationship, 175, 
1140, 1142, 1143, 1145 
Bayer 
Cooperation/Alliances, 179, 187 
Founders, 191 
Internationalization, 162 
Intrapreneurship, 403, 405 
Leadership/Management, 634 
University-Industry Relationship, 178, 
1140 
Berlin (Prussian) Blue 
Founders, 191 
Opportunity, 29 
Serendipity, 30 
Bigpoint 
Business, 539 
Financing/Capitalization, 540 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 540 
Technology, 539 
BioAmber 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1116 
Financing/Capitalization, 1115, 1116 
IPO, 1116 
Production, 1115 
Strategy, 1116 
Technology, 1115 
BioMCN, 994 
Founders, 310 
Production, 996 
Technology, 994 
Bioniqs, 1161 
Bioprodukte Prof. Steinberg 
Founders, 1048 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1049 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1049 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1049 
BioTork 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1130 
BlueBioTech 
Business, 1008 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1038, 1040 
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Production, 247, 1008 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1008 
BlueFire Ethanol Fuels, 976 
Development/Growth, 322 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1109 
Technology, 975 
BlueFire Renewables. See BlueFire 
Ethanol Fuels 
BOKELA 
Founders, 578 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 578 
Technology, 578 
Bosch 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 769 
New Business Development, 767 
Braskem 
Innovation, 1113 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1113 
British Petrol (BP) 
Cooperation/Alliances, 958 
Corporate Venturing, 968 
University-Industry Relationship, 1139 
Butamax Advanced Biofuels 
Business, 954 
Cooperation/Alliances, 953 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 1095 
ButylFuel 
Development/Growth, 322, 1058 
Founders, 1057 
Technology, 1056 
Cambridge Nanotech, 802 
Customers, 143, 411, 801 
Financing/Capitalization, 216 
Founders, 347 
Incubation, 199 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 182 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 808 
Team, 336 
Technology, 801 
Cargill 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1131 
Innovation, 1118 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1118 
Catchlight Energy 
Cooperation/Alliances, 953 
CeGaT 
Founders, 316, 347 
Cellana, 1010, See HR BioPetroleum 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1010 
Strategy, 1009 
Celulol. See Verenium 
ChemCon 
Development/Growth, 637 
Financing/Capitalization, 216, 249, 251, 
661, 626, 637 
Founders, 301, 337 
Incubation, 199 
Networking, 205 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Opportunity, 469 
Production, 246 
Chevron 
Cooperation/Alliances, 953, 966 
University-Industry Relationship, 1139 
CHOREN Industries 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 982 
Business, 981 
Cooperation/Alliances, 981 
Financing/Capitalization, 980 
Founders, 983 
Production, 981 
Technology, 980 
Cilion, 1075 
Cisco Systems 
Development/Growth, 746 
Founders, 316, 634 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 182 
IPO, 746 
Leadership/Management, 634 
Opportunity, 746 
Organization, 647, 747 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 778 
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Closure Medical 
Corporate Venturing, 243 
Innovation, 137 
Cobalt Biofuels, 1063 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1067 
Founders, 347, 351, 1053 
Technology, 1062, 1067 
CODA Genomics. See Verdezyne 
Founders, 1127 
Codexis 
Cooperation/Alliances, 956, 1131 
IPO, 990 
Cognis. See BASF 
Technology, 1123 
Comet Biorefining 
Technology, 1130 
ConnectU 
Founders, 256, 316, 337 
Idea, 413 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 413 
Coskata, 1079 
Development/Growth, 990 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1110 
Technology, 1120 
Cyano Biofuels, 1027 
Founders, 298 
Cyano Biotech, 1025 
Founders, 298 
Leadership/Management, 307 
Cyanotech 
Business, 1007 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1007 
Daimler 
Cooperation/Alliances, 467 
Corporate Venturing, 953 
Degusse. See Evonik Industries 
Diversified Natural Products (DNP). See 
BioAmber 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1114 
Financing/Capitalization, 1114 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1114 
Dow Chemical 
Cooperation/Alliances, 180, 1021, 1117, 
1131 
Corporate Venturing, 1132 
Founders, 266 
Ideation, 448 
Innovation, 58, 280, 435, 678 
Intrapreneurship, 400 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 243 
DuPont 
Competition, 266 
Cooperation/Alliances, 961 
Corporate Venturing, 465 
Innovation, 412, 431, 1123 
Intrapreneurship, 400 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 157, 414 
New Business Development, 1056 
Production, 64 
University-Industry Relationship, 175, 
950, 1138, 1145 
Dyadic International 
Founders, 1056 
Serendipity, 1056 
Enercon 
Business, 754 
Founders, 360, 756 
Innovation, 756 
Production, 755 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 502, 
756 
Technology, 359, 755 
Enerkem 
Technology, 994 
Enertrag, 509 
Business, 510 
Ideation, 508 
Evonik Industries 
Intrapreneurship, 1154 
ExxonMobile 
Cooperation/Alliances, 965 
CorporateVenturing, 1009 
Ideation, 453, 1008 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 158 
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Facebook, 413, 526 
Customers, 524, 547 
Financing/Capitalization, 518, 529 
Founders, 298 
Idea, 513 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 413 
First Solar 
Competition, 762, 764 
Cooperation/Alliances, 760 
Customers, 760 
Development/Growth, 763 
Financing/Capitalization, 215, 626, 761 
Founders, 760 
Production, 760, 763 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 763, 
778 
Strategy, 762 
Technology, 507, 761 
Fisker Automotive 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 1111 
Flaregames 
Development/Growth, 691 
Financing/Capitalization, 691 
Ford Motor Company 
Development/Growth, 682 
Production, 421 
G. E. I. Kramer & Hofmann mbH 
Founders, 560 
Gameforge, 542 
Founders, 191, 271, 298 
Idea, 266 
Genentech 
Founders, 191 
General Electric (GE) 
New Business Development, 767 
General Motors (GM) 
Corporate Venturing, 953 
Development/Growth, 682 
Genomatica 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1121, 1126 
IPO, 1121 
Technology, 494, 1121 
Gevo, 1080 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1098 
Customers, 1097, 1098 
Financing/Capitalization, 231 
Founders, 321, 1072 
Idea, 431 
Income or Loss, 1095 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 1095 
Leadership/Management, 397 
Production, 1097 
Strategy, 1096 
Google 
Business, 791 
Corporate Culture, 400, 687 
Development/Growth, 641, 683, 791 
Financing/Capitalization, 238, 792 
Founders, 298, 337, 792 
Idea, 792 
Income or Loss, 782 
Innovation, 687 
Intrapreneurship, 400 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 182 
Offerings/Products/Services, 518 
Opportunity, 793 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 781 
Technology, 520 
Green Biologics (GBL), 1059 
Business, 1059 
Development/Growth, 1058 
Strategy, 355 
Technology, 1058 
GreenFuel Technologies 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 1012 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1012 
Financing/Capitalization, 358 
Technology, 1012, 1048 
Groupon 
Business, 528, 530 
Competition, 529 
Financing/Capitalization, 529 
Idea, 528 
IPO, 528, 529 
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Hawaii BioEnergy, 1076 
HCL CleanTech, 1085 
Technology, 975 
Henkel 
Business, 508 
New Business Development, 1141 
Offerings/Products/Services, 736 
Production, 737 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 737 
University-Industry Relationship, 1140 
Heppe Medical Chitosan 
Business, 661 
Corporate Culture, 350 
Founders, 347, 661 
Leadership/Management, 350 
Networking, 351 
Hoechst 
Founders, 191 
HP (Hewlett-Packard) 
Corporate Culture, 326 
Founders, 296, 308, 336 
Innovation, 110 
Intrapreneurship, 403, 404 
Leadership/Management, 327 
Organization, 394 
University-Industry Relationship, 1145 
HR BioPetroleum 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1009 
hte 
Corporate Venturing, 243, 399 
I.G. Farben, 634, 984, See BASF 
IBM 
Leadership/Management, 633 
IGV 
Business, 1045 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1029, 1044, 1047 
Financing/Capitalization, 1044 
Founders, 301, 1044, 1045 
Leadership/Management, 309 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1045, 
1046 
Technology, 1047 
Industrial Nanotech 
Financing/Capitalization, 244 
InnoCentive 
Ideation, 436 
Opportunity, 436 
InnovationLab. See BASF 
Iogen Energy 
Cooperation/Alliances, 956 
Production, 1068 
IoLiTec, 1165 
Business, 843 
Cooperation/Alliances, 844 
Customers, 411, 842 
Development/Growth, 840, 842 
Financing/Capitalization, 249 
Founders, 300, 841, 843 
Ideation, 453 
Innovation, 840 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 841 
Networking, 841, 843 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Opportunity, 507 
Organization, 647, 842 
Strategy, 454, 648 
Team, 336 
JPK Instruments 
Customer Training, 7, 124 
Customers, 143, 740 
Development/Growth, 683, 740 
Organization, 342 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 741 
Team, 320, 340, 341 
Kergy. See Range Fuels 
KiOR, 1086 
IPO, 1092 
Production, 1093 
KIT 
Cooperation/Alliances, 984, 1029 
Technology, 984 
University-Industry Relationship, 1140 
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Kodak 
Business, 508 
Corporate Culture, 289 
Founders, 191 
KWO Kunststoffteile 
Leadership/Management, 310 
LANXESS 
Corporate Venturing, 231, 1095 
Innovation, 1113 
Lanza Tech, 1087 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1122 
Production, 1089 
Lazada 
Opportunity, 477 
LinkedIn, 551 
Founders, 300, 833 
Idea, 513, 525 
IPO, 134, 135, 528 
LivingSocial 
IPO, 530 
LS9, 1081 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1101 
Customers, 1100 
Ideation, 490 
Strategy, 1100 
Technology, 490 
Lurgi 
Cooperation/Alliances, 984 
Magnetfeldtechnik Resonanz 
Idea, 412 
Marrone Bio Innovations (MBI), 306, 350 
Corporate Culture, 350 
Founders, 303, 347 
Networking, 351 
Opportunity, 507 
Strategy, 353 
Team, 351 
Martek Biosciences 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1074 
Mascoma, 1077 
IPO, 1091 
Melitta, 124 
Merck KGaA 
Cooperation/Alliances, 187, 1144 
Corporate Venturing, 1157 
Intrapreneurship, 405 
University-Industry Relationship, 1143 
Metabolix 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1107 
MetroSpec Technology 
Development/Growth, 816 
Offerings/Products/Services, 815 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 817 
Technology, 815 
Microsoft 
Development/Growth, 745 
Founders, 215, 336 
IPO, 745 
Opportunity, 452, 745 
Organization, 748 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 631, 
776 
MineWolf, 142 
Business, 359 
Founders, 353 
Idea, 500 
Strategy, 355 
MnemoScience 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 61 
Founders, 305 
Myriant Technologies 
Business, 1124 
IPO, 1124 
Technology, 1124 
Nanion Technologies 
Development/Growth, 831 
Financing/Capitalization, 637 
Founders, 308 
Idea, 499 
Incubation, 199 
Organization, 656, 657 
Nanofilm 
Competition, 265 
Founders, 191, 305, 308 
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Offerings/Products/Services, 8 
Technology, 440 
Nanogate 
Development/Growth, 683, 740 
Founders, 741 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 741, 
743 
Technology, 440 
Nanophase Technologies 
Business, 738 
Corporate Venturing, 243 
Customers, 738 
Financing/Capitalization, 678 
Income or Loss, 738, 739 
IPO, 738 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 739 
Technology, 738 
Nanopool 
Customer Training, 7, 124 
Financing/Capitalization, 661 
Founders, 191, 316 
Idea, 126 
Opportunity, 439 
Technology, 440 
NanoScape 
Development/Growth, 677 
Technology, 677 
Nanosolutions 
Founders, 288 
Nanosys, 186 
Cooperation/Alliances, 186 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 186 
Nano-Terra 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 186 
Nano-X 
Cooperation/Alliances, 786 
Customers, 735 
Development/Growth, 735 
Financing/Capitalization, 245, 251, 637 
Founders, 194, 337 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 736, 
761, 780 
Strategy, 638 
Technology, 440 
NatureWorks, 1131 
Founders, 1080 
Innovation, 1118 
Leadership/Management, 1080 
Novagreen Projektmanagement 
Business, 1043 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1038 
Founders, 1041 
Technology, 1042 
Novaled 
Business, 751 
Cooperation/Alliances, 179 
Development/Growth, 249, 751 
Financing/Capitalization, 222 
Incubation, 305 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 182 
Networking, 185 
Organization, 751 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 751, 
752 
Technology, 751 
OHB, 83 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1029 
Customers, 310 
Firm Type/Size, 310 
Founders, 310, 316 
Offerings/Products/Services, 310 
Organization, 310 
OPX Biotechnologies 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1131 
Financing/Capitalization, 1131, 1132 
Founders, 1132 
Production, 1132 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 1132 
Strategy, 1117 
Technology, 1131, 1132 
Osmonics 
Competition, 265 
Development/Growth, 641, 742 
Financing/Capitalization, 244 
Founders, 23, 265, 316 
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Networking, 346 
Technology, 353 
PayPal, 1182 
Development/Growth, 675 
Idea, 676 
Networking, 1186 
Pelamis Wave Energy 
Idea, 502 
Perkin & Sons, 1133 
Financing/Capitalization, 661 
Perstorp 
Intrapreneurship, 400, 404 
Poet 
Cooperation/Alliances, 952 
Technology, 952 
Polymaterials, 205 
Development/Growth, 495 
Founders, 337 
Offerings/Products/Services, 301 
Organization, 650 
Prominent, 581 
Firm Type/Size, 270 
Founders, 23, 265, 353 
Prussian Blue. See Berlin (Prussian) Blue 
Puron 
Customers, 143 
Development/Growth, 1157 
Incubation, 199 
Team, 340 
PURPLAN, 672 
Business, 510 
Customers, 411 
Founders, 301, 337 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Q-Cells 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 768, 
769 
Cooperation/Alliances, 179 
Financing/Capitalization, 757 
Founders, 300, 337, 757 
Innovation, 759 
IPO, 757 
Opportunity, 507 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 757, 
758, 759 
Quiet Revolution 
Founders, 301 
Idea, 125 
Ideation, 503 
Technology, 504, 506 
Range Fuels, 1077 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 1089 
Development/Growth, 322, 989 
Founders, 316, 1072 
Renmatix 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1129 
Financing/Capitalization, 231, 1129 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1109 
Production, 1129 
Technology, 1129 
Röhm & Haas 
Founders, 191 
Idea, 412 
Royal Dutch Shell, 956 
Cooperation/Alliances, 952, 963, 1009 
Corporate Venturing, 956, 970 
Technology, 992 
University-Industry Relationship, 1139 
SAP, 1146 
Corporate Culture, 326 
Development/Growth, 744 
Founders, 296, 302, 308, 337 
Innovation, 789 
Opportunity, 744 
Organization, 394, 749 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 631 
Team, 341 
University-Industry Relationship, 1143 
Sapphire Energy, 1031 
Competition, 266, 1030 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1036 
Financing/Capitalization, 1035 
Founders, 1030 
Ideation, 453, 491 
 1234 Indexes 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1037 
Production, 1035 
Scionix, 1169 
University-Industry Relationship, 1141 
SFC Energy 
Business, 487 
Corporate Venturing, 465 
Technology, 465 
Siemens 
Corporate Venturing, 218 
Founders, 336 
Internationalization, 162 
SiGNa Chemistry 
Founders, 298, 305 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 81 
Technology, 417, 466 
SkySails 
Development/Growth, 62 
Founders, 191 
Idea, 415 
Technology, 126, 415, 503 
Smart Fuel Cell (SFC). See SFC Energy 
Solazyme, 1014 
Business, 1018 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1014, 1018 
Income or Loss, 1019 
IPO, 1019 
Political Matters/Lobbying, 1037, 1109, 
1110 
Solix Biofuels 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1051 
Financing/Capitalization, 1050 
Founders, 1050 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1051 
Technology, 1050 
Solix BioSystems. See Solix Biofuels 
Solvent Innovation, 1157 
Corporate Venturing, 399 
Customers, 411 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Solyndra 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 766 
Financing/Capitalization, 766 
Technology, 766 
SpaceX 
Founders, 1188 
Technology, 1188 
Splunk 
Technology, 516 
Subitec 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1038, 1039, 1040 
Succinity. See BASF 
SucreSource. See BlueFire Ethanol Fuels 
Süd-Chemie 
Business, 986 
Cooperation/Alliances, 986 
Financing/Capitalization, 987 
Founders, 176 
Intrapreneurship, 987 
Technology, 986 
Sun Microsystems 
Competition, 265 
SunCoal Industries 
Financing/Capitalization, 983 
Founders, 337 
Team, 341 
Technology, 335, 1041 
Sustech, 1141, See Henkel 
Synthetic Genomics (SGI) 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1009 
Tesla Motors 
Founders, 1188 
TimberTower 
Idea, 512 
Opportunity, 512 
Technology, 512 
Torqeedo 
Founders, 191 
Idea, 266, 500 
Total SA 
Cooperation/Alliances, 508 
Corporate Venturing, 953, 1094, 1095 
New Business Development, 768 
Indexes 1235 
US LED, 810 
Business, 443 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 813 
Vercipia Biofuels. See British Petrol (BP) 
Verdezyne 
Business, 1128 
Founders, 352, 1127 
Technology, 1127 
Verdia. See HCL CleanTech 
Cooperation/Alliances, 1101 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1099 
Production, 1100 
Strategy, 1099 
Verenium, 968 
Vertec Biosolvents 
Business, 1114 
Offerings/Products/Services, 1114 
Virent Energy Systems, 971 
Business, 973 
Cooperation/Alliances, 973 
Vitracom 
Business, 516 
Incubation, 305 
Serendipity, 31 
Technology, 31, 516 
VON ARDENNE Anlagentechnik 
Financing/Capitalization, 369 
IP/Licenses, Litigation, 370 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 369 
Technology, 369 
Von Hoerner & Sulger (vH&S), 83 
Customers, 310 
Founders, 347 
WITec, 802 
Customer Training, 7, 124 
Customers, 143, 411, 740 
Development/Growth, 683 
Financing/Capitalization, 216, 249, 251, 
637, 661 
Founders, 305 
Incubation, 199 
Leadership/Management, 307, 308 
Offerings/Products/Services, 317 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 674, 
775 
Team, 340 
Technology, 501 
Würth Solar 
Financing/Capitalization, 765 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 764 
Technology, 765 
Xing, 551 
Development/Growth, 649 
Founders, 298, 304, 316, 833 
Idea, 513, 525 
Organization, 657 
Yelp 
Idea, 823 
yet2.com, 157 
YouTube 
Founders, 304 
Idea, 823 
ZeaChem, 997 
Financing/Capitalization, 1000 
Founders, 997 
Production, 1001 
Technology, 997 
ZOXY Energy Systems 
Bankruptcy, Financial Disasters, 61 
Founders, 305 
Zweibrüder Optoelectronics 
Competition, 265 
Development/Growth, 641 
Founders, 189, 190, 256, 352, 560 
Production, 247, 303 
Zynga, 542 
Development/Growth, 542 
Financing/Capitalization, 529 
Founders, 271 
IPO, 530 
Revenue/Number of Employees, 541 
Technology, 527, 532 
 1236 Indexes 
Subject Index
10 - 25 - 150 Rule of thumb, 656 
Productivity, 657 
80:20 Rule, 50, 229, 489, 535, 653 
Achievements 
Actuality, 61 
Capability, 61 
Levels, 60 
Potentiality, 61 
Agents 
Agent of change, 9 
Ambiguity, 584 
Ambition, 269 
Archetype. See Configuration 
Architecture 
Developmental biology, 1171 
Entrepreneurial, 20, 668 
Development biology, 28 
Initial architecture, 668, 1181 
Similarity, 1177, 1178 
Success factors – resources, 689 
Variations on a Theme, 1179 
Structure 
Attributes, 1176 
Founder team, 1174 
Founder team and resources, 1178 
Organization, 1174 
Permutation – Diagram Lattice, 1173 
Permutation – Young Diagrams, 1171 
Permutation – Young Lattice, 1173 
Permutation – Young tableaux, 1172 
Permutation algebra, 1171 
Young Diagram as vector, 1177 
Assets, 54 
Human capital, 55 
Human resources, 54 
Intangible, 54, 55 
Valuation, 135 
Value, 132 
Intellectual capital, 55 
Organizational capital, 55 
Tangible, 54, 55 
Types, 54 
vs. Resources, 54 
Attitude 
Types, 257 
Backward-integration. See  
Manufacturing:Backward-integration 
Bakelite, 30 
Banks. See 
Behavior, 27 
Collective behavior, 41, 73 
Herding, 134 
Purposeful behavior, 35 
Behavioral Science 
Learning, 44 
Benz, Carl, 125 
Beuth, Christian Peter Wilhelm, 163 
Biobased chemicals 
Building block chemicals 
Intermediates 
3-hydroxypropionic acid (3-HP), 
1130 
Biobased economy, 951 
Biobased material 
1,4 butanediol (BDO), 1116, 1121, 1126 
2,3 butanediol (2,3-BDO), 1122 
Bio-acrylic acid, 1117, 1131 
Entrepreneurship, 1131 
Bio-adipic acid, 1127 
Biobased chemicals 
Building block chemicals, 1120 
Entry barrier, 1117 
Bio-succinic acid, 1115, 1121 
as a platform, 1123 
Market, 1124 
Production – cost model, 1126 
Butadiene, 1121 
Chemurgy, 950, 1114 
Drop-in chemicals, 1120 
Lubricants, 1100 
 Indexes 1237 
Entrepreneurship 
Issues, 1127 
Feedstock 
Non-food industrial sugars, 1118, 
1129 
Non-food industrial sugars – 
processes, 1129 
Sugar, 1099 
Markets, 1119 
Plasticizers, 1117 
Plastics 
Crossover strategy, 1112, 1122 
Food-related feedstock, 1113 
Polylactic acid, 1118 
Polyamides 
Nylon-type, 1123 
Rubber, 1098 
Drivers, biobased intermediates, 1098 
Solvents, 1114 
Biocoal 
Process 
Hydrothermal carbonization (HTC), 
1041 
Biofuels, 74 (till p. 1240) 
Algae 
Advantages over biomass biofuels, 
1003 
Basics, 1003 
Bioethanol production, 1007, 1019 
Commercialization, 1006 
Commmercialization – duration, 1007 
Cultivation, 1004 
Difference to biomass biofuels, 1002 
Entrepreneurship – bankruptcy, 1012 
Entrepreneurship – credibility issue, 
1013 
Entrepreneurship – Financing, 
management, technology, 
biorefinery, 1031 
Entrepreneurship – Public funds, 
management, technology, 1014 
Entrepreneurship – suspecting 
startups, 1013 
Entrepreneurship – US, number of 
startups, 1012 
Entrepreneurship – veterans 
management, 1010, 1050 
German directions, 1037 
German projects, 1038 
Giant firms and NTBF – Innovation 
architecture, 1010 
Giant oil firms and NTBFs, 1009 
Growth challenges, 1005 
Hydrogen, 1029 
Lessons for Europe, 1048 
NTBFs and giant firms, 1008, 1051 
Policy – lobbying, 1037 
Policy – public money, 1035 
Processes, 1004 
Processes – photobioreactors, 1047, 
1050 
Production – cost, 1036 
Production – German plant, 1048 
Production – scale-up – too fast, 1035 
Products, 1004 
Products – biocrude, 1030, 1051 
Products – oil and gas, 1030 
Products – renewable oils, 1018 
Products – value ladder, 1005 
Research history, 1002 
Supplier – high value products, 1007, 
1008, 1041 
Technology – cost ladder, 1006 
Technology and sampling, 1006 
Technology, output streams, products, 
1006 
Biobutanol, 77, 943 
ABE process, 1056 
Biobased plastics and rubber, 1097 
Competition, 1062 
Entrepreneurship 
financing, management, 
technology, 1059, 1063 
Giant firms – JV, 954 
Outstanding potential – biofuels, 
biomaterial, 1068 
Politics, 1057 
 1238 Indexes 
Potential and opportunities, 1057 
Processes – thermostable enzymes, 
1058 
Production, 1057 
Suppliers – shift to biobased 
chemicals, 1068, 1096 
Biodiesel, 76, 943 
Bioethanol, 76, 943, 986 
Blending wall, 954 
Economics, 987 
NTBF, 975 
Biogasoline, 944 
NTBF, 972 
Biomass 
Input-output performance, 946 
Biomass feedstock 
Issues, 1068 
Overview, 1069 
Production localization, 1070 
Biomethanol, 993 
Business 
Financing sources, 1104 
Business model 
Biorefinery, 947, 972, 998 
Biorefinery light, 1103 
Blending or replacing petro-gasoline, 
948 
Component complexity, 1104 
Cost, energy efficieny factors, 1106 
Direction biobased chemicals, 1093, 
1112 
Engineering services, 981 
Financing and metrics, 947 
Petroleum industry value system, 948 
By-products 
Lignin, 1103 
Corn ethanol vs. cellulosic ethanol, 77, 
954, 1069 
Cyanobacteria, 1023 
Bioethanol, 1019 
Entrepreneurship – founders, 
financing, networking, technology, 
1021 
NTBF – complex financing, 
networking, 1020 
NTBF – relationship mapping, 1020 
Opportunity analysis, 1025 
Drop-in biofuels 
Biogasoline, biodiesel, jet fuel, 1091 
Economic bubble, 152 
Economics, 1106 
Entrepreneurship, 75 
Biomethanol, 994 
Corporate venturing (CV), 
management, technology, 968 
Entrepreneurs, 983 
Hydrogen, 973 
Large-scale production, 943 
License-in, 975 
Me-too firms, 938 
Opportunity perceived, 946 
Policy, 1108 
Policy – bankruptcies, 1111 
Policy – Programs, 1090 
Processes – RD&D, 1052 
Processes – RD&D path to 
innovation, 1053 
Public funds, management, 
technology, 971, 976, 994, 997 
Risk analysis, 1053 
Serendipity, 1056 
Structure, 1051 
Survival, 943 
Veterans management, 968, 976 
from algae, 77 
Impacts, 77 
Global warming, 78 
Industry 
and crude-oil prices, 937 
Bankruptcy, 940 
Brazil, 937 
Bubble bursting, 939 
Competition, 944 
Consolidation, 941 
Incentive-driven opportunities, 936 
Natural resources, 944 
 Indexes 1239 
Origins, 936 
Participants attracted, 936, 938 
Political drivers, 949 
Political drivers – oil crisis, 950 
Segments and hurdles, 945 
Size by value, 938 
Startups – number worldwide, 1054 
US vs. Europe, 936 
vs. historical analogy, 948 
vs. natural gas, 942 
Innovation 
Constellation, 987 
Giant firms, 951 
Alliances, JVs, 958 
Giant firms – funding external R&D, 
952 
Giant firms – investment power, 988 
Giant firms – research alliances, 952 
Input-conversion-output complexity, 
1102, 1105 
Intrapreneurship 
with NTBFs, 1051 
Market 
Type – Policy-driven, 935 
Output 
Variety, 1105 
Policy 
Government-university-industry (GUI) 
relationship, 1041 
Legislation issues, 956 
Legislation, mandates, 935 
Public funding, 935, 1037 
Public funding origins, 947 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) – 
US, 1001 
Processes, 153 
Bioengineering, 957 
Bioengineering – ABE process, 1056 
Bioengineering – to ethyl acetate, not 
bioalcohols, 997 
Chindia test, 943 
Genetically modified object (GMO), 
155 
Thermochemical vs. bioengineering, 
935 
Types and players, 935 
Production 
Biggest problem, 991 
Biomass collection decentralized, 984 
Biomass collection issues, 984 
Change of economics, 986 
Cost proportion, 981, 985 
Delays – start of commercial 
productions, 988 
Input composition issues, 982 
Scale-up, 985 
Scale-up – duration, 991 
Scale-up issues, 983 
Products 
Types, 943 
Properties compared, 955 
Risk spectrum, 1102 
Technology 
Bergius process – acid, 974 
Bergius process – coal, 974 
Bioengineering – methods, 1055 
Bioengineering preference in US, 
1054 
Cellulosic sugars, 979 
COTS engineering, 997 
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process, 974 
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process – BtL, 
980 
Syngas – glycerin-to-syngas, 994 
Syngas process, 974 
Syngas process – bioethanol, 974 
Syngas process – biogasoline, 
biodiesel, 980 
Syngas process – variety of output 
and use, 992 
Thermochemical-bioengineering 
hybrid process, 1001 
Variety, 1105 
Types, 153 
Venture capital (VC) 
Broken promises, 989 
Business model, 935 
 1240 Indexes 
Changing management, 1089 
Financing NTBFs, 1070 
IPO – credibility, 990 
US – much loose money, 937 
VC-backed spin-outs, 1072 
Vinod Khosla – detailed firm cases he 
invested in, 1075 
Vinod Khosla – his firms’ IPOs, 1091, 
1093, 1095 
Vinod Khosla – innovation sponsor 
process, 1072 
Vinod Khosla – process, 1071, 1074 
Biogas 
and algae, 1043 
from algae, 1007 
Plant 
with hydrogen, wind power, 508 
Biology 
Developmental biology, 28 
Biorefinery 
Model 
Technology platforms, 1119 
Bootlegging. See 
Intrapreneurship:Bootlegging 
Boundary spanner. See 
Communication:Gatekeeper 
Bracketing. See Sociology:Brackets 
Brackets. See  
Models 
GEM Entrepreneurial process, 89 
Observables, 88 
Types, 88 
Business 
Business club, 552 
Business model, 9, 17 
Business plan 
Failures, 71 
Business-to-business (B2B), 142 
Business-to-public (B2P), 143 
New Business Development (NBD), 9 
Strategy 
Failures, 72 
Business angel, 239, See Financing:Angel 
investors 
Business idea. See Idea 
Business opportunity. See Opportunity 
Cannibalization. See Markets:Products 
Capabilities 
Dynamic, 73 
Capital 
Working capital, 210 
Capitalism, 100, 101 
Anglo-Saxon, 104 
Casino capitalism, 103 
Dynamic capitalism, 102 
Economies, 101 
Entrepreneurial capitalism, 102 
vs. managerial capitalism, 103 
Financial System 
Financial innovations, 108 
Focuses 
Investing to consumption, 108 
Intangibles, 101 
Managerial capitalism, 103 
and Venture Capital (VC), 104 
Myths, 105 
Anglo-Saxon, 105 
Nippon-Rhineland, 104 
Carbon nanotubes. See Science & 
Technology System (S&T):University-
industry relationship 
Cash flow, 51 
Certainty, 39 
Chemistry 
Epistemology, 37 
Prediction, 37 
What happens, 37 
Choices 
Trade-off, 56 
Entrepreneurship, 57 
Opportunity, 56 
Cognition, 447 
Cognitive frameworks, 445 
Meaning, 445 
Pattern recognition, 445 
Cognitive Science, 29 
Learning, 43 
 Indexes 1241 
Commerce, 82 
Communication 
Barriers, 97 
Gatekeeper, 98 
Influencing, 667 
Competencies 
Core competency, 7 
Competition, 144 
Competitive advantage, 117, 144, 397 
Attributes, 686 
Coordination, 39 
Input, 53 
Resources, 53 
sustainable, 144 
Types, 53 
Competitive group, 144 
Competitive groups, 144, 483 
Competitive technology assessment 
(CTA), 476, 485 
Competitors 
SWOT analysis, 482 
Imitation, 144 
Industrial espionage, 164 
Strategic groups, 483 
Strategy logics, 487 
Competitive advantage. See Competition 
Complexity, 41 
Organizational theory, 41 
Organized complexity, 42 
Compound Annual Grwoth Rate (CAGR). 
See  Entrepreneurship:Growth 
Configuration 
Entrepreneurial, 20, 91, 668 
Developmental biology, 28 
Initial – corporate venturing (CV), 678 
Initial – resources, networking, 679 
Initial – start with customers, 674, 676 
Initial configuration, 668 
Initial configuration – Paths to goals, 
671 
Initial financing, 669 
Pace as a driver, 672 
Initial configuration 
Path-dependency, 703 
Stability 
Core competency to core rigidity, 703 
Control, 55 
and measurement, 46 
Focuses, 54 
Types, 69 
Conversion, 50, 51 
Factor market, 52 
Offering market, 52 
Process 
Value chain, 57 
Systems 
Types, 52 
Cooperation 
Benefits, 207 
Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement (CRADA). See Science & 
Technology System (S&T):University-
industry relationship 
Coordination, 39 
and communication, 95 
Capacity, 54 
Group’s growth, 666 
Issues, 642 
Resources, 54 
Self-reinforcing, 665 
Core competency, 393 
Transition to core rigidity, 703 
vs. core rigidity, 393 
Core rigidity. See Core competency 
Cost 
Chindia criterion, 476 
Opportunity cost, 131 
Sunk cost, 145, 830 
Switch(ing) cost, 473, 474 
Creativity, 280 
Elements, 281 
entrepreneurship, 281 
Innovation, 281 
Organizational creativity, 283 
Thinking, 282 
 1242 Indexes 
Critical success factor (CSF). See 
Entrepreneurship:Critical success factor 
(CSF) 
Culture, 284 
Academia 
Research culture, 184 
Business culture, 291 
Corporate culture 
Large firms, 667 
Uniqueness, 687 
Dimensions 
Hofstede model, 284 
Power distance, 284 
Educational effects 
Engineering, 294 
Marketing, 295 
Research, 294 
Scientists vs. engineers, 293, 294 
Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial traits, 289 
Industry 
Industrial culture, 184 
Research culture, 183 
National 
US, 94 
National cultures 
Attitude towards science, 291 
Attitudes – US vs. Germany, 290 
Communication, 288 
Failures – US vs. Germany, 290 
Hofstede model, 287 
Power, 289 
Privacy – US vs. Germany, 524 
Risk-taking – US vs. Germany, 290 
US vs. Germany, 287 
Science 
Scientific disciplines, 291 
Customers 
Academia 
R&D or Engineering, 143 
Consumers, 142 
End-users, 142 
Industrial, 142 
Industry 
R&D or Engineering, 143 
Information & communication technology 
(I&CT) 
Types, 142 
Military or aerospace, 142 
Needs 
Latent needs, 410 
Professional, 142 
Cybernetics 
Emphasis 
What happens, not why, 696 
Formalism 
Entrepreneurial expectation, 700 
Fundamentals 
Transformation, 696 
Principles 
Change, 695 
Configurational constrains, 702 
Control, 699 
Event mapped to transformation, 698 
for firm development, 695 
Formalism, 698 
Predictability, 701 
Stable states, 700 
System’s state, 696 
Cyclicality. See 
Economy:Dynamics:Economic cycles 
Daimler, Gottlieb, 125 
Decision 
Decision-maker 
General Systems Theory (GST), 39 
Decision-making, 603 
Alternatives, 606 
Biases, 608 
Bounded rationality, 613 
Choices, 612 
Cognition, 609 
Cycle, 608 
Decision environment, 609 
Decision situation, 615 
Dyadic, 330 
Entrepreneurs vs. managers, 614 
 Indexes 1243 
Financing – entrepreneurs, 614 
Intuition, gut feeling, 605 
Judgent, 605 
Judgment by the people, 605 
Judgment in the process, 605 
Non-rational, 607 
Principle of Satisficing, 560 
Problem-solving, 606 
Routinized, 610 
Satisficing behavior, 613 
Scenarios, 615 
Scenarios’ role, 617 
Status quo bias, 607 
Systemic model, 609 
Systems Approach, 606 
Systems Thinking, 607 
Time and effort, 610 
under risk, 604 
vs. firm’s ownership, 610 
Window of Opportunity, 610 
Decision-making situations, 603 
Non-programmable, 605 
Programmed, 605 
Algorithm vs. heuristic, 605 
Rule-of thumb, 606 
Types, 604 
Design Thinking, 50 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). 
See Science & Technology System 
(S&T):Research Associations 
Discovery, 31, 118, See Idea:Opportunity 
Process, 31 
Dominant design. See technology or 
innovation 
Dot-Com Recession. See 
Economy:Economic bubble:Internet 
bubble 
Drivers, 42 
Value driver, 43 
Due diligence, 438, See New Technology-
Based Firm (NTBF):Financing 
Economy 
Dynamics 
Economic cycles, 149 
Economic bubble, 150 
Housing market, 151 
Internet bubble, 152 
US Great Depression, 151 
Networked economy 
National innovation system, 206 
Economy of scale, 762, 763 
Economy of scope, 762 
Edison, Thomas A., 112, 266 
Effectivenes, 56 
Efficacy, 56 
Efficiency, 56 
Electromobility, 420 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 269 
Energy 
CleanTech 
Electromobility, 464 
Investments, 464 
Electromobility 
Batteries or fuel cells, 465 
Energy efficiency, 114, 463 
Energy systems, 463 
Global market, 460 
Trends 
Developing countries, 467 
Wind turbines 
Types, 505 
Engineering 
Advance, 64 
Entrepreneurs. See Agents (till p. 1245) 
Agents, 8 
Ambition, 268 
Attitude 
toward customers, 258 
vs. financial sources, 637 
Business plan 
Lacking, 672 
Corporate culture 
Initial architecture, 663 
Corporate entrepreneur, 14 
Culture 
Facilitation, 93 
 1244 Indexes 
Decision-making 
Volition, 266, 378 
Description, 10 
Drivers, 312 
External vs. internal, 411 
Family members, 316 
Germany, 317 
Indicators, 314 
Self-realization, 313 
Spin-outs – Germany, 318 
US, 315 
Entrepreneurial professor, 752 
Experience 
Management buyout (MBO), 1045 
Experiences 
Lacking, 308 
Female, 347 
by technologies, 348 
Characters, 350 
Culture and values, 349 
Leadership and risk taking, 349 
Management, 348 
Networking and people, 349 
Financing 
Attitudes, 247 
Attitudes – outside sources, 251 
Bootstrapping – advantages, 692 
Bootstrapping – control growth, 694 
Bootstrapping and opportunistic 
adaptability, 691 
Foundations 
Ages, 297 
as a challenge, 1072 
Customer initiation, 660 
Demographics – Germany, 298 
Demographics – US, 298 
Educational level, 299 
Ex-employees, 300, 301 
Experience – Sources, 302 
Experience-based, 673 
Experiences, 297, 300, 833 
GST model, 90 
Venture capitalists (VC), 1030, 1072 
Vision, 282 
Goals 
False start, 677 
Goal persistence, 675, 676 
Lacking, 672 
Growth 
Growth orientation, 559, 560 
Intentions, 559 
Internationalization, 561 
Non-growth orientation, 561 
Overoptimism, 563 
Intention, 267 
Growth levels, 558 
Knowledge 
Firm’s asset, 687 
Necessity entrepreneurs, 300, 411 
German Reunification, 301, 1044, 
1046 
Novice entrepreneur, 306 
Opportunity entrepreneurs, 300, 411 
Personalities 
Achievements, 263 
Autonomy, 264 
Competitive antagonism, 264, 265, 
1030 
Culture, 259 
Enabling characteristics, 261 
Entrepreneurial orientation, 260, 271 
Formalized, 260 
General Systems 
Theory (GST), 260 
Genetic effect, 255 
Intuition, 569 
Judgment, 569 
Kirton Adaptive-Innovative (KAI) 
inventory, 272 
Locus of control, 263 
MBTI type, 273 
Measuring disposition, 261 
Measuring traits, 259 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), 
272 
 Indexes 1245 
Orientations, 264 
Overconfidence, 477 
Perseverance, 430 
Supporting traits and skills, 257 
Traits and behavior, 264 
vs. managers – MBTI, KAI, 279 
Risk-taking, 590 
Academic entrepreneurs, 600 
Calculated risk, 594 
Managing risk, 598, 599 
Opportunistic adaptability, 590, 601 
Scientific instruments, 702 
Risk-taking vs. decision-making, 587 
Serial entrepreneurs, 270, 453 
Experiences, 302, 303 
Founder teams, 298 
Personalities, 270 
Start-over entrepreneur, 303 
Socialization 
Family & Friends, 93 
Speculation 
Internet firms, 530 
Stage-oriented, 351, 1128 
Strategy 
Overt strategy logics, 268 
Strategy logics, 267 
Team, 91 
Types 
Academic entrepreneurs, 189 
Technical business person, 190 
Technical entrepreneurs, 189 
Entrepreneurship. See Technology 
Entrepreneurship (till p. 1250) 
Aerospace, 1188 
Ambition 
Goals, 269 
Boom-bust cycles, 151 
Bracket model, 708 
Applications, 770 
as a perturbation theory, 726 
as curve analysis, 728 
Bracket events, 728 
Bracket expression, 720 
Bracket representation, 722 
Competition, 732 
Competitive position, 721 
Constraints, 719 
Dynamic stability of sub-states, 709, 
714 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
software, 744 
Equation of state, 714 
Escalation, 748 
Escalation – logistic difference 
equation, 750 
Events – change ownership, 
management, 680 
Events – IPO, 681 
Events, Perturbations, 671 
Foundation as first bracket, 727 
Fundamental orientation, 720 
Growth modes, 719 
Irregular phases, 726 
Irreversibility, 725 
Non-organic growth, 681 
Observability, 725 
Observability and sequence, 726 
Observables, 722 
Organizational issues – productivity, 
748, 749 
Organizational memory, 721 
Phased firm growth, 718 
Phenomenology, 718 
Praxis, 735 
Praxis – Big orders, 735 
Praxis – Disruptive innovation, 736 
Praxis – Few customers, 738 
Praxis – IPO, innovation persistence, 
759 
Praxis – Networking/telecom industry, 
746 
Praxis – non-organic growth, 740, 741 
Praxis – overall growth 
representation, 751 
Praxis – PC industry, 745 
 1246 Indexes 
Praxis – political effects, innovation 
persistence, 755 
Praxis – productivity, 752 
Recession effect, 674 
Relations to effects, 727 
Startup thrust phase, 715 
Steady state condition, 714 
Steady state growth and performance, 
715 
Sub-states factoring, 712 
Teleology, 718 
Theory – comparative approaches, 
784 
Theory – equation of state, 771 
Theory – equation of state, modified, 
777 
Theory – equation of state, shapes, 
772 
Theory – equation of state, 
specialized, 773 
Theory – ex comparatione approach, 
796 
Theory – ex comparatione 
configuration, 802, 810 
Theory – ex comparatione 
expectation, 801, 808, 809, 813, 
814, 816 
Theory – expectation, 789 
Theory – expectation ex 
comparatione, 795 
Theory – expectations of growth, 783 
Theory – IPO brackets, 782 
Theory – Reinforcement, 770 
Theory – revenues, 774, 778, 780 
Theory – the unexpected, 790 
Theory – the unexpected exemplified, 
791 
Transition states, 670, 715, 716 
VC-based NTBF, 717 
Brackets 
Business brackets, 88 
Business plan 
Business plan funnel, 514 
Capitalism, 106 
Change, 109 
Competitive antagonism, 266 
Corporate culture 
Formation, 664 
Critical success factor (CSF), 479, 622 
Interconnections, 627 
Customers 
Customer development, 623, 628 
Risk-taking, 602 
Cyanobacteria 
Startup, 1025 
Description, 8, 10 
E-commerce 
PayPal, 1182 
PayPal – corporate culture, 1185 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
SAP, 1146 
Ethics, 356 
Borderlines, 359 
Industrial espionage, 359 
Levels, 356 
Manfred von Ardenne, 363 
Obsession and morality, 361 
Unethical behavior, 357 
Wernher von Braun, 370 
Expectation 
Adaptive expectation, 571 
Expressions, 567 
Measuring, 569 
Experience 
Enabling experience, 305 
Gaining, 304, 306 
Management buyout (MBO), 309 
Failures, 88 
Bankrupt origins, 620 
Co-founder conflicts, 619 
Currency exchange rates, 626 
Decreasing risks, 589 
Exit probabilities after foundation, 589 
Factors, 589 
False start, 57 
Five forces model, 626 
Leadership’s importance, 622 
 Indexes 1247 
Measuring, 618 
Mortality oe survival rates – RBSUs, 
588 
Mortality or survival rates – NTBFs, 
588 
Origins, 625 
Plans, 71 
Strategic decisions, 622 
Systemic connectedness of factors, 
621 
Systemic set of reasons, 618 
Undercapitalization, 619 
Voluntary closure, 619 
vs. Critical Success factor (CSF), 618 
Financing 
Bootstrapping, 211 
Breakeven, 212 
Cash flow management, 693 
Revenues – Public money, 1019 
Stages, 212 
US vs. Germany, 211 
First mover, 452 
Foundations 
by offering, 430 
Fundability 
Assessment – ex comparatione, 796 
Assessment – ex comparatione 
graph, 799 
Assessment – Key categories, 798 
Assessment – Key categories, 
RBSUs, 799 
Futuring 
Delphi methods, 570 
Single events, 570 
Government-university-industry (GUI) 
relationship 
Research laboratory, 1142 
Growth 
10 – 25 – 150 Rule of thumb, 656 
Challenges, 629 
Competitive advantage, 835 
Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR), 639 
Continuity of leadership, 633 
Entrepreneurs’ relevancies, 783, 832, 
833 
Events, 641 
Greiner’s Five Phases, 641 
GST framework, 636 
Human capital, 845 
Indicators, 638 
Industry genesis, 640 
Initial resource base, 833, 835 
Internal effects, 648 
Issue indicator – Productivity, 631 
Longevity, 632, 633 
Mid-size firms, 784 
Mid-size firms, critical success factors, 
786 
Mid-size firms, high growth, 785 
Models and theories, 635 
Non-organic growth, 681 
Organic growth, 681 
Organic vs. non-organic, 682 
Organization, 642 
Organizational challenges, 648 
Outcontracting, 648 
Outcontracting – reasons, 649 
Pace, 637 
Pre-startup phase, 660 
Resource-Based View (RBV), 684 
Resources – developing by layered 
phases, 839 
Resources – developing RBSUs, 839 
Resources – development for 
technology push, 840, 842 
Resources – interactions, 834 
Resources – quadrant of types, 837 
Resources – types, 835 
Socially complex assets, 687 
Stage-Based Views, 641 
Startup thrust phase, 642 
Startup thrust phase, 660 
Strategy – Value innovation, 786 
Industry 
Industry genesys, 743, 744 
Industry genesys 
 1248 Indexes 
Contextual advertisements, 780 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
software, 743 
Networking/telecom industry, 745 
OLED display and lighting, 750 
PC industry, 744 
Thin-film photovoltaic, 761, 764 
Innovation 
Innovation persistence, 623, 628 
Investment persistence, 625 
Investing 
Re-investing, 623 
Investments 
Before/after demand, 682 
Leadership 
Corporate culture, 665 
Employee Development, 665 
Learning-by-doing, 307, 308 
Management 
Development, 630 
Management setup, 647 
Science vs. business, 1095 
Veterans management team, 298 
Managing risk 
Mapping hazard versus Risk and 
exposure, 601 
Markets 
Entry, 411 
Niche markets, 398 
Measurement, 46 
Military, 83 
US vs. Germany, 84 
Mission, 355 
Objectives, 355 
Models 
Biology-oriented, 87 
Company model, 688 
Core-shell model, 81 
Evolutionary models, 683 
GEM Entrepreneurial process, 87 
GEM model, 85, 86 
System-environment model, 79, 80 
Myths, 297 
Stereotype for myth, 532 
US, 105 
Nascent entrepreneurship, 642 
Networking, 204 
Advisory Board, 204, 833 
PayPal, 1186 
PayPay – Relationship mapping, 1187 
Online games, 531 
Churn rate, 544 
Firms – growth, 536 
Freemium model, 535 
Gameforge, 542 
Gamers – types, 534 
Gaming industry, 531, 532 
Ideas and opportunities, 544 
Massively Multiplayer Online Games 
(MMOG), 538 
Virtual goods, 535, 540 
Zynga, 542 
Organization 
Quality management, 650 
Patents 
Litigation, 1095 
Payments and money transfers 
PayPal, 1182 
Personalities 
Traits as enablers, 259 
Pitfalls 
Cash flow relevance, 628 
Ego gratification, 631 
Growth contexts, 630 
Management crunch, 629 
New questions, 630 
Rejecting unexpected success, 628 
Planning 
Knowledge acquisition, 307 
Nascent entrepreneur, 306 
Policy, 32 
Bankruptcy – Solyndra, 766 
Expectation – job creation, 566 
Programs, 92 
The German Renewable Energy Act 
(EEG), 753, 760 
 Indexes 1249 
Private-public-partnership (PPP) 
Firm foundation, 1140 
Firm foundation, organization, 1141 
US, 1144 
Process 
Goal-driven vs. goal seeking 
approaches, 822 
Stage-based, 87 
Risk 
Managing risk, 598 
Risks 
NTBFs, 596 
Risks  or threats 
Technology ventures, 595 
Role models, 304 
Entrepreneurial professor, 305 
Family, 305 
Self-enforcement, 332 
Self-reinforcement, 332 
Software related 
Apps for smartphones or tablets, 532 
Big Data, 516 
for business and industry, 518 
Myths, 517 
Offerings’ life times, 522 
Revenue sources, 531 
Social data, 516 
Social networks, 522 
Success factors, 521 
Types, 515 
Valuations – IPOs, US vs. Germany, 
556 
Sources of capital 
Familiy, friends and fools (3F), 211 
Selection, 211 
Startup thrust phase, 88 
Metaphors, 662 
Success, 380 
Expectations and futuring, 569 
Numbers game, 574 
Players’ views of relevant systems, 
564 
Raising money secondary, 568 
Suppliers 
Risk-taking, 602 
Team 
Advantages, 322, 328 
and venture capital (VC), 320 
as a system, 324 
Behavior, 327 
Characteristics, 319 
Choices – initial, 332 
Coordination, 323 
Corporate culture, 326 
Creativity by diversity, 338 
Disadvantages, 328 
Diversity, 330 
Dynamics, 327 
Entrepreneur plus team, 320, 342 
Entrepreneurial pair, 336 
Entrepreneurial team, 319 
Entrepreneurial triple 
Entrepreneurial triple – competencies 
and roles, 340 
Focuses, 325 
Formation, 324, 329, 331 
Formation – staged model, 332 
Founder team, 319 
Gatekeepers, 342 
Multi-disciplinarity, 331 
Number of founders, 322 
Operational behavior, 329, 330 
Pair dynamics, 337 
Skill heterogeneity, 346 
Social coupling, 337 
Social coupling vs. competencies, 338 
Structures – 
communication/coordination, 343 
Structures – competencies, 341 
Structures – Formalism, 342 
Supportive network, 346 
Systemic view, 326 
Team creativity, 328 
Teamwork, 324 
Tensions, 333 
Tensions – release, 333 
 1250 Indexes 
Tensions – release formalism, 334 
Tensions – release self-reinforced, 
335 
vs. leadership team, 320 
vs. management team, 320 
Technology transfer, 158 
University-industry relationship 
Exchanging R&D personnel, 1139 
Issues, 1145 
Project houses, 1144 
R&D cooperations, 1143 
Shared professorship, 1140 
Sharing R&D personnel, 1141 
Vision 
Context and timing, 354 
Core purpose, 355 
Corporate, 354 
Levels, 352 
Personal vs. corporate, 352 
Equivocality, 96 
vs. uncertainty, 96 
Ethics. See Entrepreneurship:Ethics 
Events, 32 
Expectation, 379 
Expectation value 
Quantum theory, 375 
vs. expected value, 377 
Expected value 
Entrepreneurship, 378 
Soft sciences, 376 
Success, 380 
vs. prediction, 378 
Experience, 97 
Activity-related, 302 
Experience proximity, 495 
Subject-related, 302 
Experts, 97, 569, 570 
Exposure. See Systems:Exposure 
Failures 
Firm, 57 
Learning-by-mistake, 45 
Scale-up, 61 
Feasibility. See Systems:Systems Design 
Finality, 69 
Financing. See New Technology-Based 
Firm (NTBF):Financing, See 
Entrepreneurship:Financing or 
Technology Entrepreneurship:Financing 
Angel investors, 239 
Engagements, 240 
Exit, 241 
Germany, 239 
Investment orientations, 240 
Networks, 240 
Corporate venturing (CV), 241 
Business model, 231 
Exit, 243 
Investment criteria, 242 
Management process, 242 
Networked economy, 241 
Operations, 241 
Types, 242 
Crowdfunding, 253 
Debt financing, 248 
Debt vs. equity financing, 248 
Equity financing, 248 
Assessments, 250 
Family, friends and fools (3F) 
Diasadvantages, 244 
Information asymmetry, 244 
Investors 
Momentum investors, 231 
PINK SHEETS – US, 244 
Value investors, 231 
Options 
by NTBF types, 245 
Producing NTBFs, 246 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 
Assessment, 253 
Sources 
Banks, 223 
German banking system, 224, 225 
Investment organizations, 226 
Mapping US and German banking, 
225 
 Indexes 1251 
Mutual funds, 226 
US vs. German banks, 223 
Venture capital (VC) – US, 226 
Venture capitalist (VC), 226 
Sources of capital, 246 
Amount vs. firm stage, 251 
Super-angels, 238 
Investment orientations, 239 
Venture capital (VC) 
and entrepreneurship, 237 
and personnel – MBAs, 237 
and policy, 235 
and US economy, 234 
Biofuels, 232 
Burn rate, 230 
CleanTech, 231, 232, 236 
Development, 235, 236 
Exit, 229 
Fund, 228 
German situation, 235 
Investment orientations, 232 
Investment situations, 234 
Investment stages, 232 
Lead investor, 231 
Problems – US, 237 
US vs, Germany, 229 
VC investment types, 231 
VC value chain, 230 
Window of Opportunity, 245 
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process. See 
Biofuels:Technology:Syngas process 
Ford, Henry, 303 
Biofuels, 426 
Forward-integration. See  
Manufacturing:Forward-integration 
Foundations. See 
Entrepreneurs:Foundations 
Postponing, 90 
Fraunhofer Society (FhG). See Science & 
Technology System (S&T):Public R&D 
organizations 
Commercialization 
MP3, 198 
Fukushima 
Nuclear disaster, 151, 732 
General Systems Theory (GST) 
Approach to technology 
entrepreneurship, 22, 32 
Basics, 32 
Environment-Modification Principle, 53 
Model building, 46 
Genetically modified object (GMO) 
Biofuels, 155 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), 
85 
Entrepreneurship, 296 
Government-university-industry (GUI) 
relationship. See Policy or 
Entrepreneurship 
Helmholtz-Society (HGF). See  Science & 
Technology System (S&T):Public R&D 
organizations 
Hidden Champions, 575 
Configuration, 270 
Strategic group, 575 
Customers 
Customer contacts, 579 
Internationalization, 579 
Offerings’ characteristics, 577 
Services, 580 
Model 
for German NTBFs, 576 
Operations 
Ambition, aspiration and goals, 576 
Corporate culture, 577 
Employees – Education and 
commitment, 577 
Innovation persistence, 579 
Leadership, 575, 576 
Patenting, 579 
vs. conventional approaches, 576 
Prototypical case, 581 
Strategy 
Competitive advantage, 580 
Long-termism, 581 
Value-orientation, 580 
High technology. See Technology 
 1252 Indexes 
Holy Grail. See Problem 
Human resources. See Assets:Human 
resources 
Idea, 407 
Business idea, 407, 408, 825 
Latent, 412 
Occurrencies, 409 
Originator, 413 
Problem, 411 
Technical, 410 
Coincidence, 413 
Business idea, 413, 414 
Communicable, 411 
Execution, 409 
Fuzzy Front-End (FFE), 513 
Generation 
and problem-solving, 415 
Sources, 420 
Types, 415 
Invention, 409 
Opportunity 
Appetitive behavior, 447 
Browsing, 444 
Choices, 448, 453 
Concept summary, 357, 395, 439 
Creating, 439, 451 
Discovery, 443 
Entrepreneurial personalities, 446 
Evaluation, 438 
Identification, 448 
Identification – multiples, 453 
Knowledge combined, 437 
Origins, 427 
Path to exploitation, 440 
Pattern recognition, 445, 446 
Problem, 415 
Processes or events, 408 
Recognition, 444 
Re-inventing the wheel, 449 
Revealing – basis, 437 
Revealing – process, 438 
Searching, 448 
Searching for value, 449 
Technology push, 429 
Technology types, 440 
Prerequisite, 408 
Problem 
Problem-solving, 416 
Revival, 420 
Electric vehicles, 420, 422, 423 
Success 
Execution, 429 
Unique idea, 429, 430 
Ideagora. See Opportunity:Problem-solving 
Ideation, 420, 488 
Changing views 
Solar cells, 508 
Combinations 
Chemistry or physics, 501 
Components of the shelf (COTS), 500 
Existing technologies, 499 
Plant level, 508 
Plants – CleanTech combinations, 
509 
Technology trajectories, 511 
Comparative approaches 
Differentiation, 507 
Creative thinking 
What-if questions, 508 
Generalization, 479 
Interfaces 
Value chain, 510 
Methods, 488 
Process 
Ars inveniendi – The Art of Invention, 
491 
Attribute mapping, 492 
Brainstorming, 489 
Competitive intelligence, 495 
Computerized – TRIZ, 491 
Creative-intuitive, 488 
Gap analysis, 493, 494 
Inventing, 491 
Levels, 489 
Meta-plan method, 490 
 Indexes 1253 
Morphological analysis, 493, 494 
Pareto charts, 489 
Systematil-analytical, 488 
Types, 499 
Recycling ideas, 503 
Reversal 
Processes, 502 
Reverse engineering, 164, 426, 507 
Reverse Osmosis, 507 
Wind turbines, 504 
Transfering functionality 
Private to public networks, 513 
Transfering knowledge 
to other domain, 503 
Transfering Nature 
Biomimetics, 431, 489 
Transfering point-of-use 
Different targets or substrates, 511 
Transfering processes 
Automation, 498 
Cooperatives, 528 
Transfering technology 
New types of users, 497 
Imagination, 282 
Implementation, 70, 829, See 
Systems:Implementation 
Incubation 
Innovation 
Existing firms, 199 
Organization, 197 
Technology incubation, 197 
Processes, 198, 199 
Services, 197, 199 
Indicator:, 46 
Industrial espionage. See  
Entrepreneurship:Ethics 
National Security Agency (NSA), 360 
Industry, 137 
Developments 
Co-evolutionary, 137 
Dynamics, 144 
Business cycles, 149 
Export orientation 
US vs. Germany, 162 
Fastening industry, 137 
High technology, 5 
Holy Grail, 121 
Industrial development 
Germany, 163 
US vs. Germany, 162 
Industrial espionage 
Germany, 164 
Industry System 
National, 81 
US vs. Germany, 160 
Life-cycle, 146 
Curve, 146 
Oleochemicals, 1128 
Photovoltaic (PV), 753 
Segments 
US vs. Germany, 161 
Synthetic dyes – from coal tar, 1133 
Marketing, 1137 
Unattractiveness 
Five forces model, 149 
Wind power, 753 
Industry park, 200 
Influence, 27 
Planner leader, 27 
vs. power, 27 
Information 
and data, 95 
Disinformation, 96 
Information asymmetry 
Teams, 325 
Information dilemma, 47 
Misinformation, 96 
Sticky, 44 
Information and Communication 
Technology (I&CT), 4 
Innovation, 112, 114 (till p. 1254) 
Adoption, 119 
Adopter types, 122 
Curve, 122 
Factors, 126 
 1254 Indexes 
Moore’s Chasm Model, 123 
User training, 124 
Application, 114 
Architectural, 502 
as a relation, 113 
Assessment 
Errors, 125 
Barriers 
Overshooting, 398 
Behavioral, 114 
Breakthrough, 110 
Change, 109 
Competitive antagonism, 266 
Component innovation, 424 
Customers 
Customer-driven, 450 
Customer-oriented, 450 
Demand 
Pull, 120 
Diffusion, 121 
Discontinuous, 110 
Disruptive, 110 
Disruptive innovation 
Marketing issues, 398 
Dominant design, 121 
Examples, 122 
First mover, 452 
Ideas 
Funnel model, 514 
Fuzzy Front-End, 514 
Illusionary, 116 
Implementation, 113 
Incremental, 110 
Innovation persistence. See 
Entrepreneurship:Innovation 
Innovation System 
National, 80 
Market 
Pull, 120 
Marketing, 116 
New product development (NPD), 659 
Organizational, 114 
Perspectives 
Innovator vs. adopter, 118 
Supplier vs. customer, 119 
Policy 
Origins in Germany, 1138 
Process, 114 
Product, 114 
Fitting needs, 451 
Overshooting, 449 
Production 
Scale-up – too fast, 1035 
Radical. See Innovation:Disruptive 
Regulatory, 114 
Sustainability, 114 
System 
Networked economy, 106, 181 
Systemic effects 
US IT and biotechnology, 292 
Technology 
Push, 120 
Technology Push vs. Demand Pull, 395 
Technology transfer 
Contract research, 182 
Relevance of people, 984 
Transfer 
New user segments, 125 
Types, 110, 111 
Value 
Factors, 125 
Value innovation 
Approach, 788 
Strategy, 787 
vs. invention, 117 
Innovation Ecosystem, 21 
Innovativeness, 112 
Interconnections, 115 
Measurement 
GEM, 113 
Perspectives, 112 
Inspiration, 283 
Intellectual Property 
Software related, 537 
 Indexes 1255 
Types, 55 
Intelligence, 94, 95 
Behavior, 95 
Counter-Intelligence, 96 
for learning, 97 
Foreknowledge, 95 
Knowledge, 95 
Properties, 95 
Technology 
Forecasting, 455 
Technology intelligence, 27, 72 
Intrapreneurs, 14, See 
Entrepreneurs:Corporate entrepreneur 
Conditioning, 382 
Constraints, 383 
GST model, 92 
Learning 
Politics, 389 
Risk taking, 384 
Socialization 
Family & Friends, 93 
vs. entrepreneurs, 390, 392 
Intrapreneurship, 92 
Barriers, 383 
Organizational memory, 92 
Strategic fit, 397 
Bootlegging, 402 
Personalities, 403 
Business model 
Business model innovation, 385 
Corporate culture, 91 
Employees 
Employee development, 388 
Encouragements 
Corporate funds, 400 
Emloyees’ worktime, 400 
Ideas 
Idea killers, 394 
Innovation, 383 
Corporate culture, 384 
Disruptive innovations, 397 
Incremental innovation, 395 
New business development (NBD), 
385, 400 
New product development (NPD), 
385, 395 
Preference for incremental innovation, 
385 
Process types, 385 
Opportunities 
Decision-making, 385 
Personalities, 392 
Politics, 389 
Processes 
Build process, 399 
Cooperate or buy process, 399 
Project business plan, 396 
Project proposal, 396 
Stage-Gate process, 395, 396 
R&D 
Exploratory research, 387 
Research culture, 388 
Risk 
Risk management, 597 
Risk taking, 386 
Risk-taking, 591 
Strategy, 386 
Success 
Success rate, 387 
Team 
Formation, 280 
New venture team, 321 
Types, 401 
Intuition, 569 
Invention, 112 
Not invented here (NIH) syndrome, 297 
Protection 
Patents, 113 
vs. innovation, 117 
Inventors 
Inventors’ Fairs, 14 
Investors 
Strategic investors 
Corporate venturing (CV), 241 
Ionic liquids, 1150 
 1256 Indexes 
as designer solvents, 1152 
Catalog firms, 1154 
Features and potential, 1151 
High prices, 1154 
Large firms, 1154 
Large scale production, 1155 
Market fragmentation, 1152 
Markets, 1153 
Platform technology, 1153 
Scientific research, 1156 
Startups, 1151 
Bioniqs, 1161 
Ionic Liquids Technologies (IoLiTec), 
1165 
Operational requirements, 1157 
Production issues, 1155 
Scionix, 1169 
Solvent Innovation, 1157 
Technology push, 1157 
Khosla, Vinod. See Biofuels:Venture 
capital (VC) 
Kirton Adaptive-Innovative inventory (KAI) 
Adaptors vs. innovators, 278 
Description, 275 
Problem solving, 277 
Knowledge 
Acquisition 
Learning-by-doing, 45 
Actionable, 95 
and information, 96 
Creation, 95 
Instructional knowledge, 7 
Knowledge proximity, 436, 495 
Pragmatic, 96 
Social consensus, 96 
Tacit knowledge, 7 
Leadership, 26 
Behavior, 26 
Corporate culture 
Processes, 666 
for innovation, 26 
Learned vs. born, 256 
Transformational leadership, 349 
vs. management, 26 
Learning, 43 
Cumulativeness, 495 
Intervening variable, 43 
Learning curve, 99, 332 
Advantage, 100 
Learning-by-doing, 44 
Learning-by-example 
Role, 45 
Motivation, 44 
Organizational learning, 98 
Partnerships, 207 
Types, 44 
Leibniz Society (WGL). See  Science & 
Technology System (S&T):Public R&D 
organizations 
Licenses 
Perspectives, 13 
Licensing. See Science & Technology 
System (S&T):University-industry 
relationship 
Longevity. See Entrepreneurship:Growth 
Management, 25 
General Systems Theory (GST), 39 
vs. leadership, 25, 26 
Management buy-in, 310 
Management buyout. See 
Entrepreneurship:Management buyout 
(MBO) 
Manufacturing 
Backward-integration, 68 
Forward-integration, 68 
Plants 
Legislative matters, 61 
Types, 62 
Market capitalization. See Markets:Market 
capitalization 
Markets, 137 
Attitudinal, 140 
E-bikes, 465 
Attractiveness 
Measuring, 486 
Biofuels 
Encapsulated Six Forces Model, 154 
 Indexes 1257 
Entry or exit barriers, 146 
Competition 
Complementors, 147 
Encapsulated Six Forces Model, 147, 
148 
Five forces model, 147, 484 
Six forces model, 147 
Developments, 115 
Economic, 138, 139 
Entrants, 144 
Entry 
Barrier types, 145 
Barriers, 145 
Exit 
Barriers, 145 
Exits, 144 
Free, 138 
Market capitalization, 134 
Mediatorial, 139, 141 
Niche, 138 
Photovoltaic (PV), 766 
Dramatic change, 768 
Policy-driven, 139 
Biofuels, 153 
Photovoltaic, 141 
Products 
Cannibalization, 443, 398 
Reflexivity, 83 
Types, 139 
Mavericity, 280 
Max Planck Society (MPG). See  Science 
& Technology System (S&T):Public R&D  
organizations 
Measurement, 37 
Standard, 47 
Metrics. See Measurement 
Military. See Systems:Military 
Models 
Brackets, 88 
End bracket, 89 
Events, 89 
Front bracket, 89 
Stage-Gate process, 89 
Encapsulated Six Forces Model, 147 
Five Forces (Porter), 147 
General Systems Theory (GST) 
Company model, 688 
Innovation, 123 
Resource-Based View (RBV). See  
Entrepreneurship:Growth 
Assessments, 689 
Capability, 685 
Company model, 687 
Competition, 686 
Heterogeneity, 685 
Intelligence, 685 
Six forces model, 147 
Stage-Based Views. See 
Entrepreneurship:Growth 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
Code description, 274 
Four-letter personality type, 273 
National Science Foundation (NSF). See  
Science & Technology System 
(S&T):Research associations 
Natural resources, 81, 1037 
Networking, 204 
Networks 
Cluster, 200 
Community of Practice (CoP), 523 
Professional social networks 
LinkedIn, 551 
Xing, 551 
Social networks 
Advertising industry, 524 
Culture – US vs. Europe, 524 
Financial metrics, 528 
Function and purpose, 522 
Like buttons, 525 
National and business culture, 523, 
554 
Original concept, 523 
Original concepts, 525 
Professional social networks, 523 
Recruiting industry, 524 
Systems approach, 523 
 1258 Indexes 
New Technology-Based Firm (NTBF), 16 
Customers 
Types, 142 
Development 
Paths, 652 
Failures 
Mortality of survival rates, 588 
Financing 
Bootstrapping, 690 
Cash flow, 216 
Corporate venturing, 217 
Due diligence – VC, 227 
Financial projection, 227 
Financial structure, 220 
German NTBFs, 216 
German NTBFs by volume, 219 
Investment – Silent partnership, 218 
Investment capital process, 228 
Investors – Germany, 217 
Public investments – Germany, 218 
Public sources of capital – Germany, 
222 
Sources of capital – First year, 220 
US NTBFs, 216 
Venture capital process, 226 
Growth 
Cybernetic 
Principles, 695 
Description using physical metaphors, 
704 
Employees – average numbers, 557 
Entrepreneurial growth company 
(EGC), 557 
Expectations, 566 
Expectations – Profitable business, 
635 
Expectations – Stakeholders, 559 
Gazelles, 557 
Gazelles – US vs. Europe, 574 
Growth persistence, 709 
High-growth expectation firms, 563 
High-growth firms, 562 
Indicators, 562 
Job creation, 653, 655 
Jobs, 563 
Majority – stay small, 557 
Non-growth firms, 560, 561, 647 
Patterns, 558 
Phenotypes, 559 
Policy interest, 565 
Prediction possibility, 574 
Promising firms, 568 
Promising firms – assessment, 571 
Promising firms – fundability, 573 
States and performance, 706 
vs. profitability, 654 
Initial architecture/configuration, 659 
Corporate culture, 663 
Customers available, 661 
Family & friends, 661 
Resources, 660 
Starting conditions, 661 
Offerings/Products/Services, 18 
Organization 
Development by type, 650 
Policy 
Jobs by high-growth expectation 
firms, 566 
Pre-startup phase, 668 
Processes 
Self-reinforcing, 707 
Revenue or employees 
Productivity, 657 
Statistical averages, 650, 651 
Time-markers and organization, 656 
Time-markers, growth rates, 655 
Time-markers,VC-based NTBFs, 
Production, 658 
Scarcity, 60 
Systems Design 
Composing the firm, 823 
Foreknowledge and imagination, 824 
Taxonomy, 19 
by ownership, control, financing, 670 
Theory 
Contingency theory, 822 
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Type by size, 19 
Types, 17 
Producing NTBFs, 222 
VC-backed spin-out (RBSU), 844 
VC-backed startup, 670 
Venture capital (VC) 
Expectation/success of VC, 568 
Observables, 34 
Behavior, 42 
Indicator, 46 
Observation, 30, 375 
Observables 
and states, 376 
Quantum theory, 375 
Opportunistic adaptability, 72, 822 
Lacking experience, 308 
Opportunity, 47, 478 
Analysis, 467 
Assessment 
Levels, 481 
Regulations, 487 
SWOT analysis, 482 
Attractiveness 
Domains, 487 
Choice set, 454 
Multi-conditional, 476 
CleanTech 
E-bikes, 465 
Electromobility, 464 
Cost, 454 
Entrepreneurship, 131 
Execution, 479 
Straight foundations, 479 
Exploitation 
Feasibility, 471 
Risk vs. reward, 471 
vs. perceived success, 480 
Exploiting, 470 
Feasibility, 470 
Futuring, 455 
Good opportunity, 485 
Identification 
Biofuels, 475 
Trends, 457 
Mapping, 468 
Market opportunity, 410 
Megatrends, 456 
Drivers, 460 
Futuring, 458 
Green attitude, 461 
Intersections, 468 
Kondratiev waves, 459 
Sustainability, 461 
Monopoly lifting, 426 
Entrepreneurship, 427 
Movements, 457 
Open opportunities, 432 
Policy 
Biofuels, 475 
Incentives, 469 
Problem-solving 
as a challenge, 431 
ideagoras, 435 
Processes or events, 408 
Recycling, 58 
Revealing 
Technology Roadmaps, 433 
Spotting 
Domains, 478 
Systematic search, 429 
Trends, 456 
Recurring event, 456 
Unique event, 456 
Window of Opportunity, 47, 245, 470 
Factors, 47 
Timeliness, 48 
Organization 
Development 
Centralization, 643 
Formalization, 643 
Specialization, 643 
State architectures, 644 
State characteristics, 644 
Organizations 
 1260 Indexes 
Contingency theory, 53 
Learning organization, 98 
Mission, 91 
Outcontracting. See 
Entrepreneurship:Growth 
Outsourcing, 182 
Overshooting, 451, See 
Innovation:Product, See 
Innovation:Barriers 
Parameters, 42 
Pasteur, Louis, 29 
Patents 
Law 
Difference US vs. Europe, 187 
Patentability 
Criteria, 409 
Technology trajectories 
Patent maps and trees, 497 
Valuation, 133 
Perceptiveness, 821 
Performance, 706, See 
Systems:Performance 
Performance persistence, 706 
Perkin, William, Henry, 30, 1133 
Entrepreneurship and industry genesys, 
1133 
Personalities 
Traits 
Generic, 93 
Physics 
Causality, 37 
Epistemology, 37 
Why does it happen, 37 
Scientific method, 379 
Plans, 70 
Contingency planning, 599 
Execution, 72 
Policy 
Biofuels 
Corrective actions, 77 
Economic Bubble, 153 
Industry, 75, 76 
Sub-optimization, 76 
Clusters 
National competitiveness, 202, 203 
Government-university-industry (GUI) 
relationship, 206 
High-tech clusters, 1143 
Innovation 
Clusters, 200 
Lobbying, 81 
Programs 
Biofuels, 74, 152 
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), 207 
Sub-optimization, 74 
Technology transfer, 159 
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) 
German innovation system, 209 
Germany, 209 
Innovation program, 209 
Spin-out 
Formation metrics, 196 
Spin-outs 
Job creation, 195 
Sustainable growth, 195 
Political economy, 31 
Porcelain 
Innovation 
Germany, 108 
Scale-up, 62 
Porter, Michael, 147 
Practice. See Praxis 
Best practice, 380 
Praxis 
Observations, 380 
vs. theoria, 379 
Price, 410 
Elasticity, 118 
Insensitivity, 143 
Sensitivity, 143 
Problem, 417 
Defining the problem, 418 
Holy Grail, 417 
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Need 
Communication, 419 
Problem-solving 
Knowledge domain, 436 
Technology trajectories, 496 
Solution 
Barriers, 418 
Types, 416 
Technical 
Existing firms, 428 
Wicked problem, 418 
Product 
Commodization, 472 
Differentiation, 472 
Commodities, 472 
Product sets, 473, 474 
Specialties, 472 
Life-cycle, 146 
Curve, 146 
Life-time, 146 
Productivity. See Systems:Productivity 
Programs, 38 
Agents, 38 
Program structure, 38 
Project, 394 
Characteristics, 395 
Psychology, 29 
Entrepreneurial psychology, 258 
Personality psychology, 256 
R&D 
Development 
Description, 8 
R&D intensity (RI), 4 
Types, 6 
Reasoning 
Conditions, 35 
Reason for thinking that, 36 
Reason why, 36 
Recessions 
Great Recession, 104, 296 
Credit crunch, 150 
Reflexivity, xiv, 82 
Reflexive behavior, 603 
Relationship mapping, 1020 
Research Triangle Park, 201 
Research–Based Startup (RBSU), 16 
Resources, 12 
and Capabilities, 54 
Tangible, 54 
vs. input, 53 
Revenue model, 18 
Risk, 39 
Classes 
by system or firm, 592 
Events 
Types, 585 
Exposure, 586 
Domains, 591 
Failure 
Decreasing risks, 589 
NTBFs, 588 
Harm 
Reversible vs. irreversible, 594 
Hazard, 583 
Related to risk, 585 
Types, 586 
Market risk, 586 
Perception 
Asymmetry of risk perception, 591 
Probabilities, 585 
Risk management, 597 
Risk vs. ambiguity, 584 
Risk vs. hazard, 583 
Risk-taking 
Perception, 584 
vs. decision-making, 587 
Singular risk, 586 
Systemic risk, 586 
Threat, 585 
Relation to vulnerability, 586 
Underestimating, 584 
Sailing Ship Effects. See 
Technology:Transition dynamics 
Say,  Jean-Baptiste, 101 
 1262 Indexes 
Scale-up 
Cost ladder, 63 
Machines or Devices, 63 
Materials, 62 
Organizational, 63 
Scaling-up. See Scale-up 
Scenario. See Decision:Decision-making 
Future events and. current actions, 616 
Systems Thinking, 616 
Schinkel, Karl Friedrich, 163 
Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, 102 
Science 
Holy Grail, 121 
Science & Technology System (S&T) 
Organizations 
Processes, 166 
Public funding 
Germany, 173 
US, 174 
Public R&D organizations, 166 
Financing and orientation, 168 
Fraunhofer Society (FhG), 167, 171 
Germany – Technology transfer, 166 
Helmholtz-Society (HGF), 166 
Leibniz Society (WGL), 167 
Max Planck Society (MPG), 166, 171 
US vs. Germany, 170 
Research associations 
Germany –  Deutsche 
Forschunsgemeinschaft (DFG), 173 
US – National Science Foundation 
(NSF), 174 
Research organizations 
Consortia, 171 
Germany – An-Institute, 170, 172 
licensing – US, 179 
Overhead cost, 173 
Universities – US vs. Germany, 172 
US – UIRCs, 169 
US – Universities, 172, 173 
Technology transfer 
Barriers, 184 
Universities 
Payent and licenses offices, 178 
University-industry relationship, 1138 
Combine project – Carbon nanotubes, 
179 
Combine project – hydrogen from 
algae, 1029 
Combine projects, 178, 180, 181 
Consortia, 181 
CRADA – US, 179 
Existing firms, 182 
Germany, 174 
Germany – Competence networks, 
176, 177 
Licensing, 178 
Personal contacts, 178 
Private-public-partnership (PPP), 182 
Technology transfer, 178, 184 
Science park, 203, See Technology park 
Self-employment, 13 
Serendipity, 29, 30 
Services 
Technical service, 6 
Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME), 
19 
Small Business Administration (SBA), 156, 
208 
Orientation, 208 
Small company 
in US, 19 
Social networks. See Networks or 
Entrepreneurship:Software relared 
Sociology 
Brackets, 88 
Isomorphism, 28, 29 
Organizational theory, 28 
Software. See Entrepreneurship:Software 
related 
and natural intelligence, 520 
Financial innovations 
Great Recession, 519 
Privacy attacks 
NSA’s spying software, 520 
Shortcomings and limits, 520 
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Spillover effect, 73, See Systems:Sub-
optimization 
Spin-off, 13 
Spin-out, 13, 158 
Academic spin-out. See Research–
Based Startup (RBSU) 
Competence spin-out, 168, 194 
Exploitation spin-out, 168, 193 
Financing 
Sources, 211 
Sources of capital – UK, 214 
Foundations 
Barrriers, 195 
Licenses, 185 
Technology park, 198 
Intensity, 168 
Locations 
Distances from incubator, 201 
Vicinities, 200 
Spin-out intensity, 169 
Technology transfer 
Reflexivity, 185 
Stakeholder, 39 
Startup. See New Technology-Based Firm 
(NTBF) 
Types 
VC-backed, 230 
Strategy, 70 
Strategic groups, 382 
Strategy logics, 89 
Supply chain. See Value system 
SWOT analysis. See 
Competition:Competitors 
Systems, 34 (till p. 1264) 
Abstract system, 49 
Closed system, 375 
Optimization, 73 
Closed-loop, 69 
Coupling 
Loose Coupling, 43 
Tight coupling, 43 
Design, 454 
Environment, 49 
Environmental rhythm, 40 
Equifinality, 69 
Exposure, 82 
Feedback, 69 
Feedforward, 69 
Hard systems, 37 
Hierarchy, 34 
Human-activity systems, 34 
Levels, 35 
Organized complexity, 42 
Reflexivity, 82 
Identification, 79 
Improvement, 454 
Interface, 98 
Models 
Process-behavior model, 78 
Structure-functions-model, 78 
System-environment model, 78 
Open system, 49, 69 
Optimization, 73 
Operational definition, 70 
Outcome, 35 
Output, 35 
Performance, 61, 64 
Assessment, 65 
Factors, 64 
Management, 64 
Measurement, 65 
Organizations, 64 
Present vs. future, 65 
Productivity, 61 
Regulation, 68 
Soft systems, 37 
State of a system, 39 
Structure, 34 
Sub-optimization, 73 
Principle, 73 
Systems Approach, 40 
Systems Design, 49, 819 
Choose, implement, execute, 829 
Create options set, 828 
Failures and learning, 830 
 1264 Indexes 
Feasibility, 829 
for entrepreneurship, 819 
for entrepreneurship, innovation, 821 
Opportunity landscape, 828 
Problem definition, 826 
Refine, test directions, 828 
Steps, 819 
Systems Engineering, 49 
Systems Improvement, 50, 73 
Systems Thinking, 33, 40, 820 
Strategy, 72 
Whole System, 40 
Team. See Entrepreneurship:team or 
intrapreneurship:team 
Technical businessman. See 
Entrepreneurs:Types:Technical business 
person 
Technique, 7 
Technology, 7 
Base, 128 
CleanTech, 462 
Competitive technology assessment 
(CTA), 476 
Dominant design, 424, 495, 496 
Emerging, 130 
Enabling, 129 
Enhancing, 129 
Function-oriented, 127 
Generic, 128 
High technology, 4 
Proportion of foundations, 4 
High value technology (HVT), 4 
Implementation, 7 
Improvement, 111 
Key, 128 
Life-cycle, 146 
Curve, 146 
Object-oriented, 127 
Pacing, 129 
Platform, 128 
Reflexivity, 497 
Speculation, 135 
Strategy, 16 
Tacit, 130 
Tacit technology, 7 
Technological forecasting, 455 
Technology assessment (TA), 455 
Technology forecasting (TF), 455 
Technology Roadmap, 432 
Technology Roadmapping, 432 
Technology speculation 
Internet firms, 528 
Internet firms – IPO, 529 
Investing – just before IPO, 529 
Investors – US vs. Germany, 529 
Technology trajectories, 420, 496 
Problem-solving, 496 
Technology transfer, 156, 157 
by existing firms, 157 
Entrepreneurship, 158 
Licenses, 157 
Processes, 158 
US vs. Germany, 159 
Top value technology (TVT), 4 
Transition dynamics 
Hybrid – Sailing Ship Effect, 423 
Hybrid car, 424 
Types, 127, 128 
Opportunities or threats, 441 
Technology Entrepreneurship, 12 
Climate 
Culture, 189 
Research vs. technical universities, 
190 
Competencies 
Entrepreneurial pair, 191 
Entrepreneurial team, 192 
Founders, 192 
Technical and commercial, 191 
Description, 3 
Export orientation 
US vs. Germany, 162 
Financing, 246 
Sources of capital, 213 
Founders 
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Education – Germany, 193 
Education – US, 193 
Knowledge and experience, 307 
Multi-disciplinarity, 23, 24 
Networked economy, 183 
National innovation system, 206 
Networking 
Vitual company, 205 
Patents 
US advantages, 188 
Process, 23, 25 
Spin-outs 
by research organization, 165 
Licenses, 181 
Technology transfer, 183 
Technology park. See Spin-
out:Foundations 
Economic objectives, 203 
Financing, 204 
Technology transfer. See 
Technology:Technology transfer 
Teleology, 69 
Categories, 381 
Teleological relations, 381 
Expectation, 381 
Expectation and success, 382 
Theory 
Theoria 
Natural science, 379 
Observation, 378 
Thiel, Peter, 1182 
Threat, 482 
Trevithick, Richard, 424 
Uncertainty, 39 
vs. Risk or Certainty, 39 
Unique Selling Point (USP), 59 
Unique Selling Proposition (USP), 200 
Value 
Appropriation, 66, 117 
Ascribed value, 134 
Creation, 117 
Customer value, 410 
Exchange value, 131 
Impact value, 132 
Market value, 136 
Perception, 131 
Perspectives 
Products, 130 
Types, 133 
Proposition, 120 
Sharing value, 132 
Technical value, 136 
for customer, 136 
for supplier, 136 
Utility, 131 
vs. price, 131 
Value appropriation. See Value:capture 
Value chain, 58, 60 
Analysis, 65 
Performance, 65 
Value creation, 58 
Value generation. See Value:creation 
Value system, 58, 60 
Competitive position, 66 
Value addition, 66, 67, 68 
Variables, 42 
Intervening variable, 43 
Variety, 41 
Law of Requisite Variety, 42 
Variety-Adaptability Principle, 42 
Venture Capital 
Corporate venturing (CV), 104 
Venture capital (VC). See 
Financing:Venture capital (VC) 
Verbundprojekt. See Science & 
Technology System (S&T):University-
industry relationship 
Virtual goods. See 
Entrepreneurship:Online games 
Accounting 
Income statement, 542 
Vision, 282 
Von Ardenne, Manfred, 112, See 
Entrepreneurship:Ethics 
Von Braun, Wernher. See 
Entrepreneurship:Ethics 
Von Clausewitz, Carl, 71 
 1266 Indexes 
Von Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 445 
as an entrepreneur, xv 
Von Leibniz, Gottfried, Wilhelm, 491 
Von Moltke, Helmuth, 71 
Von Tschirnhaus, Ehrenfried, Walther, 62, 
266, 491 
Walton, Samuel Moore, 268, 269 
Window of Opportunity. See 
Opportunity:Window of Opportunity 
Zeitgeist, 49 
 

